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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: origination and background to this present study 
1.1 Antecedents of this present study 
This present study was made possible by a new category of student-
ship, introduced in 1969 by the Science Research Council (SRC) on the 
lines suggested by the 'Swann Report on Manpower for Scientific Growth', 
to provide broader-based subjects of study for Ph.D theses. The 
studentship was broadly defined as a "study of the economics of plant 
breeding". The SRC stated at the outset: 
"-
"It is certain that plant breeding is a highly economical 
process in the sense that the cost is small in relation 
to the economic gains that result from success. But 
neither costs nor profits are easily estimated so that 
there are few (perhaps no) really good examples of such 
assessment on record." (SRC, 1969) 
Three objectives of assessment were outlined: to assess the 
economic value of new potato varieties in relation to those they 
displaced; to define breeding objectives in economic terms, and to 
apply the ideas of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to plant breeding 
problems. It was recognised that the development of the study would 
depend upon the problems associated with assessment. 
1.2" The general background to the need for economic assessment 
in agricultural"researohand"de~elbpment (R & D) 
The antecedents of this present study are best understood against 
a background of opinion which gathered strength in the 1960s, of unease 
and concern about the return to investment in agricultural R&D. 
This was a reflection of a more general disquiet associated with public 
spending in science, and what society had been getting in return. 
"This probably had ~ large part to do with issues of economic growth; 
particularly, with fears that productivity in Britain was low relative 
2 
to that of other countries (see Postan, 1972, for example).l Views were 
sometimes expressed th~t the cost of R&D was too high in relation to 
the economic return to society, that perhaps the wrong kind of research 
was being conducted, and that part of the reason was that researchers 
were unaccountable to public direction and interest. A statement of 
this view is given in a report of the Central Advisory Council for 
Science and Technology (1968). 
A need for increased accountability was accepted in the '.Rothschild 
Report' (1971): this argued for changes in the management and control 
of public funds for R&D, and led to the implementation of the 
'customer-contractor principle'. This is defined in H.M. Government's 
white paper on public-supported R&D as: 
" ••• (government) Departments, as customers, define their 
requirements I contractors advise on the feasibility of 
meeting them and undertake the work I and the arrangements 
between them must be such as to ensure that the objectives 
remain attainable within reasonable cost." (1972, p.4) 
As a result, a large proportion of what would have been the Agricultural 
Research Council's (ARC) budget was given to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries (MAFF), and the Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for scotland (OAFS), to enable them to direct the nature of 
R&D (which the ARC would continue to administer).2 
,', 
A concern about the management of R&D has been expressed 
specifically with regard to potatoes in a report published by the 
1 In addition, <a greater awareness of environmental issues might have 
encouraged <a belief amongst observers that uncontrolled increases 
in scientific knowledge (and economic growth) would not necessarily 
lead to increased social welfare (for example, there are the < 
notorious predictions of Meadows et al., 1972 and associated debates). 
2 < 
The role of the ARC and OAFS in relation to R&D at the Scottish 
Plant Breeding station is noted in Section 4.1 
The contractor principle is perhaps an extension of a post-war belief, 
noted by Russel (1966), that SCientists should get on with the 
business of research and leave evaluation and extension of R&D 
results to trained adv~sory offi7~rs. The contractor prinCiple 
goes further by direct1ng what k1nd of R&D should be done by the 
scientist. 
Economic Development Committee for Agriculture (EDCA, 1971). In a 
review of potato R&D the EDCA .expressed concern at the methods by 
which R&D agencies selected fields of investiga~ion,· particularly, 
it was alleged, their apparent disregard of economic f~cto~s.l 
However, the pressures for more explicit techniques oi' assessment 
of R&D work have not all come from outside research establishments. 
The tasks of a director of research have probably become more difficult 
to manage in recent times, as fields of scientific investigation have 
become more specialised and complex. Directors have themselves indica-
ted that new procedures for R&D project selection and costing, which 
are concise and clear-cut in economic terms, are required (see for 
instance, Simmon's account of the historical development of potato 
..... 
plant breeding, and the prospects for economic appraisal, 1969). 
However, prior to the undertaking of ex ante estimates of costs 
and benefits of specific, it seems necessary to conduct ex post studies. 
It is then possible, for example, to link existing benefits to past 
expenditure, which at a later stage in the development of project 
selection techniques might be used as indicative of future trends of 
benefit from proposed R&D. The place of retrospective studies of 
investment as a first step in improving project selection procedures 
is discussed in Byatt and Cohen (1969). 
1.3 The aims of this present stUdy 
This present study seeks to aSSeSs the socio-economic worth to 
1 ' 'I The EDCA report was pr~mar~ Y concerned with the needs of processing. 
It. is .a recent feature of the potato industry that modern business 
interests have become more important with the development of process-
ing and pre-packing trades. This seems to have resulted in a new 
commercialism which demands increased attention to product needs and 
costs. Not only has this brought about pressures upon researchers 
to consider economic factors, but also pressures for change in 
marketing and quality generally (below, Chapter 12). 
3 
4 
. society of funds invest~1 in potato plant breeding R&D at the Scottish, 
Plant Breeding Station (SPBS). Preliminary work indicated that in 
order to keep the study within manageable proportions ~t'was necessary 
. ~ 
to restrict the main part of assessment to two varieties; Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell. 
., ' 
..... 
Thus, this study is a retrospective one. However, whilst the 
absence of systematic techniques of costing and project selection is a 
reason for applying the ideas of CBA to assess the socio-economic 
effects of investment in R&D, it also means that there will probably 
be difficulties. Data is unlikely to be in a form which is suitable 
for analysis (should it exist at all), and investment effects miqht be 
complex and not evident. This has been demonstrated in previous 
applications of CBA ideas to case studies of investment in R&D; and 
has been noted by Prest and Turvey in their classic review of CBA (1965).1 
This means that a retrospective study is unlikely to define plant 
breeding in economic terms in a way which is precise, since CBA 
identification and measurements of investment effects will probably only 
be (perhaps rough) approximations of the truth. Preliminary analysis 
for this present study strongly suggested this, but also indicated that 
'it was possible to derive an economic value for social benefit which for 
a wide range of assumptions, would be meaningful. By so doing, socio-
economic factors important to investment selection might be identified. 
1" " in reading (CBA work on R&D), one is struck by two things: one 
is the uncertainty and unreliability of cost estimates for particular 
research programmes and the second is the extraordinarily complex 
nature of the benefits resulting therefrom. Anyone living in the 
United Kingdom is very familiar with the belated discoveries by 
government departments that particular programmes of development have 
cost far more than anticipated. And although there are some . 
example~ of quantitative assessments of benefits - among which 
Griliches' paper is absolutely outstanding (see below, Sectio~ 3.6) _ 
one cannot help feeling that the multiplicity of benefits and their 
diffusion among recipients will normally be such as to prevent 
precise quantification." (p.727) 
1.4 The commercial success of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, 
and the varieties which were displaced 
The commercial success of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell resulted 
in a break in the pattern of potato maincrop varietal usa ... e which had 
1&2 persisted for over 50 years. During this time the leading maincrop 
'.~ .. 
varieties had been Majestic, first marketed in 1911, and King Edward 
VII, marketed under its present name in 1902. In 1964 varieties 
introduced to the potato industry 50 years previously had been planted 
on more than 80% of the British maincrop acreage. 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were first recorded in 1965 in 
the Potato Marketing Board's (PMB) acreage statistics at around 2% of 
the national maincrop. In 1972, Pentland Crown was grown on approxi-
mately 30%, and Pentland Dell 11% of the maincrop acreage planted in 
England and Wales, and 18% and 16% respectively, of plantings in 
Scotland. Annual plantings are shown as proportions of national 
acreages in figures 1.1 and 1.2. If the curves for the Pentland 
varieties are compared to those of other varieties, then it is to be 
seen that Majestic is the variety which has been most associated with 
falling acreages whilst the acreages of the newer varieties expanded. 
In the case of England and Wales, figure 1.1, Majestic's propor-
tionate share of the maincrop acreage, around 55% in the mid-1960s, 
fell in inverse proportion to the shares of Pentland Crown and Pentland 
5 
1 
'Maincrop' refers to the main part of potato production, for an explana-
2 
tion-see the glossary, Appendix 1. Because this study has inter-
disciplinary features an attempt had been made to minimize the. use of 
technical vocabulary: but where this is unavoidable, the reader may be 
referred to the glossary, the terms there defined are marked in the 
text with an asterisk. Other appendices contain guides to symbols, 
conventions and abbreviations (Appendix 2) and metric conversions 
(Appendix 3). 
This phenomenon appears to apply. to other countries: for example, there 
are the long-lasting successes of Bintje (introduced in 1910) in the 
Netherlands, and,Russet'Burbank (pre-1890) in North America. 
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Dell, until only about 12% of the national maincrop had been planted 
with Majestic in the early-1970s. In Scotland, figure 1.2, the varietal 
national acreage pattern is more complex. 
the figure that as Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell exp~~~ed, Majestic's 
',-
proportionate share declined: from about 30% in the mid-l~60s to 
around 5% during the early 1970s. 
The other important maincrop variety, King Edward VII, was not 
obviously affected (some observers, however, have suggested that 
plantings of this variety had been affected, see Section 12.7). In 
Scotland, figure 1.2, Redskin (introduced to the market in 1934) appears 
to have been affected by expanding plantings of Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell. Redskin's proportionate share of the Scottish maincrop 
declined from about 25% in the mid-1960s to less than 10% in the early 
1970s. 
In addition to those varieties represented in the figures there are 
others, less important, but likely to have been affected to some extent. 
The most important to Scottish markets was Kerr's Pink (f~rst marketed 
under its present name, 1917): this variety had a proportionate share 
of the Scottish maincrop of around 15% in the mid-1960s, which declined 
to about 6% in the early-1970s. It is possible that its plantings were 
adversely affected by the increased popularity of the Pentland varieties. 
However, Kerr's Pink was declining prior to the introduction of the new 
varieties, and it is possible therefore, that other varieties would 
have been substituted for it anyway.l 
Written'conmunications with the regional offices of the PMB and 
the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS), suggested that 
1 
It is likely 
early 1960s, 
increased. 
descriptions 
PMB (1965). 
that Redskin had been substituted for Kerr's Pink in the 
since the latter's acreage declined as the former's 
Acreage statistics are given in Appendix 4. Varietal 
and notes on commercial importance are given in 
8 
some minor varieties having local significance might well have been 
replaced by Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, most notably the varieties, 
Arran Consul (1925) and Doctor Macintosh (1944) •. Both 'varieties had 
held a low but fairly stable proportj-mate share of theE~glish maincrop 
','. 
since the late 1950s, but declined at the time of the Pentland varieties' 
expansion, and went altogether from PMB statistics after 1972. Arran 
Peak similarly declined but went from the acreage statistics earlier 
after 1970. 
Nevertheless, these effects were small. In national terms it is 
clear from the figures, that this study must concentrate upon the 
SUccess of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell in terms of a comparison 
with Majestic, since it is this variety which would probably have been 
grown generally up to 1972 if the new varieties had not existed.1 A 
full outline of this study's approach is given below, Section 3.9. 
Before this, however, it is convenient for exposition to establish 
a basis upon which the approach adopted might be understood. The 
application of CBA has sometimes encountered criticism and therefore 
it is important to understand the logic and assumptions underlying CBA. 
Thus, there follows in the next chapter a consideration of the general 
reasoning and purpose of CBA, and afterwards, in the succeeding chapter, 
an account of the approaches used in other CBA work in the subject area 
of agricultural R&D. 
1 
This is less certain after 1972, however, when it is more likely 
that Maris Piper would have been generally substituted for 
Majestic: this possibility is discussed below (Section 9.9). 
r,_ 
9 
CHAPTER TWO 
The general ideas by which CBA is legitimis-~dl 
\: '. . ~ '. "," '.' 
2.1 The general acceptance of the use of CBA 
.~. . 
During the 1960s, CBA was increasingly advocated for use in Britain 
for investment appraisal in areas of the economy where government had an 
important interest. Thus, CBA was applied where government funding 
had taken place, such as transport (see Coburn et al, 1960: Commission 
on the Third London Airport, 1970), and education (see Blaug, 1965: 
Morris and Ziderman, 1971). The application of CBA to plant breeding 
is consistent with this trend. 
These subject areas (and others in which government has had an 
important interest) have been generally difficult to assess economically 
and some of them, like potato R&D (Section 1.2), have probably been 
without systematic economic appraisal. The advocacy of CBA possibly 
reflected an increased ability on the part of economists to identify 
and measure the socio-economic effects of investment: or more probably, 
it reflected a desire to account for and justify an expanded public 
investment in activities for which there was little or no financial 
return. 
In more recent times the optimism originally associated with CBA 
in the early 1960s has declined. A good example of such optimism was 
1 
The place of CBA in relation to theories of public expenditure is 
considered in Millward (1971). A critical view of CBA in relation 
to administration and decision making is Self (1975). The most 
comprehensive survey of CBA work is perhaps Prest and Turvey 
_ (op cit) •. , Other general work includes Mishan (197lb), Pearce (1971) 
and Peters (1965) • 
. ' , 
f ~ . 
10 
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noted by Prest and Turvey, the originator of which was later to recant. 
The cause of recent coolness is probably associated with exaggerated 
claims for what CBA can do, and its use by competing agencies to give 
.. ~ . . ...: 
increasingly optimistic estimates of investment success. ::.: ... 
. : .• ~. 
-Certainly CBA is not a universal panacea for the assessment of 
the socio-economic effects of public investment. It is merely a 
systematic aid to decision making: it is not free from assumptions 
and much might depend upon the judgement of the analyst as to what 
can be reasonably identified and measured. However, this does not 
weaken the case for using CBA wherealt~r.native means of assessment 
might be absent or insufficient to reach a decision. Indeed, the case 
for using it, to quote Prest and Turvey, is "strengthened, not weakened, 
if its limitations are openly recognised and indeed emphasised" (op 
cit: p. 731) • 
2.2 The origins of and general idea of CBA 
eBA's intellectual origins probably begin with Dupuit·s illustra-
tion of the distinction-between a priv~te firm's and public utility 
(1844), and Pigou's investigation of externalities (costs and benefits 
external to the investing firm) (1920). The terminology of 'costs and 
benefits' appears to have first been used in investment appraisal by 
1 
"We have begun to grope our way towards a practical concept of economic 
planning which may prove in a few year's time to be as revolutionary in 
its. way as was the Keynesian revolution in economics thirty years ago 
It is the revolutionary concept of social costs and benefits ••• This 
leads to the revolutionary concept that we can actually add up the 
social costs and benefits in money terms, by asking what value people 
would themselves put on them. We can then express them as a rate of 
return on capital as an ordinary capitalist would, and so determine 
out investment rationally, from the point of view of the community as 
a whole, just as the capitalist can now do from his private point of 
view." Self (196), quoted in Prest and Turvey op cit, p. 728. 
Later Self was to describe the ·use of some standard CBA ideas as a 
"confidence trick" (1970). 
(, 
11 
by the United states Army Corps of Engineers, in the first half of the 
twentieth century; when government officials initially responsible for 
, ' . 
evaluating river navigation'improvements, were obliged by government 
' .. 
direction to consider benefits external to individual' institutions. 
":.:. 
',' 
" '. 
The general idea of CBA is to identify and then express as many as 
Possible of the factors which are considered relevant to an investment 
decision, in terms of the cqmmon denominator of money. Once this is 
done it then.becomes possible to add the effects (usually termed net 
benefit), and compare the estimate to the cost of investment. If the 
comparison is such that the return to investment compares well to 
returns in alternative investments, then the investment project in 
question can be accepted. Returns to investment are generally presen-
ted in terms of a rate of return, that is, expressed as a percentage of 
investment cost. The higher a rate of return then the greater per 
unit of investment cost will be the profitability of any given investment 
project. The social significance of profitability is based upon the 
general observation of the economy by economists and the,ir conclusion 
that market values reflect consumer preferences. 
2.3, The social significance of rate of return analysis 
The importance of consumer preferences is summed up in the notion 
of 'consumer SOVereignty': this operates in a market economy or price 
system where economic resources are directed towards the production of 
different commodities in accordance with the strength of consumers' 
demand for them. Consumer sovereignty works most effectively under 
the assumptions of a perfectly competitive market.* 
In a perfectly competitive market the value of an investment's 
output (its benefits) m~y be measured in the price which ultimate 
consumers are prepared to pay. Similarly, the costs of output are 
reflected through the markets for factors of production, in a way which 
relate~ them to the consumer valuation of the outputs which would have 
become available if resources had been used in other ways. In this way, 
the real costs of resources are interpreted as the loss to consumers of 
alternative investment outputs (that is, in terms of opportunity cost). 
Given a situation where consumer tastes and production technology 
are stable, the forces 'of competition will in the long-term bring 
about equilibrium in the markets, where rates of return to investment 
will tend to be similar throughout the economy. If rates of return are 
anywhere above average, funds will be attracted there until profits 
decline, and equilibrium is again restored. The importance of the 
rate of return to investment allocation may now be clear. It serves 
to indicate where investment might be increased: more generally, 
Comparatively high rates of return imply that an economic activity could 
be expanded to the benefit of society, made up of consumers. 
Indeed, using the framework of perfect competition, and from 
certain axioms about the nature of consumers preference orderings and 
the technical relationships between inp"ltsand. outputs, a consistent 
line of deductive reasoning leads to some impressive conclusions about 
the behaViour of the economy. It suggests that an economic system 
might allocate its resources in such a way that any change in production, 
distribution or consumption, that would possibly make one person better 
off, would only be brought about by making someone else worse off. 
This is known as a 'Paretian optimum', and a review of its conditions, 
and place in economic theory is given in Blaug, (1968). 
Of course, in the real world competition is less than perfect. For 
example, con~umers might not be as sovereign as the foregOing comments 
about valuation 9f outputs suggest, since producers might work 
together to impose trading conditions conducive only to their own 
interests. However, it appears to b~ generally believed amongst 
. '. 
·economy.ts, that competition is strong enoug·l. in western economies for 
the rate of return kind of investment appraisal to perform a social 
function. That is, it is realised that a Paretiantype economic 
system is strictly only a normative model of how an economy should 
behave if economic efficiency is a major goal of governmeritpolicy, 
the usefulness of which is to direct public investment towards a more 
socially desired outcome. 
CBA accommodates this aim by taking market values and adjusting 
them so that they might be closer to those which would have prevailed 
in a perfect market situation. In addition, it goes further in what 
13 
an ordinary rate of return might measure, by allowing investment effects 
which otherwise would not have a market value to be given surrogate 
prices, and if not measurable, at least allows them to be identified. 
It is clear then, that CBA goes beyond the simpler approach 
applied to investment appraisal under commercial conditions. Where 
estimates of profitability, although expressed as rates of return to 
investment cost, have to be based upon unadjusted market values and, 
Usually, only the costs and benefits that directly enter transactions 
between seller and buyer, so that effects without direct market value 
are omitted • 
2.4 The adjustment of market values for inclusion in CBA 
The unlikely fulfilment of Paretian conditions in a world of 
imperfect competition led economists on to investigate the possibility 
of a 'second-best' theorem (first formalised by Lipsey and Lancaster, 
1957), and associated arguments concerned with shadow prices designed 
to'comp~te for distortions in market values brought about by non-
competitive influences. As a result principles for measurement and 
correction of values became generally accepted in CBA practice. l 
1 
A full examination of distorting influences, and their relevance to 
CBA is given in Millward (op'cit: pp.305-31~). 
14 
A most obvious and palpable influence is that of government taxation 
and subsidy policies.. How this is allowed for depends upon the kind 
of approach being used to measure costs and benefits. For instance, 
where tax elements are included in market price, and if tax is related 
to usage, then consumer's utility is adequately reflected and there 
need be no adjustment.· However, if an analyst is not measuring costs 
and benefits in terms of cons'::!.er prices, but is instead considering 
the value of economic resources (market prices paid by producers), then 
because he is concerned with the productivity of resources in alternative 
locales (the opportunity costs), tax must be omitt,.ed as not reflecting 
production opportunities elsewhere. 
A more difficult example of distortion is that caused by the 
investment itself. This is an 'indivis~ility effect', where market. 
values are significantly changed by the investment effects. The 
important feature to note about this is that given effects have not 
been marginal but indivisible, there is a need to measure the intra-
marginal units of output. This is understood in terms of 'consumer 
surplus', and it is helpful to exposition later (Chapter 3) if this 
is explained. 
Consumer surplus is a concept built upon the notion that 
consumers enjoy utility over and above that wh1ch can be measured by 
the price they pay for a product or service. Theoretical reasoning 
suggests that consumer surplus can be approximated figuratively, by an 
area above and to the left of price, and below the demand ~urve.* 
Thus, in Figure 2.1, where a product's price is PI' and output sold, Ql' 
given a demand curve DO, consumer surplus approximates to Area A. 
The usefulness of the concept for CBA may be realised where 
investment has brought about a change in output with a significant 
effect upon price. . Suppo~e, in Figure 2.1, that output has been 
.""'----
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Figure 2.1 The concept of consumer surplus 
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changed after investment, from Ql to Q2 and price fallen, from PI to P2 •.... 
The gain in consumer surplus will be areas BC. Area B is surplus 
brought about by the priC;;e fall on the original ou~put, area C is 
surplus on the extra output sold at the new price. 
. .~ .. : 
Benefit may be approximated by (Pl -P2)Ql' that is, area:B; plus 
The size of the denominator «Pl -P2) (Q2-Ql»/2, which. is area C. 
depends upon the slope of the demand curve. The steeper the curve, 
then the less likely will demand be stimulated by a lower price, and 
less extra output sold, so that area C will be relatively small. 
Care must be taken to ensure that area B represents real benefit, 
I 
in the sense that it represents the full extent of a cost change, which 
is meaningful in terms of production opportunities. It might be that 
investment has brought about a price change by improving the competitive 
condition of the industry concerned, so that price had fallen from a 
position where producers were earning excess profits. In this instance, 
area B, is simply transferred from producer to consumer, and does not 
represer.t an increase in total welfare .• An example of this type is 
given by Marglin, where irrigation investment removes the opportun,ity 
. 1 
for farmers to make excess profits from limited water supplies. 
A full theoretical-exposition of consumer surplus is given in 
Hicks (1946), and of aspects of economic surplus in general in CBA 
applications, in Mishan (197lb). CBA is generally couched in terms of 
partial equilibrium analysis, that is, investment effects are identified 
and measured on the assumption that the wider economic environment 
remains essentially unchanged. When investment is being considered 
over a long period this assumption might look weak. However, the 
assumption is very important to consumer surplus. 
1 
Marglin's description of the use of CBA in water-resource design, is 
an informative introduction to the use of consumer surplus in 
investment appraisal, see- (1962 ab). _-
It is possible for example, that if investment is to charlge prices 
significantly, then consumers '··budgetary decisions, through income 
effects, might change across a range of products and services, and the 
position of the demand curve may become uncertain. This might also 
occur if investment has somehow changed the quality of the product or 
service being offered. These possibilities raise questions that 
ideally should be answered in a general equilibrium context, for which 
there appears to be no usuable body of theory. 
In this context, observers have sometimes been critical of consumer 
surplus, Little (1957, p.180) described it as a "useless toy". Even 
so, the concept has. found general use for a range of CBA studies. A 
general survey of consumer surplus work has been made by Currie ~!l, 
(1971). 
2.5 The inclusion of values into CBA not directly reflected in 
market values 
Investment effects not directly reflectedin.market values include 
those known as 'externalities' and sometimes as 'secondary costs and 
benefits'. In a strict sense these refer to investruent effects upon 
the utilities and resource costs of those individuals and groups not 
directly involved in the buying and selling of the investment's output. l 
These are sometimes difficult to measure and express in a common denomi-
nator. Broadly there are two categories of costs and benefits, 
generally termed 'commensurables and non-commensurables'. 
1 
The former can usually, with a little ingenuity on the part of the 
There is much confusion in the literature about definition of terminology: 
for example, 'secondary costs and benefits' are sometimes those invest-
ment effects- in terms not of economic efficiency but of other social 
objectives (see Maass, 1962): sometimes they might refer to effects 
which have been .induced by investment rather than directly produced 
by it (cf. Millward, op cit). 
analyst, be quantified: the aim is frequently one of constructing a 
surrogate demand curve, by inferring from people's actions (or answers 
from questionnaires) how they would react in paying for a good or 
service offered to them. This approach has sometimes led to contro-
versy, perhaps because analysts have been optimistic in what, to their 
minds, is quantifiable: there might be associated dangers of establish-
ing precedent (see Guardian, 1972). 
Non-cornrnensurables (someti~~s termed 'intangibles') are those 
effects of investment which cannot be assessed quantitatively, but only 
written into a CBA study as a description. Often, these items are the 
ones to cause most argument after publication of CBA results, particu-
1ar1y since they often involve quality of environmental considerations 
of lasting effect. It quite often appears that because quantification 
tends to be large and dominant in studies, non-cornmensurables seem 
unimportant. This need not be so. Neither is it easy to determine 
Whether the favourable benefits, shown to exist in the arithmetic, 
might be traded off against adverse effects upon non-comrnensurables. 
2.6 The relevance of CBA to a subject area associated with agriculture 
.• It was noted that generally economists considered competition 
strong enough in the economy for market values to be meaningful in 
terms of consumer preference, and therefore of significance to social 
a110cative efficiency (Section 2.3). What is less certain, however, 
is the specific application of CBA in a subject'area associated with 
agriculture, for the degree of government intervention has been great 
in this sector of the economy; so much so, that the effects of 
distortions in competi ti ve for,ces might be too, uncertain to make 
allowances for with any degree of precision. 1 
1 
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A brief account of government agricultural policy is given in Appendix 
S. The validity of intervention is considered in James (1971: 
Pp. 19-27)~' 
------- -------------.--
For example, Bowers has argued that government policy has resulted 
-
in an 'artificial' encouragement of a high usage of high cost inputs in 
agriculture, which in the long term, has raised prices to levels well 
above those which would have prevailed in competitive conditions: see 
his example with regard to the substitution of machinery for labour 
(1972). Certainly, subsidies and favourable financial arrangements 
are likely to have an important stimulatory effect upon farmers' 
adoption of different kinds of technology: but the effect is not always 
one of inflating prices. The fertiliser subsidy probably led to a 
great expansion of the usage of chemical feeds, which allowed fertiliser 
prices to fall as the market expanded (Metcalf and Cowling, 1967). 
Thus, it seems likely that distortions resulting from government 
intervention might have made for a large and uncertain bias in market 
values. 
It might seem that the sum total of government intervention and 
support had been precisely tailored to reflect benefits accruing from 
agriculture to society as a whole. In other words, agricultural 
markets had been manipulated in such a way to make market values 
reflect collective social utility. Additionally, it might be argued 
that intervention had acted to change facets of the industry's 
behaviour so that agricultural markets would act more like perfectly 
competitive markets. l 
It seems doubtful, however, if governments or their agencies 
1 Two major problems likely to exist under free conditions but which 
would not exist in a perfect market, are those of depressed 
agricultural incomes associated with rising productivity in the 
face of inelastic demand (Section 3.7) and the cobweb price-output 
interaction pattern (Section 10.3). The nature of agriculture is 
such that two conditions necessary for a perfect market, perfect 
mobility of resources and market intelligence, do not fully apply. 
See Metcalf (1969) for notes on these problems, and Phelps Brown and 
Wiseman (1970) for a statement of the conditions necessary for a 
perfect market. 
19 
20 
consider policy in the degree of detail that would probably be required. l 
For instance, Josling has suggested that there is great uncertainty 
about the economic effects of farm support measures, either in terms of 
cost, consumer or farm income effects, and that it'is likeiy that 
\ .... 
agricultural programmes survive for years without careful scrutiny (1972). 
Prest and Turvey have suggested that the non-fulfilment of 
conditions necessary to the achievement of a (movement towards) Paretian 
optimality are relevant to eBA only in as far as it makes market values 
"obviously biased" measures of investment effects (op cit: pp.704-705). 
It is the bias which is "immediate, palpable and considerable" which 
should be considered by the analyst. Small and remote divergences in 
market values from what exist under perfectly competitive conditions, 
are likely to lead to bias in eBA measurements which fall within a 
margin of probable error. Large and "unknowable" divergences, on the 
other hand, are, in Prest and Turvey's view, necessarily irrelevant to 
action (ibid).2 
I Also it is difficult to equate government actions, 
, . 
of that action, with 'soc1al' interest, rather than 
interest. 
or consequences 
say, 'sectional' 
2 This is pragmatic advice and is a feature of eBA work. When theory 
makes application difficult it is usually the approach of the analyst 
to adopt a simpler method of measurement so that CBA is made practical. 
For instance, issueS associated with 'second-best' theories can be 
very compleX, and suggestive of very sophisticated corrections of 
market valuesJ Prest and Turvey have referred to some of this work as 
"dubious sophisticates", and of little use, since it is unlikely to be 
understood by decision makers generally (ibid). 
The question of how market values should be adjusted is a controversial 
one. For example, much of the scepticism associated with marginal 
cost pricing could, as at least one observer has pointed out (Millward 
op cit), be similarly linked with CBA applications. Economic 
literature has given p~ominence to the question of Whether or not there 
is in practice, a mean1ng~ul correspondence between price and marginal 
cost. It is an issue wh1ch has been at the centre of the debate 
concerning the appropriateness of marginal cost pricing for public 
industries (see Farrell, 1958). 
The kind of examples of government intervention in agriculture 
given above, seem to fit the 'large and unknowable' category, and 
therefore, might be ignored. However, it raises problems for compara-
bility when rates of return to investment in agriculturally related 
. . 
fields come to be compared to those for investment elsewhei~ in the 
economy. 
Of course, this is not just a problem consequent upon differences 
in the non-fulfilment pf efficiency conditions alone. Different CRAs 
might use different assumptions for measurement, and omit different 
considerations. Also, the quality of data might vary greatly in 
different parts of the economy. It seems, therefore, that comparisons 
of rates of return are safer kept for use in investment selection within 
a single economic sector if one is to be sure that like is being 
compared with like. If this is done, then there seems to be no strong 
reason for not using CBA in an agriculturally related subject area. 
Nevertheless, whether small differences in rates of return can be 
considered meaningful, in the sense that they allow a 'fine tuning' of 
investment projects, is still questionable as data quality is unlikely 
to be such as to enable precise quantification. A cautious view is 
best: that a rate of return analysis is useful in that the estimation 
of average returns to a given economic activity probably indicates 
whether the return is falling or rising in relation to the average rate 
of return to investment in an economic sector generally. If it is 
rising then, ceteris paribus, investment should be increased in that 
activity. 
Whilst then, CBA might be usefully applied to investment appraisal 
in subject areas associated with agriculture, application needs further 
qualification, since there are two fundamental assumptions necessary to 
rate of return CBA which might not be acceptable to a public decision 
maker. 
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2.7 Assumptions necessary to the application of rate of return CRA 
There are two assumptions implicit in the use of rate of return 
CRA for public decision making. These are that individual consumer 
decisions are meaningful for social investment selection, and secondly, 
that a surplus of benefit over cost indicates that an investment is 
beneficial. On the first point, it might be argued that consumers 
do not act in a rational manner, or even that they are independent of 
the very technology they are meant to direct. l 
It was noted above (Section 2.3), however, that generally 
economists considered competition to be sufficiently strong (and hence, 
consumers generally sovereign enough) to mean that a rate of return 
analysis is useful for resource allocation. Even so, in a specific 
instance, consumers might not be well informed about the product they 
buy or be in a powerful position to demand from producers the kind of 
output which might best serve their interests. 
A surplus of benefit over cost assumes that if, according to 
Paretian optimality, no one is to be left worse off, then beficiaries 
compensate the losers. Of course, the Paretian condition is too 
restrictive in practice, since it is difficult to envisage an economic 
change without someone being left worse off. Thus, a compromise is 
generally accepted, that for investment to be worthwhile, benefits 
should be such that beneficiaries could (though need not actually) 
compensate losers. This is known as the 'Hicks-Kaldor' criterion for 
assessing investment worth (see Herberger, 1971). 
There are inter-person~l comparisons here if the Hicks-Kaldor 
1 Galbraith has argued in general terms, that consumers might be 
manipulated to behave in th~ interest of a given technology (or 
corporation); see his description of the 'dependence effect' (1958: 
pp.148-154). 
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criterion is used for investment selection: acceptance involves 
discrimination against the losers, if compensation is not actually paid 
1 
out (which is likely). However, the cost to the losers is one 
reckoned by the parties involved themselves. 
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Nevertheless, there is a further cause of bias towards'one group of 
individuals against another: this is inherent in taking money values 
as a common standard for measurement of investment effects. Assuming 
that the utility of money rises as income falls, then ceteris paribus, 
measurements will tend to be biased in favour of the richer members of 
the community: the more money an individual or group has, the more 
likely will he or they tend to value investment effects. If the dis-
tribution of income is considered imperfect, and if this bias is thought 
to be strong, then an investment might seem to improve the welfare 
position of the advantaged at the expense of the disadvantaged, even 
though a surplus of benefit is evident from a CBA. 
The emphasis given to consumer decisions and implied acceptance 
of status quo income distribution in CBA application~ is common to much 
of conventional economics, and has often provided a 'basis for criticism 
2 
of economic science generally. With regard more specifically to CBA" 
1 Of course, ideally economics as a science should not make inter-personal 
comparisons, since this brings elements of value judgement into the 
analysis. Welfare economics is that branch of economics which has 
investigated the nature of policy recommendations that the economist is 
entitled to make (Baumol, ~952), and has been at the heart of questions 
as to how to decide object~vely how an economic activity might be deemed 
worthwhile.' It seem:" ~o~ever, that i'7 ha~ only succeeded in establish-
ing that no welfare s~gn~f~cance can obJect~vely be ascribed to the 
results of analysis of economic activity, such as CBA (see Millward op cit) , 
2 Some have argued that the aim of Paretian-type optimality conflicts 
with 'liberal' values in that what should be democratic decisions are 
removed to the market place (see Peacock and Rowley, 1971). Some 
economists, including Galbr~ith (1974), have been critical of conven-
tional techniques of ana~ys~s: they have suggested that economic 
thinking has.restricted ~tsel: to an efficien:y (market or neoclassical) 
paradigm, wh~ch has resulted ~n a neglect of~ssues such as income dis-
tribution (see, for example, Sachs, 1970). Hunt and Schwartz present 
critical review of contemporary economic theory, and note that th a h' . e use 
of CBA to measure t e soc~o-e:onom~c effects of investment represent the 
, "high-water mark of neo-class~cal economics" (1972 : p.30). 
it is the author's view that these issues are not important enough to 
discourage the use of ,the analysis, if they are made explicit and 
understood in the full perspective of the nature of the investment 
subject area, and nature of public policy aims relevant to the 
investment decision. 
Thus, the application of CBA might usefully be complemented with 
a background analysis to determine how the market behaviour in a subject 
area differs from the perfect competition model, so that the strength 
of consumer sovereignty might be tested for its sufficiency. Also, 
the CBA itself might usefully be extended to consider costs and benefits 
subject to social objectives and priorities other than efficiency. So 
that for example, if income distr.ibution is important to social invest-
ment, then the effects of investment in terms of incidence might be , 
considered separately. 
2.8 The inclusion of costs and benefits in relation to goals other 
then efficiency in CBA 
Of course, the aims of economic policy, and hence investment, are 
many and sometimes complex, but broadly, besides the one of economic 
efficiency, they are full employment (a full use of labour resources), 
economic growth (the maximisation of outputs and incomes), equity (or 
distribution of outputs and incomes), balance of payments, strategy 
) d . 1 (conservation of resources an enV1ronment. 
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Non-efficiency costs and benefits can be included in a CBA by 
listing the agencies, persons, industries, regions affected by investment: 
1 Kohler has discussed how policy might work with these considerations in 
mind and in relation to efficiency conditions (1966). Some observers 
have stressed a needforCBA to consider non-economic aims (see 
Lichfield in Lawrence, 1966); this implies the use of interdisciplinary 
teams for CBA, since analysts' assessments of specialised opinion 
might require specialised expertise, say, where costs and benefits are 
being reckoned in terms of number and quality of flora. 
... 
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selection being made upon the basis of significance in terms of magnitude 
and policy concern of importance to the decision maker. Relationships 
between affected agencies may be traced in a network or given in a form 
of a balance sheet. 
This might usefully complement a rate of return analysis, which, of 
course, only considers effects of investment in so far as they have 
consequences for resource costs and utility overall (these are often 
termed 'real effects' of investment). If decision makers are concerned 
to know something of the incidence of investment effects, then a balance 
sheet might record financial effects as agencies actually feel them 
(financial as opposed to real effects, are usually termed 'pecuniary' 
in the literature).l 
For example, a lowering of production costs might result in savings 
which are not passed on to consumers, but simply added to the profits 
of producers. The change in costs is a real benefit in as much as the 
costs in question reflect production opportunities elsewhere, and would 
be included in a rate of return analysis. However, if a social decision 
maker is concerned solely to reduce prices to final consumers then there 
is no benefit on these grounds. The incidence of cost and benefit is 
not of direct relevance to efficiency considerations. 2 
1 
2 
Some studies seem designed more to establish a (maximum) financial 
value to an investment's output or services, rather than properly invest-
igate consequences for consumer utility or resource cost. These studies 
are 'social' only in the sense that they sometimes include third party 
effects in the rate of return arithmetic. 
Two recent studies associated with British agriculture, one concerned 
with the benefit of the prevention of foot and mouth disease (Power and 
Harris, 1973), the other with the prevention of swine fever (Ellis, 1972); 
appear to fall into this category. Ellis stated explicitly that since 
the "problem was mainly a question of additional benefits" he did not 
feel "justified to reflect social costs and benefits" (p.4). A distinc-
tion is sometimes made between the two types of eBA, and termed "con-
ventional" and "social" eBA, see for example, Russel (1973, p.57). 
The possibility that production cost savings might not be fully passed on 
has heen generally assumed away in'eBA studies in agricultural R&D by an 
assumption of perfectly competitive conditions; where, of course, compe-
tition forces cost savings to be passed on in lower prices. Examples 
of broader eBA studies are given as case-studies in IHTA (1969). 
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A major problem is how the costs and benefits of efficiency are to 
be compared with those subject to other goals. Some studies have 
sought to include non-efficiency costs and benefits into the rate of 
return, by adjusting market values to reflect 'social utilities' or 
government priorities. 
Weisbrod has suggested that the 'estimates used in the rate of 
return might be adjusted by weights in the instance of income distribu-
tion considerations, derived by inference from the study of past 
government policies and their impact upon incomes (1972). However, 
there is a presumption in this that past government policies ha~e been 
the correct ones. 
Generally, there is no obvious indication from past practices and 
policy of what might constitute 'social utility,.l Nor is there in the 
literature a generally acceptable basis for measuring costs and benefits 
to society in terms of non-efficiency objectives, which is comparable to 
the rationale which legitimises the derivation of the efficiency rate 
of return. 
Besides, the logic of including both consumer and social utility 
together in a rate of return is uncertain. The relationship between 
n 
consumer valuations, determined by individual self-interest and condi-
tions as they exist, and social valuations, determined in part, by 
collective priorities and normative considerations, is unclear and the 
difference ought to be obvious to the decision maker when he considers 
the effects of an investment. It seems clearer to separate costs and 
benefits identified and measured on the basis of different socio-economic 
goals, and leave questions of trade-off to the decision maker. 
1 It is sometimes suggested that this is the fault of government, since 
public decision makers are unwilling to denote 'ethics that count'. 
This rests upon a belief that government9 are able to lay down a 
social 'objective function' since they are placed to know what a 
society's value system should be. For a discussion of this 
possibility see Kaldor (1971). ' 
2.9 The usefulness of CBA 
This chapter has shown the general idea behind CBA. It is an 
approach based upon the market conception of how resources are 
allocated, and seeks to identify and measure costs and benefits on a 
broad basis. The application of its ideas to plant breeding is 
consistent with the use of CBA in other subject areas where previously 
economic appraisal has sometimes been absent. 
It was indicated above that a rate of return analysis has a 
useful role to play for choosing between different investments, and 
although state intervention has probably affected market values to an 
uncertain extent, this usefulness extends to the agricultural sector. 
Nevertheless, rate of return CBA must not be considered a 
universal panacea, its dependence upon individual consumer valuations, 
and a given distribution of income must be openly recognised. The 
efficiency results of CBA can be complemented with an explicit 
consideration of investment effects in terms of other socio-economic 
policy objectives. 
These points are general ones, to see the nature of previous work 
;n the application of CBA ideas to appraise investment in agricultural 
R & 0, it is necessary to be more specific. 
following ~hapter. 
This is done in the 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The application of CRA to assess the effects of 
investment in agricultural R&D 
3.1 Introduction 
By looking at previous attempts to apply CBA to problem ar~as 
similar to the one considered by this study, it is hoped to establish 
a model of approach suitable for assessing the costs and benefits of 
new potato varieties. 
Many of the problems associated with CBA measurement in the field-
of agricultural R&D investment are similar; -it is for this reason, 
and for the sake of brevity, that this chapter concentrates upon CBA 
studies carried out in this subject-area. l CBA studies more generally 
are surveyed in Prest and Turvey (op cit), and more recently, in 
Kendall (1971) and Layard (1972). 
1 CBA techniques do not present the econOmist with his only means for 
measuring the effects of technical r.hange or innovation. Studies 
of these subjects have a long history in economic literature. This 
is seen by a list of work comprehensively surveyed by Kennedy and 
Thirlwell (1972). These studies are generally ones which attempt 
.. to explain, in production function terms, the contribution to 
technical progress of various factors. Usually, technical progress 
is studied in aggregate; that is, in terms of a whole economic 
sector, and do not go into much detail. 
Some such work by Griliches (1963ab; 1964) suggests that agricultural 
productivity might be explained almost wholly by non-R & D factors, 
particularly those of education and increasing returns to scale. 
This is surprising~ given that rate of return CBA has suggested that 
R & Dmightmake a large contribution (see Section 9.~. It is 
perhaps a reminder that overall, the contribution of such factors 
(which sometimes seem in specific instances to be unrelated to output 
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changes, for example, education), might be vital to widespread adoption 
of innovation practices. 
Although it should be noted that the value of production function 
techniques has been "strongly questioned. The difficulties involved 
in measurement are notorious, and associated assumptions, probably 
at least as questionable as some of those associated with CBA 
(see Kennedy and Thirlwell, ~p cit). 
3.2 The with and without reference option by which to measure costs 
and benefits. 
The pioneering attempts at the quantification of a return to 
• .f, -
. investment in agricultural R&D, which led in time to CBA.studies of 
specific investment programes, were done in the United states of 
America (USA) by Schultz (1953). On seeking to establish·what present 
agricultural output would. cost if produced at previous input levels 
(that is, if modern production methods had not existed, he provided a 
principle for measurement subsequently used in CBA work. 
This is sometimes termed the 'with and without' approach (see 
Lichfield, 1966: p.34l). The assumption is that the true value of an 
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investment is not what it yields (effects) absolutely, but the difference 
between the yield (effects) with the investment, and the yield (effects) 
without. A major difficulty associated with this principle in 
measurement, is that analysts might never be sure what a 'without' 
situation would have been like. For instance, how other factors might 
1 have combined to affect output. 
Another problem is that the with and without reference option might 
be too narrow a basis upon which to assess investment, since the 
approach implies that the investment in question is the best one for 
aChieving change over the present situation. The importance of this 
depends upon the nature of the investment selection problem facing the 
decision maker. 
For instance, the value of a new high yielding plant variety might 
be yield advantage over existing varieties. However, social decision 
makers may wish to seek the best use of investment funds in agriculture 
generally, and therefore consider potential alternative investments to 
1 This is, of course, a variant of an enduring problem encountered in 
social science generally. ..The difficulty associated with the need to 
abstract, meaningfully, variables from a 'complicated situation in the 
real world, so that measurement might adequately reflect the results 
of an activity in question, and'its nature be understood. 
to assume that it is similar to work by Peterson and Griliches, since 
the wheat study is a product from the same school, the University of 
Chicago, from which the hybrid corn and poultry studies were produced. 
~ .. " . 
Only one study associated with agricultural R&D has' been 
published in Britain which has used CBA measurement principles. This 
is a study by Grossfield ~nd Heath (1966) of the development of a 
potato harvester. This, and the American studies, are of the rate of 
return CBA type, and are retrospective analyses of successfully adopted 
practices. 
The problems associated with R&D cost measurement in agricultural 
R&D studies have, in principle, proved less 'important than those to 
do with benefit. R&D costs were taken from the records of expendi-
ture of firms and organizations: then simply discounted (or accumula-
ted) and sununed to derive a total indicative of an overall investment 
cost, against which could be expressed net benefit as a rate of return. 
What studies attempted to measure as net benefit can be shown diagramma-
tically in terms of consumer surplus. 
Figure 3.1 depicts a single market situation consistent with 
pa~tial equilibrium assumptions, for an output of a commodity subject 
to a cost reducing and output increasing innovation. The original 
supply curve, SO' has shifted vertically by the amount of the cost fall, 
and to the right equivalent to the increase in output potentiall, so 
that afte~ the innovation the new supply curve 'is S • 
n 
. The demand curve, DD, remains unchanged. So the old price, Po' 
becomes changed, at"P
n
, where a new output, Qn' is being sold, larger 
than the original output, QO• This figure assumes, of course, that 
the market (and any associated middle markets and industries) is 
perfectly competitive, so .that ~ost and output advantages accruing 
from innovation are passed on'to cohsumers in lower.prices. So that 
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to plant breeding which also result in increased yields, such as 
ferti1isers. l 
Nevertheless, given that resources available' for CBA studies are 
often limited, and the terms of reference narrowly d~fined:by sponsors 
(whose view of alternatives might be circumscribed), the problem is 
beside the point, even if.decision makers' field of interest is wide-
ranging, since practicalities restrict socio-economic assessment to 
the narrower reference option. All the studies of investment in 
agricultural R&D have used the with and without principle; however, 
the possibility of investment alternatives should not be ignored when 
the significance of'CBA results are considered. 
3.3 Previous applications of CBA to R&D, and models of approach 
used to measure R&D effects 
Griliches' study of hybrid corn (1958) is probably universally 
acclaimed as the classic CBA study in the field of investment in 
agricultural R&D (possibly in R&D generally) • It represented the 
£i'rst study of a specific agricultural innovation on CBA principles of 
measurement. Other work has followed, . . associated with North 
American agriculture: Peterson has extended Griliches principles in 
work associated with poultry R&D (Peterson, 1967) •. More recently, 
Schmitz and Seckler have examined the introduction of a mechanized 
tomato harvester (1970), and Ardito-Barletta wheat R&D in Mexico 
(1972) • Details of this latter study are unfortunately unobtainable 
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at the time of writing, and so will not be described. 'It is reasonable 
1 An acceptance of the one alternative as opposed to the other, implicit 
in a CBA approach, might render the study's findings to criticism of 
the kind associated with work ,of the commission on the Third London 
Airport (op cit). Although this CBA sought only to determine the 
costs and benefits of siting an airport in alternative sites, some 
observers argued that the alternative of not having an airport was the 
real social question, and that because this had been decided, the 
study was merely a cost effectiveness exercis'e* (see for example, Peters, 
1974). The problem is essentially one of which level of public 
decision making is CBA appropriate. 
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changes in resource use are fully reflected in prices, and that prices 
. 
are meaningful in terms u~ consumer utility. 
Remembering all which has been written in chapter, two,the gain 
of the innovation to society may be approximated by area~hown in 
figure 3.1, under the demand and between the two supply curves, 
B+C+D+E. Since the net gain in surpluses is A+B+C+(-A+E+D), the size 
(and distribution) of surplus depends upon the relative positions of 
the supply and demand curves. For example, if the original supply 
curve was horizontal, POslo' and shifted to a new position, Pnsln' then 
the gain would approximate to area A+B+C. 
The concept associated with the degree of slope of the demand and 
Supply curves is that known as 'elasticity'. This is the degree of 
responsiveness of one economic variable to another: a move along demand 
and supply curves is a response of demand or supply to changes in price 
(known as 'price elasticity' of demand or supply); a shift of the curves 
however, is a response to changes in non-price variables, say for 
example, income (known as 'income elasticity'). Where demand or 
supply is described as price 'inelastic', changes in price bring about 
a less than proportionate change in demand or supply: when described 
as 'elastic', then changes in price will bring about a more than 
proportionate change. 
In figure 3.1, the supply curves, So and sn' are depicted as fairly 
price elastic, a~d approximately correspond to those used in Peterson's 
poulty study: thus, the benefit he attempted to measure was area 
A+B+C+E. 
illustrate price elasticity of supply which is perfectly elastic. This 
Was one of the assumptions associated with supply, used by Griliches 
(1958; op cit). He attempted to measure area A+B+C. 
The Schmitz and Seckler study used this basic framework of consumer 
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Figure 3.1 Benefit illustrated in terms of consumer surplus· 
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Figure 3.2·· Output increasing innovation and its effect upon farmers income 
surplus, but attempted to measure area A+B+C+F. . In this instance, if 
the supply curves for tomatoes had been similar to Griliches', then 
benefit might have been overestimated; but if they had been closer to 
Peterson's, then benefit might have been under-valued." 
The Schultz, and Grossfield and Heath studies, did not explicitly 
mention consumer surplus,. but because their approaches were essentially 
to measure resource cost, under competitive conditions, it may be 
suggested that they were attempting to measure benefit approximately 
equivalent to area A+B in figure 3.1. In other words, the studies 
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did not take into consideration the possibility that additional consumer 
surplus might have been generated from the sale of extra output, that 
is, on demand created by lower prices. This will tend to under-value 
benefit, but not significantly, if demand is price inelastic. 
Since the Grossfield and Heath study is one carried out in a 
British environment, and examines an innovation associated with the 
potato industry, it is of interest to this study to examine it in more 
detail. Also the Griliches hybrid corn study needs further considera-
tion, since its approach and results have received prominence in 
economic literature associated with CBA: it could be said to represent 
the classic instance of the CBA approach, as it has been applied to 
agricultural R&D. 
3.4 The Grossfield and Heath Study 
The Grossfield and Heath study attempted to estimate the costs 
and benefits of R&D on a new type of potato harvester, undertaken and 
sponsored jointly by the state-funded National Research and Development 
Corporation (NRDC) and the National Institute of Agricultural Engineering 
(NIAE). After a period o~ development, starting in 1950 with the 
evaluation of a prize-winning potato.harvester, the NRDC in 1956 took 
over a patent on a trailer-operated experimental model developed by the 
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NIAE.The NRDC then granted a licence to a large'engineering firm, 
which successfully brought the harvester up to marketable standards, and 
after 1960, successful sales. 
The NRDC received royalties from the firm, but Grossfield and Heath 
felt that these were small and unrelated to the market value,. of the 
services provided by the R&D. For their analysis,'and despite the 
serni-monopolistic position of the engineering firm, the authors assumed 
that the harvester market was competitive and so cost savings would be 
passed on to consumers of potatoes. 
The benefits of the harvester were assumed as the difference 
between the costs of liftit"l", potatoes by hand, and of using the NIAE 
harvester, experienced by those farmers who bought the machine. It 
was thought by the authors that medium sized gr~wing units (20 to 50 
acres) would be the ones to benefit most, and it was estimated that the 
average savings per harvester per annum for this size of growing unit 
would be around £80 to £90. 
The value of benefits was estimated for only 7 years, this was 
because the contribution of the NRDC was essentially one of providing 
funds at a critical stage for the NIAE, and providing licensing 
expertise and enterprise in exploiting ~he invention. Whilst eventually 
. a new harvester would probably have been produced, it is unlikely that 
the engineering firm would have taken up the NIAE model without the 
NRDC, thus the NRDC prevented a delay in benefit. 
The Grossfield and Heath study showed that a 'social' value could 
be assigned to the output of R&D in the context of the British 
potato industry. However, from work for this present study it seems 
that the harvester study might have adopted an approach too narrow for 
the results to truly reflect social benefit. It is likely that a 
closer study of production practices and marketing would have indicated 
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the probability of large additional costs associated with the substitution 
of machiner for labour and a consequent lowering of quality (see Section 
7.9 for a note on the mechanisation of the potato harvesting with 
respect to tuber damage) • 
Also the study omitted consideration of reduced unemployment 
opportunities for labour displaced. Grossfield and Heath used the 
average wage x;d-.e paid to labour to estimate savings: however, if 
alternative employment opportunities were limited in the early-1960s, 
then it might be that the alternative productive potential of labour 
was less than the average wage rate. In addition, it is not clear 
what kind of labour would have been affected by mechanisation: if it 
1 
was casual labour, particularly family, including child labour, then 
costs saved would have been less than that indicated by average wage 
rates. 
The possibility that displaced labour resulting from mechanisation 
might result in costs which should be put against the benefit of 
saved labour costs, was recognised explicitly in the Schmitz and 
Seckler study (op cit). This consciously made use of the Hicks-Kaldor 
criterion (above, Section 2.7).to trade off the net benefit in terms of 
resource cost,against the disutility associated with displacement. 
3.5 The Schmitz and Seckler mechanised tomato harvester study 
Schmitz and Seckler derived a "gross social rate of return" which 
was the measurement of net benefit in terms purely of resource costs 
saved, and a "net social rate of return", which besides resource costs 
included the personal costs to displaced labour. In other words, 
costs saved per ton of tomatoes were summed, and then compared with 
I One of the motivations for designing a mechanical harvester was_ 
to remove a need to employ Sqottish"school children in 'tatty-
howking' • 
'/' 
,', 
wages lost as a result of displacement (assuming different conditions 
of alternative employment). 
However, this approach seems inconsistent: since on the one hand, 
the opportunity cost of labour (its resource cost) isbeing,reckoned 
Upon the assumption of full employment, whilst on the other,-disutility 
is summed, which is associated with under- or full unemployment; their 
trade off is questionable. A correct approach would be to estimate 
labour costs together, but on different assumptions to see how the 
overall rate of return varied. Thus, to the total of labour costs 
saved should have been added costs associated with displacement 
(disutility of differences in labour income before and after the 
innovation, plus that of additional factors associated with psycholo-
I gical losses and, perhaps, family removal to other areas). The 
difference this would make upon the overall result for the study would 
d~pend upon the size of effects upon other, non-labour, production 
costs: unfortunately, Schmitz and Seckler did not give a breakdown of 
resource cost savings. 
3.5 2 The Griliches' study of hybrid corn 
The Griliches' study bears some similarity to this present study. 
It was a study of piant breeding, which-attempted to estimate a rate of 
return to investment made over a major part of the first half of this 
century. However, the R&D concerned was that which produced the 
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novel hybrid corn varieties in the USA: a number of R&D organisations 
Were involved, and the cost of research on the idea of hybrid corn was 
not considered. 
1 There might have been increases in utility associated with improved 
work conditions for labour remaining in harvesting employment. 
2 More is stated about the Griliches' approach in Appendix 6, with 
regard specifically to its application to the SPBS innovation. 
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There were two elements in costs; the flow of annual R&D expenses 
over a period, 1910-55, and extra production costs involved in producing 
hybrid seed as opposed to the open pollinated varieties. Research 
, .'. -t 
expenses were based upon a mail inquiry to State agricult~al experimental 
stations, information from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), and an arbitrary doubling of state expended funds to account 
f · t 1 or pr~vate R&D cos s. These costs were then accumulated forward to 
1955 at 5% and 10% compound interest (the reverse of the procedure of 
discounting present value from the inception of the research) to arrive 
at an expression of the capital value of R&D investment, on which it 
is possible to compute a rate of return. 
The second element of costs was subtracted on an annual basis from 
gross benefits. It was derived from a knowledge of the total extent of 
Corn acreage, the proportion of it planted with new varieties, and data 
on seeding rates. It was assumed that the annual cost of the resources 
Used for the production of new seed was equivalent, given competitive 
conditions, to the price of the seed. The difference between prices 
for old and new seed would thus be an indication of extra resources ~nd 
their cost in producing hybrid seed. 
Two sets of assumptions were used to produce two estimates for 
benefit, that is, supply of corn was in one instance assumed perfectly 
elastic, the other, inelastic. However, the difference was small 
(about 7% of b~nefits), and for simplicity this study will consider only 
the former assumption. 
Although the annual value of corn was known there was no direct 
information about the effect of the new varieties on corn prices. This 
could be inferred however, from the productivity of the new seed, which 
I R&D records were generally insufficient to link hybrid corn R&D 
with its cost, and Griliches stated that "(cost) figures should be 
taken with several grains of salt, the dosage increasing as one goes 
back into the past" (op cit) • 
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could be approximated by multiplying the proportion of corn acreage 
, planted with new varieties by the observ"d crop yield advantage of 
these new varieties over older varieties. If this in turn is multiplied 
by the value of the total output of corn, an estimate is derived for 
A+B+C+F, figure 3.1. 
The area F needed to be omitted, but to do this,'Griliches required 
to know the price elasticity of demand for corn. This was obtained 
from the USDA, which Griliches took and multiplied by the extra output 
of the new varieties, to approximate to the area C+F, then halved to 
derive C. It was then possible for Griliches to estimate annual returns, 
and consequently to accumulate net benefit forward to 1955, in the same 
way as for research costs. An estimate was made for future net benefit, 
and the two were added together and used to compute a rate of return to 
R&D costs. 
In the same study as hybrid corn, Griliches investigated in a 
similar way, a rate of return to investment in R&D associated with 
hybrid-sorghum. The results, when compared to those of the bybrid 
Corn analysis, indicated the importance of total national crop output 
to size of the rate of return. Although sorghum research costs were 
much smaller than those for hybrid corn, the annual returns were much 
smaller as well, principally because of the relatively small planted 
acreage of sO,rg-hum. 
" 
Like Grossfield and Heath in their CBA, Griliches applied the 
assumptions of a perfectly competitive market to derive a meaningful 
rate ft' th t 1 . f' t' 1 o re urn, W1 ou qua 1 1ca 10n. A closer study of American 
1 
This is to say, he assumed that competitive conditions were sufficiently 
strong to guarantee that production cost savings would be realised and 
passed on to consumers of corn (and that freed resources would be 
alternatively employed). "It was recognised that the corn price 
required a downward adjustment to allow for the effects of market 
support in inflating price abGve the" level where it would reflect more 
than the resource costs of producing corn (see Appendix 6, for a note 
On the price adjustment) • 
agriculture might have uncovered relationships which throw doubt upon 
the size of Griliches' rate of return. 
For instance, Griliches assumed that a 10% increase. in yield per 
acre, brought about by the new hybrid varieties' yiel~ adv~n.tage, would 
lead to a pro rata reduction in the selling price for corn: .. However, 
it seems unlikely that yield is related proportionally to costs, since 
some cost items remain fixed with changes in yield, and others vary 
uncertainly (this is certainly so with the potato crop in Britain, 
Chapter 6). 
In the instance of American corn production, the dominant factor 
influencing prices has been a strong tendency to over-production. The 
US government has provided subsidy facilities to encourage farmers to 
plant less corn. This suggests that resources have been slow to leave 
corn production, so that although costs per ton per acre would probably 
have fallen as a result of higher yields, costs per ton of corn sold 
for human consumption might not have done so, to any great extent. And 
thus, the Griliches' rate of return might be greatly exaggerated, in 
that the cost savings envisaged might not have been fully realised. 
However, if hybrid corn had contributed to surplus trading condi-
tions, it is probable that market prices would have been kept down to 
.. 
levels which otherwise would not have been reached. This would have 
.. 
meant a financial benefit to consumers, perhaps of some size and dis-
-
tributional importance. 
This is not of itself a factor of relevance to a rate of return, 
since it is not a real effect involving production changes or additions 
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to surpluses, because essentially the effect is only a transfer of income 
1 from growers to consumers. However, there are three features of a 
1 The transfer of income from growers to consumers, of course, involves 
a transfer of surplus from producer to consumer surplus. However, 
total surplus is unchanged by the transfer, and a CBA rate of return 
would be unchanged. 
situation with lower prices, which might bring about changes in real 
welfare, from an efficiency standpoint. These are the possibility 
that lower prices result in a larger output being sold; that a transfer 
of income affects investment and need for state (or state ,inspired) 
intervention to maintain agricultural incmnes. 
'" 
" 
If lower prices generate an additional demand, then additional 
consumer surplus will be derived from the extra output involved. 
For instance, in figure 3.1, assuming price to have fallen from P to 
o 
1 P at the new supply curve, S , more output, Q + Q , will have been 
n n n
sold; the resulting extra consumer surplus is denoted by the area C. 
The size of extra output sold as observed (Section 3.3)~ will depend 
upon the kind of demand elasticities present, and these are likely to 
be inelastic. 
This is to be expected because the cause of surplus trading 
conditions where agricultural productivity is rising, is associated 
with inelastic demand: or more strictly, the industry's problem of 
adjusting output to allow for increased supply potential when demand is 
fairly stable, and unlikely to respond to changes in prices brought 
about by reduced costs. The effects of surplus trading conditions upon 
investment and the need for state intervention are usefully described 
in relation to this problem. 
3.7 The general problem of increased productivity in agriculture: 
the broad 'effects of investment in agricultural R&D 
Consider first the effects of rising productivity upon the incomes 
of farmers where demand is inelastic. 
Taking the same assumptions as forfic:JUre 3.1, that is, those 
associated with a perfectly competitive situation; and given an output 
increasing innovation which shifts the supply curve from So to Sn' the 
effect upon f~rmers' incomes can be shown diagrammatically, in figure 
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3.2. At the old supply curve, output, QI' is sold for price, PI' and 
farmers' market receipts approximate to area Pl.QI. 
At the new supply curve, additional market supplies brought about 
... , -t. 
by the innovation's higher output forces prices down,to P2~ although 
more output is being sold, at Q2. The shaded area tothe,"~i9ht of 
PI P2 approximates to farm, receipts lost as a result of the lower price: 
that shaded area above QIQ2' to receipts ,gained from the sale of the 
increased output. The extent to which these off-set each other 
, depends upon the slope of the demand curve, DD7 that is, the price 
elasticity of demand. For agricultural products generally, demand is 
inelastic, which means that demand will increase less proportionally 
than the fall in price. Thus, the rise in income from extra sales 
will not compensate for that lost as a result of the price fall. 
Under the conditions of a perfectly competitive economy, however, 
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farmers will be no worse off than before. since the forces of competition 
ensure that in market equilibrium, all producers are earning 'normal 
profits' (just enough to make production worthwhile). What will have 
happened is that the loss of income to the farming industry will have 
been brought about by marginal producers leaving the industry (not 
necessarily the ones on the least fertile land, but producers for whom 
altern?tive occupations offer higher returns). 
Whilst agriculture might in fact, be a highly competitive industry 
(it is generally made up of small competing units trading in fairly 
homogeneous commodities), one condition necessary ~or perfect competition 
,. 
is generally absent. This is the requirement that resources be 
perfectly mObile. Agricultural resources are sometimes specialised, 
often to particular crop, and generally remote from (non-agricultural) 
alternative employments. 
Thus, given the impact rising productivity will tend to have upon 
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agricultural incomes and the difficulty the industry might have in 
adjusting to changing ,?onditions in supply, it is likely that in 
uncontrolled conditions, increased output potential is. lik€:!ly to 
produce a chronic situation of surplus trading and depressed rural 
incomes. In America, Heady long ago, pointed to the'gen~ial welfare 
effects' of innovation in agriculture, particularly as they might 
affect the general prosperity of rural areas (1949). 
This general effect might affect the efficient employment of 
resources over the long term, if the transfer of income from growers 
to consumers (noted in the previous Section) means that farmers have 
less to invest, and are Il'Ore likely to be given to false economies, 
neglect soil fertility and structural improvements. This possibility 
has attracted the interest of the state in agriculture and agricultural 
innovation, to an extent where resources have been employed to support 
markets and encourage structural change (the third possibility for 
resources, noted previously).l 
The interest of the state is based upon general considerations, 
however, not only the efficient use of resources within agriculture, 
but the inq;>lications of a depressed agriculture for the rest of the 
economy. Since the level of agricultural incomes might be important 
to the ~alance in the relationship between country-side and urban areas, 
Which affects migration patterns, general enq;>loyment and social invest-
ment (and therefo~e, many of the non-efficiency goals of economic policy 
noted in Section 2.8). 
1 Strictly, the consequences of transfers of income, and of funds that 
the state would use to finance market support operations and grower 
subsidies, are far-reaching. If the transfer of agricultural invest-
ment funds to consumers does not result in alternative investment with 
at least equivalent returns (that is, consumers do not save an extra 
amount equivalent to that received in lower prices), then there is a 
cost, in terms of resourceso However, this in practice is difficult 
to identify. 
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These considerations, associated with the problem of agricultural' 
output adjustment to changes in condition of supply, seem to suggest 
serious limitations to the use of the Griliches' rateof'return as 
evidence for a very large social benefit from investment'in hybrid 
; ":;. 
corn (and hence, similar plant breeding) • The realityof',~he situation 
suggests that significant cost savings might not have been realised. 
Also, the possibility of wider consequences for resource use, and 
affects for non-efficiency social goals, were not considered. 
The main fault of Griliches narrow approach is associated with an 
assumption of comparative equilibrium (full market adjustment is 
assumed to have occurred), without sufficient reference to what would 
likely have been the true situation of disequilibrium, which would 
surely have led to important qualifications of the CBA results. This 
is not to suggest that Griliches (and perhaps other analysts in CBA 
associated with agricultural R&D) was unaware of broader issues: 
his purpose may have been to try (the novel) ideas of CBA, and not 
cloud exposition with complications and qualifications. 
The general impression left by the three studies referred. to in 
the text above, Sections 3.4 to 3.6, is that relevant (to social 
decision making) investment effects might be ignored if the subject 
area of the CBA is not examined closely. However, there might be 
practical difficulties in doing this if there is only a single analyst 
and limited study _funds. In which case, all that can be practically 
done, is to relate the investment effects, as derived under perfectly 
competitive ass~ptions (with of course, appropriate adjustment of 
market values), to a generally observed investment effect and test the 
sensitivity of the rate of return to the broader issue. 
This, the Schmitz and S~ckler study attempted to do by considering 
the effects of mechanisation upon labour (Section 3.5). They were 
--~-----------
aware of and observed in their study, the general effects of technolo-
gical change upon labour attitudes (notably the history of the 
'Luddites') and importance of the cotton harvester'in undermining the 
. .:.' 1· 
livelihood of "numerous agricultural labourers" (opcit:1f> .• 570). 
And therefore, estimated costs a~sociated with labour dispiacement on 
a variety of assumptions, to see how it might affect a resource cost 
rate of return. 
However, although aware that mechanisation will require new tomato 
varieties, they did not investigate the potential effects of these 
varieties. 2 Nor did they specifically consider mechanisation in 
relation to the state interest in agriculture. To see how broader 
issues important to social policy might be included with a rate of 
return analysis, it is necessary to look outside CBA work in agricu1-
tura1 R&D to a CBA of forestry. 
3.8 H.M. Treasury's CBA of forestry 
As part of the government's review of forestry policy, a team of 
inter-departmental economists under the chairmanship of the Treasury, 
produced a CBA of forestry (1972). The aim was to collect relevant 
information and fit it into a CBA framework, and where, quantitative 
material proved to be absent or incomplete, the aim was to take account 
of an apparent consensus of opinion. 
Conceptually,_the study was made up of four parts • The first 
.' 
involved the attempt to compare the return to resources used in 
1 The effect of technological change upon the sharecropper had been 
examined in a sociological paper, which had attracted wide attention 
in literature associated with agricultural R&D, by Day (1967). 
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2 They state:. "we have not entered the discus'sion as to whether the new 
tomato grown for mechanised harvesting is of inferior quality than that 
grown prior to mechanisation: If the new variety is inferior, which 
is debatable, the costs incurred because of inferior quality are not 
accounted for" (op cit: pp.572-573). 
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forestry to the return which could have been expected if the resources 
had been used in hill farming, the presumed alternative. This involved 
a consideration of both enterprises in some detail. 
Secondly, the study attempted to assess the effects upon interests 
associated with recreation and amenity, involved in a substitution of 
forestry for hill farming. The main basis of measurement was to inf~r 
from the costs incurred by visitors to an area, what they would be 
willing to pay for an assumed advantage over hill farming. l 
Thirdly, the effects of forestry upon water, climate and wild life 
of a region were considered (as resources and environment of an area). 
Of these only the effects upon water were reckoned as significant 
enough for inclusion in the rate of return. 
Fourthly, the study considered and examined issues of importance 
to government policy generally, which might be of relevance to forestry's 
substitution of hill farming. These included regional employment 
opportunities, strategic considerations (the possibility of disruption 
of supply of wood), and the balance of payments. The validity of . 
these as social concerns was examined, and both their resource and 
financial costs reckoned. 2 
1 
2 
The 'Clawson' model for measuring recreational benefit was used 
(Clawson, 1959). The weakness of this approach is perhaps associated 
with the correctness of using individual assessments for recreational 
pursuits in an environmental context. The nature of out-door recreation 
is sometimes only possible where visitors per acre are minimised. Thus, 
it is likely that this kind of activity will never show a very high 
return compared to other activities, since only a small number of people 
can enjoy themselves at any given time. It seems therefore, that if this 
type of activity is not to be neglected then it must be treated as an 
intangible. The question of whether forestry or hill-farming might be 
best for a particular consideration was decided by the economists them-
selves, on the basis of informal discussions with interested organisations. 
This has dangers in that dissenting opinion might be dismissed by analysts 
as irrelevant, or irrational when really it should be assessed under the 
willingness to pay criterion as a cost, or included as an intangible. 
For example, it was stated" •.• persistent unemployment is considered to be 
an evil, the removal of which fully merits the expenditure of public funds. 
It is less clear how much cost society is willing to incur in terms of real 
resources in order to reduce unemployment, after taking full credit for the 
net output of those provided with work. • •• certainly relevant to calculate 
the implied 'costs per job' of maintaining employment in agriculture and 
forestry, in terms both of resources and public expenditure, for comparison 
with current standards in other fields". (H.M. Treasury, 1972, op cit p.4) 
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The value of these objectives to society could, the study suggested, 
be represented by a premium, added to the value of those resources 
associated with the objectives. Thus, the study used a premium of 20% 
of the value of wood to indicate the value to the balance of payments 
of forestry as an import saving activity. The figure was an arbitrary 
1 
one. 
The inclusion of costs and benefits in terms of specific social 
objectives, into the efficiency rate of return, is a result of the 
approach of the Treasury study, which sought to consider all the 
interests affected by forestry as consumers, including the state. This 
implies that the distinction between individual utility on the one hand, 
and collective utility (and objectives) on the other, is unnecessary. 
A rate of return can be derived which reflects the net sum of utility 
of both individual and collective objectives (or in other words, to 
represent together, in the efficiency rate of return, both the utility 
of individual consumers and the utility of government regarding an 
investment's effects). 
This seems unwise for reasons noted above, Section 2.8; in 
particular, with regard to how it might blurr the importance of invest-
ment effects in terms of what a public decision maker might consider as 
two distinction considerations. Namely, the effects for private 
individual consumers (the 'efficiency obje~tive), and those in terms of 
specific government policies. To include both in rate of return means 
that a trade-off between the costs and benefits in terms of one to th~ 
other has been decided prior to consideration by the decision makers. 
It was pointed out that there is no basis, as yet, for valuing social 
I As all such premiums or notional values are likely to be, see Section 
2.8. In fact, it was only with a 20% premium that forestry was able 
to show a positive rate of return. 
.. . . 
___ • ____ ~_. ____________ ~_..L~~. _ ___' ____ ._ 
utility associated with government aims and policy'Cibid).l 
Nevertheless, the fact that the study attempted to identify and 
measure investment effects for a broad range of interests and uses of 
the country-side, represents a broader approach tha~ thc:,se.used in CBA 
.. , . 
applications in the subject area of investment in agricultural R&D. 
These were largely concerned to assess costs and benefits in terms of 
efficiency only in relation to the consumer of the final agricultural 
product. The Treasury study approach is a step forward, since the 
decision maker is supplied with additional information to that simply 
concerned with resource use and final consumer utility, since he is 
SUpplied with intel~igence of costs and benefits to third parties, 
considerations and policies not easily allowed for in market valuations. 
This is consistent with the purpose of CBA outlined by Prest and 
Turvey in their survey: 
"CBA is a practical way of assessing the desirability of projects, 
where it is important to take a long view (in the sense of 
looking at repercussions in the further, as well as the nearer, 
future) and a wide view (in the sense of allowing for side 
effects of many kinds on many persons, industries, regions, etc.) 
i.e. it implies the enumeration and evaluation of all the 
relevant costs and benefits". (op cit: p.683). 
The previous work in CBA application to investment effects resulting 
from agricultural R&D has generally tended to be narrower than this 
description of what CBA might do implie~. As observed it has, perhaps, 
been more concerned to investigate the idea of CBA, to assume away the 
possibility of broad effects to facilitate a simpler estimation of 
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resource cost or consumer utility, that relevant to the direct consumers 
of the final product., 
-1 
It might be argued that since the influence of the state is so large as 
to influence market values to a large and uncertain extent, then prices 
and costs 'are such that it is impossible anyway to distinguish between 
private and social utility. If this is so, then the premise that 
individual consumers are sovereign and determine in a meaningful way 
the outputs and services they receive, is uncertain. Also, there is 
no guarantee that the workings and policy of the state and its agencies 
do influence market values in a way which reflects social utility 
(Section 2.6). 
As indicated in the instance of the Griliches' hybrid corn study 
above, the effects of a plant breeding innovation are probably wider 
ranging than what the theoretical model of perfect competition might 
imply I both the resource cost and distributive effects might be 
uncertain, and involve an important state interest. For this present 
study, it is hoped to give more attention to the nature of the 
agricultural background, to judge if investment effects have been more 
complex than a.simp1e assumption of competitive conditions would imply. 
3.9 The scope and approach adopted for this present study 
The approach of this present study is restricted of necessity, by 
financial constraints and a need to clarify exposition. . For these 
reasons this study will be restricted to Great Britain only. The 
seed potato industries of Ulster, the Isle of Mann and the Channel 
Islands are not considered and since Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
are maincrop varieties, the early crop sector of the potato industry 
enters into consideration at only a few points. 
Some parts of the potato industry have not been considered in 
detail with regard to the resource use of their business: these are 
the garden and the potato trade generally, and the advisory research 
service. These were investigated to some extent, but the effect of 
the new varieties upon them were considered to be such as to not 
warrant the large share of this study's finances required to uncover 
the full implications of the displacement of Majestic. 
The steps involved in the CBA approach adopted and which hereafter 
determine the structure of this present study, are broadly 
first involve~ the derivation of an inve~ent c~st' for the 
produced Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. The second is 
three. The 
R&D which 
concerned 
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with the derivation of net benefit and the expression of it as a rate of 
return on investment cost. Thirdly, other effects not included in a 
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rate of return, but important to government policy objectives are 
considered, and in one instance used to qualify the rate of return 
results. 
The first step takes up two chapters of this study, one to describe 
the system of R&D at the SPBS, and the other concerned with measure-
ments of R&D costs. . The R&D system is described in relation to 
the identification of the part of the potato research programme relevant 
to the production of Pentland Crown and Pentland Delli cost apportion-
ment assumptions are then made upon the information so derived. 
The criterion used to estimate net benefit is the one of resource 
cost, as opposed to one which takes consumer willingness to pay. 
The former attempts to identify and measure changes in resource cost, 
as opposed to the latter's use of final prices. This allows for a 
more detailed examination of cost changes than is possible with the 
willingness to pay criterion. l 
Whilst this study was in progress, the Director of the SPBS had 
published along CBA lines, his own assessment of the sccial costs and 
benefits of R&D 'Output produced by the station (Simmons, 1974). 
The major part of estimated benefits are attributed to the new potato 
varieties that are the subjects for assessment in this present study. 
This work and its results with 
regard to the results of this present study, are assessed below 
(Section 9.13). 
The Director followed a rescurce cost criterion to.estimate the 
returns to the new potato varieties, by considering, as this present 
study does, farm costs. However, the study is not detailed, taking 
1 
The willingness to pay criterion is applied to the SPBS innovation, 
following the Griliches' moder' of approach in Appendix 6. 
production costs from one, rather unreliable source, without qualifica-
tion. The main problem is associated with the fact that varietal 
effects are uncertain, and some investigation is r~quired before 
reasonable cost assumptions can be derived. Some' consideration as 
to the identification of varietal effects and their importance to 
costs, is given at length prior to measurement. 
Once estimates of benefit have been derived, it becomes possible 
to compare them to investment cost. This is done in conjunction 
with considerations of how the comparison might best be presented, and 
the sensitivity of the comparison to changes in key variables and 
inclusion of other factors associated with resource cost. 
The third step is to complement the rate of return results with 
a consideration of issues which might be important to government. 
This represents broader assessment of investment effects on the lines 
of the forestry study, although because potatoes are more specific to 
a given land use, it might be expected that these considerations will 
not be as important as they were, to the Treasury's study, except in one 
important respect. 
This is how new potato varieties might have been important to the 
workings of market regulation policies,. and in combination with, have 
had a widespread and general impact upon the potato industry. 
It is hoped that what follows will be a modest approach to CBA, 
which recognises not only the limitations of technique but that of the 
quality of data; one hopes to be cautious, taking care not to extend 
the process of identification and economic quantification beyond the 
POint which is credible. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The R&D background to the introduction of 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
4.1 The origins of the SPBS 
For strategic reasons, which manifested themselves during the First 
World War, and because of the depressed conditions in agriculture during 
the early part of the twentieth century, a need was recognised for 
improved plant breeding (findings of the 'Selbourne Committee', 1916). 
In Scotland, the Royal Highland and Agricultural Society responded by 
raising £22,500 from public subscription to establish a 'Scottish 
Society for Research into Plant Breeding'; the subscription was 
backed pound for pound by government finance, to bring founding capital 
to £45,000. The society was registered in 1921 under the Friendly 
Society's Acts, and facilities were established at a plant breeding 
station, Corstorphine. In 1954 a move was made to the station's 
present site at the Edinburgh Centre of Rural Economy, by Roslin -
later called Pentlandfield. 
Beginnings were small, the founding staff consisting of two 
scientists and an annual expenditure of around £3,000. Income was 
provided by government aid, the society's investments, sale o~ produce 
and members' subscriptions. The move to Pentlandfield brought a 
Significant change in source of income, for although the Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (OAFS) met four-fifths of the 
£130,000 capital costs involved, the rest was provided by the society, 
Which liquidated investments derived from the original foundation. So 
that since that time the costs of the SPBS have been almost wholly 
supported out of OAFS funds. A" full account of the institutional 
--igins and development (including details of organisation and finance) 
52 
53 
of the SPBS is given in Gallie (1971). 
The SPBS is one of eight research institutes grant-aided by the 
DAFS. This organisation examines and co-ordinates resear~h cost 
estimates and exercises control over staffing complemEmti·:·: in so doing, 
it draws upon the ARC's experience for advice on scientif.·:-:; aspects of 
work. The ARC, which since the Second World War has come to assume 
increased responsibility for general agricultural research policy and 
overall administration has exercised scientific control throughout the 
research service by means of visiting groups. The DAFS has represen-
tatives on the ARC (for a brief description of the organisation 
structure of research service see ARC, 1969: more specifically, for an 
account of agricultural R&D in Scotland in relation to the SPBS and 
ARC in the 19502, see SPBS, 1955: pp.12-l8). 
A twofold system of financial control has been used in the research 
service: the use of five year forecasts of annual estimates and 
expenditure, and a six yearly programme of work of each institute and 
its annual review. Forecasts and annual estimates have been based 
Upon traditional forms of 'input accountancy'; that is, cost estimates 
are divided into headings of such categories as staff, equipment, main-
tenance and so on, and not upon elements of programme of work or projects. 
This has atso applied to breakdown of research work within individual 
institutes; the lack of project costing, even to the type of'crop, was 
noted by an EDCA report as a feature of agricultural R&D in Great 
Britain (1971 op cit). In fact, this might be common to research 
establishments generally (Baker & Pound, 1964). The lack of project 
Costing will be important when the R&D costs of the new varieties 
are considered for measurement. 
4.2 Objectives and work of the SPBS 
The SPBS was established for the improvement of qgricultural plants: 
54 
;, 
"It is hoped that such improvements may be attained partly by selection, 
and partly by the creation of new varieties possessing in the higher 
degree those qualities which will make them most profitable under 
Scottish conditions". (SPBS, 1922: p.2). These aims, have remained 
approximately the same down to recent years (SPBS, 1969: p~3). 
Explicitly it is seen that the concern is less with social or consumer 
interests, as with the profitability of Scottish agriculture. Pentland 
Crown's propensity for a greater usage of oWn grown seed cannot be said 
of course, to make it a variety likely to increase the profitability 
of the important Scottish certified seed industry, so perhaps the 
objectives of the society and station are not given prominence in practice. 
Whilst nearly all the R&D carried out at the SPBS has had as its 
ultimate purpose, the output of improved plant varieties, a useful 
distinction may be made between \'Tork of a scientific interest, and that 
directly involved with breeding and testing for new varieties. The 
relation between the two, which for convenience shall be termed 'research' 
and 'development', is not always clear. It suffices to note here, 
however, that in practice perhaps more than half of the work at the SPBS 
has been of the development kind. A historical review of the whole of 
the SPBS activities is given in Gallie (1954) and more recently in 
,Simmons (1968). 
Plant breeding began with cereals, herbage, root plants" and 
potatoes in 1921. However, very quickly, potato breeding assumed more 
importance relative to the other R&D and work became based upon two 
departments, those of potato and forage. The latter has come to be 
Concerned chiefly with barley, oats, brassicas and some grasses. 
Several named varieties have been marketed but by the end of the 1960s, 
without any significant impact on national acreage figures. 
""7£_-- .. 
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4.3 The evolution of the potato research programme 
-
The contribution of potato research to Pentla~I.' Crown and Pentland 
Dell is difficult to identify, and so it seems instructive to describe 
the research environment in some detail. This will make the business 
of research cost apportionment easier to understand. The approach 
adopted for this study was to build a record of the potato seedling and 
varietal contribution to Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell (a family 
tree), and to use this, in combination with the record of ' research in 
papers, annual reports and staff recollections, to associate research 
programmes and plant breeding material with innovation characteristics' 
noted as important in the potato industry chapters. 
This approach is probably more detailed than most which have been 
used to identify research contributions to innovation. Other work 
has relied heavily upon the memories and knowledge of senior research 
personnel; however, at the SPBS, staff changes had made this difficult. 
The family tree is sho~~ in Figure 4.1 and was conctructed from the SPBS 
records by the author specifically for this study; it will be used for 
reference throughout this section. 
It had been hoped that an innovation map, similar to those used to 
identify critical events in technology to assess the weight of contri-
bution from basic as well as applied science to innovation (see IITR, 
1968; Isensen, 1969), might have been applicable, but ignorance about 
the early decisions in potato" research prevented this. A more general 
but less detailed account of potato research at SPBS than. the one 
provided in this section is given in MacArthur (1970). " An account of 
the development of potato breeding generally is given in Simmons 
.. 
(1969 op cit). 
The foundation stock of the'SPBS came from a St. Andrews breeder, 
Dr. J. H. Wilson, and selection began upon a similar basis to that which 
· ..... . 
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might have been used by horticultural breeders, of visible inspections 
of varietal characteristics and judgements based on hunch. In fact, 
it is probably fair t'o state that this approach remained, with some 
refinements, the principle behind the R&D that led to the introduction 
of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. 
In the years prior to the establishment of the SPES, private 
breeders had raised some varieties which were to become very successful, 
(Majestic and King Edward VII).l What seemed to be required of breeders 
was a Jperhaps lucky) flair, or ability to spot say, high yielding 
varieties, and a knowledge that high yielding seedlings are likely from 
certain crosses (hybridisations). It was more important to do this 
well, than know the genetical basis for high yields. 
However, inadequate knowledge was a major problem for the potato 
research programme at the outset. Little was known about varietal 
background, and existing classifications were suspect, since the effects 
of disease and of a suspected narrowness of the genetic base of European 
potatoes were uncertain. The potato had been slow to become a subject 
for geneticists, probably on account of its relatively complex hybrid 
structure (due to tetrasomic inheritance). This factor presents 
particular problems for plant breeding, for it means that individual 
potato var,~eties (or seedlings) are extremely heterogeneus and that their 
--
progeny contain a wide range of both good and bad characteristics. 
This makes it diffic~lt to trace varietal characteristics, and also means 
that large numbers of seedlings must be raised to find an occaional one, 
With a recombinat;on of genes which generally produce desirable results, 
though none, very undesirable. 
Thus, in the early year's of the SPBS, work 'concentrated upon the 
Collection and classification of varieties and seedlings, isolation of 
-
lndeed, one Donald Mackelvie continued to raise good commercial 
~ties into the 1930s, the 'Arran' series of varieties (Rennie, 1968). 
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pedigree strains (pure lines), comparative trials and selection. It was 
not long before disease considerations, which in the first instance had 
been associated with a need to take stringent precuations to prevent 
further infection (particularly from viruses), became prominent. This 
is not to suggest that research rather than development was' given 
priority, but that from the beginning the two went hand-in-hand. In 
fact, research was carried out directly with practical ends in view 
(SPBS, 1925): SPBS staff were always on the look out for the possibility 
that research material might contribute to a new variety (that is, 
material which might contribute to a new combination of varietal 
attributes, which might have commercial significance). 
A major commercial problem'earlier this century was wart disease, 
Synchytrium endobioticum, a disease that potentially can destroy complete 
crops and infect soils for a considerable period. Its importance 
required legislation which ensured that infected areas were scheduled, 
wherein susceptible varieties were prohibited. 
The SPBS gave priority to the investigation of this disease. By 
1930 the general basis for varietal immunity had been found to rest upon 
Mandelian inheritance: that is, where resistance behaves in bxeeding 
as a dominant character, and can be easily introduced into breeding stock 
(for example, the inclusion of one immune parent in a hybridisation, 
leads to at least 50% of progeny seedlings with immunity). Thus, from 
about this time all new varieties had wart immunity. For an account of 
this first success of organised plant breeding (in co-operation with 
Official sanctions) see Cox (1967; pp.87-8). 
Wart immunity, and another problem, pollen and ovule sterility 
(associated with the ability"of potato plants t~ flower and set seed), 
.. 
were the major determinants of the choice of varieties and seedlings in 
the early years and this is reflected in the early ancestors of both 
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Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, as shown in figure 4.1. For instance, 
varieties such as Pepo, Flourball, Ashleaf and Shamrock had both wart 
immunity and plenty of pollen. 
By the mid-1920s, however, blight (Phytophtura infestans), and 
viruses had generally become recognised as the most commercially 
significant of potato diseases (McIntosn, 1925). Blight investigations 
featured in the SPBS's research programme from the beginning and virus 
related work began in earnest after 1929, when in response to an applica-
tion from the society, the Empire Marketing Board made a grant (which 
led to the establishment of a sub-station). It is with these two 
diseases that the main part of research at the SPBS was concerned during 
the period up to Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's introduction to 
the market. 
By the end-l930s, selection for hybridisation for commercial 
screening involved the inclusion of material from both blight and virus 
investigations. The decade following, however, was a period of 
stabilisation for the SPBS's activities, but with the relaxation. o£ war-
time conditions, saw an expansion which saw a broadening of breeding 
material (some of the material imported from overseas proved important 
to the development of Pentland Crown). 
D 
An impression. of the aims of breeding policy, and associated 
problems, at the SPBS at this time is given by Black (1953): a list of 
factors important in determining 'economic type' is given in Appendix 8. 
It is likely that researchers at this time, thought in terms of a 
series of potential new varieties. The blight and virus investigations 
were presided over by the two most senior potato scientists at the SPBS, 
Black and Cockerham respectively. Their interests seem to have deter-
mined the combination of attributes a series of potential varieties 
might have. Both Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell are the result of 
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attempts to incorporate blight and virus resistance properties in 
breeding material. Pentland Dell evolved out 'of the blight investiga-
tions and Pentland Crown from those concerned with viruses. These 
investigations deserve consideration in more detail. 
4.4 Blight investisations 
Attempts to include blight resistance in potato varieties started 
. 
properly after the epidemics of 1846-48. It was not until about 1909, 
however, that blight resistance was positively demonstrated in breeding 
material (Sa1aman, 1970). This involved a wild species, Solanum 
demissum, originally from Mexico. 
At about this time, Wilson (at St. Andrews) was using what were 
probably derivatives of S. demissum to transfer a blight immunity to 
cultivated stocks (ordinary commerical varieties termed S. tuberosum). 
This is a long process, because hybridisation must usually be followed 
by a system of repeated backcrossing to varieties of economic type in 
order to eliminate undesirable factors and bring together desired ones. 
In the proeess, it is quite likely that the original resistance will 
have become dispersed. So then it is necessary to inter-cross selected 
plants from purely bred lines in order to recombine the genes. 
Derivatives of Wilson's material formeq the original collection of 
material for the SPBS and Black's blight investiations began with this: 
the seedlings and varieties at the bottom of Pentland Dell's pedigree, 
figure 4.1, were derived from this material. 
There were four main breeding systems used by Black for testing 
blight resistance, and all are represented in Pentland Dell's pedigree. 
The first (1) is the 'multiple hybrid' system. This includes a pedigree 
produced by Wilson, with initial cross~s made at the beginning of the 
century. In figure 4.1, it is represented by seedlings and varieties 
at the bottom of Pentland Dell's family tree, below seedling 121(2). 
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The variety of S. demissurn that Wilson used cannot be identified with 
certainty, but it is probably CPC2l27, one used in more recent experi-
ments. The Wilson derivatives held their resistance until about 1932, 
but then succumbed to blight attack (the seedling l2l(2)·was used later 
":.:.: 
to derive 699(49) on account of its pollen propensity, rather than for 
any blight resistance). 
The second system (2) is that of the'S. demissum - S. tuberosum' 
one. New work began in 1932 by crossing S. demissum, CPC2l27 and 
selecting in subsequent backcross generations for resistance to the new 
strain of blight responsible for the breakdown of material produced by 
system (1). Five generations using S. demissum and three S. tuberosums 
produced seedling 877a(34), which was widely used as a parent in breeding; 
but it was on the way to obtaining this seedling that one of the ,second 
generation turned up in Pentland Dell's pedigree, 571(18), see figure 4.1. 
It was found that progenies bred only from S. demissurn and S. 
tuberosum gave segregation ratios which bore little resemblance to 
standard Mendelian ratios (due to different chromosome number and 
irregularities in species' behaviour). In order to overcome this 
difficulty, S. demissum, which is hexaploid, was crossed with the diploid 
species, S. phureja to obtain a fertile tetraploid hybrid, 735 (38'), see 
figure. ~his is the third system (3), 'So phureja - S. demissum-
S. tuberosurn 'hybrids'. The original cross was made in 1937 from 
s. phureja, CPC 1311, and S. demissum CPC2l27: the result, 735(38) was 
crossed with S. tuberosum, Gladstone, and the triple hybrids then 
backcrossed. Repeatedbackcrosses with S. tuberosum varieties followed, 
producing plants with normal chromosome behaviour. 
This breeding system (3), forms a large part of Pentland Dell's 
pedigree, up to and including se'edlings 1104a (2) and 1104 (3) ; seed-
lings which are common to both the Roslin Chania and Roslin Sasamua 
{'" 
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lines,. the parents of Pentland Dell. The last breeding system to be 
included in the pedigree is (4 f ' (S. tuberosum X S. phureja) X (S. demis-
sum X S. tuberosum) '. This is a system linking those of (2) and (3) 
and including seedlings from 571(18) and S. phureja. The only notable 
inclusion in Pentland Dell's pedigree that appears to have been a 
contribution from outside blight investigations is that embodied in 
Craigs Defiance, a variety stemming from the SPBS's virus work, with 
field immunity from several mild virus strains. 
The blight breeding systems were based upon a knowledge that 
dominant genes might control resistance to specific races (or biotypes) 
of the fungus. Th.e aim was to produce new varieties having these 
dominant genes (called R-genes). The first variety of this type was 
Pentland Ace; it was introduced in 1951, but in 1954 when its plantings 
had reached nine acres, the variety suffered a severe blight attack. 
Perhaps this was to be expected since derivatives of S. demissum 
had previously had their blight resistance broken down. Black had 
noted in the early 1950s that the value of R-gene reaistance was 
uncertain (1953, op cit), and as early as 1938 biotypes of blight had 
been identified (Reddick and Mills, 1938). Gradually it came to be 
realised amongst potato breeders that R-gene resistance was unreliable 
in the face of the versatility of blight in evolving new biotypes: no 
variety was likely to remain immune to blight for long. Research 
interest began to switch to more promising fields of enquiry, particularly 
the significance of field resistance (a quality controlled polygenically 
and not by a dominant gene: . varietal resistance manifests itself as an 
average reaction to disease, so that crops might be less affected with 
.. 
some varieties than others). 
However, although after the failure of Pentland Ace, the SPBSbegan 
to concentrate attention upon other types of resistance, Pentland Dell 
4· .. $ 
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was introduced in 1960 with three R-genes (giving immunity to the main 
blight biotypes). The variety was rapidly taken up by gr \'lers and 
accepted as a variety immune to blight. Reports that blight had been 
recorded on crops of Pentland Dell in south west England 'had supposedly 
. .' " 
been made to research service prior to the general blight immunity 
,~ .. 
breakdown (O'Neill'1968). Given the information that was apparently 
available about the nature of Pentland Dell's immunity, it is curious 
that growers were apparently taken by surprise when breakdown came 
(Hardie and Hampson, 1969). This happened generally in 1967. There-
after, the variety's share of the national maincrop declined, and 
later stabilised at a level lower than might have been e~ected, given 
its initial rapid rate of adoption, see figures 1.1 and 1.2. 
Conversations with SPBS staff suggested that Pentland Dell would 
never have been marketed without its blight immunity and certainly not 
Upon the basis of its high crop yield potential alone. This almost 
implies that the variety exists by default. However, the presence of 
S. demissum in the variety's pedigree is possibly significant, for the 
fact that it broadened what was a very narrow genetical breeding base. 
At least one observer has suggested that S. demissum contributed signi-
ficantly to pushing up varietal crop yield potential above previous 
levels (Toxopeus, 1952). It is possible that a main reason for the 
failure to"find successful competitors for Majestic and King Edward VII 
was the limited material available to breeders to increase crop yields. 
4.5 Virus investigations 
Virus related research was encouraged earlier this century by seed 
certification,schemes (organised by the Board of Agriculture for 
1 Scotland, and the Potato Synonym Committee), which enabled growers to 
propagate pure stocks true to varietal names. This greatly helped 
researchers to identify deviations from varietal type due to virus 
1 The fore-runner of DAFS. 
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infection. Also, during the 1920s, international work established the 
biological nature of virus disease. 
From the outset, some work at SPBS was desiqued to ascertain whether 
viruses could be controlled by breeding. An important step forward had 
. .~-
been achieved in America by the development of seedling USDA· 41956, a 
variety with field-immunity to a mild vuris, called 'x' (Schultz et al, 
1934); it was found that the resistance could be transmitted to hybrid 
progeny (Stevenson et al, 1939). The discovery at SPBS of the 
n~chanism of field immunity from mild viruses, soon followed (Cadman, 
1942). It was discovered that a dominant gene was responsible for a 
hypersensitive necrotic reaction, when plant tissue was invaded by a 
mild virus (the reaction works to kill plant tissue around the virus 
so that it becomes isolated and harmless). This kind of field-immunity 
was transferred to Pentland Dell, through Craigs Defiance (see figure 4.1). 
This success led to a search for field immunity from severe mosaic 
(virus 'Y'). American work concerned with both virus Y and leaf roll 
had produced Katahdin a variety which exhibited some resistance to virus 
Y, and by passing it on to progeny showed that resistance was inheri-
table (Jones & Vincent, 1937). Katahdin appears in Pentland Crown's 
pedigree, figure 4.1; this is because it was used by Hutton in Australia 
to study ~he speed and intensities of necrotic reactions to viruses~ 
It was crossed with Snowflake, an old Australian variety, useful for its 
pollen propensity (Bald & Pugsley, 1941), hence the presence of this 
variety in the pedigree. 
Hutton's research produced seedlings of a quality which prompted 
him to forecast commerc~al varieties with resistance to virus Y within 
a foreseeable future, a prophecy fulfilled by Pentland Crown. The 
nature of resistance was found not to be field immunity, but field 
resistance (Hutton, 1948). It was a seedling from the Snowflake-
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Katahdin crosses which was received from Hutton by the SPBS and crossed 
in the late 1940s to obtain Pentland Crown's parent, seedling 11-79, 
see figure 4.1. An indication of international co-operation is shown 
by the fact that Hutton's virus investigations had received valuable 
" "'-
virus strains from Britain (from Bawden at the Rothshampst~~ 
Experimental Station). 
Pentland Crown's other parent, G414a(64), is a product wholly of 
the SPBS's virus investigations and is responsible for the new variety's 
degree of resistance to leaf roll. It had been noticed early on that 
varietal differences in reaction differed in relation to infection from 
leaf roll virus, however, no type of resistance was known. varieties 
which had showed less than average susceptibility were grown in field 
trials of SPBS where they would be exposed to natural infection. It 
seems that these continued upon a year-to-year basis without any 
certainty as to how long they should take. Some degree of resistance 
was first recognised as inheritable in trials between 1933 and 1935 and 
three varieties were selected as promising: one of them was Southesk, 
a qrand-parent of Pentland Crown, see figure 4.1. 
It is likely that one of the 2164 seedlings raised from Southesk 
during 1939-40 was G414a(64). This seedling was put through leaf roll 
trials during the 1940s, then selected as suitable for commerical 
hybridisation. The other parent of Pentland Crown, seedling 11-79 was 
being used for virus·aphid research and it was a hunch of Black's which 
put the two together. 
The origin of Pentland Crown's comnon scab (Steptomyces s'cabies) 
resistance is'a mystery and cannot be explained in relation to the 
pedigrees shown in figure 4.1, as the varieties there seem susceptible. 
Likewise is Pentland Dell's spraing susceptibility. These factors 
would not have gone unnoticed by the SPBS, however, their importance was 
.. 
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probably thought secondary to the main aim of producing commercial 
varieties with resistance to severe viruses and blight. 
4.6 The importance of tl.!,':: blight and virus programmes· 
The contributions of the blight and virus programmes w~re necessary 
to bring about Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. In a sense the 
success of these varieties is only a part of the return to research 
if the purpose was to produce a series of varietal types with resistance 
to blight and virus. The research would have gone on at the SPBS 
regardless of whether the new varieties had been introduced or not. 
Thus, the costs associated with these activities were not caused by the 
new varieties directly, but by the need to have varieties with resis-
tance to virus and blight, so that the likelihood (or possibility) that 
varieties such as Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell would one day be 
facilitated and produced. 
The research itself has probably had a contributory effect to 
knowledge generally. The work in geneco10gy in relation to blight 
and viruses has, one observer has written, given the SPBS an inter-
national reputation, for a contribution of the "wiqest significance up 
to the early 1960s" (Russel, op cit: p.360). Two papers which 
appeared to attract international interest were ones concerned with the 
classification of blight biotypes (Black, 1952) and the nature of field 
immunity to virus X (Cadman op cit). 
4.7 The development of potential varieties 
A period of varietal development can be described as that'period 
from the year of hybridisation to varietal regi~tra.tion and marketing. 
At the time of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell this took eight years: 
one for hybridisation, four for screening at the SPBS and another three, 
involved with 'merit trials'. The process is pictorially represented 
I 
in figure 4.2 and in terms of the approximate numbers of seedlings 
involved at each state in table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 Approximate development path of Pentland Crown 
Number of individual 
seedlings at P.C. 
development stage 
(a) 
1951 Hybridisation 
1952 8,000 
1953 2,000 
1954 400 
1955 100 
1956 7 
1957 4 
1958 2 
Number of plants 
per seedling 
1 
3 
8 
40 
(b) 
1/25th acre 
1/8th acre 
1/2 acre 
Source: SPBS staff recollections and Annual Reports 
Year of 
Merit Trial 
(c) 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
Promising breeding material was supplied from research investiga-
tions, or from elsewhere, for hybridisation: after which seed (balls 
or potato plums) was harvested and stored for a following (usually the 
next) year. Early selection was made upon the basis of Il'Orphological 
characters, such as the attractiveness of haulm, stolon length, shape 
and colour of tubers and freedom from tuber disease. Little reliance 
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was put upon yield at the single plant stage, but tuber size and numbers 
were regarded as a,good indicator (preferably few and large). In the 
early 1950s single plant selections were planted straight into the open 
ground. 
The attrition rateaIl'Ongst seedlings was highest at the end of the 
first year, see table 4.1. In the second year after hybridisation, 
seedling plant number was increased to three and more accurate assess-
ments were made of morphological characters. Yield indicators were 
still liable to be misleading. Tests involved checking for tuber 
diseases such as common scab and the appearance of virus effects from 
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new variety distributed to trade 
- - - -- - -
3rd year merit trial 
2nd year merit trial 
1st year merit trial 
~- - -- r---II--..a - - - -
4th year SPBS trial/tests 
3rd year SPBS trial/test 
2nd year SPBS trial/tests 
1st year SPBS trial/tests 
hybridisaticin 
research programmes 
Figure .... 2 The development stages of a potential variety during the 19505 
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infection in the previous year, and for specific strains of blight. 
The third year involved tests for wart disease and Virus X, yield 
trials of a limited nature and observations upon the incidence of disease 
generally. Tubers were also examined for cooking quality ~ (not to be 
... , 
unpleasant: texture, consistency, colour and flavour were "considered) • 
By the end of this year, researchers could obtain a reasonably accurate 
impression of the probable advantages. 
The fourth year involved a repeat of the third for environmental 
factors, prior to submission for use in the 'merit trials'. At the 
end of this stage, approximately half a dozen seedlings might have been 
of sufficient standard to go further and be available in enough quantity 
to provide at least one-twentyfifth of an acre. 
Potential varieties were then submitted to the Agricultural 
Scientific Services Station (the official seed testing at East Craigs, 
by Edinburgh) for authoritative assessment (these were called during 
the 1940s and 1950s, the Official Immunity and Merit Trials) • The 
purpose of the trials was to provide an independent assessment of 
potential varieties; to prevent the marketing of wart susceptible or 
synonym varieties and to discourage the marketing of mediocre types. 
Confirmatory tests and assessments were carried out by other 
organisations. Final decisions about whether a seedling received a 
commendation, which signified that a seedling was believed to be of a 
standard at least equivalent to that of existing varieties were made 
by a Potato Trials Advisory Committee (which included both scientists 
and growers). A full description of the merit trials and criteria of 
assessment appears in Davidson (1964). 
4.8 The introduction of new varieties to the potato industry 
Upon commendation seedlings were named and registered with the 
DAFS. Throughout this latter period the SPBS (with help from the 
society's members) would have been maintaining virus-free stocks, and 
multiplying the number of plants; so that at the end of the merit 
trials enough stock existed for marketing and distribution to research 
organisations (for further tests and trials). Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell were marketed in different ways. 
Stocks of Pentland Crown were handed over in the year of naming, 
1958, to an agent appointed by the society (J. C. Dougall Limited, 
Auchterarder). The agent was a certified seed potato merchant 
(referred to as a raiser· in the industry) and he received half an acre 
of stock from the SPBS's virus-free nucleus. The agent was permitted 
to grow the variety for one year before distribution, but then in the 
second, was required to distribute three-quarters of the stock to other 
seed potato merchants. The society retained the right to distribute 
small quantities to research organisations for experimental purposes 
and with the agent's consent, to some approved raisers of virus-tested 
stocks (SPBS, 1956). 
Pentland Dell was not handed over to an agent but upon registration 
and naming, in 1960, was given to the OAFS, who distributed stocks to a 
number of selected certified seed producers (SPBS, 1961). This change 
in procedure resulted in a faster extension of the variety to ware 
growers than probably would have been the case with the system used for 
1 Pentland Crown. Pentland Dell is first recorded in PMB acreage 
1 The author heard allegations that Pentland Crown had been deliberately 
released to the market slowly by raisers to maximise the scarcity value 
of the variety and keep up certified seed prices (conversations with 
PMB staff, Edinburgh). These allegations appear to have originated from 
certified seed merchants in England. Unfortunately, although these 
allegations were investigated, the raisers who marketed Pentland Crown 
(and those associated with Pentland Dell) were no longer available to 
provide information for this study, and so nothing is known, in any 
reliable detail, of the early circumstances of Pentland Crown (and 
Pentland Dell). Hay gives some information about raisers generally 
(1969): where it is suggested that certified seed stock can take between 
four to eight years to reach the ware grower, after introduction by a plant 
breeder. 
..;. 
statistics in 1965, the same year that Pentland Crown first appeared 
there, but the former variety had been introduced two years earlier. 
A faster marketing means that growers receive the advantages of new 
varieties all the sooner (and, therefore, the returns to investment are 
the greater), but also, that more growers are likely to be involved in 
the 'learning process' associated with the new variety __ If things go 
wrong under commercial conditions then more growers will be adversely 
affected. So, ironically, the speedier marketing of Pentland Dell 
might have meant that its blight immunity breakdown was felt by a 
maximum of growers. 
A more comprehensive, yet rigorous testing of new varieties under 
actual commercially conditions might have cushioned the learning 
1 process for growers. It was a consequence of the pqtato growing 
industry's experience with Pentland Dell that led the PMB and Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) to co-operate together in 
commercial trials for 'recently introduced varieties,.2 
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Once information is present with regard to varietal behavio\lr, it has 
to be published in a form which can be passed on to, and understood by the 
farming community. The main organisation responsible for doing this, as 
well as carrying out trials and tests (collating and conducting assess-
ments), is the National Institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB), and in 
Scotland, the DAFS; a full account of the NIAB's varietal assessments 
is given below' (Section 7.1) • 
1 
2 
There is evidence that the learning process uncovered several faults, in 
Pentland Crown.as well as Pentland Dell. The latter's extreme susecp-
tibility to spraing (Section 7.8) and propensity to trouble from little 
potato (Section 7.1) were 'grower discoveries' (conversations with NIAB 
staff). Pentland Crown gave trouble-from damage and storage problems, 
part of it because the ne~ variety had been ~reated as if it were like 
Majestic (Section 7.8). A general critique of the extension and advisory 
part of the agricultural res~arch service is Marcellin (1973); it is des-
cribed as the weak point in the development and application of innovation. 
The reasons for the trials are given in a footnote, Section 7.1: the' 
relationship to the NIAB assessments is also noted. 
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The information published by the NIAB takes a form of a leaflet, 
with notes about varieties recommended for commercial use: the informa-
tion is based upon trials carried out at several centres in Britain, and 
is up-dated every year, see for example, NIAB (1971). In addition to 
'" ',-
this source, growers and merchants may obtain information, p~rhaps of a 
more local character, from the regional offices of the ADAS (which often' 
have direct links to local experimental centres). 
It seems likely, however, that growers generally rely upon the~r 
certified seed supplier for the main part of their information about 
new varieties (see Jones, 1963, for a full account of sources of 
information available to farmers, and how they are used). One other 
important source is the PMB, which regularly sends out publications to 
registered growers, and organises trials and meetings. 
4.9 The relation of R&D to costs 
There are three features associated with R&D costs, which this 
chapter has brought to light. The most important is that the new 
varieties were a product of an existing system. That is, R&D arrange-
ments would have existed anway, whether Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
had been introduced or not. In this sense, the new varieties are 
unlikely to have contributed significantly to R&D costsl yet the 
system existed to'produce new varieties. 
The other., two features are the long-time scales involved (from 
hybridisation it was fourteen and twelve years to the time Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell respectively made an impression upon national 
acreages), and the contributions of individuals (the flair which put 
seedlings G4l4a(64) and 11-79 together: the work of Hutton in Australia). 
Factors such as these make the application of economic appraisal 
difficult in fields associated with investment in R&D. 
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It will be remembered that other work in agricultural R&D has 
concentrated largely upon methodological problems associated with 
deriving net benefit. The problems associated with R&D investment 
< 
costs were ones more of uncertainty than approach. For e~ample, in 
Griliches' hybrid corn study, his approach was to take R&D as a 
whole, and the main problem was simply a lack of cost estimates. Thus, 
he was forced to make allowances and cost approximations which were 
pure guesses (Section 3.6). 
This study, when it comes to uncertainty about R&D costs, is no 
exception to the rule. It is hoped, however, that the above description 
of the background to the introduction of the new varieties has been such 
to enable the reader to see cost estimates in a true ~ense of proportion. 
So that in the following chapter, concerned with the derivation of R&D 
cost, approximations (if only educated guesses) will be understood. 
4.10 A summary of this chapter's main points 
The traditional method of cost control leaves records in a form 
which is unsuitable for CRA. The institutional background was 
considered, and the development of the R&D programme at SPBS linked 
to the pedigree of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. The original aims 
of the station were specifically Scottish ones, but in time, they seem 
to have been generalised. The work of the SPBS can be understood as 
falling into two parts, research and development. 
Although breeding was begun from the beginning of the SPBS's life, 
50 years ago, the·emphasis was upon research, with a view to laying a 
foundation for a scientific approach to breeding. The problem in the 
early stages was associated with general ignorance. 
It was not long before blight and virus considerations dominated 
research. Pentland Dell and Pentland Crown represen~ outcomes from 
--=""""-----------~~~.--.-~- .. -----~"--- -- .. _ ...... _-----._--_. 
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these research activities, respectively. Pentland Dell represents an 
attempt to develop a variety with (a now redundant) resistance to 
. - -
blight, whilst Pentland Crown is a variety with resistance to the Y 
and leaf roll viruses. Other characters associated with these 
- . 
varieties, such as spraing susceptibility and common scab resistance, 
cannot be linked with any conscious effort on the SPBS part (except in 
terms of recognition in screening procedures). 
The work on blight and virus research has given the SPBS an 
international reputation. 
The development side of breeding involves screening and selection 
of promising seedlings. A seedling required a minimum of 7 years to 
reach registration and naming. The last three years involved 
assessment by bodies external to the SPBS, to judge the merits of 
varieties for commercial use. 
At the end of development varieties were released to the seed trade. 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were marketed in different ways: this 
affected the speed with which they reached ordinary ware growers for 
general cultivation. It was impossible to obtain information about 
this stage of the varieties' history. 
In a"direct sense, it seems unlikely that the two varieties 
contributed to R&D costs to an extent which would have changed total 
costs significantly-from what they might have been without the new 
.' 
varieties. However, the R&D system as a whole was established to 
facilitate the production of new varieties such as Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
.. 
Derivation of estimates for the R&D investment cost 
5.1 Records of R&D costs at the SPBS 
The record of expenditure at the SPBS for the period from the foun-
dation to the time when the Pentland Crown. and Pentland Dell were 
marketed, was of an input accountancy form (that is, according to 
expenditure upon items used, rather than activity); a method used 
commonly throughout the research service at that time. The information 
is available in the form of statements of expenditure, published in the 
SPBS's annual reports. A copy of one such statement, representative of 
the others used for this study, is to be found in Appendix 8. 
Totals of expenses taken from this source appear in column (a) table 
5.1. Some totals are approximations between those of a previous and 
subsequent year, because records were missing: however, these are- ft!w 
and are denoted in the table by an asterisk. There are no records for 
expenditure for potato R&D specifically and so the totals refer to the 
whole SPBS's programme of work. 
Totals cover all expenditure, including capital and administrative 
costs. They therefore reflect the costly move of the SPBS from Craigs 
House to Pent1andfie1d in the early 1950s. The contribution of funds 
to this operation began in the post-war years of the 1940s and reached 
their highest point around the mid-1950s. For example, in 1954 
capital expenditure amounted to about £0.48m out of the total, £0.075m 
(SPBS, 1954: pp.10-13). It is hoped that the distorting effect of 
elements such as these are allowed for, at the end of each cost period 
(below, Section 5.4) by treating asset's then, as receipts. 
where it can be detected in the accounts, is omitted. 
Depreciation, 
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TABLE 5.1 
SPBS Expenses: Derivation of Potato R&D costs (£s) 
.t. : 
Total 
SPBS Price Adjusted Staff Total '-Salary Potato 
expenses Index Expenses Ratio Expenses .'-Ratio Expenses 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) ,- ~';-(f ) (g) 
1922 3930 3.8 14934 1.3-1.3 7467 
1923 4611 4.0 18444 9622 
1924 3641 4.0 14564 7282 
1925 3803 3.9 14832 7416 
1926 3321 4.0 13284 6642 
1927 3900 4.1 15990 2-1 5330 
1928 3719 4.2 15620 2-1 5207 
1929 1399 4.2 14276 3-3 7138 
1930 5953 4.4 26193 3-4 14967 
1931 5405 4.7 25399 3-4 14514 
1932 5132 4.8 24634 3-4 14077, 
1933 4981 5.0 24905 3-4 14231 
1934 5156 4.9 25264 3-3 12632 
1935 5124 4.9 25108 3-3 12554 
1936 5235 4.7 24604 3-3 12302 
1937 5425 4.5 24412 3-3 12206 
1938 6007 4.5 27031 5-3 10137 
1939 7070 4.2 29694 5-3 11135 
1940 6363 4.0 25452 5-3 9544 
1941 6487 3.8 24651 4-3 10565 
1942 7638 3.6 27497 3-3 13748 
1943 6820 3.3 22506 3-3 11253 
1944 6796 3.1 21069 2-2 10534 
1945 6889 2.9 19978 2-2 9989 
1946 8096 2.6 21050 3-4 12029 
1947 11088 2.5 27720 5-4 12320 
1948 15598 2.3 35875 5-4 15944 
1949 18448 2.2 40586 6-4 16034 
1950 23343 2.2 51355 7-5 21398 
1951 31788 2.0 63576 6-5 28898 
1952 38826 1.9 73769 .6-4 29508 50 36884 
1953 ~60260 1.8 108468 7-4 39443 45 48811 
1954 75526 1.8 135947 8-4 45316 43 58457 
1955 70849 1.8 126880 8-4 42293 40 50752 
1956 51783 1.7 88031 10-5 29344 39 34332 
1957 49859 1.6 79774 11-5 24929 39 31112 
1958 61584- 1.6 98531 11-5 30792 39 38428 
1959 54372 1.6 86995 12-6 28998 39 33928 
1960 57184 1.6 91494 12-6 30498 38 32023 
Source: (a) (d) SPBS Annual Reports 
(b) Appendix 9 
(f) SPBS ~ecords 
" 
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It is sometimes suggested in literature concerned with investment 
appraisal, that only those costs directly associated with the R&D in 
question should be taken into account (capital outlays and fixed costs 
excluded). In questions associated with future expenditure, this is so.l 
The concern in this study, however, is a retrospectvie one, the computa-
tion of an average rate of return on previous investment. 
How the totals shown in table 5.1 reflect the alternative value of 
R&D resources is uncertain. As Nicholson has observed, too little is 
known about the opportunity costs of research resources to use estimates 
which depart from market values in CBA, with any degree of certainty 
(1969). Thus, there is no correction of estimates in the table for 
use in this study. 
However, it is necessary to take account of time. The estimates 
shown in column (a)-do not allow for the effects of differences in the 
purchasing value of money over time. Purchasing value of money is not 
constant, pound for pound, over time. 
5.2 The use of a price index to adjust money values to a constant 
standard for measurement and reference over time 
This century, prices in Britain generally, have tended to rise 
over time, so that the pound in recent years has tended to purchase 
fewer goods and services than it had done previously. This means that 
costs and benefits measured in one year might not be comparable to those 
valued in another. 
1 This sometimes involves the principle of 'bygones are bygones': that 
past expenditure is irrelevant to future developments, which is to say, 
that any investment decision must be made upon the basis of a 
comparison of future expenditure with future-returns. It does not 
imply that past R&D is irrelevant, for its effects upon the future, 
but that marginal changes in 'expenditure should lead to returns greater 
than those obtainable elsewhere from investing the funds in alternative 
activities. 
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To allow for this, it is usual in CBA studies to adjust values by 
-
weighting them, using a price index. For this present study, it was 
decided to use a general output price index. This is the Consumer 
Price Index, compiled annually by H.M. Treasury for national accounting 
purposes. Details about how it is derived, a copy of the index and 
table of weights compiled from the index, are contained in Appendix 9. 
If there are grounds for believing that changes in relative prices 
of R&D or agricultural resources might have been ignored or hidden by 
a general index, then a specialised input index could be used. For 
example, Peterson used an index based upon the salaries of associate 
professors in large American universities, to convert values used in 
his p::>ultry study (1967 op cit). 
The MAFF publishes a specialised index, the 'agricultural price 
indices (all products)', and this indicates that agricultural prices 
were more general~depressed during the 1920s and 1930s, than prices 
generally in the economy (as reflected by the consumer price index). 
This index, however, varied throughout the period relevant to this 
study, when the bases and methodology were changed at various times. 
Thus, it was decided to use the general index. 
The~SPBS expenses shown in column (a), table 5.1, were adjusted 
" 
to 1971 £s values, shown in column (b). Adjustment was achieved by 
weighting the valu~s by the percentage changes in the annual value of 
the pound from 1971 (the latest year for which most· data was available 
for this study).. So, for example, if the price index shews that for 
year preceding 1971, prices were 10% lower, then the adjusted value of 
the pound is correspondingly more in the year in question, and costs 
and benefits in that year must be inf.lated by 10% (multiplied by 1.10). 
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5.3 Derivation of potato R & D.~~xpenses 
Since input accounting does not list expenditure by activity, there 
is no record at the SPBS which proportion of expenses has been due to 
potato R&D on the one hand and that of forage crop plants on the other. 
It is necessary to devise a method by which total expenses can be 
apportioned between the two kinds of activity. Except in the instance 
of scientists, no reliable record had been kept at the SPBS of what the 
potato and forage departments had taken in terms of resources. 
Staff lists appear in the SPBS's annual reports, and from these it 
was possible to derive ratios of forage to potato scientists. Since 
conversations with SPBS staff suggested that the number of staff 
employed in the two departments was proportional to the resources used 
by the departments, it seemed that these ratios could be used to 
apportion total SPBS's expenses. 
The staff ratios that were used are shown in column (c) table 5.1; 
the figures on the right hand side denote potato scientists and on the 
left, those of forage. The estimated potato R&D expenses are listed 
in column (d). Only staff records of scientific and experimental 
grade scientists were used: since at that level personnel were less 
likely to have been exchanged between departments, than say, scientific 
assistants. 
Records at the SPBS were such, that it would have been possible 
after 1951 to have used staff salaries rather than number. This might 
seem a superior method, because size of salary might be an indication 
of the resources a scientist has at his command. The result of this 
method is to increase the proportion of expens~s taken by the potato 
department, perhaps because th~ senior scientists had been there longer 
than their counterparts in the forage department, see columns (e) and 
(f), table 5.1. To be consistent, however, this study uses staff 
number, since little is known about salaries prior to the early 1950s. 
5.4 Apportionment of R&D e~,' 'enses between specific va:r.\_~· 
There is a lack of a formal relationship between research input and 
varietal output, particr.,Jarly given the chancy nature of hybridisation. 
However, as noted in the previous chapter, there has been a systematic 
organisation of R&D effort aimed to facilitate that"cha~¢e' was 
biased towards the introduction of new varieties, such as Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell. 
It seems then that it is relevant to consider the whole potato 
R&D costs incurred prior to the introduction of the new varieties. 
This was the procedure adopted by Grilichesi he did not consider the 
specific costs of any hybrid corn varieties, but instead attempted to 
estimate the costs of the system of R&D which made those varieties 
possible. 
The inclusion of all potato R&D costs in the CBA arithmetic 
would take account of 'dry holes', the failures (or dead-ends) to be 
expected in R & Di for example, the blight immunity breakdown of Pent-
land Ace (Section 4.4). This might go some way to answering criticism 
that CBA studies of investment in agricultural R&D only measure the 
effects of successful innovations (Section 9.15). However, taking all 
R&D costs might be too conservative a bias against the returns from 
the SPBS innovation, since it involves a 50 year investment period. 
A high discount rate would probably make net benefits achieved in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s seem very small in relation to the costs of 
R&D investment. 
An alternative to the whole of R&D costs approach is that which 
Uses .varietal development periods to apportion expenses. This might 
be said to ignore research posts to the extent ,that potato costs prior 
to years of hybridisation are ~ot considered. This need not be 
unreasonable, since it seems unlikely that research programmes would 
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have been affected, or different, had not individual varieties been bred. 
This means that only those costs incurred for 1951 to 1960 would be 
relevant, for this is the period in which the developments of Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Oell happened. There were of course, other 
seedlings, which turned into named varieties, undergoing trial and 
multiplication at that time (see Appendix 8), however, only three of 
these, Pentland Beauty, Pentland Hawk and Pentland Ivory have achieved 
commercial success to date in terms of having planted acreage recorded 
in the PMB statistics: this SUCCess was modest, and is described in 
Section 9.9). 
Thus, potato expenses could be divided between these successful 
varieties, or all named varieties, or estimated number of seedlings 
undergoing development. The former approach is adopted as the more 
conservative assumption which means that during the early years of 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Oell's developments, potato costs are shared 
with Pentland Beauty, and for the later years, with Pentland Hawk and 
Pentland Ivory. 
The methods of taking all SPBS's potato R&D costs and the develop-
ment period approach, are not the only possibilities of cost apportion-
-
mente Many variations are possible. For example, expenses could be 
treated ona decade basis, the net returns to which would come from 
" SPBS's varieties, (or only Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell) achievements 
in a following decade to that of R&D costs. Another might be to 
compute average R & 0 costs per year, divide the number of R & 0 years 
by successful commercial varieties, multiply the two results together 
to derive an average R& 0 cost and time period. Then in a'similar 
way, average all benefits and compute a rate of return to the average 
R & 0 cost. These method~ and ones like them' are less specific and 
thus less pertinent to a study"concerned with Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Oell. Also, given the wide margin of error that probably 
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exists for whichever method is chosen, refinements did not seem worthwhile. 
The two methods of considering investment cost, the longer time 
'.span one of taking all potato R&D costs to 1960"let this be termed 
'whole potato R&D investment cost', and the shorter one which just 
covers the development period of the new varieties, let this:be termed 
'development investment cost', are chosen for use in this present study. 
The appropriate potato expenses for the two methods are shown in tables 
5.2 and 5.3 respectively. 
For development investment cost, it is seen that total potato 
expenses are divided between the number of seedlings which later 
achieved commercial success, column (c), to derive estimates of cost 
shares for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, column (d). The item 
'funds' at the beginning and end of the cost periods, refers to the 
assets of the SPBS at the times shown. These are taken to represent 
the purchase price of the initial investment outlay at the beginning 
and re-sale value at the end (these totals will of course differ when 
discounting is used). 
5.5 The use of discount rates to adjust the values of costs and 
benefits to reflect a decision maker's time preference in 
foregoing current expendituretd'obtainfuture benefit 
(a) The concepts of discounting and present value 
The potato expenses shown in tables 5.2 and 5.3 require adjustment 
to reflect a 'present value' (as net benefit will have to be discounted): 
this involves a discounting procedure widely used in investment 
I 
appraisal generally. Discounting is based upon the assumption that 
1 A history of developments which led to the general adoption of dis-
counting in investment appraisal generally is given in Shaw (1968). 
The use of associated present value techniques has only in recent 
times found general acceptance. It is likely that encouragement 
from bodies such as the National Economic Development Council has been 
important to a wider understanding of discounting (NEDC, 1965).' 
It is feasible to allow for inflation effects simply by an upward 
adjustment of discount rates instead of using price index. However, 
,this would ,imply that inflation rates "were constant, which is unlikely: 
also it might act to confuse what the discount rates are meant to measure. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Potato Research Costs 1921-1960 (£5) 
Potato Discount factor Discounted expenses 
Fds at expenses 5% 10% .5% 10% 
1921 81747 0 0 81747 81747 
1922 7467 0 0 7467· 7467 
1923 9222 0.952 0.909 8779 8183 
1924 7282 0.907 0.826 6605 6015 
1925 7416 0.864 0.751 6407 5569 
1926 6642 0.823 0.683 5466 4536 
1927 5330 0.784 0.621 4179 3310 
1928 5207 0.746 . 0.564 3884 2937 
1929 7138 0.711 0.513 5075 3662 
1930 14967 0.677 0.467 10133 7005 
1931 14515 0.645 0.424 9362 6154 
1932 14077 0.614 0.386 8643 5434 
1933 14231 0.585 0.350 8325 4981 
1934 12632 0.557 0.319 7036 4030 
1935 12554 0.530 0.290 6654 3641 
1936 12303 0.505 0.263 6213 3235 
1937 12206 0.481 0.239 5871 2661 
1938 10137 0.458 0.218 4643 2210 
1939 11135 0.436 0.198 4855 2205 
1940 9544 0.416 0.180 3970 1718 
1941 10565 0.396 0.164 4184 1733 
1942 13748 0.377 0.149 . 5183 2048 
1943 11253 0.359 0.135 4040 1519 
1944 10534 0.342 0.123 3603 1296 
1945 9;989 0.326 0.112 3256 1119 
1946 12029 0.310 0.102 3729 1227 
1947 12320 0.205 0.092 3634 1133 
1948 15944 0.281 0.084 4480 1339 
1949 16234 0.268 0.076 4351 1234 
1950 21398 0.255 0.069 5456 1476 
1951 28898 0.243 0.063 7022 1821 
1952 29508 0.231 0.057. 6816 1682 
1953 39443 0.220 0.052 8677 2051 
1954 45316 0.210 0.047 9516 2130 
1955 42293 0.200 0.043 8459 1819 
1956 29344 0.190 0.039 5575 1144 
1957 24929 . 0.181 0.036 4512 897 
1958 30792 0.173 0.032 5327 985 
1959 28998 0.164 0.029 4756 841 
1960 304~a 0.157 0.027 478a 823 
Fds at 
1960 82739 0.157 0.027 -12990 -2234 
299688 192783 
Note: Calculated using Tab~e 5.1 
'<:I' 
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TABLE 5.3 Costs of potato research: A breakdown of e!Eense on the basis of time Eeriods corresEondin~ to the 
'development' Eeriods ofsUccessfu1SPBS varieties 
Potato expenses Share of expenses to Discounted expenses of individual 
1971 values individual varieties varieties 
. ' ," Nos • Share Pentland Crown Pentland Dell 
.. (al (b) (c) (d) (f) (g) 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
Fds at ··Apri1 1950 ·45432 2 22716 22716 22716 
1951 28898 2 14449 14449 14449 
1952 29508 2 14754 14046 13411 
Fds at April 1952 38188 3 12729 12729 12729 
1953 39443 3 13148 11925 8471 13148 13148 
1954 45316 3 15105 13051' 11344 14380 13730 
1955 42293 3 14098 11603 9629 12787 11645· 
1956 29344 2 14672 11503 9111 12677 11019 
1957 24929 2 12464 9298 7030 10259 8513 
1958 30792 3 10264 7298 4793 8047 6374 
Fds at April 1958 75760 3 25253 -17955 -11793 
97934 89161 
1959 28998 3 9666 7211 5452 
1960 30498 3 10166 7228 5215 
Fds at April 1960 82739 3 27580 
-19608 -14149 
78857 73676 
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money is worth less received or paid in the future than it is when 
received or paid in the present, and is a method which involves weighting 
investment costs and benefits, by use of an interest rate, so that they 
reflect 'present values'. For example, if the cost of an_investor, in 
terms of foregoing current consumption, is 10% (this is called his time 
preference), then £121 due to be received or paid in two years' time, 
should be discounted by a 10% interest rate, which would deflate the 
sum in present value terms to £100, at the start of the two years. 
The principle works in reverse to the idea of compound interest: 
if £100 is lent out now for two years at 10% compound interest, then 
the amount due to the investor would be £121 at the end of the period. 
More formally, present value is expressed by the following formula: 
p ~ A/(l+r)n 
Where P is the present value of a future sum; A is the future sum 
itself; r is the discount rate, and n is the number of years. 
The process of discounting costs and benefits is simplified by the 
availability of present value (or discounted cash flow) tables. These 
state the present value of 1 receivable at various future years: for 
instance, totals are usually presented for 1% to 10% interest rates, 
for one to fifty years from the present time. Tables are contained 
in an appendix to Merret and Sykes (1966, pp.150-157), and are 
calculated from the above formula. 
(b) The choice of an appropriate interest rate for discounting 
The major problem associated with discounting is that a choice 
must be made as to which interest rate is most appropriate to reflect 
the decision maker's time preference. This is important, since it might 
make the difference between Mhether or not an investment looks acceptable. 
A high rate of interest lends greater weight to costs and benefits 
realised towards the beginning of an "investment project, than would a 
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low one. A large proportion of public investment is probably of a type 
where costs are initially high, but with benefits delayed a long time 
into the future. 
This is certainly the case with plant breeding investment. In 
fact, given the whole potato R&D investment cost assUmptibn, it is 
approximately forty-three years from the starting date of the invest-
ment to when the first net benefit is recorded. Unfortunately, the 
problem is not straightforward. If a relatively low rate of interest 
is adopted for publicly funded investment, it is likely that, ultimately, 
the size of the public sector would grow relative to that of the 
private. Thus, the issue tends .to be controversial: a large part of 
the theoretical literature associated with CBA application is about the 
choice of discount rates. 
In a perfectly competitive economy a single rate of interest will, 
in equilibrium, indicate not only time preference but also measure the 
opportunity cost of investment funds (the returns foregone, obtainable 
from alternative investment). In the real world, however, many 
interest rates are observable. 
For some years past, government departments appear to have generally 
applied a discount rate of 10% (Harrison and Mackie, 1973). It appears 
that t~is figure is held to be approximately equal to the minimum 
return on capital acceptable from private investment projects; after 
allowing for distortions caused by taxation, risk, et cetera (see 
H.M. Treasury, 1966). 
This ignores the possibility that differences might exist between 
private and social, individual and collective, time preferences. 
These could exist for se/veral reasons, but most notably because of 
.. 
market distortions (see Musgrave, 1969; Metzler, 1951), or more simply, 
because the needs of individuals and firms tend to be more immediate 
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than those of society collectively (Pigou, op cit.,. These reasons 
suggest that the discount rates which would be appropriate for private 
investment might be too high for public investment appraisal. 
The arguments surrounding discount rates have genera fly been 
" 
avoided by analysts themselves. This is because it is possible to 
present CBA results for a. range of discount rates, without unduly 
extending space given to calculations, and thereby leave the problem of 
h ' tthd" ak 1 c 01ce 0 e eC1S1on-m ere 
This, it was decided, would be done for this present study, 
taking two rates, 5% and 10%. These are generally the two picked 
for previous studies of investment in agricultural R&D. The inception 
of investment and so year 0 for discounting, are assumed at 1922, for 
the whole potato R&D investment cost, and 1951 and 1952 for the 
development investment costs of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
respectively. 
1 Theoretically the consideration of appropriate discount rates Can 
become very complicated, particularly with respect to the nature of 
opportunity cost resulting to the private sector from the different 
ways in which public investment may be financed. If public expen-
diture is increased at the expense of the private sector, both 
private investment and consumption might be displaced, with attendant 
multiplied effects for further investment and consumption. It may be 
that the benefit of the public investment itself, will have consequences 
for private spending. 
Many practical difficulties arise in considering these possibilities; 
most "of them ,associated with lack of knowledge. These,. involve knowing 
from where a specific investment's funds come from, the contribution 
from private consumption and investment, what kind of investment, and 
how market dist9rtions and uncertainty could be important to interest 
rate determination. Feldstein has attempted to formalize some of 
these questions (see 1964 abc). 
Prest and Turvey (op cit) have indicated that anlysts have not succeeded 
in quantifying the usually very difficult expressions involved. It 
seems necessary to assume that both costs and benefits of publicly 
funded investments consist exclusively of consumption, and that if 
private .investment opportunities are influenced, the effects are only 
marginal, so that their present value is zero (for a discussion of the 
significance of marginality in association"with these questions, see 
Millward, op cit: Section 9.5). 
No discount greater than 10% was chosen because of the long time 
periods involved between the inception of R&D costs and realisation 
of net benefit. A high rate would seem to make net benefit insigni-
ficant to investment cost. As it is, the effect of discount rates of 
5% and 10% are quite marked, see tables 5.2 and 5.3. . It is seen that 
potato expenses are markedly reduced towards the end of the investment 
periods; drastically adjusted downwards in the instance of the 1922 to 
1960 expenses, under both discount assumptions, table 5.2. The effect 
upon net benefits received after the mid-1960s will be even more drastic. 
An alternative method to taking present value at the inception of 
R&D investment is the inverse of discounting, the method of applying 
an interest charge to R&D costs and compounding expenses forward to 
a date at the end of the investment period (and discounting net benefits 
thereafter from that point). The results would be the same, that is, 
within the error of rounding off net benefit estimates. Since the 
straightforward application of the discounting from investment inception 
approach seems to be the one most commonly applied in British CBA 
studies it was decided to use it here. 
The use of 5% and 10% rates of discount in conjunction with the 
R&D investment cost periods in tables 5.2 and 5.3,.produces six 
estimates of R&D total investment cost. For the whole potato 
investment cost, incurred between 1922 and 1960, estimates of around 
£300,000 and £200,000 are obtained at the 5% and 10% rates of discount 
respectively, table 5.2. The total cost of Pentland Crown's develop-
ment period, 1951 to 1958, is estimated at £100,000·and £90,000, at 
the 5% and 10% rates respectively; whilst for Pentland Dell, 1953 to 
1960, it is £80,000 and £70,000 respectively, table 5.3. These are the 
investment costs of R&D upon which a rate of return can be based. l 
1 " These are presented here as the best indication of costs: to see how 
sensitive the overall CBA results are to estimates of investment cost, 
a range of investment cost is considered below, Section 9.5 
~,. T--~--'~---_-----·----I 
5.6 R&D costs incurred outside the SPBS 
--. 
Costs involved in R&D, testing and extension of information about 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, incurred by agencies and organisations 
external to the SPBS were not included in the estimates of investment 
cost. Included in these might be the costs associated with virus 
research abroad, particularly that of Hutton in Australia (and before 
that, America), without which Pentland Crown's virus Y resistance would 
not have been obtained. 
However, since this present study is concerned with Britain, no 
attempt has been made to consider the international contribution to the 
SPBS's work. Instead, it might reasonably be assumed that any costs 
to outside agencies (including those in Britain) are matched by the 
costs to the SPBS (and therefore, included in the whole potato R&D 
investment cost assumption) of its own contribution to outside. l 
Since extra seed costs will be included as a consideration in the 
derivation of net benefit, to include effects upon the certified seed 
industry in investment cost would be to double count. However, the 
condition of the industry might easily have been affected by the new 
varieties for several reasons, and therefore, the effects of the new 
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varieties upon it are given separate consideration elsewhere (Section 11.4). 
Of costs incurred by the extension and advisory services there 
is little available informati~n. Records of expenses relevant to the 
time when the new varieties were first being handled seem generally to 
be in the form of input accountancy, and would, therefore, be difficult 
to unravel. .Giventhelimited financial resources available to this 
study, and the likelihood of little information in a usable form, the 
question of costs was not gone into in detail. 
1 For instance, Kenya Akifa, ,. was a variety selected in Kenya from 
material sent from the SPBS (it has been described as "stop-gap" 
until that country is able to produce better varieties, Macarthur, 
op cit: p.12). 
4 
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/ 
Generally, spokesmen for the organisations concerned with extension 
----
and advisory work felt that no extra costs would have resulted from the 
SPBS innovation, that probably would not have been incurred anyway. 
If new varieties had not been introduced, budgets and costs would have 
remained largely unchanged. Thus, in this case, it seems reasonable 
to assume that outside costs were insignificant enough to be inside the 
error that has anyway to be associated with the derivation of R&D 
investment cost. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Potato production costs 
6.1 Introduction 
No varietal growing cost data for commercial conditions is available, 
on a consistent basis, which could enable a comparison to be made 
between on the one hand, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, and on the 
other, Maj estic. Thus, there is no clear basis on which to base. a 
comparison in a 'with' situation in terms of resource cost with a 
presumed 'without' one. 
The National Farmers' Union (NFU) had carried out some survey 
work which involved potato varietal costings, with regard to growing for 
processing (NFU, 1972ab), and raw data was made available for this 
present study, so that differences in varietal costs might be identified 
and estimated. Unfortunately, this proved too fragmentary to give 
consistent results. Another possible source of varietal information 
was the PMB but material from there was not available to outsiders. 
6.2 General sources of information regarding potato production costs 
Hence, it was necessary to derive estimates of varietal cost by 
inference from published material concerned with potato costs generally. 
Published sources fall into two categories: case studies of costings, . 
and idealised costings based upon case studies and surveys. Of the 
former, costings are unfortunately few, and local in character: they 
include, Anderson, 1966 and 1967; Bone and Haughs, 1968; Davison, 1967; 
MacPherson, 1962 and 1967; Mathias, 1965; and Rayner 1965. These 
costings were all conducted ~y agricultural education establishments. 
The second category may be subdivided into two: farm management 
pocket books and recent PMB published information~ The former base 
their cost information on existing published information supplemented 
by material from elsewhere: their purpose is to give useful indications 
in a form amenable to farm planning, and they do not pretend to give 
~. .. 
reliable average estimates for national conditions as a whote (in fact, 
farm management pocket books appear to be widely used by agricultural 
organisations for planni.ng, or constructing their own cost surveys). 
Examples of this kind of publication are Nix/A: and Davidson/A, both 
of them annual publications from Wye College and Cambridge University 
respectively. 
6.3 PMB production cost publications, and their usefulness for this study 
The PMB publications were based upon the results (or partial 
results: there are indications that the PMB was not able to process 
survey data to its full extent) of a survey of the 1970 maincrop. The 
sample consisted of the 1680 farms, which were held to be representative 
of national conditions. Publications stemming from this work consisted 
of a potato costs handbook, and a list of average co stings for the 
'country as a whole. 
The former was held to represent a 'model farm' situation, where 
twenty acres of potatoes was grown (see·PMB, 1972c). The list was 
circulated to certain agricultural organisations (a copy was passed on 
to the author by the NFU), and was published later in an EDCA report 
(1972). A copy is contained in Appendix 10. It is these sources of 
information that are used for this study, because of their nationally 
representative character. 
Unfortunately, the PMB costings relate to a single year only, and 
it is not possible to know for certain if th~y hold good for the years 
1965 to 1972. Indeed, given" that Majestic had taken a large proportion 
of the planted maincrop acreage, then its replacement by the new 
varieties might well be expected to have a significant effect upon total 
maincrop growing costs, so that 1970 costs might not be representative 
(after adjustment to 1971 £s) of say, 1965. 
A comparison of PMB costs with those estimated in earlier case-
studies (op cit) in real terms, is summarised in Appendix 10. The 
fragmentary nature of the latter work might make the comparison meaning-
less: however, there is some indication that costs in 1970 were in real 
terms generally higher. The total average cost per acre as reckoned 
by the PMB survey was £176.5 (1971 £s) in 1970. For 1961 it was put 
at £165 (MacPherson, 1962 op cit); 1963 and 1964 at £158 and £163 
respectively (Raynor op cit); 1965 between a range of £125 to £156 
(Anderson, 1965 op cit; Bone and Haughs, op cit; Davidson op cit, and 
Mathias op cit): 1966, a range between £148 and £168 (Anderson, 1967; 
Bone and Haughs opcit; MacPherson 1967 op cit). 
PMB estimate in real terms. 
All are below the 
More uncertainty has to be attached to the PMB costs when total 
cost is compared to what might be taken as the average market return 
per acre for maincrop in 1970. Given an average market price observed 
for 1970-1971 (1971 £5) of £15.67 per ton (table 7.7), and an average 
maincrop yield of 11.28 tons per acre (PMB/A), the average market 
return might have been approximately £176.8 (providing that all of crop 
yield could have been sold). This compares to an average total cost 
of £176.5. This is the more surprising, when many growers themselves 
have apparently felt that returns have been too high (MAFF et al, 1973: 
para 12). 
There are possibly four main reasons why the PMB estimate of 
average cost per acre seems high in re1ationto market revenue (and to 
average costs obtained elsewhere). The first is that many growers 
might grow potatoes not as a main cash crop but for rotational (and 
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other husbandry) reasons: these might be high cost enterprises. How-
ever, there is no evidence to suggest this is so. Secondly, the PMB 
estimates might be designed to give the costs of husbandry practices 
which are typically carried on, rather than indicate what might be an 
average (and lower) cost. Thirdly, the PMB might have tended to be 
generous where cost assumptions were open to discretion, so that high 
cost assumptions rather than realistic ones were made. Fourthly, it 
might be that costs were in 1970 higher than they would have been in 
an average year. 
A NFU costing for the 1970/71 season gave estimates different from 
the PMB ones. The total average costs per acre on crop grown for 
freezing and dehydration processing were estimated to be £146.3. How-
every, the sample of growers was small, twenty-one only (NFU, 1972a op 
cit). Also, the NFU believed that these growers were amongst the 
better growers who were more likely to use good quality inputs which 
were associated with higher costs. 
the first, remain uncertain. l 
Thus, the fourth point must, like 
The possibilities that the PMB estimates are based upon typical 
husbandry practices and generous cost assumptions is best considered 
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with direct reference to the cost ~ategories themselves. In considering 
these, costs will be referred to, as above, on a 'cost per acre' basis. 
This is a method of exposition only, and does not imply that costs can 
1 d ha ' 2 be re ate to c nges l.n acreage. The relevant cost categories are 
1 In 1973 the PMB published estimates of the costs of potato growing for 
that year (PMB, 1973d). In pound adjusted terms (1971 £s) these indicate 
a fall overall of £17 per acre. This does not mean that the 1970 costs 
were unusually high, however, since the PMB appears to have used the 1970 
estimates as a basis for calculating the 1973 ones, which implies that 
largely the two sets of figures are not independently comparable. 
2 There are alternative ways to express costs which might be more appropriat 
for some husbandry practices, and these are'used when appropriate: for 
example, grading costs can be expressed in terms of weight of produce 
handled (a 'per ton' basis). This study, however, generally follows afte 
the usual practice in farm costings of presenting costs on a per acre basi 
Growers are likely to see the importance of cost categories as variable. 
Part,i"cularly in terms of operationaJ.,. flexibility,: that is, if they can be 
varied,with acreage decisions, and afterwards, during the growing and 
marketl.ng of the crop itself. It is likely that overall growers 
evaluated costs in terms of farm re~ouz::ces ,as a,whole~ , 
shown in Table 6.1, and their relativeimportan?e in terms of size, is 
expressed there as a percentage of the average cost per acre estimated 
in the 1970 PMB survey. The results of this survey are given in 
Appendix 10. 
TABLE 6.1 
Maincrop Potato Production Costs PMB, 1970 Survey 
XExpressed as a percentage of total costs per acre) 
Category of Potato Costs % of average total growing 
costs per acre 1970 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Seed 
Fertilisers 
Herbicides 
Pesticides 
Fungicides 5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Haulm defoliants 
Labour: plan~ing, cultivations, spraying 
harvesting 
9 •. grading 
10. Machinery: tractor 
I!. 
12. 
13. Chitting 
14. Irrigation 
15. PMB 
16. Rent/rates 
17. Interest 
specialised machinery 
general macninery 
18. Snare of ~enera1 farm expenses 
19. Storage 
Total 
20% 
12% 
2% 
1% 
2% 
1% 
4% 
8% 
4% 
5% 
10% 
4% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
6% 
3% 
6% 
5% 
99% 
Note: Figures do not add up to 100% due to a rounding of figures. 
Source:; PMB survey results, Appendix 6. 
6.4 Potato seed costs 
the 1970 maincrop cost survey estimated that seed costs were 20% 
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of the average total costs per acre, see table 6.1. The average being 
reckoned at £32.3 per acre, with a range of £21 to £53 per acre. 
These estimates were based upon seed prices stated by growers, with an 
allowance for a use of own-grown seed and a degree of was~age (see 
Appendix 10). 
The price of seed refers to that of 'certified' seed. Since the 
main potato growing areas are situated in a part of Britain where 
aphids are very active in spreading virus diseases which are degenera-
tive in their effects upon seed stocks and crop yields, seed has 
frequently to be replaced by imports (certified to standards of freedom 
from virus, and other diseases) from other regions. The need to buy 
certified seed varies according to locality, variety and husbandry 
practice. For instance, some varieties are less susceptible to virus 
attack than others, and, therefore, growers might be able to retain 
a larger part of their output for use as 'own-grown' seed. 
Of course, own-grown seed is generally cheaper to use, although 
it does entail some cost. It has to be prepared, stored and inspected: 
but most important, there is an opportunity cost to the grower of not 
marketing it for human consumption. On this basis, in its assumptions 
to derive a seed cost for its 1970 survey, the PMB assumed a cost for 
own-grown seed of £16 per ton (that is, £17.3, 1971 £s). The average 
., 
market price in 1970/71 was £14.5 (£15.7) (table 7.7) 
The PMB estimate seems to be exaggerated, since it seems likely 
that not all of the tubers held back for seed could have been marketed 
for human consumption. This is because the seed size is largely 
outside that required for human consumption (NFU, written communication). 
For out-grades the marke~ opportunity cost might be very low indeed and 
the other costs associated w~th own grown seed, not great enough to 
bring the total cost up to the PMB estimate. 
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The overall impact of the cost of own-grown upon total seed costs 
depends upon the proportion of total acreage planted with this kind of 
seed. In the PMB handbook this was placed at 40%, and it seems likely 
that this figure was used for the 1970 survey results. 
Both the alternative market costs of using own-grown seed and the 
prices of certified seed might vary markedly between years. If ware 
potato prices are high, fewer potatoes tend to be kept back for own-
grown seed, and consequently the demand for, and hence prices of 
certified seed increase. This is a factor that has been observed by 
both the National Association of Seed Potato Merchants (NASPM/A) and 
Hay (in a report about the Scottish certified potato seed industry, 
op cit). 
Another major factor which determines the p~ice of certified seed 
is varietal choice. A variety much in demand and, or short in supply, 
will generally fetch a high price. In the instance of a new variety 
this can be very high. Another important factor, is the standard of 
health to which seed is certified: generally, however, ware growers 
have bought seed at the 'A' standard - (about 70% of the total certified 
SD . 
seed acreage in Scotland wasiplanted during the period relevant to this. 
study: OAFS, private communication). 
~other factor, solely dependent upon variety, is seeding rate. 
This is defined as the weight of seed planted per acre, and varies 
according to varietal choice. 
6.5 Fertiliser costs 
The 1970 maincrop survey indicated that fertilisers made up 12% 
of the average costs per ,acre of producing potatoes, table 6.1. The 
average was £20.4 per acre, ~ith a ~ange of £12 to £29: the PMB 
assumed-- that the typical application would represent 10-14 cwt per acre 
of a high nitrogen fertiliser. 
In addition to application of artificial fertilUrerspotatoes often 
1 
receive large treatments of farm yard manure. Allowances for this 
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were not made in the costings. The most import~ntfactor' in determining 
fertiliser applications is probably the size of planted ~~reage. 
COI!ll.Tlunications with officials of the ADAS for the purposes·.of this 
present study, indicated that no obvious varietal effects exist. 
6.6 Chemical spraying costs 
Chemical spraying cost categories include those of herbicides, 
pesticides, fungicides and haulm defoliant, which together accounted 
for about 6% of the average cost per acre in 1970, table 6.1. The 
average costs per acre, with the respective ranges, were £2.5 (£0.7-3.7), 
£2.0 (£1.5-2.8), £2.7 (£0.7-4.8), and £2.1 (£2.1-3.8), respectively. 
For herbicide the typical application was assumed to represent a 
standard does of Gramoxone: the PMB observed that the estimate shown 
could be applied to 45% to 50% of producers, since only this number 
used a herbicide. The pesticide calculation was based upon the presumed 
use of a standard does of Metasystox: the PMB observed that only 60% of 
growers used a pesticide. The fungicide cost was based upon an as sump-
tion that three. applications of Maneb were used, the haulm defoliant 
cost was based upon a standard dose of DHBP. 
" It might be expected that spraying costs would depend upon weather 
conditions, since disease·is to a large extent dependent upon climate • 
. '
However, it seems from fragmentary evidence in previous costings that 
growers generally apply applications as a precautionary measure, and 
spray on a consistent basis. Varietal choice is likely to be important, 
however, since there are observable differences in husbandry practice 
in crops of different va~ieties (PMB, 1968a): 
1 It has been observed in a ~mFF publication that feeding has been 
extended to a point where on many farms, crop yields have probably been 
adversely affected (Carter, 1972: p~99). 
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6.7 Labour costs 
The PMB categorised labour into three kinds for the purposes of 
presenting its 1970 costings; those incurred prior to harvest (culti-
vations, planting, fertilising and spraying); those of h~vesting, and 
." '.-
grading. An allowance for labour was added to the overhea~s estimate 
and included in stof:age costs. Excluding the latter, the three types 
of labour made up 4%, 8% an.:; 4% of the average cost per acre, table 
6.1: which were £7.2 (£2.5-12.6), 13 (£9.6-20.3) and 7.4 (£4.5-17.5) 
per acre respectively. 
Those incurred prior to harvested were assessed by the PMB upon the 
basis of 18 man-hours per acre, at the hourly cost for regular labour 
of £0.40. Harvest costs were assessed on the basis of 7 workers: 
three of them regular and employed on a tractor, and four casual, 
employed at £0.30 per hour on picking; using a one-row harvester, and 
lifting l~ acres per day (this is 38 man-hours per acre). Grading 
costs were estimated for a situation of two regular and four casual 
workers, riddling an 11 ton crop at 3 tons per hour (22 man-hours per 
acre). 
Potatoes are a relatively high labour demanding crop, but it is 
unlikely that regular labour would be employed for potato crop needs 
alone. Therefore, in this sense the cost of regular labour in terms 
of the requirements of the whole term enterprise is fixed" (although the 
potato crop might provide opportunities for overtime, that might be 
missing with other crops). This is not so with casual labour which 
might be solely employed on potatoes. 
Potatoes are most in need of labour at harvest (and sometimes 
grading), at a time which .. is a busy one for the farm generally. It is 
then that casual labour is li~ely to be employed. No reliable estimates 
appear to exist to indicate what the usage of casual labour is: the 
NFU suggested to the author that, perhaps a quarter of the maincrop 
acreage might be concerned with this kind of labour'. The availability 
of casual labour is limited in some parts of potato producing regions: 
one observer has suggested this factor to be the most crii'ica1 one in 
. ':,' .. 
these areas, for the determination of whether potatoes are grown at all 
(Carter op cit). 
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The availability of casual labour might not be important to grading, 
if indoor storage fa~i1ities are available to permit sorting after 
dark, or at times when the weather is unfavourable for other farm 
activities. In fact, the opportunity cost of regular labour for use 
associated with grading might then be very low indeed since alternative 
opportunities for farm work are then fewer (see Ingersent, 1967; for 
an examination of grading costs). 
6.8 Machinery costs 
The 1970 PMB survey categorised machinery costs into three: those 
associated with tractor use, specialised machinery (to the potato crop) 
and general machinery. The specialized category was the largest of 
machinery costs at 10% of average costs per acre, followed by tractor 
and general machinery, at 5% and 4% respectively, see table 6.1: that 
is, £15.7 (£8.0-20.1), £8.4 (£4.5-11.7)" and £6.7 (£4.0-11.2) per acre 
respectively. 
The PMB based the tractor estimate upon allowances for fuel, 
depreciation and repairs; for 25.2 tractor hours, given a machine size 
between 45 and 65 hp, and charged at £0.30 per hour.' The specialised 
machinery estimate was based upon the assumed use of a two-row automatic 
planter and a one-row harvester (plus an allowance for ridging and 
grading equipment). No explanation accompanied the 1970 survey 
results for the general machinery category: it is possible to gain 
something of an insight, however, if the PMB handbook is referred to, 
as is true for all these cost estimates ( PMB, 1972c op cit). 
Investment in general machinery and tractor expenditure must, of 
course, be determined by the farm economy generally. Investment in 
specialised machinery, however, is directly associated with potato 
growing, but is likely to be fixed over several.seasons, and determined 
by the grower's expectation of average throughput of output over that 
time. Subject to capacity limits, growers will probably attempt to 
maximise crop output to reap economies of scale. 
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In the shorter term, machinery costs might vary for a.number of 
reasons independent of investment cost (and so depreciation), which are 
associated with fuel and repairs. These are likely to be also impor-
tant for labour time. The most important is associated with harvest, 
and the conditions prevailing at that time. In recent years weather 
has tended to make· the period for harvesting short, about twenty days 
during 1969-1971, before the wet conditions usually experienced in 
November make lifting slow and damage levels very high (Crisford, 1972). 
It might therefore, be necessary to speed up harvesting, and use more 
fuel and risk more breakdowns (and pay overtime rates). 
Other factors of importance might be distance that machinery must 
cover (from central buildings, as well as on the field), crop yield 
(weig~t as well as its soil depth and maturity), and management-
harvester to store system (organisation, in addition to resources being 
used). The consequence of any individual one of these is difficult to 
predict. For example, the Sutton Bridge Experimental Station (SBES) 
has noted that trials using similar harvester to store systems show no 
significant differences in terms of cost when different sized outputs 
were handled (SBES, 197~b). It could be that local conditions, such 
as field soils, are very important. 
The importance of varietal choice to costs associated with labour 
and machinery is generally uncertain since it is likely that varietal 
differences are marginal, when compared to all the other factors that 
might be involved. Where it is important, it is likely to be so in 
combination with a nlntiber of factors: for instance, if conditions 
favour a heavy yield and weather conditions are not suitable for harvest-
ing, then a heavy yielding variety is, ceteris paribus, going to prolong 
the harvesting operation, and hence, costs. 
6.9 Chitting, irrigation and storage costs 
The 1970 PMB survey results indicate that chitting,* irrigation 
and storage costs accounted for around 2%, 2% and 5% of the total cost 
per acre respectively (that is £4, £3.5 and £8.5 per acre, with ranges 
of £3 to £7, £3 to £12.5 and £4.2 to £17.6 respectively), see table 6.1. 
For chitting the PMB estimates assumed that a majority of seed was 
chitted in a permanent building with lighting control. Nothing was 
stated about irrigation systems, although it was noted that only about 
10% of the maincrop was regularly irrigated. 
storage systems. 
Nothing was stated about 
All these cost categories involve practices which have been subject 
to recent development: both chitting and irrigation have become more 
important, and the use of indoor storage has increased in recent times 
(see ~FF, 1972b: for a general review of developments in husbandry). 
However, whilst some varieties might benefit from chitting, irrigation 
and improvements in storage, varietal effect upon costs is likely to be 
marginal, once systems have been installed on a farm. 
6.10 Rent and PMB levy costs 
The rent and PMB costs account for 6% and 2% of total costs per 
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acre respectively, in the r~sults ·from the 1970 PMB survey (that is, £9.5 
and £3 per acre, with a range £5.5 to £17 for rent only), see table 6.1. 
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Explanations did not accompany the PMB survey results for these factors,'. 
but the former seems to be based upon what growers might expect to pay 
in terms of rent (plus an allowance for rates) for potato land, whether 
owned or not. 
The estimate for rent appears to reflect the possibility that 
potatoes were planted on land of above average fertility: but an 
average of rents in the leading potato producing areas indicates a rent 
lower than that estimated for the 1970 PMB survey. The PMB handbook 
gives average rents for the leading potato areas in England: the 
average for these is £7.4 per acre, which is less than the survey 
estimate of £8.5 (in real terms, these are £8 and £10.3 respectively). 
The PMB cost refers to the levy, which after 1970 was increased to £4 
and £4.20 per acre in 1971 and 1972 respectively. 
6.11 Other cost categories 
The remainder of costs are those which are associated with the 
general running of the farm enterprise, apportioned perhaps upon the 
basis of acreage share taken by potatoes; it is not clear how these 
were derived for the 1970 PMB estimates. Together these costs are 
rec~oned at about 9% of total cost per acre (that is, £14.5 per acre), 
table 6.1. They include allowances for overhead labour, maintenance, 
management and office expenses; plus a category to allow for the 
" 
opportunity cost of interest foregone on short term capital employed. 
-
The PMB suggests in its handbook that this latter category is 
equivalent to the interest foregone on 'capital' th.at would have been 
available immediately, if a grower had not planted potatoes. This might 
be made up of expenditure upon materials, casual labour, running and 
repair costs associated with machinery and the PMB levy (in the handbook, 
all totalled to £74.34 per acre: which if invested at 5~% a year would 
yield £4.08: in real terms £80 and £4 respectively) • 
6.12 The identification of the effects of Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell with regard to production costs, compared to a situation 
with only Majestic 
From the assumptions behind the 1970 PMB cost estimates it is seen 
that taken together, the average cost per acre given, is; unlikely to be 
a true average; since the PMB might have been both generous, and 
concerned to give a 
The gener~ is 
typical (or model) cost, rather than average one. 
observable particularly in the estimates of the 
cost of own-grown seed and rent category. 
The cost assumptions used are not necessarily relevant to an 
average situation. It was noted by the PMB that only a part of the 
maincrop was subject to spraying and irrigation: one might also add 
that this is a qualification for a majority of the practices assumed to 
hold, and form a basis for estimating costs. For example, a one-row 
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harvester was used on only a quarter of the maincrop (Crisford, op cit), 
and it was observed in 1968, that 37% of the maincrop was subject to 
chitted seed (PMB, 1968a op cit), so that the assumption that in 1970 a 
majority of growers used proper facilities for chitting seems unrealistic. 
To reflect a realistic and average situation the PMB should have 
considered growers and acreages as a whole, since this might have made 
a difference to the category totals, and perhaps resulted in a lower 
average cost per acre, more in line with previous work in potato costings. 
The problem for this present study is whether these estimates can be 
used to derive estimates.of changes in costs brought about by the dis-
-
placement of Majestic, by Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. 
Generally, the individual cost categories can be used: for where 
it is felt that estimates err, they can be adjusted by the use of 
supplementary information. The advantage of the 1970 estimates is 
that they generally provide an assessment of costs which applies to 
the whole country and during a time which is relevant to the present 
study. However, it must be decided how general data can be used to 
assess the specific impact on costs of varieties. 
It is necessary to identify varietal attributes, and assess 
whether these have any practical importance which can be measured for 
their effects upon production costs. Important varietal attributes 
can be identified by reference to authoritative literature and 
surveying grower opinion itself. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The identification of variet(1 :' attributes and the importance 
of the displacement of Majestic by Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell with regard to husbandry and costs 
7.1 Authoritative recognition of differences in varietal attributf" 
It was stated in Section 4.8 that the main authoritative source 
for information about the suitability of potato varieties was the NIAB 
leaflet of recommended varieties. This, of course, recommends both 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell for commercial use, as well as 
Majestic. This latter variety is described as a good yielder, with 
moderate resistance to tuber blight, and good keeping quality. Its 
weaknesses are judged as a high susceptibility to common scab and 
propensity for tubers to crack.· 
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Pentland Crown is noted as a very high yielder, with tubers resistant 
to common scab, unlikely to crack, but with tubers on the large side. 
The variety is also noted as resistant to virus Y, and moderately 
resistant to leaf roll. Weaknesses of stolon retention* and late 
maturity are noted. 
Pentland Dell is noted as an early maturing variety, with a 
propensity to give high yields of attractively shaped tubers, which 
make up very uniform samples involving little waste. Growers are 
advised to use well sprouted bold seed to ensure good establishment. 
Weaknesses of the variety's high susceptibility to spraying and tuber 
blight are noted. Full descriptions of some of the varieties recommen-
ded by the NIAB are included in Appendix 11. 
The NIAB also lists in .,the advisory leaflet the rela ti ve performance 
of recommended varieties with regard to factors largely determined by 
variety, and of economic importance. The list is reproducedin table 
7.1. Performances are indicated on a scale of 0-9, and high figures 
indicate that a variety shows a given charactert"o a high degree. 
Thus, Majestic scores 8 for storage (measured here by"the length 
of dormancy: the longer it takes, the less will moisture loss result 
1 from sprouting), but only 4 for common scab. Pentland Crown scores 
9 for common scab, but only an average 6 for storage. These figures 
can only be taken as rough indications of how a variety might behave 
under commercial conditions. Local conditions and weather effects 
are important: of most importance is how a combination of variety, 
physical conditions, and production method works for any season. 
The worth of the NIAB assessments is that they represent an ' 
authoritative view of the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
varieties. However, it is evident that they are only pointers to how 
a variety might behave, they say nothing specifically of how a variety 
might actually perform under commercial conditions, but are concerned 
2 
rather, to recommend varieties generally. 
1 Staff at the NIAB commented that Majestic had been the best variety 
they had assessed for storage (private conversations with NIAB). 
2 This appears to have been implicitly " recognised in the reasons for 
beginning trials and surveys in 1969, for the PMB publication 
'Commercial Assessment of Recently Introduced Potato Varieties': 
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"The performance of new varieties in replicated trials under a wide 
range of growing conditions over several seasons is also examined by 
the NIAB with a view to including the best varieties on the NIAB's 
Recommended List. Howeve~, detailed information on the bulk storage 
properties of a new variety, its susceptibility to mechanical damage 
and its marketability does not normally become available until a 
variety is grown, harvested, stored and marketed on a commercial 
scale." (PMB, 1975: p.l). 
These assessments were begun too late to consider Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell (and in fact, were instituted after grower discoveries 
of fauits in Pentland Dell: see Section 4.8). 
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TABLE 7.1 
NIAB Recommended Maincrop Varieties: Assessments 
Variety: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8* 
Yield 6 5 6 7 8· 8 6 8 
Tubers: 
" " 
Size 8 6 8 7 8 ~ 8 7 8 
Uniformity 6 6 6 8 6 9 6 7 
Freedom from defects 5 7 4 6 6 8 5 6 
Number per plant (Rating) 6 7 5 7 4 5 6 4 
Storage 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 
~ualit:l: 
Freedom from discolouration 9 8 5 9 5 6 5 5 
Flouriness 8 6 8 8 7 6 7 8 
Dry matter 3 5 4 6 3 6 8 7 
Disease Resistance: 
Tl1ber rots 5 7 6 6 7 6 5 6 
Blight in foliage 6 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 
Blight in tubers 5 2 6 4 6 1 5 7 
Common scab 4 7 4 3 9 6 7 7 
Leaf roll 5 6 5 6 7 6 4 6 
Severe mosaic 7 4 6 6 8 5 4 8 
Spraing 3 6 4 6 3 1 7 1 
Key to Variety Code - (1) Desiree; (2) King Edward; (3) Majestic; 
(4) Maris Piper; (5) Pentland Crown; (5) Pentland Crown; 
(6) Pentland Dell; (7) Record; (8) Pentland Ivory 
* Provisionally recommended 
High figures indicate that the variety shows the character to a 
high degree 
Source: NIAB op cit. 
7.2 The need for a survey of growers' attitudes to the substitution 
of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell for Majestic 
No published work was available in 1971 to indicate directly how 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell had performed under commercial 
conditions in comparison to Majestic. Also, there appeared to have 
been no attempt made to systematically identify factors that growers 
themselves might find important in relation to varietc.l choice. Hence 
to identify those varietal attributes important to the substitution of 
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Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell for Majestic, it was decided to survey 
growers who had grown one or both of the new varieties, and Majestic. 
7.3 Survey objectives 
The objectives were twofold. To identify the importance of 
factors associated with varietal choice to growers, and secondly, to 
link these factors with grower assessments of how the new varieties had 
performed in contrast to Majestic. This will shed more light on what 
varietal attributes are commercially important, and perhaps pinpoint the 
main categories of costs affected. The concern is not to investigate 
reasons why growers opt for first trial of new varieties, but rather 
to discover the importance of varietal attributes in relation to 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, in practice. 
7.4 ~ethodology 
The basis for survey methodology was determined more by opportunity 
than planning: .because of limited finances it was impossible to 
investigate a representative sample of growers, however, the NFU offered 
assistance at an opportune time. The NFU provided distributive 
facilities and helped design the questionnaire. A copy is included 
in Appendix 12. 
Questionnaires were sent to 200 growers located in the eastern 
potato growing counties of England (most of the British potato acreage 
is concentrated there) • The survey was carried out during March, 
1971. This is important for it was a time when growers were in the 
best position to judge between the three varieties, since many growers 
were still planting acreage of all three, or had recently. grown them, 
. .~. ". 
so that the memory of their experience was still fresh. 
The questionnaire listed factors which were considered relevant 
and important to varietal choice, with space to allow growers to 
write-in others, should they feel them to be important. ) Factors were 
chosen with the help of the NFU, and in the light of the potato 
growing industry's problems discussed in the previous chapter. 
Respondents were required to state in order of preference which factors 
they considered important, and then to place ticks or crosses against 
the factors, according to whether or not the new varieties rated a 
positive or negative performance over Majestic. Of course, some of 
the factors will not be independent of each other: for example, 
growers might rate disease resistance important because of its con-
tribution to maximising yields. This cannot easily be allowed for, 
the factors were chosen in the form shown, primarily so that grower.s 
would understand them. 
The nature of the sample was dete~ined by the NFU mailing list. 
It was not known what the contacted growers were growing or acreage 
sizes involved. The only common link between the growers was that 
all of them had at some time grown a part of their crops for process-
ing. Since a certain type of grower might produce for this market, 
there is a possible bias here, but beyond that it is impossible to go: 
this is because very little is known about what kind of grower produces 
--
for processing. Probably of more importance is the geographical 
confinement to eastern England. This includes the best potato land 
l 
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in Britain, and might not be representative of the national situation. l 
7.5 Results 
(a) Acreages of varieties grown by respondents 
A total of 68 growers replied and filled in the forms correctly, 
that is, 34% of those contacted. Many growers felt that they had not 
grown Pentland Crown or Pentland Dell long enough to judge fairly. 
Of the rest, respondents had planted in 1970, and were planning to plant 
for 1971, the following: 
1970 
1971 
Pentland 
Crown 
1600 
1370 
Pentland 
Dell 
512 
935 
Majestic 
294 
251 
Other 
Varieties 
2278 
2108 
An indication of how this corresponds to national figures can be 
more easily seen in the ratios of the new varieties' acreages to those 
of Majestic. The sample returns a ratio of Pentland Crown to Majestic 
acreage of 5.4:1 arid 5.5:1 for 1970 and 1971 respectively, against a 
national ratio of 1.1:1 and 1.6:1 respectively. The sample ratio of 
Pentland Dell acreage to that of Majestic is 1.7:1 and 3.1:1 for 1970 
and 1971 respectively, against a national ratio of 0.5:1 and 0.7:1 
respectively. Thus, the impression is that Majestic is less popular 
with respondents than it might be with growers generally. However, 
it is importarit to note that growers should have disqualified them-
selves from answering the questionnaire if they had not grown the new 
varieties, or not grown them long enough to be able to judge fairly, 
and it is likely that many of such growers would still be growing Majestic. 
1 A study of regional acreage statistics suggests that there were quite 
marked variations in the adoption patterns for Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell. Both ,the timing and shape of adoption curves differ. 
As a check to the survey results, the opinions of local and regional 
officials of the ADAS and PMB were solicited by mail. Generally, the 
survey results were supported by regional comment and observation. 
The methodology of this mail survey, along with diagrammatic illustra-
tions of adoption curves, are found in Appendix 13. In the same place 
are notes based on the comments of··the regional, officials contacted. 
These cast an informative light upon varietal choice, not just in 
association with the new varieties popularity compared to Majestic, but 
in regard to other widely grown varieties. " . 
.. _._ .. - .. "-~----'-'---------
(b) Factor preference 
The pattern of grower preference for varietal factors is shown in 
table 7.2. Three groups of 'factors may be distinguishable from the 
table: those listed 1 to 6, 7 to 10 and 11 to 15. The superiority 
of the yield factor is manifest. All but one or two of the respondents 
mentioned this factor and most placed at the top, or near to the top 
of their preferences. 
TABLE 7.2 Ranking of factors important in ware potato growing 
Points* Times as , of 
mentioned growers 
Factors (a) (b) (c) 
l. Higher yields of ware quality 993 61 (98) 
2. Rapid tuber bulking and early 
maturity 848 41 (66) 
3. Uniformity of tuber size and 
shape 795 51 (82) 
4. Stores well 716 50 (81) 
5. Less frequent replacement of 
seed 684 41 (66) 
6. Increased reliability 604 43 (69) 
7. Tolerant of a wide range of 
soils 484 37 (60) 
8. Lo,\/er damage levels 483 40 (65) 
9. Tolerant of a wide range of 
weather 467 34 (65) 
10. Better disease resistance 438 38 (61) 
ll. Lower seed rate required 324 33 (53) 
12. Lower fertilizer application 282 29 (47) 
13. Lower fungicide application 267 30 " (48) 
14. Lower herbicide application 231 30 (48) 
15. Lower pesticide application 214 30 (48) 
Note: *Points are based on order of ranking, so that 1 = 20 points, 
2 = 19 points and so on. 
'Rapid tuber bulking and early maturity' is a factor important to 
timing and flexibility of harvesting. The faster yield bulks up, 
and the earlier is tuber maturity, then the more time a grower has 
to harvest and choose his marketing time. 
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The high placing given to this factor, and to storage, 
see table, raises a possibility that should be borne in mind in relation 
to Pentland Crown. The 1970/71 season was the bad one for this variety, 
and at the time of the survey many growers seemed to be aware of this. 
This might have meant that growers gave to storage and early maturity 
an importance which in other seasons might not apply so strongly. 
Generally, factors with a direct bearing upon production costs were 
given a low order of preference, most of them coming in group 11 to 15. 
Many respondents did not rate them at all. However, the factor associa-. 
ted with own-grown seed was placed high at 5, table 7.2. 
Respondents' assessments of the performances of Pentland Crown and, 
Pentland Dell in relation to Majestic, and for the factors listed, are 
summarised in table 7.3. 
(c) Higher yields of ware quality 
The new varieties rated very highly for the yield factor. All the 
respondents who answered for Pentland Dell noted the variety's 
superiority, and for Pentland Crown, only one respondent ~3rked negatively, 
see table 7.3. Considering how soil conditions might vary between 
farms, this shows a very consistent performance. This result seems 
to confirm the NIAB's observation that the new varieties are high 
yielders. Ware quality might be better than Majestic's~ since as the 
~IAB noted, cracking is less, and samples of Pentland Dell especially, 
involve little grading waste. 
(d) Rapid tuber bulking, early maturity 
For this factor, the new varieties generally did well, which is 
surprising in the instance of Pent~and Crown, given that the NIAB notes 
it for late maturity. It might be that respondents confused rapid 
bulking with high crop yield potential, and did not connect tuber 
TABLE 7.3 
Performances of Crown and Dell compared to Majestic 
Factors 
Higher yields of ware quality 
Rapid tuber bulking, early 
maturity 
Uniformity of tuber size 
and shape 
Stores well 
less frequent replacement 
of seed 
Increased reliability 
Tolerant of wide range of 
soils 
Lower damage levels 
Tolerant of wide range of 
weather 
Better disease resistance 
Lower seed rate required 
Lower fertilizer application 
Lower fungicide application 
Lower herbicide application 
Lower pesticide application 
Written-in factors 
Common scab protection 
Cracking 
Market demands 
Saleable yield 
Spraing 
Planting 
Crown 
ticks 
(a) 
59 (95) 
36 (58) 
58 (94) 
12 (19) 
32 (52) 
28 (45) 
43 (69) 
14 (23) 
20 (32) 
25 (40) 
13 (21) 
1 (2) 
2 (3) 
10 (16) 
1 (2) 
19 (31) 
10 (31) 
4 (6) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
Dell 
ticks 
(b) 
48 (100) 
22 (46) 
43 (90) 
20 (42) 
9 (19) 
18 (37) 
17 (35) 
18 (37) 
10 (21) 
6 (12) 
12 (25) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
8 (17) 
1 (2) 
16 (33) 
10 (21) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
Crown Dell 
crosses crosses 
. (c) (d) 
1 (2) 
3 (5) 
o (0) 
34 (55) 
3 (5) 
7 (11) 
2 (11) 
27 (44) 
3 (5) 
13 (21) 
8 (13) 
3 (5) 
10 (16) 
8 (6) 
1 (2) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
6 (12) 
o (0) 
18 (37) 
4 (8) 
6 (12) 
10 (21) 
11 (23) 
10 (21) 
20 (42) 
2 (4) 
3 (6) 
16 (33) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
o (0) 
1 (2) 
1 (2) 
Notes: (1) Bracketed figures denote assessments as percentage of 
total of respondents growing variety . 
(2) 62 growers assessed Pentland Crown, 48 growers 
assessed Pentland Dell 
damage and storage troubles with late maturity. Also, stolon reten-
tion, a trouble associated with Pentland Crown's late maturity by the 
NIAB (written communication) was not noted by any respondents. 
(e) ~niformity of tuber size and shape 
Both the new varieties did very well indeed, compared to Majestic, 
fJr this factor, table 7.3. No respondent noted a negative performance. 
Some wrote in how pleased they were with Pentland Dell. This factor 
is particularly important for pre-pack samples if wastage is to be 
avoided. Pentland Dell's tubers are described by the NIAB as 
attractively shaped. 
(f) Storage and damage factors and Pentland Crown
d 
More than half of the respondents assessed Pentland Crown negatively. 
This might have been expected given that it was being compared to an 
excellent storage variety, Majestic. However, Pentland Crown seems 
worse in the comparison than does Pentland Dell. It might be that 
Pentland Crown's poor performance for 'lower damage levels' (and 
perhaps, its mixed result for 'better disease resistance'), has worked 
to make it particularly bad for storage. The NIAB notes that Pentland 
Crown is sometimes subject to stolon retention and late maturity, both 
of these might be contributory factors to increased incidence of damage 
in the lifted crop, (see below, Section 7.8). 
(g) Disease resistance and funiicide applications and Pentland Dell 
Pentland Dell's blight susceptibility appears to have made itself 
felt for both disease resistance and fungicide applications. The 
variety's poor performance for the former factor might also be 
explained by its susceptibility to spraing. Both blight and spraing 
.. 
are specifically warned against with regard to Pentland Dell by the 
NIAB. 
!! ffl' 
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(h) Other factors 
Pentland Crown exhibited a generally favourable assessment with 
regard to seed replacement, reliability and soil tolerance (factors 
5-7, table 7.3). The former perhaps reflects the variety's resistance 
to virus Y and leaf roll, noted as important by the NIAB •.•. Reliability 
and soil tolerance might refer generally to all the advantages noted 
above for Pentland Crown, being maintained over a range of conditions. 
Consistency is, of course, necessary for general acceptance. The 
variety's lower susceptibility, than that of Majestic, to common scab 
and cracking is likely to be important for soils and conditions which 
favour dry soils, since a lack of water at certain times might 
encourage both troubles. 
For Pentland Dell, assessments under the remaining factor categories 
are subject to low response rates, and are generally mixed. Some 
respondents noted that Pentland Dell rated well in comparison with 
Majestic for common scab. Pentland Dell has no known resistance, but 
perhaps the susceptibility of Majestic is greater. It might be that 
respondents are not clear in their minds about what constitutes scab 
symptoms, and that tuber skin marks generally are linked with common 
scab. 
7.6 The significance of varietal attributes, as identified, for 
varietal effects upon production costs 
The key factors noted by the NIAB, as associated with the new 
varieties and Majestic, Section 7.1, and confirmed as important by the 
survey, can be summarised as keeping quality of yields, and virus 
resistance. Whilst the new varieties do not compare well with Majestic 
on the first count, they do well with respect to yield and quality, and 
Pentland Crown with virus resistance, and what this implies for seed 
replacement. The importance of stolon retention and late maturity in 
the case of Pentland Crown is not obvious from the survey results, 
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except perhaps, the low rating given to the variety for damage levels 
(and storage). Similarly, the NIAB observations about Pentland Dell's 
blight and spraing susceptibility might be confirmed in the low rating 
given for disease resistance. 
Generally the survey underlines the importance to growers of out-
put (the size and suitability of crops for marketing) factors, and it 
is likely that the new varieties were used instead of Majestic for 
output reasons rather than ones directly to do with costs. This 
suggests that it is possible growing costs per acre might not have been 
reduced by the displacement of Majestic, and indeed, costs might have 
risen if the rise was obviously less than what growers could expect 
from extra income associated with the marketing of higher outputs 
per acre. 
One obvious cost saving factor is the need to replac~ less seed 
.associated with the use of Pentland Crown. However, the indirect 
consequences for costs, associated with handling a higher yield, higher 
damage levels and storage, might be significant enough to off-set 
savings. Other categories which are obviously more directly related 
to costs, those of seed rates and chemical applications were given low 
ratings of importance. l 
"However, whilst these might not be important to individual growers, 
any difference in applications between crops of different varieties 
across the country as a whole, might add up and, therefore, require 
consideration in this present study. Thus, to know more about general 
effects, it·· is necessary to inquire further as to the consequences of 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, from what might be expected, given 
the information so far presented and with· reference to additional 
I Staff at the NIAB felt that providing new varieties were not unreliable, 
disease resistance was a bonus point to the main one of increased 
output (private conversations, NIAB). 
9; 
-- . .'.,," 
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material. Using the general cost information in Chapter 6, varietal 
attributes will be linked more closely with husbandry practices and 
costs. 
This is conveniently done, for exposition purposes, hY.considering 
varietal effects under five headings. These are two assoc"iated with 
output related costs, weight and quality of yield: one each with seed 
costs, observed differences in husbandry practices on crops of different 
variets, and considerations not otherwise examined. The aim will be 
to identify the consequences of the new varieties for costs, and decide 
whether or not, effects can be measured. 
7.7 Output related costs - weight of yield 
The NIAB and the survey suggest that Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell possess a large yield advantage over Majestic. This is confirmed 
in PMB yields statistics for different varieties; and represented here 
in diagrammatical form, figures 7.1 and 7.2, for England and Wales, and 
1 Scotland respectively. 
The yield advantage implies that an extra weight may have given 
rise to additional costs per acre for harvesting, handling into store, 
and grading. However, as indicated in Section 6.8, this is uncertain 
1 Th~ new varieties yield advantage over other varieties has grown less 
over time. This might be because early users of Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell were those who could best afford the initially high cost 
of seed of (the under-supplied) the new varieties. These growers are 
probably relatively successful, and therefore, the ones most likely to 
be using high quality inputs and, therefore, obtaining high yields. 
As adoption became more widespread, it is likely that these growers 
came to form a smaller proportion of total Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell growers (this process has been claimed for cereal. varieties, see 
Brittan, 1969). Other factors might also have been involved. For 
example, the general health of seed stocks could have become worse as 
growers increasingly retained a proportion of their outputs for own-grown 
seed, whilst using less certified. Also, Pentland Dell's yield poten-
tial might have been affected by the collapse of its blight immunity, 
since the threat of the fungus often necessitates premature 
destruction of baulm. 
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since changes in weight of yield seem marginal, and only one of a 
combination of factors which determine harvester-to-store efficiency. 
For example, it is conceivable that in some instances, extra weight 
upon a harvester elevator might improve the flow of tuber uptake into 
the lorry, since fewer tubers are likely to roll and fall backwards 
into the soil (NIAB, private conversations).l 
A general consensus of opinion collected from regional offices of 
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the ADAS and PMB is that Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, by displacing 
Majestic, have not significantly affected harvesting costs (written 
communications). The relative unimportance of weight to harves~ing is 
implicitly recognised in costings, including that of the PMB in 1970, 
where costs are generally reckoned upon the basis of acreage travelled 
by the harvester (as the factor which determines time spent on 
harvesting). 
Changes in weight of yield similarly seem to be unimportant for 
storage costs, where the predominant determining factor is depreciation 
upon the investment made in buildings and associated control facil.ities. 
It is handling into store which is most dependent upon yield weight. 
Unfortunately, there are no reliable estimates for this category of cost. 
Weight is probably of most importance for grading, where extra 
output is likely to involvt! additional sorting labour time. This is 
recognised in costings, .where grading cost estimates are generally based 
-
upon tonnage handled. Although this assumption is also subject to 
qualification, that whilst generally, labour costs increase with weight 
handled, there are other important determinants such as t.he condition of 
yield (particularly when adversely affected by soil and weather conditions). 
1 Weight of soil that the harvester must sort through is, on the other 
hand, likely to contribute to s'lower harvesting, and variety might have 
some effect. Pentland Dell has a slight tendency to set its tubers . 
deeper in the soil than most other varieties (a feature which might 
mean that the variety is less affected by greehing*, caused by exposure 
of tubers to the light (see table' 7.4): in some instances, this might 
require the harvester to handle more soil (NIAB, private conversations). 
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Taking the importance of extra weight caused by the new varieties 
yield advantage for costs overall, it is to be assumed that effects 
are uncertain. In terms of harvesting and storage costs, they cannot 
be measured for this present study: all that can be observed is that 
the new varieties might have marginally contributed, in combination with 
other factors, to higher costs in some seasons. In terms of grading, 
it is assumed for this present study, that grading costs have been 
affected adversely by increased outputs: it is possible to derive an 
estimate for this, by taking the assumptions used in the 1970 PMB study, 
Section 6.7. 1 
7.8 Output related costs - quality of yield 
The results of the survey, Section 7.5, generally indicated that 
growers assessed the new varieties highly for quality of yield: ratings 
were good for ware quality, uniform size and shape of sample (part i-
cularly Pentland Dell), and in common with the NIAB descriptions, some 
respondents noted a lower incidence of scab and cracking. However, 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were not assessed so highly for damage 
and disease, factors which are important determinants upon quality: 
they also affect keeping qualities, and so the quality of output out of 
store (it was noted in the survey that Pentland Crown rated badly for 
storage). This implies that for some years, at least, the new varieties· 
might have had associated with them extra costs connected with a need 
for careful handling (and hence, slower harvesting and sorting). 
Since 1969 the PMB and MAFF have co-operated in a series of trials 
designed to assess the commercial prospects of recently introduced 
1 Some American farm costings suggest a strong association of high crop 
yields with high crop costs (for example; Maier and Loftsgard, 1964). 
However, this seems to be an as~ociation which involves costs 
generally, not just those which could be affected by weight of output, 
and might, therefore, simply reflect that the most successful farmers 
are the ones who purchase the best, and hence, most costly inputs. 
. i 1 var~et es: these were too late, of course, to consider specifically 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, however, these and Majestic have been 
used as controls, and some results which indicate how the three 
varieties compare in terms of grading quality have been published 
(PMB, 1972f and 1973e). These are reproduced in table 7.4, and are 
for the years 1970 and .1971. It is not known how comparable the 
results are, but they should serve to indicate the presence of signifi~ 
cant differences between the three varieties. Also, the grading 
standards that the results are based upon, are ones above the minimum 
ware standard and would be suitable for quality pre-packed potatoes, 
this means that under average commercial conditions, rejection rates 
would be less severe. 
Generally, the results shown in table 7.4 correspond with the 
NIAB observations (Section 7.1) and the survey results (Section 7.5). 
The good keeping quality of Majestic is evident in its very.low level 
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of sprouting, although in terms of moisture loss and. rots the difference 
between the three varieties does not appear significant. Also, Majestic 
records a higher incidence of cracking and irregular shaped tuber, 
2 
although this is at a low level. 
Overall the new varieties are shown as superior, in terms of grading 
out-~!ade both prior to and after storage, to Majestic. Pentland Dell 
-is shown as particularly good, especially with regard to silver scurf, 
Helminthosporium solani, and poor skin quality, factors which are 
1 It is these trials which were instituted to complement information 
supplied by the NIAB (Section 7.1: footnote and Section 4.8). 
2 A propensity of Majestic to give irregular shaped tubers, although not 
noted by the NIAB in its leaflet, has been frequently observed in 
potato literature: for example, one often quoted survey, indicated 
that 16\ of Majestic's tubers were badly shaped against an average of 
6\ for other varieties (Church at aI, 1970). Conversations with 
processors' representatives, indicated that Pentland Crown might be 
particularly prone to internal symptoms of secondary growth, such as 
hollow heart: however, in the result for internal defects in table 7.4, 
indicates that the variety is likely to do better than Majestic for 
internal defects generally (which includes internal bruising). 
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TABLE 7.4 
ComEarison betwF'n Majestic and Pentland Crown ,in PMB "Commercial 
Scale Testin9: of Hew and Recent1~ Introduced Varieties" 
Majestic Pentland Crown Pentland Dell 
Crop Year '" Crop Year Crop Year 
Ware Crop 1970 1971 1970" 1971 1970 1971 
At harvest and loadin~ into store 
" " 
\ grading out-turn 39 49 45 55 43 63 
\ tubers la" - 3" 56 72 60 75 55 77 
Damage Index 360 261 331 279 307 243 
% common scab 30 57 19 30 23 45 
\ growth cracks and shape 6 7 1 4 ;.. 
% greening 6" 9 8 3 3 
After stora9:e 
% tubers sprouted after 10 weeks 
storage (1970/1971) 26 82 76 
% moisture loss 4.8 4.6 6.5 4.9 6.3 4.3 
% rots 0.1 1.5 0.8 1.4 0.5 0.5 
\ grading out-turn 39 46 41 52 46 63 
\ b~ number of ware-size 
tubers with defects 
internal defects 18 9 15 1 14 9 
gangrene 4 5 17 11 7 4 
skin spot 9 15 6 2 10 6 
silver scurf 58 40 51 25 18 16 
poor skin quality 89 53 68 53 62 25 
Notes: Grading out-turn is the proportion of potatoes within the size range 
la-3 inches judged suitable after washing and grading for quality pre-
packaging purposes and which are free from the following defects as defined: 
mechanical damage which is associated with any secondary infection causing 
tissue breakdown and/or which is not removable by peeling and minor trimming. 
Greening of a high colour intensity. Pest damage which cannot be removed 
by peeling and minor trimming, and blight, blackleg, gangrene and dEY rot 
which cannot be removed by peeling or minor trimming. Growth cracks and 
shape: gross irregularities, secondary growths and growth cracks. 
Tubers 1~-3 inches: those tubers which pass through a l~in. riddle and 
which will stand on a 3in. riddle are discarded. The remaining tubers 
are counted at ware grade. 
Damag~ Index: of a sample was defined as (% by wt. surface scuffed) + 3 
(% by wt. peeler damaged) + 7 (% by wt. severely damaged) 
where surface scuffed 
peeler damage 
severe damage 
= skin only broken 
= flesh wounds of less than 2mm in depth 
= wounds of more than 2mm in depth 
Moisture loss: difference in weight of the samples between loading into 
store and removal from storage. 
Rots: those""tubers which would disintegrate during normal handling. 
Internal defects: any tuber suffering from bruising or necrosis. 
Surface blemishes: common scab and skin spot are considered to be present 
on any tuber which is infected but silver scurf is only recorded if the 
area affected exceeds 25% of the ~otal surface area. 
Skin quality: is an indic~'tion of the suitability for washing. Poor skin 
quality refers to those tubers which are severely blemished and which are 
unsuitable for washing. 
Source: PMB 1972f op cit, 1973e op cit. 
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important for high quality pre-pack samples (Cox, op cit).l 
It is noticeable ~hat Pentland Crown is still liable to be affected 
by common scab (as high as 30% of output in 1971) although at levels 
significantly lower than might occur in the other varieties. Common 
scab is the only disease which is given prominence in the PMB quality 
speficiations (Section 10.7): it is associated with light soils, and 
is most active in dry conditions when tubers are setting. Apart from 
careful siting of crops, the only effective, non-varietal, method of 
control, is that of well-timed irrigation (Wellings has indicated that 
two extra water applications are required to normal irrigation practice, 
1972).2 
Pentland Dell appears no more susceptible to internal effects than 
either Majestic or Pentland Crown. This might not have been expected 
since the variety has a high susceptibility to spraing, and may be more 
liable to internal bruising. Spraing symptoms are stripes or blotches 
in the tuber flesh, and are caused by soil-borne viruses:· the most 
important and the one associated with Pentland Dell, is tobacco rattle 
virus. Ellis has suggested that this virus was responsible for the 
decline of Pentland Dell's acreage on light textured soils during the 
late 1960s (1971). 
the propensity of Pentland Dell to be susceptible to internal 
bruising, is suggested by drop tests, tor example at the National Institute 
of Agricultural-Engineering, Scotland (written communication). The 
1 
2 
Silver scurf is often present in samples since it is very prevalent: it 
has been estimated that perhaps about 50% to 85% of stored potatoes are 
affected (AHRF, written communication). The trouble may give a rough 
feel and appearance to a tuber, but need not appear unsightly. 
In the early 1950s, a comprehensive survey suggested that between 2% and 
4% of the national outpu~. might-have been lost as a result of the disease 
(Large and Honey, 1955). Since that time, the effects of common scab 
have probably become more commercially significant with the growth of 
the pre-pack trade. A full description of common scab is given in 
MAFF (197la). 
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variety apparently has a relatively thick skin, which acts against tuber' 
splitting, but does not prevent internal damage. The commercial 
significance of this kind of damage is that it is difficult to inspect, 
and affected tubers may be passed on to customers. 
It is possible that these troubles were avoided by the growers who 
took part in the PMB-MAF~.test because they were aware of the variety's 
weaknesses, and had stopped planting on spraing susceptible soils, and 
had taken care in handling. This implies that growers were no longer 
experiencing a 'learning process' with the new varieties. However, 
1 there is evidence that this was not so in the instance of Pentland Crown. 
Although the results in table 7.4 indicate that for damage Pentland 
Crown is not significantly more susceptible than Majestic, growers 
generally had trouble handling the newer variety because, probably, they 
made mistakes. 
7.9 Troubles experienced by growers in handling Pentland Crown with 
regard to mechanically caused tuber damage 
Current agricultural practices and trends seem adverse to any 
variety not particularly suited to rough handling. Mechanization of 
the potato crop has in recent times greatly expanded. In harvesting, 
(and the potato is a difficult crop to lift out of the soil without 
damage) only around 3% of the national maincrop was lifted by complete 
harvester in 1958 and by 1973 the proportion had expanded to 51% 
(Statham 1974).- Possibly this was the maximum level given soil type, 
technology and varieties at that time (Statham, 1972). Evidence that 
complete harvesters might render double the proportion of potatoes in 
a crop unfit for ware, as other types of harvesting machine (allowing 
more labour) was presented by Twiss (1963)~ 
1 The growers involved in the PMB-MAFF tests might have been ones whose 
husbandry and behaviour is relatively progressive, and, therefore, 
more aware of varietal needs and associated handling requirements. 
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The potato is a fragile vegetable (possible this has only recently 
been generally realised, see Norkett, 1972), which is susceptible to 
mechanical damage. In fact, the main cause of tuber damage and disease 
has probably been mechanical in origin (see for example, Twiss and 
Jones, 1965). This might have had particular consequences.· for storage 
quality. Gangrene, Phoma spp, a rotting disease which has caused 
widespread losses in store during recent years (Hampson, 1972b), has 
been linked to mechanically caused tuber damage (Hirst et aI, 1970): 
once, this disease was considered rare (Hessayon and Fenemore, op cit). 
In Eastern England during 1970 and 1971 the author encountered 
a great deal of comment from growers at the NFU concerned with Pentland 
Crown, its reaction to damage and subsequent performance in store 
(comment which seemed to be substantiated by conversations with NIAB 
staff in 1973). The consensus of opinion suggested the following. 
During 1970/71 a number of factors combined to act against Pentland 
Crown. Crops were late maturing and lifting conditions poor due to 
bad weather. Fearful of continuing bad weather, and anxious to plant 
a following crop of winter wheat, crop yields seemed high enough to 
justify rushing harvest, even if a part of the crop would be lost as 
damaged by the faster working of the harvester. It was only later 
howev,er, that the full extent of tuber damage was realised in store;· 
by that time, widespread losses had resulted from rot diseases, 
1 particularly gangrene. 
1 The results in table 7.4 indicate a higher incidence of the disease in 
Pentland Crown than the other varieties. It was originally thought 
that Pentland Crown might have a moderate resistance to gangrene 
(SPBS, 1959): but commercial conditions have seemed such as to render 
it relatively susceptible. 
A contributory factoro.to storage losses in 19'70/71 (and perhaps, some 
winters thereafter) could have ~een the presence of mild temperatures. 
This would make storage management more difficult (sprouting more likely), 
and combine with growers inexperience in keeping Pentland Crown (as 
opposed to Majestic), to give problems. 
FT" 
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A consensus of opinion indicated that this situation would not have 
arisen with Majestic, and some growers suggested to the author that 
they would stop expanding plantings of Pentland Crown in favour of other 
varieties. Indeed, the growth in the variety's percentage share of 
the maincrop acreage did stop (and decline slightly) after this time 
(see figures 1.1 and 1.2). In conversations, the NIAB suggested that 
the effect of a 'bad year' was important psychologically for varietal 
choice, and that Pentland Crown's popularity had probably been badly 
affected (NIAB, private conversations). 
There are several features about Pentland Crown which have been 
noted in the potato literature. The NIAB observed that the variety 
was likely to mature late (Section 7.1), and this is a factor which 
is likely to increase mechanical damage in two ways (other than an 
associated grower desire to hurry lifting a late crop): stolon ret en-
tion and scuffing occur more frequently with immature crops. The 
former trouble (noted by the NIAB), where haulm remains fixed to the 
tuber at lifting, res~lts in damage if stolons are torn away from the 
tuber uncleanly, so that a gash is left behind. l Scuffing is a 
scraping of the tuber skin, and is more likely to occur in ,,immature 
tubers because the skin is less hard wearing. 
rt has also been suggested that Pentland Crown has an above average 
tendency to give fewer but larger tubers (Scott and Younger, 1973). 
It is likely that this tends to render the variety more liable than 
other varieties to damage from tuber scuffing and perhaps, splitting 
(ADAS, written co~unication) •2 
1 
2 
Stolon retention also results in a loss of yield, since many tubers are 
likely to be pulled to one side with the haulm, and be disposed of with 
the haulm. 
The introduction of a top "riddle size in 1972, after complaints that 
graded samples had tubers which were too large is a measure which might 
have had an effect both upon size of marketable yield, and grading time. 
There appears to be no estimates to indicate wh~t proportion of 
Pentland Crown's Yield is likely to be out-graded, relative to other 
varieties. 
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7.10 The effects of changes in quality of yield upon costs 
The question of quality of yield has been developed above at some 
length, because later in the text, the quality of the new varieties, 
particularly that of Pentland Crown, is examined as an issue of 
importance with regard to other considerations, Chapter 12. However, 
the immediate concern here is to assess whether by displacing Majestic, 
the new varieties have significantly cpanged production costs. 
The overall impact of the new varieties upon costs, and whether 
this compares favourably or otherwise with a situation where only 
Majestic would have been grown, depends upon the balance of a combina-· 
tion of factors. Generally Pentland Dell has probably facilitated 
cost savings, because of its propensity to give uniformly high quality 
samples, and although it tends to keep less well than Majestic (and 
thus, demand more inspection and applications of sprout suppressant), 
this is not enough to off-set advantages in terms of handling and 
general inspection. 
However, there might have been significant costs associated. with 
sorting and grading the variety in those years when spraing and tuber 
blight occurred. These might have been relatively high, since more 
growers had planted Pentland Dell in those years, than since, in more 
recent times. 
The situation with regard to Pentland Crown is more uncertain. 
The general impr~ssion is that whilst the variety might, potentially, -
give quality at least as good as Majestic, it requires careful 
handling. If this had been done then extra costs are likely to have 
been involved with slower harvesting speeds and careful inspection. 
However, evidence of problems in 1970 and 1971 suggests that improper 
handling and practices might have occurred so that these costs were 
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not realised, except ones associated with clearing wastage. 
It seems, therefore, that overall no more can be stated about the 
cost effects of changes in quality of yield, than that the consequences 
are uncertain, but that probably they have tended to involv.e extra 
costs. This observation must be added as a qualification to the 
quantified cost effects derived in Chapter 8. 
7.11 Varietal effects upon potato seed costs 
In terms of the cost category classification used in Chapter 6, 
the most important category was that of seed, and the one which 
varietal influences are most likely to ~ffect and be of most importance. 
It was noted, (Section 6.4) that variety is important to seeding rate, 
the price of certified seed, and the viability of seed stocks for use 
as own-grown seed. The growers' survey indicated that the factor of 
'less seed replacement' might be important in the instance of Pentland 
Crown, but that for both the new varieties, seeding rate considerations 
did not seem important to growers (Section 7.5). 
(a) Varietal differences in seeding rates 
, -
It was observed above, that whilst cost differences between 
varieties might not be of major concern to individual growers, if these 
are small in relation to output considerations, nationally these might 
add up, and, therefore, be relevant to this present study (Section 7.6). 
This applied to varietal differences in seeding rates. 
1 Plus losses in income associated with marketab1e'output foregone 
(probably, the main cost to growers) • , 
There is some evidence to suggest that the incentive to ensure that 
growers grade their potatoes to a minimum standard required by the 
PMB quality specifications has been only partly effective (Section 
12.5): hence, growers might not have been too predisposed to prevent 
low quality or releasing it to the market (the loss in marketable 
output might not have been as e~tensive, therefore). 
-* 
;57 I 
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The 1968 national maincrop survey indicated that, on average, rates 
of 21.2 cwt per acre, 23.9 and 22.4, had been used for crops of Majestic, 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell respectively (PMB, 1968a op cit table 
5.3) • The ADAS has published recommended optimal rates (see Shotton 
and Jarvis, 1972). These differ slightly from the rates observed in 
1968. Majestic seemed to have been, slightly over-planted in 1968 but 
the new varieties were being planted quite close to official recommenda-
tions (perhaps not surprisingly, given their novelty). 
(b) Seed prices 
Varietal seed prices differ according to the conditions of the 
supply and demand for individual varieties. A list of certified seed 
prices for Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, is given for 
1965/66 to 1971/72 in table 7.5. These are only rough approximations 
to the market average. This is because price information is collected 
in an ad hoc manner; the PMB is geared to the ware end of 'the potato 
market, and whilst it keeps abreast of price developments in the seed 
market, it does not appear to keep consistent records. The prices 
shown in the table are based upon information from the PMB, and also 
from additional material supplied by the NASPM. 
Majestic's prices are likely to have been altered from those which 
would have prevailed in a situation without the new varieties, in two 
ways. Prior to 1969, the year in which the PMB applied acreage 
restrictions, the new varieties might have contributed to surplus ware 
conditions, affected average market price, and so had an effect upon 
the use of own grown seed (the relationship between the ware and 
certified seed market was noted above, Section 6.5) • Secondly, the 
substitution of the new varieties for Majestic might affect the supply 
and demand conditions sufficiently to affect certified seed price. 
Prior to 1965 when the new varieties had still to make an impact 
z jiia: 
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upon the national maincrop acreages, Majestic's certified seed prices 
were similar, on average and in real terms, to those shown for the late 
1960s in table 7.5. The most critical years were 1966/67 and 1967/68, 
a time when the NASPM noted a tendency for Majestic to b~",over-supplied. 
This was when Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell·were being ·rapidly 
adopted. 
TABLE 7.5 \' 
\ 
Average (1971 £s) price of Scottish certified seed per ton 
Majestic Pentland Dell Pentland Crown 
£(1971) £(1971) £ (1971) 
1965/65'" 17 (24) 35 (49) 35 (49) 
65/66 16 (21) 34 (45) 34 (45) 
66/67 23 (30) 34 (44) 34 (44) 
67/68* 18 (22) 16 (20) 29 (36) 
68/69 18 (22) 15 (18) 19 (23) 
69/70 26 (30) 18 (21) 29 (33) 
70/71* 28 (30) 20 (22) 31 (33) 
71/72 28 (28) 29 (29) 31 (31) 
Source: NASPM, PMB 
Another feature noted is that the new varieties attracted high 
prices during the early period of their adoptions, as demand was strong 
in relation to supply. After Pentland Dell's 'blight immunity' 
breakdown and associated weakening in the demand for its certified 
seed, the variety's prices declined to levels generally below Majestic 
prices. The demand for Pentland Crown's seed has generally remained 
firm. 
The certified seed prices shown in table 7.5 can be'used in 
conjunction with the observed seeding rates, to derive varietal certi-
fied seed costs per acre. These are shown in table 7.6. It is 
seen that the costs associated with Pentland Crown are significantly 
above those for the other two varieties. Quite low costs are shown 
associated with Pentland Dell. 
'4 IT 
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TABLE 7.6 
Estimated certified cost of seed per acre (1971 £s) 
Majestic Pentland Dell Pentland Crown 
1965/66 22 50 54 
1966/67 32 49 53··.· 
1967/68 23 22 43 
1968/69 23 20 27 
1969/70 32 24 39 
1970/71 32 25 39 
1971/72 30 32 37 
Note: Estimated from seed prices, table 7.5, at seeding rates 
as observed in 1968 (PMB, 1968a op cit) 
(e) OWn-grown seed 
The observed seeding rates can also be used to derive estimates 
for varietal own-grown seed costs per acre. A reasonable measure of 
the opportunity cost of own-grown seed might be say, quite arbitrarily, 
two-thirds of the average ware marketprice of the previous season 
(this is less than that used for the 1970 PMB survey, Section 6.5). 
Average market prices of potatoes bound for human consumption are shown 
in table 7.7. Taking those in column (c), and deflating them to two-
thirds, estimates of opportunity cost of own-grown seed are derived: 
see column (a) in table 7.8. 
Applying the observed seeding rates to these costs produces own-
grown seed cost per acre as shown in table 7.8 columns (b) to (d), for 
Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. The low 
seeding rate for Majestic gives this variety a cost advantage. 
Total varietal seed costs per acre depend upon the proportion of 
crops planted with certified and own-grawn-seed. Since own-grown 
seed per acre is less expensive than that of certified seed (cf. tables 
7.6 anf 7.8), it might be expected that Pentland Crown's resistance to 
viruses Y and leaf roll, in as far as this permits growers to retain 
II!! !' 3 
TABLE 7.7 Guaranteed and average growers prices per ton 
1960/61 
61/62 
62/63 
63/64 
64/65 
65/66 
66/67 
67/68 
68/69 
69/70 
1970/71 
71/72 
72/73 
Guaranteed UK growers 1971 equivalent 
price average price growers average 
price 
(a) (b) (c) 
13.00 
13.25 
13.25 
13.75 
14.00 
14.25 
14.50 
14.50 
14.87 
15.12 ' 
15.87 
16.55 
16,~55 
11. 75 
18.25 
18.05 
15.00 
14.05 
14.22 
19.38 
14.65 
15.52 
22.05 
14.51 
15.06 
19.71 
18.33 
27.74 
26.35 
21.60 
\9.53 
18.91 
24.81 
18.31 
18.63 
25.14 
15.67 
15.06 
18.32 ' 
Source: PMB 
TABLE 7.8 Estimated cost of own-grown seed per acre 
5 year moving 
average 1971 
£s 
(d) 
22.71 
22.83 
22.24 
20.03 
20.04 
21.16 
20.51 
18.56 
18.56 
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Cost/ton 
(a) 
Majestic 
(b) 
Pentland Crown Pentland Dell 
1964/65 
'·,,65/66 
66/67 
67/68 
68/69 
69/70 
70/71 
71/72 
72/73 
14.4 
13.0 
12.6 
16.5 
12.2 
12.4 
16.8 
10.4 
10.1 
15 
14 
13 
17 
13 
13 
18 
11 
11 
(c) 
17 
16 
15 
20 
15 
15 
20 
12 
12 
(d) 
16 
15 
14 
18 
14 
14 
19 
12 
11 
Note: Estiffiated from table 7.7 at seeding rates observed in 1968. 
* At two-thirds of alternative ware market value. 
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own-grown seed longer than normal, might have resulted in reduced total 
seed costs per acre. Although the high prices of this variety's 
certified seed has probably tended to off-set this. 
(d) Pentland Crown and virus Y and leaf roll 
The need to import potato seed certified free of virus disease into 
the main potato regions was noted above (Section 6.4). Since potato 
seed is vegatatively reproduced, virus infection of parents is liable 
to be passed on to progeny, with increased severity of symptoms: the 
effect upon crop yields after the first year of infection may be very 
large. For a full examination of how viruses work, their effects 
upon potato plants, see MAFF (1971b). 
Virus Y and leaf roll virus are the most damaging in the denegera-
I tive process. The former (sometimes called severe mosaic) is probably 
the most significant commercially, because it is more difficult to 
control than leaf roll virus. Since the vector, the peach potato 
aphid, Myzus persiac, spreads virus Y immediately it feeds upon an 
unaffected plant, but six hours are required for the aphid to spread 
leaf roll: thus spraying is likely to be more effective in the latter 
instance (Carden, 1972) • 
. ,Pentland Crown is the only variety (apart from the moderate resis-
tance of Desiree to virus Y, see table 7.2)which has good resistance 
to virus Y and .moderate resistance to leaf roll. This might cause 
spraying to be more effective as a virus control measure, and possibly 
enable growers to keep own-grown seed longer than would otherwise be 
possible. In southern and coastal areas where virus Y is likely to 
be most severe, grower~ possibly replace seed stocks annually: in 
I The mild viruses possibly play ~n important part (see Richardson, 1970); 
however, in terms of a high use of own-grown seed, the field immunity 
of Pentland Dell to the common mild virus (see section 4.5) seems to 
have had no discernible affect (see table 7.9): perhaps because its 
susceptibility to severe viruses cancels out any potential advantage. 
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northern and western areas where leaf roll is likely to be most severe, 
growers possibly have to replace stocks every three years (as recommen-
ded by Mi-dox, 1971). In the former instance, Pentland Crown's 
resistance might enable growers to keep seed for a year longer: 
perhaps in average areas, as long as 3 to 4 years longer {suggested to 
the author by the NIAB). 
(e) Varietal usage of own-grown seed 
Differences in varietal usage of own-grown seed can be inferred 
from acreage statistics of certified seed and ware crops; more 
specifically, if varietal certified seed acreage of one year is compared 
to the ware acreage of a subsequent year. Table 7.9 gives varietal 
ratios of certified seed acreage to ware. On average for the period 
shown, the ratios for Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, were 
1:9, 1:14 and 1:7 respectively. 
TABLE 7.9 
Ratios of a season's maincro12 ware acrea~e to 12recedin~ certified 
seed acreage 
Year Pentland Crown Pentland Dell Majestic (a) (b) (c) 
1964/65 21.5 5.1 9.1 
65/66 20.7 7.7 6.8 
66/67 17.5 10.5 9.0 
67/68 13.2 6.3 9.2 
68/69 7.1 3.3 9.4 
69/70 13.0 6.6 11.6 
70/71 12.5 6.2 10.2 
71/72 11,"1 5.7 11.1 
72/73 12.6 7.6 ' 7.6 
Note: Calculated from statistics in table 8.3 
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The table is based upon certified acreage planted in Scotland, so 
that assuming that other sources of certified seed are relatively 
unimportant (see below, Section 11.4, for a note on the importance of 
the Scottish certified seed industry), and that differences in crop 
yield are not sufficient to distort the significance of the ratios, 
then it seems clear that Pentland Crown was planted with a high propor-
tion of own-grown seed and Pentland Dell was not. 
It has been estimat~d that in 1972 about 42% of the maincrop had 
been planted with own-grown seed (PMB, 1972a). If this is correct, 
and taking the maincrop acreage to be 464,647 acres in 1972, then 
278,792 acres (60%) might have been planted with certified seed •. If 
this proportion is compared to the 1971 certified seed acreage of 
50,473 (maincrop varieties only), then the average ratio of certified 
seed to ware acreage is estimated at around 1:5.5. 
If this estimate is applied to Pentland Crown's acreages, that is, 
100 acres of its certified seed is likely to produce 550 ware acres, 
then it seems likely that in 1972 a large part of the variety's ware 
acreage was attributable not just to once but twice or more grown seed. 
The ratio for Pentland Crown in table 7.9 for 1971/72 is 1:11.1, that 
is 100 certified seed acres might be associated with 1,110 ware: if 
from' this the average estimate of 550 is sub~acted, then 560 acres 
might then be associated with twice or more grown seed. Pentland 
-
Crown's seed to ware acreage ratio appears to have fallen over time 
table 7.9. This might be associated with the fact that the variety's 
certified seed price has tended to decline, and with it the incentive 
to save on seed costs, or simply that the variety's virus resistance 
has weakened. 
Pentland Dell's ratios have been generally low. This might be 
because seed stocks are easily infected by severe viruses, or because 
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of other reasons. For instance, bold tubers are required for seed, 
this, and given the variety's tendency to produce uniform tuber 
samples, is likely to have made the ware market opportunity cost of 
seed relatively high. If this is so, then the estimates of cost of 
own-grown seed per acre, table 7.8, are too low, and perhaps more 
realistically, should reflect whole market price rather than two-thirds. 
Another explanation might be that the acreage certified for seed 
might be greater than the potential market would justify.l The need 
to produce bold tubers allows the certified seed producer to grow more 
of his crops to full maturity, which tends '::.0 increase the proportion 
of output that can be marketed for ware. This proportion is known as 
'tops trade' in Scotland, and involves the sale of tubers too large 
for seed for pre-packing (see Produce Studies op cit). 
The seed ratios of Majestic appear in recent years to have become 
larger. This might have resulted from general reasons for an 
increased use of own-grown seed (see Section 11.4) • 
The importance of these ratios for deriving the proportions of 
varietal acreage planted with the two types of seed is discussed more 
fully in the following chapter (Section 8.5). It suffices here to 
observe that now the varietal costs per· acre associated with certified 
and own-groWn seed have been estimated, tables 7.7 and" 7 • 8 respectively, 
it remains only to derive the acreage proportions, before the effects 
of the new varieties upon total seed costs can be estimated. 
7.12 The implications of differences in varietal chemical applications 
for costs 
The PMB survey of the 1968 maincrop indicated differences in 
. 
pesticide, fungicide, herbicide and haulm defoliant applications for 
1 This might in part explain why Pentland Dell appears to be more popular 
in Scotland, on a percentage of planted acreage basis (cf. figures 1.1 
and 1.2), than in England and Wales. Also, why the price of its 
certified seed has been relatively inexpensive (~able 7.5). 
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different varieties (PMB, 1968a op cit). These are reproduced for 
Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell, Majestic and King Edward IV below in 
table 7.10. Fungicide is used against blight, as generally, so is 
haulm defoliant. l Majestic is shown to have required fewer applica-
tions: this might reflect the moderate resistance of Majestic to tuber 
blight noted by the NIAB (Section 7.1).2 And partly explain why it 
recorded a lower level of pesticide application, since pesticides are 
sometimes combined with fungicides. 
The lowest herbicide application is shown for Pentland Crown. 
This corresponds with the growers' survey result for herbicide, where 
the variety records a small but positive performance compared to 
Majestic (cf. table 7.3). This might result from Pentland Crown's 
tendency to have its haulm spread relatively quickly between the rows, 
to shorten the time available for spraying. 
1 
2 
Haulm defoliant is sometimes used to stop a crop early where greater 
time is required for harvesting. Otherwise, haulm is destroyed to 
stop blight from spreading into the ground and infecting tubers, to 
cause rotting. It has been suggested that the potential loss from 
tuber blight is small, only about 1% of potential output liable to 
loss In a bad blight year (Cox op cit). The commercial significance 
of blight proper, is that after first appearance on a crop, the fungus 
is in favourable conditions likely to destroy the whole crop (Brenchley, 
1972). Blight affects yield by a premature dstruction of the haulm, 
when tuber growth is stopped. However, control can delay blight, 
perhaps by a month: since weather conditions (and the crops dense 
enough) to favour its spread occur only later in a season, a month's 
delay can save a major part of a crop's potential yield. A full 
description of blight and its effects is in MAFF (1972c). Since 
individual crops might be seriously affected by blight, growers tend 
to take a minimum of risks and indulge in insurance spraying. In 
national terms this behaviour might be more costly than the potential 
losses (see Cox and Large, 1960. 
It has been stated that the commercial success of Majestic has been due 
to its moderate resistance to tuber blight (Cox and Large, op cit) • 
However, in the growers survey this factor did not appear important in 
relation to others. 
Probably of more importance is reliability in the face of disease 
generally. The success of Majestic is s triumph of mediocrity in 
that the variety does nQt have' any spectacular resistance to disease, 
but is not very susceptible to any. 
.' 
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TABLE 7.10 
Varietal differences in disease control: PMB National Maincrop Survey 1968 
(Figures represent percentage of GB crops treated) 
(a) (b) 
Variety Pesticides* FunSiLicide 
Majestic 39 50 
King Edward 58 94 
Pentland Crown 43 68 
Pentland Dell 35 55· 
Note: *Estimates for England and Wales. 
used in Scotland. 
Source: PMB, 1968a op cit 
(c) (d) 
Herbicide Haulm defoliant 
40 59 
45 86 
38 69 
48 68 
No figure for pesticides 
The timing of the survey might have importance to the interpre-
tation of the varietal comparisons. Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
were in 1968 still being adopted for the first time by many growers, 
and the relatively high chemical applications compared to those for 
Majestic might reflect an abnormal care, on the part of growers, not to 
take unnecessaruy chances. It is likely that in the instance of 
Pentland Dell, these crop observations would have been different after 
1968: for in 1969, advisory groups began to recommend the same 
fungicide and defoliant treatments as those normally given to crops of 
King Edward VII (see Hardie and Hampson, op cit). Thus, it is possible 
that for after 1968, fungicide and haulm defoliant applications on 
crops of Pentland Dell were similar to those shown in table 7.10 for 
King Edward VII. 
Another factor of possible importance, is the geographical distri-
bution of c:ops surveyed. After Pentland Dell's blight immunity 
breakdown, it is possible that plantings of this variety were less 
affected in northern (and perhaps inland areas): these are areas less 
likely to be affected by aphids"and thus, in average terms, pesticide 
applications might be reduced for Pentland Dell. Table 7.10 does 
indicate that the location effect was already b7ing felt. The worst 
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effects of the blight breakdown were felt generally in 1967, and, 
therefore, the variety's acreage in blight prone areas had probably 
already fallen. 
If the 1968 crop observations can be assumed to hold for other 
seasons, bearing in mind what has just been written, they can be used 
in conjunction with the spraying cost estimates of the 1970 PMB cost 
survey, to derive estimates of varietal spraying costs. For example, 
converting the 1970 cost for pesticide to real terms, and rounding off, 
£2 per acre is obtained: this can then be multiplied by the observed 
proportion of Majestic's crops in 1968, which were treated with 
pesticide (39%, table 7.10). If this is done for the other spraying 
categories, and the total added, an estimate for Majestic's chemical 
cost per acre is derived; see row (a) table 7.11. Majestic's 
chemical costs per acre are estimated at £4.27. 
TABLE 7.11 
Estimates of varietal chemical costs 
Majestic 2 (.39) + 3 (.50) + 2 (.40) + 2 (.59) = £4.27/ac 
Pentland Crown 2 (.43) + 3 (.68) + 2 (.38) + 2 (.69) = £5.04/ac 
Pentland Dell 
to end 1968 2 (.35) + 3(.55) + 2 (.48) + 2 (.68) = £5.06/ac 
PO post 1968 2(.58) + 3 (.94) + 2(.48) + 2(.86) = £6.66/ac 
For Pentland Crown an estimate of £5.04 per acre is similarly 
derived. For Pentland Dell, £5.06 per acre, and if it can be assumed 
that in 1969 and therafter, chemical applications were the same as for 
King Edward VII, £6.66 per acre. See rows (b) to (d) respectively, 
table 7.11. Of course, it is likely that Pentland Dell's fungicide 
and hau1m defoliant applications prior to 1968 might have been less 
than those indicated by the obs~rvations in table 7.10, given that 
breakdown occurred first in 1966, and generally in 1967. However, 
there is no evidence on which to base any figures. 
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There will be regular labour costs associated with spraying 
applications. These can be inferred in a similar way, using the 1968 
crop observations. Unfortunately, the 1970 survey cost elements 
. . 
associated with spraying are hidden in the general cost category of 
"those incurred prior to harvest" (Chapter 6) • However, information 
of some detail is contained about spraying activities and associated 
costs in the PMB handbook (PMB, 1972c QP cit), and this can be used 
instead. . See (Section 8.5) for a full explanation. 
Table 7.11 indicates that differences in terms of costs per acre 
are small between different varieties. However, in terms of what 
these small differences imply overall for national resources, differences 
in varietal performance might be important. The full implication is 
shown below (ibid). 
7.13 Additional factors involved in '.::le displacement of Majestic 
which might be important to cos~s 
There are three- influences which will tend to bring about cost 
changes, which are indirect in their effects. These involve the 
possibility that the'increased use of the new varieties instead of 
Majestic might have brought about a change in production techniques; 
that the new varieties in being suited to particular soils might have 
changed a range of costs, and the consequences for pla~ted acreage and 
associated costs of an increased output potential. 
The 1960s'were years of technical change in potato production, and 
it is likely that this change would have occurred had the new 
1 
varieties been introduced or not. However, the care required to store 
Pentland Crown might h~ve encouraged some ,growers to adopt more sophis-
ticated storage systems, ~r, more likely, encouraged the spread of 
1 Indeed, the new developments in some instances might not have favoured 
the new varieties: for example, an increased mechanisation of har-
vesting might not have worked to"favour Pentland Crown (Section 7.9). 
See Jones (1972) for an account of changes in husbandry during the 1960s. 
chitting. Majestic is probably not helped bychitting, since the 
variety is relatively late to sprout, and crop maturity is generally 
not a problem. 
However, Pentland Crown's crops sometimes do mature late, and 
chitting acts to prolong the growing season. Chitting may be of 
particular benefit to Pentland Dell. Since this variety sometimes 
reacts badly to low soil temperatures to give blanking (non-emergence 
of plants) from little potato,· chitting enables seed to be kept back 
longer from planting without yield loss, until weather conditions 
improve. 
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Differences in the versatility of varieties in terms of particular 
soils might have led to plantings on land, which otherwise with only 
Majestic available, would not have been used for potato growing: this 
might have affected a range of costs. However, whilst there are 
indications that Pentland Crown's common scab resistance has allowed an 
expansion of acreage on lighter soils (more suited to the employment of 
complete mechanised harvesting), and Pentland Dell's acreage has tended 
to be sited away from light soils associated with spraing, no general 
trend is obvious. 
"The last of the influences noted above is the most important. 
Whilst it is only possible that chitting and storage costs might have 
risen, and the'effects of versatility are unknown, the consequences of 
the added output potential provided bY,the new varieties in higher 
yields are likely to be large. This is because the demand for potatoes 
is highly inelastic, and if surplus conditions are to be avoided (as in 
the example of hybrid corn, Section 3.7) then acreage must be released 
from potato production. 
The adjustment of the size of industry is the responsibility of 
the PMB, and more is stated about this below, Chapter 10. It is 
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enough here to observe that acreage ~las first taken out of potato 
production as a result of the increased output potential brought by the 
new varieties in 1969. This resulted in cost savings associated with 
that acreage, many affecting cost categories not otherwise influenced 
by variety. These will be examined in detail- in the following chapter. 
7.14 A summary of the cost implications of varietal attributes 
In terms of output related costs, the extra weight of the new 
varieties output, implied additional costs for harvesting to store to 
grading. It is possible, however, only to measure the effects upon 
the latter: grading costs seem the most obvious of the relevant cost 
categories to be affected. The quality of yield has probably been 
such that on balance, extra costs per acre-were -incurred with the use 
of new varieties, from harvesting through storage to grading. 
The effects of the new varieties upon seed costs are measurable. 
In terms of certified seed cost per acre, Pentland Crown's costs are 
higher, and Pentland Dell's lower than Majestic's: in terms of own-grown 
seed, both the new varieties, because of the seeding rates, are the 
more expensive. However, it seems likely that Pentland Crown had 
permitted a much greater use of own-grown seed, which will have tended 
to reduce the certified seed cost elem~nt of total seed costs. Pentland 
Dell had not. 
The implications of the new varieties for chemical costs are also 
measurable. They are higher costing per acre than Majestic, Pentland 
Dell particularly so after its blight immunity. 
That might have been additional costs for chittingand storage, 
if the new varieties influenced ~heir development. These are not 
measurable. There might be cost implications associated with soil 
versatility, however, these are unknown. Of most importance, will 
be costs saved as a result of reduced acreage brought about by a need 
to compensate for the new varieties' higher yields. 
Overall, ignoring the possibility of savings associated with 
reduced acreages, the costs per acre of growing Pentland tr?wn and 
Pentland Dell seem likely to be higher than would be the situation 
if only Majestic had been. grown. This suggests that resource costs 
per acre will have been increased. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The measurement of the effects of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
upon the potato industry 
8.1 The main ways in which potato prod"'ction costs and market 
prices for potatoes :'i11 have been affected 
The overall effect that the substitution of Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell for Majestic has had upon potato production costs, will 
have depended upon the timing of the PMB's measures to restrict 
acreage to compensate the extra output potential of higher yields. 
This also is an important determinant of the substitution's effect upon 
market prices and growers' incomes, and the need for the PMB to embark 
upon market support and surplus disposal programmes. Thus, these 
considerations will be taken together in this chapter for measurement, 
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along with the consideration of cost implications resulting from changes 
in growing costs per acre, identified in the previous chapter. 
It was seen that growing costs per acre probably were higher with 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell (Section 7.14); however, the advan-
tages to their growers was probably in terms of extra output sold 
(Section 7.6) • There is a more general effect of the new varieties 
that would affect growers' receipts generally. This would occur if the 
contribution af the new varieties' extra output, in higher yields, was 
large enough to influence market trading conditions so that an approxi-
mate balance between supply and demand was transformed into a surplus 
supply of potatoes. 
Of course, extra output, to result in greater pressures upon 
resources used in the PMB's market support and surplus disposal 
programmes, need only occur in what are already surplus conditions. 
The effect upon general prices in such trading conditions will then 
depend upon the success the PMB has in maintaining growers' prices. 
Of course, transfer effects are involved in these questions. The 
loss in growers' incomes as a result of lower prices imply, at least in 
part, depending upon how changes in growers' prices are reflected 
through the distributive system, that consumers will gain. Also, if 
the new varieties bring about the incurment of extra costs associated 
with market support and surplus disposal, these might be funded by 
government (and therefore, the tax-payer) if the PMB's finances become 
over-stretched. l 
After the imposition of acreage restrictions, the contributory 
effect of the new varieties' extra output should have been allowed 
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for and, therefore, neutralised. However, this will have been achieved 
at a general loss in potential market revenue from the returns associa-
ted with acreage that has been taken out of potato production. Against 
this, however, are opportunities for growers to use freed potato 
resources in other alternative occupations and, thereby, realise 
revenue from other crops. Of course, general potato market prices 
will tend to be higher in non-surplus seasons than they would have been 
immediately prior to acreage restrictions. Additionally, the growers 
of the new varieties will still have been earning extra revenue 
n 
associated w!th higher outputs per acre. 
The effect upon consumers of changes in production costs might have 
been reflected in market prices. If acreage restriction has been 
substantial .then large amounts of resources are likely to have been 
freed from potato production, so that the total cost of potatoes per ton 
bound for human consum~tion will have been significantly reduced. The 
1 If the situation were tQ continue (the effects of the new varieties' 
extra output were not compensated for by acreage restrictions) then 
one might expect growers' levies to the PMB to be increased. Also, 
a continuing pressure upon growers' incomes would tend to affect 
investment and perhaps long-term prices. The role and workings of 
the PMB are examined below (Chapter 10). 
extent to which this is reflected in market prices will probably depend 
upon to what extent the extra costs (if any) of growing the new 
varieties off-set savings associated with acreage restrictions. 
It is seen from these observations that the size of the new 
varieties' extra output is an important factor. It can be defined as 
the new varieties' crop yield advantage over substituted varieties, 
times the new varieties' planted acreage. The implicit assumption is 
that other varieties have been substituted to an extent that is 
equivalent to the new varieties' acreage. In fact, the attractions of 
the new varieties might have generated plantings additional to a 
situation without the new varieties: however,given the nature of the 
PMB's basic acreage allocations, the scope for generated acreage is 
probably very small (the margin between basic acreage, and actual grower 
up-take of the basic, is indicated by statistics in PMB/A: table 1). 
8.2 Derivation of estimates for Pentland Crown's and 
Pentland Dell's extra output 
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As a first step in the derivation of estimates for the new varieties' 
extra outputs, it is necessary to compare varietal crop yields to 
establish Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's crop yield advantage. 
Then secondly, to take the planted acreage observed to have been planted 
, 
with the new varieties, and multiply this by crop yield advantage. 
Estimates of varietal crop yields are published annually in a PMB 
handbook of potato statistics (PMB/A). These were used for this study, 
and supplemented by more specific detail from material supplied by the 
PMB statistics' branch at Oxford. A list of annual varietal crop 
yields, 196.5 to 1972, .is given in table 8 .• 1. Only the varieties 
likely to have been subst~tuted by Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell are 
shown. Estimates are given for England and Wales and Scotland separately. 
The Scottish situation differs from that of England and Wales, 
00 
~ 
.-I 
TABLE 8.1 Varietal Annual Crop Yields, 1965-72 
Year 
1965· 
66 
67 
68 
69 
1970 
71 
72 
Notes: (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Pentland Crown 
E & W Scot. 
(a) 
13.65 
11. 75 11.05 
12.55 11. 70 
11.65 11.00 
11.10 10.75 
11.90 12.30 
12.55 12.05 
11.90 11.25 
Pentland Dell 
E & W Scot. 
(b) 
13.95 11.20 
13.80 12.50 
12.40 11.80 
12.30 11.05 
10.65 10.40 
11.50 12.55 
12.25 12.35 
11.50 9.80 
Crown & Dell 
E & W Scot. 
(c) 
10.95 10.55 
11.80 12.40 
12.50 12.25 
11.80 10.65 
Crop yields assessed on 1~ riddle, tons per acre. 
Majestic & 
others 
E & W Scot. 
(d) 
10.90 9.25 
9.85 9.85 
10.25 11.00 
9.85 9.65 
9.35 10.15 
10.65 11.85 
10.35 11.05 
10.50 10.25 
E & W, Scot., denote England and Wales and Scotland respectively. 
Redskin 
Kerrs Pink 
Scot. 
(e) 
. 10.40 
10.30 
11.00 
10.50 
10.15 
11.00 . 
10.95 
10.15 
'Others' in columns (d) and (f) are varieties of similar marketability to Majestic and take up' a 
negligible share of the total planted maincrop acreage. This excludes, crop yields of varieties 
newer than Pentlands Crown and Dell. 
(4) Column (f) estimated by taking an average between yields shown in columns (d) and (e). 
Sources: PMB/A; PMB Statistics Branch, Oxford (written communications) 
Redskin 
Kerrs Pink 
Majestic 
& Others 
Scot. 
(f) 
9.82 
10.07 
11.00 
10;07 
10.15 
11.42 
11.00 
10~20 
149 
because varietal acreage patterns are more complex in Scotland (cf. 
figures 1.1 and 1.2), and that Scottish potato statistics are influenced 
by the important Scottish certified seed industry. The nature of this 
latter factor is one essentially of a supply industry to the main part 
of the potato industry. It is likely, therefore, that changes within 
it might be reflected in the price of certified seed to ware growers. 
To include cost changes in the seed industry in the main cost benefit 
arithmetic, along with changes associated with seed price to ware 
growers, would be to double count in terms of efficiency criterion. 
This is not to suggest that changes produced by the SPBS's innovation 
upon the certified .seed industry are unimportant, but that.they should 
receive separate consideration (Section 11.4). 
Thus, the concern is to omit the influence of the Certified seed 
indu~try from the Scottish statistics. Ideally it would be helpful 
to know how Scottish crop yields might be influenced by certified seed 
crops, since such crops are sometimes stopped relatively early to 
ensure that the proportion of tubers suitable for seed samples is 
maximised, and crop yield is consequently reduced below what it might 
have been if the crops had been grown to full maturity. However, a 
large proportion of crops have been grown on a 'seed-cum-ware' basis, 
~ 
that is, grown to full maturity to maximise the ware co~tent of yield 
(Produce Studies, 1973), and from the overall statistics there appears 
to be no obvious difference between size of crop yields in England and 
Wales, and Scotland. 
So it is probably sufficient to weight the Scottish yields on the 
basis of the estimated.proportion of acreage planted with crops grown 
for ware, and those certified for seed (this can be done by using 
estimates of maincrop acreage for seed, supplied by the DAFS). The 
intention is to combine the national estimates to derive varietal crop 
yield advantages for Britain as a whole. This is done in table 8.2. 
0 
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r-I TABLE 8.2 Derivation of Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's crog yield advantage 
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1965 .79 .21 .45 .09 0.91 2.7 1.4 3.0 1'.4 2.6 2.9 
1966 .80 .20 .50 .10 0.90 1.9 1.0 3.9 2.4 1.8 3.7 
1967 .80 .20 .49 .10 0.90 2.3 0.7 2.1 0.8 2.1 2.0 
1968 .82 .18 .49 .09 0.91 1.8 0.9 2.4 1.0 2.2 2.3 
1969 .82 .18 .49 .09 0.91 1.7 0.6 1.3 0.2 1.6 1.2 
1970 .82 .18 .46 .08 0.92 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.8 
1971 .83 .17 .46 .08 0.92 2.2 1.0 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.9 
1972 .83 .17 .46 .08 0.92 1.8 1.0 1.4 -0.4 1.7 1.3 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) 
Note: Calculated from tables 8.1 and 8.3 
,...., 
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Planted acreages of Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, Great Britain TABLE 8.3 
(a) (b) ec) 
Scottish certified 
Total planted acreage seed acreage Estimated ware acreage 
". 
M PC PD M PC PD M PC PD 
1964 267185 32979 304 530 234206 
65 268505 7222 3841 30928 696 1498 299435 6526 2685 
66 231956 16073 15535 22068 1673 3965 209888 14420 11570 
67 215105 32847 50709 17382 3553 9209 197723 29294 41500 
68 171382 52637 67385 12131 5842 9115 159251 46795 58270 
69 123241 49564 36515 8785 7817 6456 114456 41747 30059 
70 108964 109298 50373 6758 8882 7472 102206 101826 42901 
71 72948 120705 54415 4083 9591 7831 68865 111124 46583 
72 48579 114387 49890 3405 7509 5414 45174 106873 44476 
_.- 73 28372 100892 44715 2334 6414 3602 26038 94478 41113 .. 
-.:. 
Note: Estimate ware acreage derived from subtracting (b) from (a) 
Sources: Calculated from DAFS register of certified potato seed crops and PMB/A. 
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The crop yield advantages of the new varieties for England and 
Wales, and Scotland are shown in columns (a) and (b). The proportions 
of the British acreage taken by the two areas are shown ·in columns (c) 
and (d), and after the proportion of the Scottish acreage·· taken by ware 
is calculated, column (e), these are amended to the proportions shown 
in columns (f) and (g). These amended proportions are than. used as 
weights to combine the totals in colUmns (a) and (b) into totals, for 
Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's crop yield advantages for British 
conditions generally, columns (h) and (i) respectively. 
Estimates of varietal acreages were obtained for use in this study 
from the PMB handbook (1972c op cit: table 2), and deflated to allow 
1 for acreage certified for seed by varietal acreage statistics supplied 
by the DAFS: see table 8.3. These estimates are multiplied by the 
information derived in table 8.2 to obtain totals for 1965 to 1972 
which approximate to the new varieties ~xtra output. These are shown 
in table 8.4. 
TABLE 8.4 
Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's Extra Output 
Pentland Crown 
Year Extra Output (tons) 
1965 16968 
66 25956 
67 41521 
68 102949 
69 66795 
70 122191 
71 233360 
72 181693 
Note: Calculated from tables 8.2 and 8.3 
Pentland Dell 
Extra Output (tons) 
7786 
42809 
83000 
134021 
36071 
34321 
88508· 
53447 
1 There are acreages certified for seed in England, but these represent 
a small proportion of the whole, see Appendix 14. 
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There are three features to note about these estimates for extra 
output. They must be regarded as only approximations. For example, 
prior to 1969 the PMB'crop yield estimates were non-random, in a strict 
statistical sense, and, therefore, might not have been nationally 
representative. However, the estimates for extra output are crucial 
in the sense that they provide the basis for much of the arithmetic 
that follows. 
Secondly, the estimates shown i~ table 8.4 constitute 'extra 
output' compared to a situation that would have existed without the 
new varieties. 
However, this situation is inferred from actual observations. It 
is not possible to be certain what circumstances would have been in an 
alternative situation. For example, the observed crop yields of the 
substituted varieties might have been different. If the new varieties 
substituted Majestic on the best land than in an alternative situation, 
the crop yields of the older variety might have been higher than the 
observed ones (it was ~uggested that this might have happened in the 
early years of the new varieties' adoption, in respect to narrowing crop 
yield advantages, Section 7.7FN). On the other hand, the new varieties 
might have found particular application on soils less suited to Majestic, 
" 
so that the, acreage of the older variety became conce~trated on land 
best suited to it, so that in an alternative situation its crop yields 
were on average lower than observed ones. 
The third feature is that the estimates in table 8.4 are properly 
extra outputs, only in the period prior to the PMB acreage restrictions. 
That is, assuming tha~ the PMB successfu~ly adjusted quotas to 
specifically take account of thQ new varieties' additional contribution 
to the industry's supply potential. It is then possible, given this 
assumption, to suggest that the estimates of '~xtra output' after the 
~~~~~~~===========-===========~-~---~-----~-==-~·~--------------~------------~1~5~4~ 
imposition of quotas in 1969, are those tonnages of potatoes that would 
have been produced by existing technology, and without the new varieties~ 
on acreage additional t:o that actually planted in 1969 and thereafter. 
8.3 Derivation of estimates for potato acreage freed as a 
consequence of extra output 
It is now possible to derive estimates of the extent of extra 
potato acreage that would have been required to produce the new 
varieties' extra output. It is assumed that the extra output is 
necessary because the PMB should have allowed for the increase in supply 
potential when it imposed quotas. This might then reasonably be 
assumed equivalent to the acreage freed from potato production by the 
new varieties. Thus, freed acreage is simply the estimates for extra 
output in 1969 and thereafter, shown in table 8.4, divided by the 
average crop yield per acre of the substituted varieties, see table 8.5. 
TABLE 8.5 
Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's contribution to freed acreage 
Average crop yield Acreage of older varieties required to 
older varieties produce extra output 
(tons/ac) PC PD Total 
10.7 1586 728 2314 
9.9 2622 4324 6946 
10.4' 3922 7981 11973 
9.9 10399* 13537* 23936* 
9.5 7031 3797 10828 
10.8 11314 3178 14492 
10.5 22225 8429 30654 
10.1 17989 5292 53281 
Total 58559 20696 79255 
Annual Total 14640 5174 19814 
Note: Calculated from table 8.4 
In the context of the arithmetic and the task of deriving the 
measurement of effects upon costs, it is unnecessary to derive 
E , 
directly the estimates for freed acreage. Since more simply, the 
yield advantage of the new varieties could be expressed as a percentage 
of the substituted varieties crop yield, and for ,example, multiplied 
by costs associated with changes in acreage. So if .Lx p.~r acre can 
be meaningfully related to marginal changes in planted acreage, and 
crop yield advantage is say, 10%, then costs saved as a result of 
freed acreage is .Lx per acre times 0.10 times the new varieties 
planted acreage. 
Of course, the estimates of costs will remain the same, since the 
difference of approach is one of presentation only. Freed acreage is 
used here, as this gives a clearer impress.ion of the magnitudes 
involved and is, therefore, more useful for purposes of e~position. 
This suggests that the new varieties' increased crop yield poten-
tial was a significant factor in the process which brought about a 
smaller acreage. It also points to a significant contribution from 
other factors which worked to increase crop yield per acre. 1 It is 
likely that the pressures leading to a chronic over-supply had been 
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under way for some time, hence the general rise in varietal crop yields 
(figures 7.1 and 7.2), and that the new varieties were only the straw 
(albeit a heavy one~ to break the camel's back, and force the PMB to 
note a permanent change in the underlying conditions of supply. 
There are two features to note about the estimates for freed 
acreage, table·8.5. They assume that the proportion of waste in the 
extra output is similar to that which would have been produced by the 
output of the substituted varieties on the freed acreage. Otherwise, 
if the new .varieties say, produced an extra output with very little 
waste at grading then pOSSibly more acreage than that shown in table 
1 Of course, a fall in consumption per head of population such as that 
which occurred in the late 1960s· (Section 12.,10) will have aggravated 
the trading situation: it is not known how the PMB took this factor 
into account in its quota imposition (changes in demand might have been 
viewed as tem rar 
8.5 would have been required with the older varieties, if an amount 
equivalent to the extra output that is destined for human consumption 
is to be produced. 
The second feature is that PMB quotas work in a blanket-like 
fashion upon plantings so that all growers are affected, whether they 
plant the new varieties or not. This suggests that it might have been 
possible that th~ increased output potential of the new varieties was 
to some extent, off-set by reduced plantings of varieties such as 
King Edward VII, and hence that the crop yields used to derive freed 
acreage are inappropriate and should include an allowance for King 
Edward VII. There might have been a tendency for King Edward's 
plantings to have been affected in the short term, but there is no 
indication that plantings were significantly affected (see Section 
12.7). 
8.4 The measurement of effects upon market price, grower market 
revenue and surpluses, prior to 1969 
A good indication of where the effects of the SPBS's innovation 
might have been felt was given above (Section 8.1); this section makes 
an attempt to measure effects upon market prices, grower revenue, and 
surpluses of the new varieties' extra output prior to 1969. Taking 
revenue, the market value to growers of the new variet.ies' extra output 
is the tonnage (table 8.4) times average market price (table 7.7: 
column (c». Rounding the estimates down to take account of the 
influence upon average market price of the higher priced red-skinned 
varieties, totals are derived indicative of extra market revenue from 
higher yields, (see table 8.6). 
Even after allowing ;or rounding down, it is likely that these 
figures are over-statements of the market return to the extra output. 
Since they still assume that nearly all of the extra output can be sold 
1 for human consumption at prices close to the market average. There 
might have been an extra market return associated with Pentland Crown's 
scab resistance. 
Taking the variety's planted acreage and multiplying it by crop 
yield, estimates of output are obtained. If it can reasonably be 
assumed that between 2% and 4% of this output would have been lost if 
Majestic had been grown instead of Pentland Crown (see section 7.8), 
then taking these proportions of the new variety's annual outputs and 
multiplying them by average market prices, produce values for extra 
market returns associated with common scab resistance. On average for 
1965 to 1972, approximately £0.243m to £0.486m market revenue was 
received annually. It is likely that the lower figure.is closer to 
reality, since it is possible that sometimes, Pentland Crown samples 
can be affected by scab to a significant extent (ibid, table 7.4). 
The effect of the new varieties' extra output upon surpluses can 
be inferred, if extra output is expressed as a percentage of surpluses, 
see table 8.6. It seems reasonable to suppose that only in 1968 did 
the new varieties contribute substantially, when a potential balance 
between supply and demand might have been turned into a surplus. 
TABLE 8.6 
Estimates of extra output contribution to surpluses, market revenue 
(£1971ms) 
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Contribution to total 
Extra output as % of surplus costs of market support 
PC PD Combined PC PD 
(a) (b) (c) 
1965 0.4 2 1 3 0.226 0.113 
1966 1.7 
1967 2.2 5 11 16 0.500 1.100 
1968 4.4 5,1 66 117 1.150 1.150 
Note: Calculated from tables 7.7, 6.1, 6.2 and 8.4 
1 If allegations that growers have .. been able to. unload bulk supplies of 
poor quality produce are correct, then the exaggeration is probably 
small, see Chapter 12. 
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It is possible to judge the impact of what this might have meant for 
average market price, by looking at other seasons when supply and demand 
were approximately in balance. Two such years were 1962 and 1969; 
taking an average of market prices in these two years, that is £25.14 
per ton, and comparing it to that in 1968 (table 7.7), a price difference 
of £6.51 is obtained. Assuming that around 4.9m of maincrop potatoes 
went for human consumption in 1968 (table 10.4), then multiplying this 
, 
by £6.5, suggests that the loss to growers in market revenue was around 
£3l.85m. This is more than enough to off-set the gain to growers of 
the new varieties from the sale of extra output: in fact, a net loss 
of around £23m. 
Of course, here is a gain to consumers, in that they were able 
to buy their potatoes at a generally lower price. The extent to which 
this happened would be dependent upon the price fixing practices of the 
retail (and to a lesser extent) wholesale trades. In fact, retail 
prices for white-skinned potatoes in 1968/69 were low when compared 
to those of the following season, 1969/70, 1.83 compared to 2.37p per 
lb (in real terms, estimated on the basis of retail prices in Appendix 
15). The difference works out at £12.1 per ton, which at a human con-
sumption rate of 4.9m tons is a price gain of £59.3m: that is, at over 
a pound per head of population. This does of course, assume that the 
1968/69 and 1969/70 seasons are comparable: if so, this is a significant 
distributional-benefit of the SPBS innovation. 
However, there is a cost in terms of surplus" disposal and market 
support, in addition to the effects upon " growers , incomes. This might 
" " 
be inferred by assuming that the new varieties contribution to surplus 
costs is proportional to their c~ntributions in terms of extra output. 
So mUltiplying the total costs of surpluses by the varieties' propor-
tional shares of surplus, columns (b), the varietal contributions to 
costs are obtained, columns (c), table 8.6. Of course, in 1968, the 
whole of the cost is assumed caused by the new varieties. 
Not all ef surpluses are wasted, some will be used for stock feed 
anc. some small tonnages used for other activities. The value of 
stockfeed was in 1968 around £0.8m, and in 1968 and 1967, apportioned 
upon the basis of assumed varietal contribution to total surplus, 
approximately £0.09m and £0.42m re~pectively (estimated from informa-
tion in table 10.2). 
It is assumed that for 1969 and thereafter, the new varieties made 
no significant contribution to changes in market price, due to effects 
upon general trading conditions. It might be possible that increased 
crop yield potential, at the expense of planted acreage, somehow causes 
output to be more volatile. There does not seem to be any evidence to 
indicate that this is so. However, if there are important cost 
changes resulting from the SPBS's innovation, these might become 
reflected in market prices. 
8.5 Changes in the productioncostsof9rowers of the new varieties 
When the new varieties' extra output was being considered above, 
this was in comparison to Majestic and to a far lesser extent, other 
minor varieties, such as Redskin and Kerr's Pink (particularly in 
Scotland).- Very little is known about the costs of growing minor 
varieties and for this·reason they will not be considered specifically 
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in the measurement of costs. This is unlikely to make any significant 
difference to the overall estimates, since the commercial importance 
of Majestic has been overwhelmingly predominant. 
As indicated in Chapter Seven, the main cost categories likely to 
have been affected by the., substitution of Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell for Majestic, are those of seed, spraying and some labour and 
machinery costs. These are considered separately below. 
'II 
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(a) Seed costs 
Varietal certified seed and own-grown seed costs per acre were 
derived in Chapter Seven for Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell (see tables 7.6 and 7.8). It appeared that the older variety 
was less costly to plant for both types of seed. However, to know how 
the total seed cost associated with planting the new varieties, compare; 
to the cost of just planting Majestic, it is necessary to know in what 
proportions certified and own-grown seed were used for the new 
varieties, and would have been used if Majestic had been planted. 
The varietal certified seed to ware acreage ratios, see table 
7.~give only a rough impression of the use of certified and own-grown 
seed. However, the lowest ratios may be used to infer what certified 
seed acreage produces in terms of ware acreage (similarly to the 
example used to illustrate that Pentland Crown's ware acreage was 
probably planted with once and more own-grown seed, see Section 7.9). 
Once an estimate is obtained that is indicative of what certified seed 
produces, then from a consideration of varietal certified seed acreages 
(in table 8.3), it is a simple matter to estimate-the likely proportions 
of the following ware acreage planted with the two kinds of seed. 
Pentland Dell exhibits the smallest ratios. It is possible that 
these might'have been affected to some extent by the variety's-blight 
immunity breakdown and'associated limitation of the demand for certified 
seed. Thus it seems reasonable to take a ratio after the effects had 
probably been felt, but before the troubles associated with Pentland 
Crown's storage problems (it seemed possible that some growers might 
,-
switch from Pentland Crown to Pentland Dell) • The ratio for 1970/71 
was chosen, 1:6.2; that is, it was assumed that an acre of certified 
seed was likely to result in 6.2 ware acres. 
Multiplying the varietal certified seed acreages by 6.2 and 
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subtracting the results from observed ware acreage in the following 
season (table 8.3) gives estimates indicative of the ware acreage 
planted with certified and own-grown seed respectively. The estimates 
are shown in table 8.7. The figures in parenthesis denote the use of 
own-grown seed as a proportion of ware acreage. These seem reasonable. 
For example, the PMB 1968 maincrop survey suggested that around 33% 
of acreage was planted with own-grown seed (PMB 1968a op cit): 
Majestic was still the dominant variety at that time and its proportion 
in table 8.7 indicates a use for own-grown seed of 32%. 
TABLE 8.7 
Varietal acreages estimated as planted with different types of seed 
Majestic 
CSA* OGA** 
1965 204470 94963 (32) 
1966 191754 18134 (9) 
1967 136822 60901 (31) 
1968 107768 51483 (32) 
1969 15212 39244 (34) 
1970 54467 47739 (47) 
1971 41900 26965 (39) 
1972 25315 19859 (44) 
(a) (b) 
Pentland Crown 
CSA OGA 
1885 4641 (71) 
4315 10105 (70) 
10373 18921 (65) 
22029 24766 (53) 
36220 5527 (13) 
48465 53361 (52) 
55068 56056 (50) 
59464 47414 (44) 
(c) (d) 
Pentland Dell 
CBA OGA 
2685 
9288 
24583 
57096 
30059 
40027 
46583 
44476 
2282 (20) 
16917 (41) 
1174 (2) 
2874 (7) 
(e) (f) 
.. The lo~ use of own-grown seed for Majestic in 1966 might be 
associated with the rapidly increasing commercial sucCess of the new 
varieties about that time: Maj estic growers might have cut down on 
plantings of own-grown seed, whilst at the same time taken up the new 
varieties. The greatest use of own-grown seed for crops of Pentland 
Dell occurred during the years of the variety's greatest acreage 
expansion,and the decline in usage thereafter might be associated with 
,. 
blight immunity breakdown"and what has been stated above (Section 7.9) 
about the use of bold seed. The low use of own-grown seed for crops 
of Pentland Crown in 1969 might also be associated with Pentland Dell's 
sudden loss in popularity and consequent strengthened demand for 
Pentland Crown. 
The costs of growing Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell are now 
obtained by multiplying the acreage proportions of the two kinds of 
seed by the appropriate costs per acre lists in tables 7.5 and 7.7. 
However, to be able to compare these with the seed costs of Majestic, 
if it had been planted on the new varieties' ware acreage, it is 
necessary to derive a new list of estimates of acreage. This is done 
by taking the proportions of Majestic's actual planted ware acreage, 
taken by own-grown seed and applying it to the new varieties acreage. 
So, for exarrq;>le, in 1965 the proportion of Majestic's ware acreage 
planted with own-grown seed was 32%. 
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If it can reasonably be assumed that if Majestic had been planted 
on Pentland Crown's ware acreage in 1965, 32% would have been sown with 
own-grown seed, then the acreage of Majestic that would have been 
planted with the two kinds of seed works out at 4438 and 2088 acres 
for certified and own-grown seed respectively: which is 68% and 32% 
of Pentland Crown's ware acreage in 1965. 
The proportions attributed to the two kinds of seed for Majestic, 
planted on Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's ware acreage, 1965 to 
1972, are listed in table 8.8. To estimate the cost, the information 
with regard to Majestic in tables 7.5 and 7.7 is used as above and 
seed costs corrq;>ared in table 8.9. It is to be seen that seed costs 
were lower only in the instance of Pentland Dell, during the period 
1969 to end-197l. The main reason is the low certified seed cost of 
this variety and the ~ecline in its popularity following the blight 
immunity breakdown. Despite Pentland Crown's virus resistance and 
associated greater use of own-grown seed, it is seen that the high 
certified seed price and greater seeding rate are sufficiently important 
TABLE 8.8 
Majestic acreage planted with different types of seed, if the 
variety had been planted on Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's 
acreage 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Notes: * 
** 
TABLE 8.9 
Majestic on Pentland Crown 
ware acreage 
CSA* OGA* 
(a) (b) 
4438 2088 
13122 1298 
20213 9081 
31821 14974 
27553 14194 
53968 47858 
67786 43338 
59852 47026 
Majestic on Pentland Dell 
ware acreage 
CSA OGA 
(c) (d) 
1826 859 
10529 1041 
28635 12865 
39624 18646 
19839 10220 
22738 20163 
28416 18167 
24907 19569 
acreage which might have been planted with certified seed 
acreage which might have been planted with own-grown seed 
Seed costs compared on planted acreage (£'OOOs) 
Cost of Majestic Cost of Cost of Majestic Cost of 
on Pentland Crown Pentland on Pentland Dell Pentland 
ware acreage Crown ware acreage Dell 
1965 107 31 92 79 44 13 132 
1966 276 18 194 162 221 15 418 34 
., 
1967 606 118 456 284 859 167 1082 237 
1968 700 255 793 495 872 317 1142 21 
1969 606 185 833 83 436 133 541 
1970 1619 622 .1599 800 682 262 841 40 
1971 2034 780 1817 1121 852 327 1025 
1972 1676 . 517 . 1843 569 697 215 1290 
Note: .. Calculated from tables 8.7 and 8.8 
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to suggest that the new variety has had associated with it higher seed 
costs than Majestic might have had. 
(b) Spraying costs 
Varietal spraying costs per acre (materials only) were"derived 
above (Section 7.10) from information gathered from the PMB 1969 main-
crop survey, see table 7.11. These suggest that the differences in 
growing costs per acre for planting Majestic instead of Pentland 
Crown, Pentland Dell in the period up to and including 1968, and the 
period thereafter, have involved savings of £0.77, £0.79 and £2.39 
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per acre respectively. Multiplying these estimates by the new varieties 
planted acreage derives totals that might be indicative of extra costs 
associated with growing the new varieties. 
(c) Labour costs 
In principle the labour costs associated with spraying might be 
derived in the same way as the material costs, upon the basis of 
observations made in the PMB 1968 maincrop survey, see above (Section 
7.11) • Unfortunately, the information about labour costs associated 
with spraying cannot be taken from the 1970 cost survey, but must instead 
be taken from the costs handbook (PMB, 1972c op cit). 
There it is assumed that spraying equipment consists of a hundred 
gallon tank and that 25 acres are covered per day: regular labour is 
used, working an eight hour day, at an hourly rate of £0.40 (not £0.45 
as the handbook suggests: the higher figure was used in the handbook 
to allow for overtime payments). Data from the 1968 maincrop survey 
suggests that crops . .of Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, up 
to end-1968, received three spray applications: and Pentland Dell after 
1968, five. This is based on the assumption that spraying is determined 
by the need to apply fungicide and haulm defoliant {that is, that 
pesticides are applied with fungicide) • 
The cost is worked out upon a per acre basis, according to the 
principles laid down in the handbook and then multiplied by the varietal 
crop proportions considered to have had spray treatments (in the 1968 
survey) • The derivation of total spraying costs per acre are shown 
in table 9.11. The costs per acre associated with Pentland Crown are 
shown as greater by to.079 than those suggested for Majestic: for 
Pentland Dell prior to end-1968, greater by to.4l, and post-1968, 
greater than Majestic by £0.454 per acre.· These are multiplied by the 
new varieties planted acreage to obtain estimates of extra costs 
associated with growing the new varieties. 
TABLE 8.11 
Estimated varietal labour costs associated with spraying (£ per acre) 
Pesti- Haulm 
cide Fungicide Herbicide defoliant 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Majestic 0 0.384 ( .50) 0.128 ( .4) 0.128 (.59) = 0.319 
Pentland Crown 0 0.384 (.68) 0.128 ( .38) 0.128 ( .69) = 0.398 
P.O. to end 1968 0 0.384 (.55) 0.128 ( .48) 0.128 ( .68) = 0.360 
P.O. post 1968 0 0.64 ( .94) 0.128 ( .48) 0.128 
PC M" .079; po 68 M "" .041; po p68 M "" .454 
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote proportions of varietal 
acreage likely to receive applications 
Calculated using table 7.10 
(.86) 
The herbicide category is interesting, since it is possible that 
= 0.773 
. 1 
herbicides allow growers to minimise cUltivations (Evans, 1972). That 
it might be assumed that where herbicides are applied say, one less 
cultivation is required. Using the PMB handbook again, the roost 
appropriate cultivation to be affected is ridging: it is assumed that 
the equipment was a mould board ridger, capable of covering ten acres 
1 There might also be advantages associated with increased crop yield and 
faster harvesting (Evans ibid): but these do not seem to have been measured. 
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per day. The cost under this assumption works out at £0.32 per acre~ 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell according to the 1968 crop observations 
had 2% less and 8% more of their acreage treated with herbicide than 
did Majestic (table 7.10) and, therefore, extra costs of £0.32 per acre 
associated with 2% of Pentland Crown's acreage and savings of that 
amount associated with 8% of Pentland Dell's acreage. 
Of the other labour costs associated with growing the new varieties, 
only those associated with grading are relatively simple to derive. 
Both Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell seem to require care in handling 
and inspection, in activities concerned with such as chitting and 
planting, harvesting and storage (Chapter 7). There is no reliable 
information on which to base measurement of labour time spent upon these 
factors. 
To derive grading costs, the assumptions of the 1970 PMB cost 
survey are used (Section 6.8), with the difference that 'it is assumed 
that only a quarter of the output is handled by casual labour; that is, 
for 25% of the output, four of the six workers are casually employed. 
The labour cost per ton in the all regular labour instance is £0.80 and 
where casual labour is used, £0.67 (£0.27 and £0.40 per ton, for the 
regular and casual labour respectively). Multiplying these estimates by 
the new varieties extra output (table 8.4), produces totals indicative , 
~ 
of extra grading costs associated with the new varieties, see table 8.12. 
TABLE 8.12 Estimated varietal gradings costs (£bOOs) 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Pentland 
Crown 
RL 
(a) 
10 
16 
25 
62 
Pentland 
Dell 
RL 
~) 
5 
26 
50 
80 
Notes: RL = regular labour costs; 
Pentland' 
Crown 
RL CL 
(c) (d) 
1 
2 
3 
7 
2 
3 
4 
10 
Pentland 
Dell 
RL 
(e) 
1 
3 
6 
9 
CL 
(f) 
1 
4 
8 
13 
CL = casual labour costs 
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No grading costs are derived for the period after 1968, since the 
imposition of quotas in 1969 should have compensated for the extra output 
from higher crop yields. Although of course, there might still have 
been grading cost differences stemming from the substitution of Majestic, 
if the new varieties first order quality was such that grading practices 
were somehow altered. In addition, as regards the estimates prior to 
1969, it is by no means certain that grading costs can be meaningfully 
related to weight of output (Section 6.8), particularly if samples were 
marketed without proper inspection. For these reasons, such estimates 
of grading costs might be exaggerated. 
(d) Machinery costs 
There are probably consequences for machinery costs (and associated 
running expenses to do with building costs) from the replacement of 
Majestic by the new varieties: such factors as tractor time (affecting 
fuel and repairs) involved with spraying and harvesting. Given the 
1968 varietal maincrop observations, only those costs associated with 
spraying can be indicated, if the same approach as that used for materials 
and labour is followed (that is, by assessing the proportions of 
acreage affected). 
A cost estimate for fuel and repairs per acre of maincrop is 
provided by Nix (1972). This is put at £8, which is close to the 
1970 PMB estimate of £9 per acre: it was decided to use the former, 
because of the 'depreciation element present in the PMB estimate (a factor 
not dependent upon varietal use in a direct sense, but upon machinery 
. price and obsolescence considerations). 
However,'the figure of £8 covers all potato husbandry activities, 
including the costly one of harvesting. The 1970 PMB cost survey 
suggested that about two-thirds of labour cost was associated with 
harvesting; therefore, the machinery cost. per acre estimate might be 
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scaled down to something over two-thirds, say, one-fifth as associated 
with spraying activities. The cost differences between growing the new 
varities instead of Majestic are shown in table 8.13. Multiplying 
these by the new varieties planted acreage derives estimates of extra 
costs associated with growing the new varieties. 
TABLE 8.13 
Estimated varietal machinery costs associated with spraying (£IOOOS ) 
F H C HO 
Majestic 4.5 (.50) 1.5 ( .40) 1.5 ( .60) 1.5 (.59) 
Pentland Crown 4.5 ( .68) 1.5 (.38) 1.5 (.72) 1.5 ( .69) 
Pentland Dell to 
end 1968 4.5 ( .58) 1.5 ( .48) 1.5 (.52) 1.5 ( .68) 
Pentland Dell 
post 1968 7.5 ( .94) 1.5 ( .48) 1.5 (.52) 1.5 ( .86) 
PC M = 1.11; PD M = 0.49; PDB M = 5.20 
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote proportions of varietal acreage 
likely to receive applications. 
Calculated using table 7.10 
(e) Summary of extra costs. associated with growing the new 
varieties instead of Majestic 
= 4.64 
= 5.75 
= 5.13 
= 9.84 
The annual additional costs associated with growing the new varieties 
instead of Majestic are shown according to cost factor category in 
tables 8.14 and 8.15, for Pentland Crown a~d Pentland Dell respectively. 
G1ven the assumptions underlying the estimates shown, perhaps those for 
machinery and grading costs are the least reliable • It must be remem-
.. bered in any case, that these are estimates and of a very rough kind. 
However, they do provide insights into the relative importance of 
different-cost categories. 
The cost estimates are high and indicate clearly that the new 
varieties have probably been more costly to grow per acre than Majestic 
might have been. In total the extra costs on average per annum are 
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approximately £0.260m and £0.300m for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
respectively. This represents around £4 and £7 per acre extra, for 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell compared to what Majestic might have 
cost. These high estimates were not obvious at the start of this study. 
TABLE 8.14 
Extra costs associated with Pentland Crown's planted acreage 
Spraying 
seed mat. lab. cult. grad. mach. Total 
1965 33 5 1 13 7 59 
1966 ' 62 11 1 21 16 III 
1967 16 23 2 32 33 106 
1968 333 36 4 79 52 504 
1969 125 32 3 46 206 
1970 158 78 8 -1 113 356 
1971 124 86 9 -1 123 341 
1972 219 82 8 -1 119 427 
TABLE 8.15 
Extra costs associated with Pentland Dell's planted acreage 
Spraying 
seed mat. lab. cult. grad. mach. Total 
1965 75 2 7 1 85 
1966 216 9 33 6 264 
1967 293 33 2 1 '64 20 413 
1968 26 46 2 2 102 29 207 
1969 -28 72 14 1 156 215 
1970 -63 103 19 1 223 283 
1971 -154 111 21 1 242 221 
1972 378 106 20 1 231 736 
.. 
Previous work at the SPES suggested that the new varieties had 
entailed little or no extra costs, that the revenue from difference in 
output, was virtually 'free profit' (Simm::>ns, 1974 op cit: p.15). It 
was thought that Pentland Crown's 'virus resistance and Pentland Dell's 
blight immunity prior to '1967 would have ,reduced seed and spraying 
costs respectively. 
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The only cost category to exhibit significant savings is that of 
seed, in the instance of Pentland Dell. 'This appears to be associated 
with the variet:·'s b1igh immunity breakdown and c~nsequ~~t fall in 
popularity and certified seed price. There might have.heen some small 
. . .." 
savings associated with fewer cultivations on crops of Pentland Dell, 
but it seems too small to attach any significance to the estimates. 
8.6 Cost savings consequent upon freed acreage 
The greatest impact of the new varieties upon costs is likely to 
have been felt after quota imposition in 1969, and associated with 
savings resulting from a reduced acreage. Some costs will have been 
saved approximately in proportion to acreage taken out of production. 
With these it is a relatively straightforward process of estimating 
Majestic's cost per acre and multiplying this by the freed acreage 
contributable to the new varieties (table 8.5), to derive saved costs. 
Other costs might be affected less directly and these cannot be easily 
measured. 
Those cost categories which can be most closely related to acreage 
are seed, rent, the PMB levy (these three are the most directly linked), 
fertilisers, spraying costs and to a lesser extent, labour and machinery 
costs. Where possible the costs estim~ted as saved as a result of 
reduced acreage, should be those of Majestic. This is easily done 
with seed and spraying, since estimates of costs per acre have been 
derived for MaJestic above (tables 7.5, 7.7 and 7.11). 
The spraying cost of Majestic was put at £4.27 per acre. For seed, 
it must be establ!shed what acreage of that freed, would have been 
.' planted with'certified and own-grown seed, so that the freed acreage 
associated with each type can be valued by the appropriate seed cost 
per acre. Using the"derived proportions of Majestic's actual acreage 
planted with own-grown seed (table 8.7), ~is is done in table 8.16. 
--......... ~--~--------------------------- -
TABLE 8.16 
Varietal seed costs saved, associated with freed acreage 
contributablc"toPerttlandCrown and Pentland Dell (£lOOOs) 
, PC FA planted , PD FA if planted 
with Majestic with Majestic Cost 
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PC Cost PD 
CS OGS CS OGS CS OGS CS OGS 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
1969 4640 2391 2506 1291 107 31 58 17 
1970 5996 5318 1684 1494 192 69 54 19 
1971 13557 8668 5142 3287 434 156 165 59 
1972 10074 7715 2964 2328 302 87 89 26 
Notes: FA == freed acreage; CS == certified seed; 
OGS = own-grown seed. 
The other cost categories are not easily associated with Majestic 
specifically. Given the lack of specific information about this 
consideration, it is necessary instead to use average estimated of costs 
per acre. For rent, the lower handbook estimate is preferred to the 
one given as a result in the 1970 PMB cost survey, that £8 per acre 
(Section 6.12). ThePMB levy is charged on a per acre basis and so will 
be saved (for the grower) with reduced acreage. However, in 1971 the 
PMB increased the levy to take account of a falling income from reduced 
plantings. Thus, from that time no savings are assumed. The rate 
assumed for the levy is £3.24 per acre. 
Fertiliser cost savings are assessed at the result derived from the 
1970 PMB cost survey, at £22 per acre. Labour costs are also taken from 
"" the PMB survey result, that is, for husbandry activities up to and includ-
ing harvesting: the estimated cost is £21.82 per acre. This figure is 
chosen primarily for convenience since labour time depends so much upon 
a combination of factors (Section 6.8), that the relationship of cost 
with marginal chang~s in acreage must be uncertain. 
Grading is not allowed for, given the method of measurement, which 
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derives freed acreage estimates from extra output: the grading costs 
saved as a result of reduced acreage will be off-set exactly by the 
cost of grading the extra out:;;·ut from the new varieties higher yields, 
after 1968. For an estimate of machinery costs saved per acre, the Nix 
estimate of £8 is preferred to the 1970 PMB cost survey result, to 
exclude the latter's allowance for depreciatio.l (Section 6.9) • The 
cost of capital equipment (and buildings) will after acreage reduction, 
have to be spread over a smaller planted acreage (but tonnage will 
remain approximately the same for the industry generally). 
Other costs such as storage, chitting and irrigation are unlikely to 
change very much with marginal changes in acreages (see Section 6.1a). 
These are, therefore, left out of consideration. 
Summaries of estimates of costs saved are given in tables 8.17 and 
8.18, for freed acreage associated with Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell respectively. It is seen that the largest categories are those 
of seed, followed by fertilisers and labour. In total, saved costs 
associated with reduced acreages appear to have been large; around 
£1.298m and £0.458mannually between 1967 and 1972, for Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell respectively. They represent an annual range of 
£84 to. £91 per acre for both varieties; which is about 50% of the 1970 
PMB cost survey estimate of total cost per acre, or about 60% of those 
costs which might vary with acreage. 
TABLE 8.17 
Costs saved associated with freed acreage brought about by Pentland Crown 
Spray 
Seed Fert. Mat. Lab. Mach. Levy Rent Total 
(a) (b). (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1969 138 155 30 153 58 23 56 611 
1970 261 249 48 247 91 37 91 1024 
1971 590 489 95 485 178 178 2015 
1972 389 396 77 393 144 144 1543 
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TABLE 8.18 
Costs saved associated with freed acrease brousht about b~ Pentland Dell 
Seed Fert. SPS Lab. Mach. Levy .~ Rent Total 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1969 75 84 16 83 30 12 30 330 
1970 73 70 14 69 25 10 25 .. 286 
-
1971 224 185 36. 184 67 67 763 
1972 115 116 23 115 42 42 453 
8.7 Conclusion to Chapter 
If these cost savings are combined with the extra costs associated 
with planted acreage, then it seems that the SPBS innovation prior to 
1969 raised potato costs around £0.437m annually and, thereafter, lowered 
them by about £1.060m annually. Given a human consumption of four 
million tons, the overall impact of the cost savings after 1969, on an 
annual basis, is very small indeed in terms of final retail price (if 
the benefit were passed on). The saving works out at around £0.265 
per ton of potatoes going for human consumption, and after allowing for 
an average mark-up of 160% (Section 12.10), the effe.ct spread across all 
pOtatoes sold for human consumption upon retail price might be around 
0.0003p per lb. 
An overall summary of the effects which the SPBS innovation has had 
u~n the potato industry between 1965 and 1972 is presented in table 8.19. 
These cover only those effects which lend themselves to measurement. The 
effects upon the distributive trades,· processing industry and catering 
trade, are uncertain; the possibility that they might have been affected 
has been discussed below (Section 10.10) • Attempts are made elsewhere 
to assess the impact,of the new varieties upon the certified seed industry 
(Section 11.4), and the importance of varietal quality to the final 
consumer (Chapter 12). 
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This chapter has been concerned with pecuniary costs and benefits, 
it has not sought direqtly to measure resource cost. Table 8.19 
notes measurements of financial cost and benefit in relation to which 
group they affect. However, most of the information derived in this 
chapter about potato production costs will be of relevance to the 
measurement of resource cost and the derivation of a rate of return. 
TABLE 8.19 
Main measurements of the innovation's effects within the potato industry 
Sector 
Growers 
Consu-
mers 
PMB 
Costs 
Market revenue lost 
from competition with 
extra output, 1965-68; 
£m4.46. 
General surplus effect 
on revenue 1968: 
£m26.00 
Extra varietal growing 
costs, 1965-72: £m4.53 
Benefits 
Market revenue gain from 
extra output 1965-68: £m8.70 
Growing costs saved 
associated with freed 
acreage 1969-72: tm7.02 
General surplus effect on 
prices, 1968: £26.00m. 
Uncertain price effect 
consequent upon cost changes 
Market support operations 
1965-68: £m4.24 
Levy income losses 1969-70 
£mO.08 
Balance 
+ 4.24 
+ 2.49 
26.00 
19.27 
+ 26.00 
+ 26.00 
4.24 
0.08 
4.32 
!!!!!!!!!I!!I!!!l!!!l!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~~~~~====::::=====:::":::::':::;:=-~-:-::----,------ .. ~.--.- _.-_ .. _ .. - -- ----.-.-- .-----. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Derivation of social rates of return to investment cost 
9.1 Potato production costs and resource cost 
The aim of this chapter is to derive estimates of social rates of 
return to the SPBS investment cost derived in Chapter 5. In the 
first instance, rates of return will be derived upon the basis of 
resource cost changes within agriculture for 1965 to 1972. To test 
the sensitivity of certain cost factors, some alternative methods are 
applied. Then the impact of several considerations upon these rate 
of return estimates is considered in the following order: the resource 
costs involved with market support operations, the timing of acreage 
restrictions, future returns after 1972, and the contribution of other. 
SPBS varieties. Lastly, some observations are made as to the signi-
ficance and comparability of the rate of return estimates. 
The measurements of the effects of Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell have had upon production costs are summarised in tables 8.14, 8.15, 
8.17 and 8.18, and may be used to derive a resource cost rate of return, 
to the estimated costs of investment derived in Chapter 5. The 
resource cost criterion involves the measurement of resources in terms 
of. their productive potential in a next best alternative. Thus, if 
the cost information derived in Chapter 8 is to be used in the rate of 
return arithmetic, it is necessary to be reasonably sure that estimates 
reflect these opportunity costs. 
The only cost category considered in the tables which is not 
obviously a reflection of production opportunities elsewhere is that 
for the PMB levy. This is a subscription and, therefore, reflects no 
change in resource use, it is essentially a transfer of grower's 
incomes to thePMB: hence~ a reduction in"acreage, merely transfers 
&2 
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money back from the PMB to growers. Thus, this category is omitted 
from the measurements of resource cost. 
Of the other cost categories in the tables, all are relevant to 
·resource cost, but it is less certain whether the market values used as 
a basis for deriving t~e cost estimates are adequate reflections of 
opportunity cost. There are several instances of doubt which it is 
as well to note, so that the estimates which go to make up resource 
cost might be qualified. 
The value of own-grown seed was estimated upon a basis of market 
opportunity cost to growers, of not selling the seed to the ware market 
(Section 7.11). This is not altogether meaningful in terms of resource 
use, since market price is dependent upon trading conditions as much as 
it is upon the cost of producing potatoes for market. The question is 
whether the cost of resources which went into producing the seed is 
likely to be close to two-thirds of market opportunity cost. 
Another possibility associated with seed costs i.s that the initially 
high prices of the new varieties' certified seed.might have reflected 
monopolistic elements. That is, prices might not only reflect resource 
use in supplying seed, but also the exploitation of scarcity value. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about the costs of certified seed 
growers, to be able to state with certainty that the high prices might 
have meant that producers had been earning excess profits. If prices 
. have contained monopolistic elements the ef~ect will have been to cast 
1 It might be thougl:t: that the levy reflects the resources used by the 
PMB to deal with surpluses: that therefore, because the acreage res- . 
trictions remove pressures to conditions which lead to surplus, then 
the levies saved as a result of reduced acreage reflect resources saved 
associated with the reduced need to cope with surpluses. It is doubt-
ful if there is a meaningful relationship between levy and resource use 
in market support operations, however; for example, the PMB sought 
during the 1960s to have its levi~s increased since it was felt that 
running costs exceeded the PMB's income. In addition, it is impossible 
to have savings associated with not having the new varieties' extra 
output, since without the new varieties no extra output would have 
existed anyway. 
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a conservative bias upon the estimation of net benefit. 
There is also uncertainty as to whether or not agricultural wage 
rates are an adequate measure of labour 'opportunity costs. A high 
proportion of casual labour used for potatoes might not have available 
to it alternative employment. This applies most notably to family 
labour (which could be important, for example, one observer reported 
an estimate which put family labour at about three-fifths of the total 
British farm work force, see Cherrington, 1973b). The re._ource cost 
of such labour is debatable. It may be seen as leisure time, which 
has been valued by some cost-benefit analysts at approximately 25% of 
average hourly earnings (CTLA, 1971: op cit). 
Another approach might be to use a surrogate price based upon say, 
the earnings of domestic servants (as suggested by Weisbrod, (1960), to 
measure the opportunity costs of housewives) • Such approaches produce 
results not dissimilar to the values for the market rate paid for casual 
labour in agriculture. Thus the casual labour estimates might not be 
exaggerated in terms of resource cost. 
Another factor to be noted is the valuation of farmers' time. This 
was implicitly assessed in the previous chapter as equivalent to that of 
regular labour, since no special allowance was made for it in the labour 
cost estimates. However, it may be that farmers have entrepreneurial 
and management facilities which make their time more valuable in terms 
. . 1 
of alternative employment on other crops. 
'1 If the resource cost rate of return is to be used to compare the 
productivity of investments in agriculture to that of investments else-
where in the econpmy, then it is likely that many reasons have generally 
made agricultural wage rates basically lower than those for comparable 
skills outside agriculture (see Cherrington, 1972, and,1973a), and that, 
therefore, labour costs are less than their opportunity costs to the 
economy generally. However, it has been noted that given the degree 
of state interest in agriculture~ it is not wise to compare rates of 
return to investment in agriculturally associated fields with those 
for investment elsewhere in the economy. .See Section 2.6 and 9.14~ 
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The opportunity cost of land has received a great deal of attention 
in studies associated with agricultural production. Conventionally, 
there are three ways to approximate the alternative value of land: to 
compute a standard interest rate on the sale value of land, to take the 
net return expected from an alternative crop or to use rent. Estimates 
of the latter were derived in Chapter 8 and so these will be used here. 
There is some indication that rents have generally lagged behind 
. increases in agricultural productivity. On the other hand, rent might 
include allowances for non-productivity factors, such as the value of 
other merits of having land, landlord costs and so on (see Wibberly and 
Boddington, 1970, for a full consideration of whether or not land. rents 
and prices reflect productivity). This might off-set the importance of 
the laq factor. Land agents, Jones Lang Wool ton, have been reported 
as believing that generally rents have been related to what farmers can 
afford to pay and therefore, productivity (Farmers Weekly, 1972). 
Taking all these qualifying factors together, the effects in terms 
of distortions are probably not large" and within the distorting 
effects of errors which might reasonably be associated with the kind of 
general cost data used for this present study. In addition, to use 
the parlance of Prest and Turvey, the divergences from opportunity costs 
are "unknowable" and not "obvious", and, therefore, can be ignored 
I (Section 2.6). 
9.2 The rotation factor 
One factor not considered at all in the chapter on the measurement 
of effect's within the potato'industry was that of rotation. It has 
sometimes been suggested by observers that apart from sugar beet (a crop 
that is limited by quotas) potatoes are the only available cash crop* 
l. 
However, since seed cos~s make up a large- part of costs affected by-· 
the new varieties, this category is considered again on alternative 
assumptions, to test the sensitivity of the rate of return to" this 
factor, Section 9.4 
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for breaking cereal rotations (for example, see, Richardson, 1973): other 
crops might not be sufficiently profitable to be worthwhile. The EDCA 
has suggested that the continuous growing of cereals is a major cause 
of yield loss (1968). 
. ,~. , 
The restriction of acreage brought about by quota imposition in 
1969 will have limited potatoes for use in rotations. This is likely 
to have resulted in losses to cereal yield. If it can be assumed that 
this lost output is necessary so that extra resources have had to be 
spent on procuring it (say, by spending on products that canbe exported, 
so that foreign exchange may be earned and cereals imported), then the 
rotation factor is of relevance to resource cost. 
Nix has noted that the effect of a break crop upon a following 
season's cereal crop yield is variable, given different conditions (op 
cit). He suggests that for winter wheat, a first crop after rotation 
might be two cwt. above average and thereafter, in subsequent years crops 
might yield two cwt. less. These estimates may be conservative with 
respect to potatoes, given the high applications of fertilisers potatoes 
generally receive and, therefore, the likelihood that a large residual 
remains for a following crop. 
To arrive at an approximation of resource loss associated with the 
new varieties' contributions to freed acreage, it is necessary to assume 
that the market prices for cereals reflect the resources required to 
produce the cereals. In the years prior to 1972 market prices was 
generally below guaranteed levels (MAFF, 1974). It may be, therefore, 
that mar~et price had been below the resource cost of producing domestic 
cereals. H?wever" because the aim here is to derive a figure represen-
tative of the resources required to produce the cereal output loss 
through reduced rotations and give.n that this output would probably have 
.-
had to have been importe~ (domestic cereal production has probably been 
180 
close to the Ina.ximum possible with the available soils: see EDCA, 1968 
1 
op cit), this is not important. 
The resource cost of lost cereal yields is estimated for 1970 to 
1972 only, because of a lag effect (rotation effects are, of course, 
felt subsequently to the year of a break crop), and found by first 
estimating the market value per acre of cereals. This is approximated 
by using the average annual market prices for wheat in the afore-stated 
years (£29.85, £24.11 and £32.61 per ton, respectively) and multiplying 
this by average annual wheat yields (table 9.11). Since not all of 
the national potato maincrop acreage is likely to be followed by cereal 
crops (and given that the most intensive arable acreage is located in 
the eastern and east midlands of England, see figure A13.3) the yield 
loss of 0.10 tons per acre by Nix is halved: then used to multiply the 
estimated market value of cereals per acre. 
This derives totals of £2.5, £2.1 and £2.8 per acre lost annually 
per acre for each acre freed from potato production. To find the total 
cost, these estimates are simply multiplied by the freed acreaqe 
. estimates in table 8.5. The results for Pentland Crown, 1970 to 1972, 
are £0.028m, £0.047m and £0.05Om and Pentland Dell, £0.008m, £O.OlSm and 
£O.015m. 
9.3 A social rate of return to potato R&D investment at the SPES 
Combining the estimates presented in tables S.14, S.15, S.17 and 
S.lS (excluding the levy category) with those costs associated with the 
rotation factor, produces estimates for resource cost, shown in column 
1 This assumes that the resources expended in the UK on exports to pay 
for the adaitional imports of cereals is approximately equal to those 
expended upon cereal production overseas. A wider implication is that 
cereal production overseas is less resource costing than in the UK and 
that, therefore, it might seem that efficiency would be best served if 
the UK concentrated upon exports' and grew fewer cereal crops. There 
are other advantages associated however. with a large domestic cereal 
production, most notably strategic ones. (see EDCA, 1968 op cit). 
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(a) tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, for Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell ar,d both 
varieties combined, respectively. The ~stimates for the new varieties 
individually, tables 9.1 and 9.2 are subject to discount factors equal 
to 0 at the beginning of Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's development 
periods, 1951 and 1953 respectively: and in the instance of both 
varieties, table 9.3, the discount factor is 0 in 1922, at the start of 
the R&D programme at SPBS (see Section 5.4). 
TABLE ~.l 
Net benefit associated with Pentland Crown (£'0008) 
Net benefit Discount factors Discounted net benefit 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
1965 59 .505 .263 - 29.8 - 15.5 
1966 - 111 .481 .239 - 53.4 - 26.5 
1967 - 106 .458 .218 - 48.5 - 23~1 
1968 - 504 .436 .198 -219.7 - 99.8 
1969 382 .416 .180 158.9 68.8 
1970 622 .396 .164 246.3 102.0 
1971 1654 .377 .149 623.6 246.4 
1972 1097 .359 .135 393.8 148.1 
1071.2 400.4 
TABLE 9.2 
Net benefit associated with Pentland Dell (£'OOOs) 
Net benefit Discount factors Discounted net benefit 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
1965 - 85 .557 .319 - 47.3 - 27.1 
1966 
- 264 .530 .290 -139.9 - 76.6 
.. 
1967 - 4i3 .505 .243 -208.6 -108.6 
1968 - 207 • 481 .279 . - 99.6 - 49.5 
1969 103 .458 .218 47.2 22.5 
1970 11 .• 436 .198 
-
4.8 2.2 
1971 532 .416 .180 221.3 95.8 
1972 - 292 .396 .164 -115.6 
- 47.9 
-347.3 -193.6 
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TABLE 9.3 
Net benefit associated with Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell (£'OOOs) 
Net benefit Discount factors Discounted net benefit 
5% 10% 5% 
1965 - 144 .123 .017 - 17.7 
1966 - 375 .117 .015 - 43.9 
1967 - 519 .111 .014 - 57.6 
1968 - 711 .106 .012 - 75.4 
1969 485 .101 .011 49.0 
1970 611 .096 .010 58.7 
1971* 2186 .092 .009 201.1 
1972 805 .087 •. 009 70.0 
184.2 
Note: *The year of break-even, when return had cumulated' 
sufficiently to balance costs. 
10% 
- 2.4 
- 5.6 
- 7.3 
- 8.5 
5.3 
6.1 
19.7 
7.2 
14.5 
Given these very long time periods it is seen from the tables that 
the discount factors deflate resource cost considerably; this reduces 
net benefit, shown here as positive numbers, in relation to the earlier 
R&D cost. It is seen from the tables that Pentland Crown produces a 
sizeable net benefit, about £1.071m and £0.400m at the 5% and 10\ 
discount rates respectively, over the 1965, to end-1972 period. 
Pentland Dell, on the other hand, might have led to an overall loss in 
resources, around £0.347m and £0.194m respectively. For both varieties, 
Pentland Crown's resource savings was probably enough to off-set the 
effects of Pentland Dell, so that net benefit was around £0.184m and 
£0.014m respectively. 
Taking the cumulat ed R&D costs derived in the previous chapter 
and the cumulated net benefit in tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, the latter 
,. 
may be expressed as a percentage of the former, to obtain rates of 
return, as shown in table 9.4. These suggest that for example at the 
5% discount for Pentland Crown, £1' invested between 1951 and 1958 at 
the SPBS on the assumed development of the variety, yielded about £11 
between 1965 and 1972. Which is more than £1 annually between 1965 a"nd 
1972. Pentland Dell does, of course, show negative rates of return, 
see table 9.4. 
TABLE 9.4 
Rates of return attributable to investment in R&D consequent 
on the success of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
(a) 
5% 
10\ 
(b) 
5\ 
10\ 
(c) 
5\ 
10\ 
Pentland Crown Pentland Dell 
Cumulated research expenses (£ 'OOOs) 
98 79 
89 74 
Cumulated net returns (£'OOOs) 
Rate of 
1071 
400 
return (100 
1093 
449 
-347 
-194 
(b) 
a 
\) 
-493 
-262 
(d) Rate of return as annual return 1965-72 
5\ 
10\ 
137 
56 
- 55 
- 33 
Both varieties 
300 
193 
184 
14 
61 
7 
8 
1 
Pentland Dell's poor performance is to some extent a reflection 
of the timing of its blight immunity breakdown. The immunity lasted 
just long enough to ensure that the variety recorded the high growing 
costs prior to 1968 (comparable to those of Pentland Crown), but not 
enough to ensure that plantings would be increased after that time, 
when its extra output would have led to freed acreage and associated 
cost savings, on a scale at least equivalent to that of Pentland 
Crown's. Of course, had immunity breakdown occurred later than 1967, 
Pentland"Crown's success might not have been so great. 
9.4 The "sensitivity of the rate of return to changes in seed 
cost assumptions 
Of the doubts expressed above (Section 9.1) about whether potato 
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" production costs reflected resource opportunity cost, the most critical 
factor is that of seed. The estimates which are most suspect are those 
for own-grown seed cost per acre, for the years shown marked in-table 7.8 
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with an asterisk: these are for totals based upon market opportunity 
costs when ware market prices were high because trading conditions 
reflected below average output conditions. Taking an average of the 
costs shown for other years and applying them to the asterisked seasons 
shown, produces own-grown seed cost of £12, £14 and £13 per acre, for 
Majestic, Pentland Crown ° and Pentland Dell respectively. 
Similarly, if the certified seed costs per acre, shown in table 7.6 
for the years 1964/65 to 1966/67 are adjusted to an average of the costs 
for 1969/70 and 1971/72; that is, £38 and £27 per acre for Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell respectively; to remove the possibility that 
prices reflect scarcity of the new varieties. Then the seed costs 
associated with the new varieties are those shown in columns (a), 
table 9.5. This changes net benefit to that shown in column (b), which 
changes the rates of return to those shown at the foot of table 13.5. 
TABLE 9.5 
Sensitivity of rates of return to changes in assumptions behind seed costs 
(a) 
Adjusted seed costs 
Pentland Pentland 
Crown Dell 
1965 5 - 18 
1966 - 32 - 49 
1967 46 125 
1968 - 58 190 
1969 13 103 
1970 °103 136 
1971 783 330 
1972 170 -263 
Discounted net benefit 
5\ 
10\ 
Adjusted annual rates 
of retUrn 5i 
10\ 
(b) 
Adjusted net benefit 
Pentland Pentland 
Crown Dell 
- 31 - 28 
- 81 - 97 
- 44 5 
-229 9 
382 103 
622 - 11 
1971° 484 
1097 -292 
1367.4 67.9 
530.1 25.7 
174 11 
74 4 
Both 
- 59 
-178 
- 39 
-220 
485 
611 
2455 
805 
347.9 
33.9 
14 
2 
--~" ~---" -- ---"----"""-- "----""--"""--"""------
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It is seen that the overall effect is to increase the rates of 
return, by nearly 40% for the most favourable estimate, at the 5% discount 
rate for Pentland Crown. A notable feature is that Pentland Dell's 
rates of return have become positive. Thls points to the importance 
of the seed cost assumptions, particularly the question of whether it 
is valid to use the market value of the initially high prices of certi-
fied seed as indicators of resource cost. 
It is, if these prices are truly indicative of the resources that 
went into the extension, multiplication of the new certified seed stock. 
One might expect the initially high costs of marketing the new varieties 
to have been passed on, eventually, in prices to ware growers. 
Unfortunately, little is known about such costs (Section 4.8 and 5.6). 
Thu,s, the od 9:i n",J_ sl"!~d cost assnmptions Rhould he accepted, but recog-
nised as a conservative influence on the rate of return arithmetic. 
Little in general is known about what the effects of the new 
varieties might have been in the period immediately after their intro-
duction, and prior to 1965. In particular, what the extent of the 
ware acreage of the new varieties might have been. It is likely that 
there were net resources costs incurred during that time since certified 
seed prices were very high. Given that the ware acreage of the new 
varieties was very small, it was decided to omit this consideration from 
measurement. 
9.5 The sensitivity of the rates of return to changes in investment cost 
The sensitivity of these rates to changes in investment cost are 
shown in table 9.6. They are similar at the 20\ change to the results 
that come from changing the seed cost assumptions, but not quite as 
large. A 20\ increase in investment cost, for example, produces 
approximately, a 35\ increase in the annual rate of return for Pentland 
Crown at the 5% discount rate: given a 10% change, however, th~ rate is 
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increased by 15%. For both varieties, rates are not very sensitive. 
TABLE 9.6 
Sensitivity of annual rates of return to changes in investment cost 
:!:: 10% change :!:: 20% change 
Pentland Crown 5% 124 to 152 % 113 to 172 % 
10% 51 to 62 'II 47 to 70 'II 
Pentland Dell 5% -61 to -50 'II -69 to -46 'II 
10% -36 to -30 'II -41 to -27 % 
Both varieties 5% 7 to 9 'II 6 to 10 'II 
10% 1% 1% 
Of the two approaches used to derive a rate of return, that is, 
apportioning R&D costs upon the basis of varietal development (to 
derive the Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell results, above), and 
using the whole of potato R&D costs to 1960 to compute a return (to 
derive the 'both varieties' results), the author prefers the latter. 
This is because it takes into account the whole system of R&D at 
SPBS, the principle aim of which, is to produce varieties like Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell (Section 5.4). Up until 1972, the success of 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell represented nearly the whole economic 
success, in terms of resource cost, of the system (the importance of 
other SPBS varieties is discussed in Section 9.10). 
Thus, the relative insensitivity of the rate of return for 'both 
varieties' is important, as it affects the more significant of the two 
approaches used to derive investment cost. However, the derivation of 
rates for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell is not pointless, rather it 
provides an indication of what returns might be from investment success 
associated with a future hybridisation and development programme apart 
from the investmen~ in the whole R&D system. Also, it distinguishes 
between the contribution of Pentland Crown on the one hand, and Pentland 
Dell on the other.' Seen in terms' of the 'both varieties' approach, the 
commercial success of Pentland Dell actua~ly reduced the overall return, 
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off-setting to some extent the benefits from the commercial success o'f 
.. - ~ 
Pentland Crown. Commercial success does not guarantee an overall social 
benefit in resource terms. The assumptions behind the resource cost 
criterion presuppose the existence of alternative occupations for 
resources. Net benefit implies that production opportunities have 
somewhere been enhanced'.·' In the above estimation of the rate of 
return, the alternative productivity of land was taken into account by 
inclusion of the rent cost category. It was noted, however, that an 
alternativ~ measure is to consider more directly what the alternative 
to potato production is and consider the return to that alternative 
occupation (Section 9.1). 
9.6 Alternative enterprise to that of potato growing: 
alternative method of deriving a rate of return 
The attempt to derive a rate of return upon the basis of comparison 
of",~he potato to another enterprise raises the question of where potato 
land might otherwise be employed. No published information exists 
which specifically answers this. It is possible that the imposition 
of quotas might, for example, have resulted in land leaving agricul~ 
tural production altogether. Total arable acreage declined by 2% 
between 1968 and 1972, of which a large proportion went to urban 
development, the remainder to animal rearing and forestry (MAFF statistics). 
However, it is likely that potatoes are grown on some of the most 
productive soils in regions removed from large centres of urban develop-
mente Also, there is some evidence to suggest that because potatoes 
are a relatively large cost enterprise, they are not commonly grown on 
land marginal to agriculture (Gasson, 1966). 
The potato acreage is only a small proportion of the total arable 
. acreage and so it is impossible to 'obtain a detailed impression from 
agricultural acreage statistics of how a reduced acreage in 1969 and 
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thereafter, might have been reflected in other crop acreages. However, 
an overall picture does show trends in commercial practice, see table 9.7. 
Maincrop potato acreage shows a significant fall, whilst the 
percentage shares of other crop plantings have remained steady, except 
cereals. Wheat has ex~anded most of all in recent years. One feature 
of interest is that bare fallow (included under 'others' in the table) 
showed an increase in 1969, but thereafter returned to normal. Perhaps 
this represents a pause whilst growers waited to see if the PMB quota 
restrictions would be permanent. 
In the light of this evidence it seems most likely that potato land 
would otherwise have been employed for wheat. This contention was 
supported by comment from the NFU (private conversations) that freed 
potato acreage would be employed in wheat and barley enterprises. 
Since barley is in terms of planted acreage the most important crop 
grown in Britain, it seemed worthwhile to consider this crop and wheat, 
as alternatives to potato production. 
Hence, this study makes two alternative assumptions: (A) that 
freed acreage went into wheat production, or (B) into barley. However, 
not all of Britain is good arable land, and it is likely that other 
uses in agriculture made use of potato land. Thus, it will be assumed 
that only half of freed acreage went, under assumptions (A) and (B), to 
wheat and barley and that the productivity of the rest might be approxi~ 
.. mated by the rent cost category. In addition, given the information 
about bare fallow, it will be assumed that in 1969, only half of the 
freed acreage was actually used. 
The same cost categories as before are relevant, except of course 
that of rent in the instance of the half of freed acreage assumed 
planted with cereals. The costs associated with growing the new 
varieties on planted acreage instead of Majestic, are shown reproduced 
0'\ 
co 
r-l TABLE 9.7 Change in composition of arable land use, Great Britain 1960-72 
Fodder Temporary Total Maincrop 
Wheat Barley Cereals Beet crops Other Vegetables Grass Potatoes Potatoes 
1960 11.6 18.7 12.6 2.4 6.7 2.9 2.3 38.0 4.6 3.0 
1961 10.2 21.3 10.6 2.4 6.3 3.9 2.0 39.5 3.9 2.5 
1962 12.5 22.0 9.2 2.3 5.9 3.0 2.1 38 .. 8 4.1 2.7 
1963 10.6 25.9 7.8 2.3 5.3 3.3 2.2 38.5 4.2 2.8 
1964 12.0 27.4 6.7 2.4 4.9 2.9 2.1 37.5 4.2 2.8 
1965 13.7 29.1 5.9 2.5 4.5 2.7 2.0 35.5 4.0 2.8 
1
1966 12.1 33.2 5.4 2.4 4.2 3.2 2.0 34.0 3.6 2.6 
1967 12.6 32.9 6.1 2.5 4.2 3.1 2.2 32.6 3.9 2.8 
1968 13.3 32.5 5.9 2.5 4.5 2.9 2.4 32.2 3.8 2.7 
1969 11.5 33.2 6.2 2.5 4.5 4.0 2.6 32.0 3.4 2.4 
11970 14.0 31.2 6.4 2.6 4.1 3.0 2.9 32.0 3.8 2.6 
1971 15.2 31.2 6.5 2.6 3.9 2.6 2.5 32.0 3.6 2.5 
1972 15.6 . 31.2 5.3 2.6 3.7 2.7 2.5 32.6 3.3 2.3 
Notes: (1) 'Other cereals' over 90% accounted for by oats, others include may rye 
(2) 'Fodder crops' include beans, peas, turnips and swedes, mangolds etc. 
(3) 'Other' includes hops, mustard, fruit, flowers, bare fallow etc. 
Source: Appendix 16 
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in column (a), tables 9.8,9.9 and 9.10 for Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell 
-- -
and both varieties, respectively. The costs associated with the new 
varieties' contributions to freed acreage are shown in column (b): 
these are those totals shown in tables 8.17 and 8.18 halved as applicable 
to that proportion of acreage not planted with cereals and quartered in 
1969, to allow for the 'possibility that half the freed acreage was then 
left as bare fallow). 
TABLE 9.8 
Alternative use assumptions: net benefit and rates of return 
associated with Pentland Crown (£'OOOs) 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
(a) 
- 59 
-Ill 
-106 
-504 
-206 
-356 
-341 
-427 
(1:» 
147 
493 
1007 
771 
Rate of return 
TABLE 9.9 
(c) (d) 
144 132 
504 462 
948 894 
833 756 
(e) 
- 29.8 
- 53.4 
- 48.5 
-219.7 
35.4 
253.8 
608.5 
422.5 
968.8 
988% 
(f) (g) 
- 15.5 - 29.8 
- 26.5 - 53.4 
- 23.1 - 48.5 
- 99.8 -219.7 
15.3 30.4 
105.1 237.2 
240.5 588.1 
158.9 394.9 
345.9 899.2 
399% 918% 
(h) 
- 15.5 
- 26.5 
- 23.1 
- 99.8 
13.1 
98.2 
232.4 
148.5 
327.3 
368% 
Alternative use assum~tions; net benefit and 'rates of return associated 
with Pentland Dell (£OOOs) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (q) (h) 
1965 
- 85 - 47.3 - 27.1 - 47.3 27.1 
1966 -264 -139.9 - 76.6 -139.9 - 76.6 
1967 ~413 -208.6 -108.6 -208.6 -108.6 
1968 -207 - 99.6 - 49.5 - 99.6 - 49.5 
1969 -215 80 77 71 - 26.6 - 12.6 - 29.3 - 14.0 
1970 -283 138 210 199 28.3 12.9 23.5 10.7 
1971 -221 381 359 339 215.9 93.4 207.6 89.8 
1972 _ -736 226 235 222 -104.9 
- 43.5 -114.0 - 47.2 
-382.7 -211.6 -407.6 -222.5 
Rate of return' -484% -286% -516% -301% 
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TABLE 9.10· 
Alternative use assum12tions: net benefit and rates of return associated 
with both varieties (£'OOOs) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1965 -144 - 17.7 2.4 ·;".17.7 
1966 -375 - 43.9 5.6 ;".-43.9 
1967 -519 - 57.6 7.3 - 57.6 
1968 -711 - 75.4 8.5 - 75.4 
1969 -421 227 221 293 2.7 0.3 0.9 
1970 -639 631 714 661 67.8 7.1 62.7 
1971 -562 1388 1307 1233 196.2 19.2 189.4 
1972 -1163 997 1078 978 79.0 8.2 70.6 
151.1 11.0 129.0 
Rate of return 50% 6% 43% 
Notes for tables 9.8, 9.9 and 9.6 
(a) growing costs associated with planting the new varieties instead 
of Majestic, tables 8.14 and 8.15 
(b) growing costs saved associated with freed acreage: includes 
half those listed in tables 8.17 and 8.18, excluding levy, 
but including rent 
(c) growing costs saved associated with freed acreage: estimated 
on assumption A 
(d) growing costs saved associated with freed acreage: estimated 
on assumption B 
(e) net benefit, under assumptions A and B respectively discounted 
& at 5% discount rate, totalled at the foot of the columns, and 
(g) there converted into rates of return 
(f) net benefit, under assumptions A and B respectively, discounted 
& at 10% discount rate, totalled at the foot of the columns, and 
(h) there converted into rates of return 
(h) 
2.4 
5.6 
7.3 
8.5 
0.1 
6.5 
18.5 
7.3 
8.6 
4% 
For the proportion of freed acreage used for cereals, the aim is 
to estimate the market revenue earned on the acreage, and because 
potatoes are probably more resource consuming per acre than cereals, 
it will be necessary to subtract cereal costs associated with marginal 
changes in acreage, from those potato costs similarly dependent upon 
planted acreage." The result may be assumed a benefit to the non-
agricultural economy. For example, if cereals require less fertiliser 
per acre than potat.oes, then th~ consequent savings may be assumed 
equal to the resources saved in the manufacturing of fertiliser as a 
a Ji .. 
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result. The implicit assumption is that these resources can be usefully 
employed elsewhere so that their marginal product is similar to what 
their cost was to the fertiliser industry. 
The market revenue received per acre for cereals is found by 
multiplying average annual prices per ton by average annual yields, 
tons per acre; see table 9.11. Data for cereal costs per acre are 
contained in Nix (A) op cit. The fertiliser costs per acre are put at 
. £6.5, spraying at £0.9 and machinery at £4.0, are given as the same for 
both wheat and barley. Seed costs per acre differ slightly, £4.1 for 
wheat and £3.1 for barley. This makes a total of £17 and £16 per acre 
for wheat and barley respectively. Unfortunately, there is no certain 
estimate for associated labour costs. It is therefore assumed that 
regular labour costs are equal to those for potatoes: casual labour, 
however, is left as a consideration in the calculations. 
TABLE 9.11 
Derivation of net benefit on alternative crops 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Market price/ton 
Wheat Barley 
(a) 
27.01 24.75 
29.85 31.03 
24.11 24.52 
32.61 28.28 
Market revenue/acre 
Wheat Barley 
(c) 
43.49 35.39 
49.85 41.58 
42.19 36.53 
" 55.11 45.53 
Crop. yield tons/acre 
Wheat Barley 
(b) 
1.61 1.43 
1.67 1.34 
1.75 1.49 
1.69 1.61 
Market revenue - cereal/costs 
Wheat Barley 
(d) 
27.89 20.79 
31.75 24.48 
24.49 19.63 
36.71 28.13 
Note: (d) includes allowances for rotation costs and casual 
labour savings. 
Casual labour associated with grading is omitted for the same 
reasons as stated above (Section 8.6). However, there are still those 
associated with harvesting. To find these the assumptions of the 1970 
PMB cost survey are used (Section 6.8). The value is estimated at 
£6.4 per acre; since casual labour is assumed to be used for only a 
quarter of an acre this is reduced to a quarter, £1.6 per acre. This 
figure may be multiplied by the annual proportion of freed acreage 
assumed planted with cereals, and included as a benefit. 
The costs of cereal production enumerated above are most 
conveniently subtracted from the estimates of market revenue to give 
193 
a net benefit, which can then be combined with potato costs saved 
associated with freed acreage in tables 8.17 and 8.18, but excluding the 
labour category (and rent of course) and divided by two. Allowances 
need to be made for rotational effects as before, except in the instance 
of barley, the loss in potential yield will be associated with wheat. 
In this instance, it is assumed that the yield affected is the same, 
but that its market value is determined by the barley price. 
The cereal market revenues, minus costs, minus rotational costs 
per acre, are shown listed in table 9.11, column (d). These are 
multiplied by half the totals of the estimates for freed acreage in 
table 8.5, and then added to the potato costs saved as noted, to make 
up the estimates of benefit in columns (c) and· (d), tables 9.8, 9.9 and 
9.10. The next step is to add columns (a), (b) with.(c) and (d) 
respectively, to derive net benefit for the wheat and barley assumptions 
shown discounted in columns (e) to (h). 
The cumulated net benefit can now be expressed as a rate of return; 
these are shown at the foot of the relevant columns in the tables. 
Compared to the rate derived in the previous section it is seen that 
these are generally below those estimated~on the basis of the original 
arithmetic, using only the rent category to express alternative value 
of freed potato acreage (cf. table 9.4), although the difference is 
small and probably within the size of error caused by the nature of 
cost approximations derived in Chapter'8. There was no halving of 
costs saving associated with freed acreage in 1969, in the original 
arithmetic (that is, no allowance for bare fallow or non-use of land). 
If this had been included, then it is likely that the sets of results 
would have been even more similar. 
Thus far in the consideration of rates of return attention has 
been given only to consequences for production resources on the farm. 
The impact of the new varieties upon the costs of market support was 
noted above (Section 8.4), but the effects in terms of resource cost 
were not examined. Consider this now, in relation to the first 
estimates derived as rates of return, that is, using rent only as an 
indicator of the alternative value of land. 
9.7 Resource costs associated with market erice sueeort and 
surplus diseosal 
A rough approximation of resource cost may be obtained by sub-
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tracting from the total costs of market support, compensation payments, 
plus the value of surplus potatoes moved into stockfeeding; estimates 
for these three factors are listed in table 10.2. The remainder of 
the total may reasonably be a reflection of resource cost. It might, 
however, understate resources if total costs of surpluses hid the 
possibility that the pattern of the PMB resource use changes: for 
example, potato inspectors might be switched to market support buying, 
with ,less time to surveY,the marketed quality of potatoes. The 
consequences of'this for resources is that the marketed quality of 
potatoes might decline, and consequently, somewhere along the distri-
butive chain labour costs associated with sorting and removing damaged 
potatoes might rise (as well as labour time associated with meal or 
processing preparation). 
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The costs associated with compensation payments and stockfeed are 
essentially financial payments. Although this might be disputed if it 
can reasonably be assumed that compensation approximates to extra 
effort associated with the grower attempting to locate a market, or that, 
in the instance of stockfeed, extra resources are involved in transpor-
tation. In the former case, there is no evidence of extra effort: 
the compensation may be assumed as a payment designed to cover produc-
tion costs (these have already been included in the rate of return 
arithmetic). With stockfeed, it may reasonably be assumed that 
transport costs are balanced by the value of resources saved, that. 
would otherwise have gone to produce alternative animal feeds. 
In fact, this might understate the value of stockfeed, since some 
potatoes will not leave the farm of origin, but be used nearby for 
feeding. Also, very recent evidence from the PMB 'outgrades scheme' 
for transporting surplus potatoes to animal rearing areas, indicates 
.. "'.~ 
. that the cost of transport per ton carried has been as little as £2 
(PMB, 1974f: p.9). This implies a shortfall of more than £4 per ton 
at the price observed by Turff (1971: p.49). However, potatoes 
require special treatment before they can be fed to most animals ~nd 
will therefore involve a certain amount of labour time, this might 
work to minimise the difference (ibid). 
The assumed resource costs of surplus seasons, between 1965 and 
1969 may be apportioned between Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell along 
similar lines to that done for varieta.1 contribution to surplus and 
cost, above (Section 8.4). The result is that extra resource costs 
are attributable to the new varieties for 1965 of £O.138m and £0.069m; 
for 1967, £O.115m and £O.253m, and 1968 of £0.545m and £0.545m, for 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. 
This changes cumulated net benefit at the 5% and 10% rates for 
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Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell and both varieti~s co~hined, to £O.71Om 
and £O.230m; £-0.776m,and £-0.412m; £0.002m and £-O.007m respectively; 
and associated rates of return to 724% and 258%;,,'::"'982% and -557%; 1% 
and -4%. These represent a large fall, around 300% for tpe most 
, " 
favourable estimate, for Pentland Crown at the 5% discount rate 
(cf. table 9.4). 
9.8 Timing of quote impositi(!!. 
The actions of the PMB have probably been of most importance in 
terms of resource cost in the timing of its quote restrictions. To 
test this consider two alternatives, that the PMB had acted one year 
later and one earlier, to impose acreage quotas and thereby allow 
savings associated with freed acreage. l These situations can be 
compared approximately, by omitting benefit associated with freed 
acreage in 1969 from consideration in the latter alternatjy,~, and 
including an estimate for potential benefit associated with what might 
have been freed acreage in 1968, for the former. 
It is likely that for both alternatives costs a~sociated with 
growing the new varieties on planted acreage instead of Majestic, would 
be different than those estimate in Chapter Ten. This is because a 
delay in PMB quota imposition would permit growers generally to plant 
more acres, some of which might have the new varieties, and vice versa, 
with faster PMB action. However, this is debatable, since Pentland 
Crown was probably under-supplied and might have had the same acreage, 
whatever the PMB did. Another consideration is the effect upon 
resources used in market support. A delay on the part of the PMBin 
1 Conversely, i't might be though of in terms of earlier or later marketing 
in the new varieties: if they had taken one year later to be marketed 
(that is, feature in the PMB acreage statistics) then ceteris paribus, 
the PMB might have acted one year later. Of course, the situations are 
not strictly comparable, since the discounted costs associated with 
growing the new varieties on planted acreage instead of Majestic would 
be slightly differ~nt due to timing. PMB timing has no effect on the 
timing of these costs; but slower marketing will tend to delay them. 
1969 might have ,resulted in a surplus in that year. On the other hand, 
earlier imposition of quotas might have prevented the surplus conditions 
of 1968/69. Thus, in one instance, costs might have'been incurred, in 
the other saved. 
For the delay alternative, benefit is omitted from the calculations 
in Section 9.3, of the order of £0.S88m and £0.3l8m for Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell respectively in 1969. However, benefit is included 
for 1970 to allow for rotation effects (£0.028m and £0.008mrespectively). 
This produces cumulative net benefit at the 5% discount rate of £0.838m, 
£-0.489m and £O.098m, for Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell and both 
varieties respectively. These estimates convert to rates of return 
855%, -620% and 32% respectively. At the 10% discount rate, net benefit 
is £0.299m, £-O.2l6m and £0.005m, which converts to rates of return of 
336%, -353% and 3%, for Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell and both varieties, 
respectively. 
The sawingsassociated with the faster action alternative may be 
based upon estimates of freed acreaqes derived similarly to thos~ for 
1969/72 in Chapter 8 (that is, those estimates for 1968 denoted by an 
asterisk in table 8.5). Costs associated with freed acreage between 
1969/1972, averaged £86.82 and £86.68 per acre for Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell respectively (Section 9.9): multiplying these by freed 
acreage gives totals for costs saved if acreage imposition had been 
applied in 1968. 
This benefit might have been £0.903m and £1.l73m for Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell respectively in 1968. The cost in terms of rotation 
in 1969 might have been £0.025m and £0.032m respectively. At the 5% 
discount rate cumulated net benefit might have been £1.454m, £0.202m 
and £O.398m, for Pentland Crown, Pentland Dell and both varieties, 
respectively. Converted to rates of return, these become 1483%, 256% 
, . 
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and 133% respectively. At the 10% discount rate, cumulated net benefit 
might have been £0.575m, £0.118m and £0.039m, and rates of return 646%, 
21% and 20% respectively. 
The importance of the PMB's timing seems important from these 
estimates. In the year later instance, the most favourable rate is 
down around 200% (cf. table 9.4). A speedier imposition of quotas 
might have markedly increased rates, however. Pentland Crown's 5% 
rate is increased around 400%. The rates for Pentland Dell are trans-
formed. A negative rate, at the 5% discount factor, of 439% becomes 
a positive one of 256%. This is to be expected, since the full effect:. 
of the variety's blight immunity breakdown had not been felt in 1968, 
consequently, its planted acreage was at a peak and hence, so was its 
extra output (the variable important to the estimation of freed 
acreage, Section 8.3). 
Thus far in this chapter it might be suggested that measurements 
have only concentrated upon the 'bare bones' of resource costs. There 
is a possibility of a net benefit after 1972. In the instance of the 
combined varieties rate of return, to investment over 50 years at the 
SPBS; it might be consistent to include the costs and benefits associa-
ted with other varieties, if such exists. 
consideration. 
. ) 
9.9 Future returns to the SPBS innovation 
These factors need 
In terms of present value the useful life of new varieties, the 
extent to which net benefit goes on being earned, is determined by 
the size of the discount rate and distance, in terms of time, of net 
benefit ~ccruin9. It was noted above (Section 5.5) that a high 
discount rate markedly reduces net benefit and thus lowers the rate of 
return. It is likely that n~t benefit accruing to Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell in future years, taking the 50 years investment period, 
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might not add much to the rates of return shown in table 9.4. 
Another factor important to longevity of life of net benefits is 
varietal obsolescence. This might result from developments such as 
breakdown in varietal resistance to disease, or the introduction of 
new varieties. To some extent Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell have 
experienced both (Section 7.8). 
It could be argued that varietal success is but a step in a con-
tinuous process of progressively improving varietal stock, so that the 
benefits of individual varieties (which represent improvements) continue 
into perpetuity; perhaps with some additional R&D cost associated 
with the maintenance of varietal characteristics, see for example, 
Schultz (1971). Griliches assumed that the returns from hybrid corn 
varieties would continue indefinitely and he valued the whole research 
necessary to the development of individual hybrid corn varieties. 
It may be that to be consistent with an overall approach such as 
this it is necessary in the instance of British Potato varieties, to 
consider all the potato research that has been conducted in Britain 
which would have been likely to produce maincrop varieties similar to 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. However, this study has for its 
brief, only R&D relevant to Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell at the 
SPBS.' The question being asked is what would be the cost to society 
of not having the SPBS varieties: had another variety been available 
with identical advantages the answer would be none. Thus, the innova-
tion's timing is important; benefits last for as long as it can 
reasonably be assumed that no alternative varieties would have produced 
similar results. 
Interestingly, the success of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
heralded a spate of successful new maincrop varieties. These probably 
represent the first ~lush of fruit of the efforts of agency R&D with 
maincrop potatoes. It remains to be seen if this momentum can be 
maintained, particular~y after the expansion programmes of the last two 
decades (there is some evidence of a pause, perhaps to allow for an 
adjustment to more modern methods of plant breeding: for an account of 
recent developments and prospects in potato plant breeding, against the 
background of previous work, see Simmonds, 1969, op cit). 
Of these new varieties, the most successful has been Maris Piper 
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(a variety bred at the PBI: its description appears in Appendix 11). 
This variety first appeared in PMB varietal acreage statistics for 1968 
and has since increased its share of the British maincrop to 10\ (1973). 
During the early 1970s it proved itself to be a close substitute for 
both Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. Generally, the variety has no 
crop yield advantage over the SPBS varieties, but possessed superior 
cropping ability in eeelworm (or potato cyst nematode) infested areas. 
Howard has suggested that between 25% to 50% of potato soils. contain 
eeelworm populations high enough to lower crop yields by more than a ton 
per acre, many of the affected plants showing no. symptoms (1971). 
Eeelworm is a principle reason for restricting potato plantings to one 
year in four/six on the same land (PMB, 1968a op cit), a measure that 
probably takes some of the most productive land out of potato production 
(Southey, 1965). 
Maris Piper possesses a resitance to the common piotype of eelworm, 
Heterodera rostochiensis and this is undoubtedly the major reason for 
its success (regional offices of PMB, ADAS: written communications). 
It is a factor which could become more important still, if EEC eelworm 
regulations are rigorously enforced in Britain. These prohibit 
plantings of susceptible varieties, such as Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell, on infected land, unless the soil has been adequately cleared 
with insectidies (Directive 69/465/EEC 8/12/69). 
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Another factor that might have had a hand in Maris Piper's 
commercial success, is the damage done to Pentland Crown's quality 
reputation in recent commentaries. It seems likely that accounts in 
the potato trade literature (for example, British Farmer & Stockbreeder, 
1973) have encouraged the view that Maris Piper is a superior variety 
to Pentland Crown, a view probably encouragedby the PMB (cf. PMB, 1972a 
op cit).l 
The important point to note is that it is likely that had not the 
SPES varieties existed, Maris Piper would probably have replaced 
Majestic as the mainstay of the British maincrop. This is because 
Maris Piper is a close substitute for Majestic and generally yields more. 
It is less certain when this would have occurred, probably in the early 
1970s. Thus, the future net benefit likely to be achieved by Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell, will be approximated by consideration of 
situations with Majestic in one instance and with .Maris Piper in the 
other. 
As a first step it is necessary to assume estimates for the size 
of the planted acreage and crop yields of Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell after 1972. Concerning acreage, the pertinent question is the 
extent to which Maris Piper's success is likely to eat into the SPBS's 
.' 
varieties popularity. Quite arbitrarily, assume that Pentland 
Crown's ware acreage will stabilise at 90,000 acres and that of 
Pentland Dell's at 40,000; this is somewhat below that estimated for 
1972; of around 107,000 and 45,000 acres respectively (cf. table 8.3). 
The crop yields of Majestic, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell are 
approximated for the future, by the average of 1969 to 1972, to give a 
1 PMB home economists have rated Maris Piper's cooking quality superior 
to the SPBS's varieties (Section 12.9). There seems to be no firm 
evidence to suggest that Maris Piper is potentially a superior 
variety for grading, however. 
crop yield advantage of 1.6 and 1.3 tons per acre, for Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell respectively. Maris Piper's future crop yield is 
approximated by an average of 1971 and 1972 of 11.7 tons per acre 
(PMB statistics branch, written communication), to give a crop yield 
advantage to Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell of 0.4 and 0.1 tons per 
acre respectively. Bearing in mind that the yield advantage of the 
SPBS varieties was observed to decline in the early years of their 
adoptions (Section 7.7 FN), it may be that Maris Piper's yield will also 
fall with time relative to the yields of other varieties, particularly 
if Maris Piper's eelworm resistance to the common biotype becomes less 
important with build-ups of the other main biotype, Heterodera pallida 
(TEHF, written communication) • If so, Pentland Crown's and Pentland 
Dell's yield advantage will tend to become larger. 
Consider the instance of where the SPBS's varieties might be held 
to have replaced Majestic in future years. An approximation of what 
this will imply in terms of resource costs can be obtained from an 
average of the cost information previously derived. An annual average 
will be used for the years 1969 to 1972, a period after the full 
effects of Pentland Dell's blight immunity had been felt. 
The extra production costs associated with the new varieties' 
planted acreage, worked out on average at £3.87 (range: £3.07 to £4.93) 
per acre, and £8.76 (range: £4.74 to £16.55) per acre, for Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. The Pentland Dell estimate 
appears to have been inflated by the above average seed cost in 1972. 
An average for.1969 to 1971 only, produces a lower estimate of £6.17 
(£4.7? to £7.15) per acre. This seems more reasonable and so it will 
be used. These estimates are next multiplied by the assumed future 
plantings to obtain estimates of extra resource costs of £0.348m and 
£0.247m for Pentl~nd Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. 
Ii'IllI!thQQ& d J 
'"' 
The annual average costs saved associated with freed acreage, 1969 
to 1972, worked out at £86.82 and £86.68 (range for both varieties: 
£83.63 to £90.66) per acre for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell respec-
tive1y. Using the assumptions above future planted acreage and yield 
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advantage above, estimates of saved costs amount to £1.226m and £0.442m 
for Bent1and Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. Adding these to 
the extra costs, gives totals of £0.876m and £0.195m net benefit for 
the two varieties. For the varieties combined, it is £1.07lm. 
At the 5% discount rate the net returns for Pentland Crown accumulate 
to large proportions. In year 2000 (that is, 47 years after hybridi-
zation) net benefit might have amounted to £5.832m (£0.062m in that 
year), which represents an overall rate of return of 6000%, an annual 
one, of 165%. Pentland Dell in year 2000 (45 years after hybridization) 
might have accumulated net benefit of about £0.192m (£0.009m in 2000), 
an overall rate of return of around 165%; and annual one of 6%. The 
break-even point for this variety would occur around 1986. 
However, in view of what has been stated about Maris Piper it is 
probably more realistic to carr~ute future rates of returns upon a basis 
of a comparison of the SPBS's varieties with this variety. Unfortunately, 
very little information is available about Maris Piper's production 
costs. Thus, it will be assumed that they are similar to Majestic's 
(in fact, they are likely to be higher given the newer variety's 
higher certified seed prices: the effect of this assumption is such as 
to probably cast a conservative bias over the results). The difference, 
therefore, between this and the case with Majestic, will be in terms of 
freed acreage: smaller in size because Maris Piper's yield is assumed 
larger than that of Majestic's. 
The totals for costs saved associated with freed acreage, amount 
to £0.267m and £0.030m for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. 
m ! g; 
When these are combined with extra costs, the estimates for net benefit 
are £0.6l5m and £-0.2l7m for the two varieties. If Pentland Dell is 
to produce a positive net benefit, then it is necessary for the variety 
to show a yield advantage of 0.9 tons per acre over Maris Piper; but 
even then, at a 5% discount rate the variety is unlikely ever to break 
even. At-the 5% discount rate, Pentland Crown's net benefit accumu-
lates to around £4.24lrn by the year 2000. This is a rate of return 
of about 4000% (or 120% annually, after 1965) • , 
These calculations are very approximate indeed, given the 
uncertainties of the future. The first area of uncertainty surrounds 
production costs. Weatherhogg (1973) for example, has suggested that 
the relative costs of producing white-skinned potatoes will change. 
At the time of writing fertiliser costs, an important category in the 
estimates associated with freed acreage have risen markedly after the 
1973 middle east war and subsequent rise in oil prices (Financial 
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Times, 1974). This would enhance savings in resources associated with 
freed acreage relative to extra costs associated with growing the 
SPBS's varieties. 
Another important factor has been a general rise in world food ' 
prices. This has been reflected in a revival of demand for potatoes 
and near doubling.in the market prices 'for cereals (MAFF statistics). 
- Whilst world trading conditions might return to conditions similar to 
those previously prevailing, it seems likely that with Britain's 
membership of the EEC and full implementation of the conunon agricultural 
policy, that food prices might remain generally high. Thus, the value 
of po~ato production might have increased in two respects: the value 
of the cr?p as a relatively inexpensive food item and value of freed 
acreage to alternative crops. 
A third general factor affecting the future is the'possibility of 
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changes in varietal popularity. There are indications that specialised 
purpose varieties might become more important. Maris Piper with its 
eelworm resistance is an example. There is a recently introduced 
variety that shows every sign of commercial acceptance, Stormont Enter-
prise, for its resistance to spraing. Any increase in importance of 
specialist varieties is likely to be at the expense of both Pentland 
1 Crown and Pentland Dell. In conclusion, it is the view of the author 
that after 1972, the returns to the SPBS innovation are those which are 
based upon the comparison with Maris Piper. Since the yield advantage 
is small and probably not large enough to be significant in the face of 
the uncertainties of the future. It is necessary therefore, to state 
that future returns are likely to be small and will not significantly 
affect the rate of return results obtained for the period, 1965-1972. 
9.10 Other potato varie~ies bred at the SPBS which have achieved 
some commercial success 
A list of named SPBS varieties, with hybridization and registration 
dates, appears in Appendix 8 and varietal descriptions of those mentioned 
in this section appear in Appendix 11 (a general reference of varietal 
descriptions is PMB, 1965, op cit). Besides Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell, five SPBS varieties have been planted on a wide enough 
scale to merit inclusion in PMB varietal acreage statistics. These 
are Craigs Alliance, (Red) Craigs Royal, Pentland Beauty, Pentland 
Ivory and Pentland Hawk. Craigs Royal and Pentland Beauty are quite 
closely related to Pentland Dell. and Pentland Ivory is a hybridization 
of Pentland Dell and Pentland Crown, see figure 4.1. The others, 
although less closely related to Pentland Dell and Pentland Crown, have 
probably contributed (albeit to a small extent) to potato expnses 
,. 
incurred at the SPBS prior to the 1960s (so too, probably, has the 
1 Although Pentland Dell might be more resistant, since this variety 
might produce exceptional yields of first order quality on some 
farms (Section 7.8l. 
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promising Pentland Marble) • It might be appropriate therefore, to 
evaluate their net benefit, should it exist, and add it to the returns 
used to compute a rate of return to the investment cost incurred over 
the fifty years to 1960. 
The impact of these other varieties upon the potato industry was 
considered and to some extent examined, but in the end not evaluated 
for this study. This was because varietal comparison was found to be 
difficult, information hard to obtain and probably the study would have 
become unwieldy to an extent where the importance of the Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell innovation might be obscured. Also, it 
seemed from preliminary investigation that no substantial extra benefit 
could be measured. A few notes about these other varieties will serve 
to indicate some of the difficulties. 
Pentland Beauty, (Red) Craigs Royal and Craigs Alliance are early 
crop varieties (for the importance of the early crop trade, and a 
general reference about the nature of production, see Cox, 1972). 
Pentland Beauty was first marketed in 1956 and first appears in PMB 
acreage statistics for 1965, and reached its maximum share of the 
British early crop acreage in 1967, at around 4\. However, in 1973 
the variety ceased to have enough acreage to be recorded in PMB 
statistics 1 the year previously the NIAB had withdrawn it from their 
recommended list. l 
Craigs Royal was first introduced in 1948, and came into commer-
2 
cial prominence during the early 1950s. In 1957, a red-skinned 
lThe NIAB had described Pentland Beauty's cooking quality as very good 
(NIAB, 1971 op cit). In 1962 a red-tubered variant had been marketed by 
a Mr. Main (Windygate, Scotland). These two qualities of cooking propen-
sity and colour might have made this variety suitable for a strong mar-
keting compaign, however, it is doubtful if potato consumers generally 
were ever aware of the variety's existence. 
2craigs Royal be9an commercial life with a discovery, in 1953, of the 
presence of a leaf mottling of a mild mosaic type in stocks. This proved 
to be tobacco veinal necrosis caused by a mild strain of virus Y, and 
widespread in stocks of Craigs Royal. Stringent inspection of seed 
stocks eradicated most of this trouble (Todd 1962). 
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variant was introduced by J. Marshal (a certified seed merchant of 
Dunning, Perthshire: a raiser who had co-operated with the SPES). This 
gained in popularity at the success of the original variety. The 
combined percentage share of both reached a peak around 1967, at about 
24% of the early crop national acreage: it has since declined. to 
around 16% (1973); probably as a result of competition from Maris Peer. 
The colour advantage of the variant seems likely, however, to ensure 
that the variety will continue to be grown generally: particularly for 
the southern markets (where King Edward VII is popular). 
Not much information is generally available about these three early 
crop varieties, particularly with regard to what they replaced and why. 
It has been suggested that Craigs Royal became important at the expense 
of Great Scot (Howard, 1963a: p.1S): if this was so, it seems more 
likely that success was maintained at the expense of Arran Pilot (see 
PMB early crop acreage statistics).l At first glance this might seem 
surprising since the older variety (and Great Scot) is an earlier 
maturing potato, whilst Craigs Royal is classified as a second early. 
First early crop varieties have as their main husbandry advantage, 
a tendency to bulk early to allow marketing when prices are relatively 
high; whereas second early crop varieties bulk later but with re1a-
tively higher yields. It seems that in some areas Craigs Royal might 
bulk relatively early (Whitehead et al 1953). It is possible that 
this versatility led to a shift in the balance between the popularity 
of first and second early crops. 
Plantings of (Red) Craigs Royal expanded to record levels in the 
early 1960s, which corresponded to a time when second early acreages 
expanded generally. This seemed to result from factors which affected 
the early crop as a whole, since plantings of first early crops also 
2 Great Scot's acreage had been at low levels. It was about 1% of 
the national early ~rop acreage in the mid-l950s. 
increased significantly. This general increase in output potential 
seems to have produced surplus trading conditions, which led in its 
turn to a contraction of plantings. However, this appears to have 
occurred from the statistics (PMB/A op cit) in first early crops, a 
factor which probably led some observers to comment that a shift did 
occur between first and second early varieties (and indeed, might have 
in part brought about a concentration of early crop production in the 
earliest producing regions, see Cole, 1967).1 
Craigs Alliance is listed by the NIAB as a second early crop but 
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it can also be grown as a first early. The variety was first marketed 
in 1950 but was not recorded in the PMB acreage statistics until 1968. 
It appears to be at its maximum popularity at the present time, around 
4% of the British early crop (1973). It was originally considered to 
be a competitor for Arran Pilot (Whitehead et al, op cit), and perhaps 
it has gained some success at that variety's expense. Craigs Alliance 
main advantage is the early high yield and it appears to have won 
popularity in the moister areas of England, it seems to be readily 
accepted in some west midlands of England markets (Wa.terson, 1968). 
Given that in the rate of return associated with the combined 
results of both Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, all potato R&D 
costs up to 1960 were assumed attributable to these two varieties, then 
any benefit from the three early crop varieties is a bonus to that rate 
of return. However, there is uncertainty about what Pentland Beauty 
and Craigs Alliance replaced and in the instance of Craigs Royal, how 
its yield advantage over Arran Pilot can be interpreted as meaningful; 
1 A contributory factor to the depressed prices of these years might 
have been the" influence of a carryover in maincrop surplus potatoes 
into the early crop season. This would depress early potato prices (ibid). 
The prospect of lower prices for early potatoes would make second crop 
varieties look more attractive to growers, since if prices failed to 
be high, then the versatilit¥ of (Red) Craigs Royal offered the possi-
bility of.bulking up crop yield to high levels, and thus, higher 
outputs. 
given that plantings of c:arly crops are variable and not subject to 
acreage quota impositions. 
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All three varieties have husbandry disadvantages which might affect 
costs. A PMB survey of the early crop in 1968 (PMB, 1968c) supplied 
information which sugg€c;ted that (Red) Craigs Royal has received more 
applications of spraying than other leading early crop varieties. 
Pentland Beauty has the disadvantage that its tubers tend to be brittle 
and Craigs Alliance has a tendency to exhibit above average suscep-
tibility to blight and blackleg (Macarthur op cit) • 
Pentland Ivory and Pentland Hawk are very recent introductions, 
both of them were named in 1966, and therefore will have involved 
R&D costs at the SPBS after 1960. Both varieties were early enough 
to affect the share of development costs attributable to Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell, however (Section 5.4)1 Pentland Ivory had 4000 
acres planted in 1971, and by 1973 had had this expanded to 16,000 
about 4% of the national maincrop. This rate of increase might well 
slacken, since the variety's certified seed acreage remained virtually 
the same in 1973 as it had been the previous year. 
The commercial success of Pentland Ivory is in some ways an 
extension of that of its parents, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, 
since it appears to possess many of their attributes without significantly 
passing them in overall advantage (cf. table 7.1). It has been suggested 
that Pentland Ivory has special qualities associated with tuber shape 
and size (PMB 1972f op cit). Its one main difference, however, seems 
to be a high dry matter content: this might make it suitable for crisp 
manufacturing. 
Pentland Ha~appeared in the PMB avreage statistics for the first 
time in 1973, at less than 1% 9f the national acreage. Conversations 
1 Pentland Beauty also had some influence in this respect (ibid). 
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with the NIAB suggested that the variety would not be "robust" enough 
for commercial conditions, yet it seems that the variety has started 
to win popularity on account of its tough tuber skin and associated 
resistance to mechanical damage. (NASPM, 1975}. This factor might 
become still more important and if so, Pentland Hawk might expand at 
the expense of Pentland Crown (Section 7.8). 
The method by which the resource costs of Pentland Ivory and 
Pentland Hawk are derived, will depend upon whether the effects of the 
varieties are to be combined with those of Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell to derive a rate of return to the whole costs of potato R&D at 
the SPBS, or whether the aim is simply to derive a return to varietal 
development periods. l In the first instance, the question of relevance 
is how SPBS's varieties might be replaced if they were suddenly with~ 
drawn. As indicated (Section 9.9), it seems likely that Maris Piper 
would be the variety most widely grown. Thus, the planted acreage 
and yield of Pentland Ivory and Pentland Hawk would have to be cor;.~.·:;.red 
to that variety. 
According to MAFF yield comparisons both varieties consistently 
yield more than Maris Piper and might, therefore, have cost savings 
associated with freed acreage. However, these effects would be difficult 
to translate into something which is meaningful to a combined rate of 
return, if year one for discounting is 1922: since future returns would 
2 involve discounting over 50 years •. Where the aim is to compute 
returns to costs incurred during varietal development periods, it is 
necessary to compare Pentland Ivory and Pentland Hawk to Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell, since these are likely to be the main competitors 
(assumin~ that Maris Piper is chiefly used for eelworm infested soils). 
1 
2 
Pentland Ivory would not have existed without Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell, of course. 
Although R&D costs could be accumulated toward varietal introduction 
at a rate of interest, and thereafter, net benefit discounted, (see 
Section o· 5.5) • 
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There appears to be no yield advantage for either Pentland Ivory 
or Pentland Hawk with respect to the older varieties. It might be that 
Pentland Hawk's damage resistance affects the size of marketed yield 
and therefore gives the variety·a marked yield advantage. This might 
mean that less potato acreage is required to meet a given demand, and 
thus, freed acreage might be possible. However, there does not seem 
to be any evidence for this. On the whole, it seems that these 
varieties are unlikely to show any significant cost savings. 
Perhaps this raises a general point, of why should varieties be 
grown if they yield less and have little significance overall, in terms 
of resource cost. The answer lies in reasons associated with local 
conditions (see Appendix 13): these varieties have attributes which 
tend to maximize the net return a grower can expect with his own 
individual conditions. Usually this means the maximisation of crop 
yields. Thus, low-yielding varieties in general terms might contribute 
to maximizing output overall. The question of relevance in relation 
to varieties which are being valued is what they replaced: for example, 
if the predominant reason for Maris Piper's adoption is its eeelworm 
resistance, then the value of that variety is such compared to existing 
varieties' performances on eelworm soils. 1 
The problem for evaluation is ignorance. For example, it is not 
clear what the effects of Pentland Hawk's damage resistance are in 
terms of resources; either directly for production costs, or more 
indirectly, through the possibility of freed acreage (see above), 
compared to a situation where only Pentland Crown might have been grown. 
There are SPBS varieties still to make their mark upon the national 
potato acreage, in whose pedigree is material that contributed to the 
1 It has been reported that in"heavily infested fields, Maris Piper can 
yield 12 tons per acre against 3 tons per acre for Majestic (Howard 
1971op.cit). 
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Pentland crownl and Pentland Dell success. Perhaps the most promising 
is Pentland Marble, a ~ariety selected at the SPBS specifically for the 
processing industry. Its small round tubers are suited to canning 
uses (although they present serious disadvantages at harvesting and 
might be difficult to sell in alternative markets) and it appears to be 
the only competitor in this respect to Maris Peer (Price, 1974). The 
variety has seedlings 882(5) and 1104(2) as ancestors in common with 
Pentland Dell (see figure 4.1). 
9.11 Summary of the annual rates of return to investment at the SPBS 
A summary of annual returns derived in the previous sections of this 
chapter appears in table 9.12. Of course, they are very rough approxi-
mations, but generally they give the.impression, even after allowing for 
. 
the unreliability of data and associated approximations, that investment 
in potato R&D at the SPBS has been economically successful in terms of 
resource cost (in as much as it measures the productivity of potato 
resources in alternative employments). This is a result of Pentland 
Crown's commercial success, the extent of its planted acreage and size 
of its yield advantage over Majestic, between 1965 and 1972 •. It seems 
that Pentland Dell has not contributed to this economic success, largely 
because of its disease troubles. On these grounds it is more worthwhile 
to have had the SPBS, than for society to have gone without it (and thus, 
to have had to keep with Majestic from 1965 to 1972). 
The SPBS rates of return do·not co~are favourably with those 
obtained in other studies of investment-in agricultural R&D. Compare 
the rates shown in table 9.12 with those in table 9.13. The SPBS rates 
derived under the 'both varieties' approach are, in terms of scope, 
most comparable to the rates obtained in the Schultz, Griliches, and 
Schmitz and Seckler studies. The SPBS rates for 'Pentland Crown' and 
1 Pentland Crown is being used in breeding selection at the PBI. For 
example, it has been used in attempts to combine it with King Edward 
(PBI Annual Reports) 
M 
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TABLE 9.12 Annual rates of return to investment in potato R&D at the SPBS 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
, (6) 
(7) 
Annual rates 1965/1972 
Farming resources (Section 9.3) 
with amended seed assumptions (Section 9.4) 
under alternative assumptions (Section 9.6) A 
B 
Farming and market support resources (Section 9.7) 
(1) plus allowance for year's delay in freed acreage 
(Section 9.8) 
(1) plus allowance for year's earlier freed acreage 
(Section 9.8) 
(8) Farming resources in 1965 to year 2000 (Section 9.9) 
i Majestic 
ii Maris Piper 
Pentland Crown 
5% 
137% 
174% 
123% 
114% 
91% 
107% 
186% 
165% 
120% 
10% 
56% 
74% 
49% 
46% 
33% 
42% 
81% 
Both 
Pentland Dell Varieties 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
--, 
-55% -33% 8% 1% 
10% 4% 14% 2% 
-61% -35% 6% 1% 
-65% -38% 5% 1% 
-156% -95% 0% 0% 
-77% -45% 4% 0% 
32% 20% 17% 3% 
6% 
'Pentland Dell', on the other hand, are most comparable to the rates 
d ' 1 obtained in the Grossfield and Heath, and Peterson stu ~es. 
instance do the SPBS's rates compare favourably. 
In no 
TABLE 9.13 Annual rates of return estimated for investm~n:t in 
agricultural R&D (5% discount rate) 
All USA Agricultural Research (Schultz, 1953, op cit); 
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(Peterson, 1971) 
Hybrid Corn USA (Griliches, 1958, op cit) 
Hybrid Sorghum USA (Griliches, 1958, ibid) 
Potato Harvester UK (Grossfield & Heath, op cit) 
Poultry Research USA (Peterson, 1967, op cit) 
Tomato Harvester USA (Schmitz & Seckler, op cit) 
75% 
750% 
360% 
264% 
600% 
Sources indicated by parentheses 
900 to 1300% 
(-8 to 345% if compensa-
tion paid to displaced 
labour) 
Of course, it is questionable just how closely these rates may be 
compared. It was noted above (Section 2.6) that inter-sectorial 
comparisons may be unwise where market values are influenced so strongly 
by government policy, as they are in agriculture. It seems appropriate 
to keep comparison within a sector, however, to compare the SPBS's 
rates with those in the table is to make comparison an international one, 
and because of this, perhaps to make it the more doubtful. For 
instance, the higher rates for hybrid corn are partly to be expected 
as market size in the USA is large, and given that innovation has been 
widespread, then output affected will also tend to be large. 
In addition, it is to be wondered if these rates represent an 
optimistic view of investment effects. A feature of the work reviewed 
in chapter three was the simplistic approach employed by the studies. 
It is possible that they omitted important costs, or more simply assumed 
too much about the realisation of benefit. For instance, in view of 
1 The former group are essentially studies of broad R&D effort, which 
was designed to lead to the development of better agricultural inputs: 
the latter, more with the introduction of an improved input. The 
forestry study is not included in the table, because it was comparing 
two different kinds of produdtion process for land use, and is there-
fore not strictly comparable to the studies in the table. In fact, 
the rate of return to forestry was negative: the results becoming 
positive only if a 20% premium for balance of payments co~siderations 
is added 5% to 7 % • 
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what was stated above about mechanised harvesting and associated damage 
levels, (Section 7.8). It seems surprising that the Grossfield and 
Heath study did not consider this possibility (Section 3.4). 
9.12 Alternative methods for presenting returns 
The rates of return above are sometimes termed 'external' rates of 
return, and may be expressed as: 
(100 x NB) where NB = net benefit, and IC = investment cost. IC 
It was adopted for use in this present study to follow the conventional 
practice of the authors of the CBA studies noted above. l This style 
of presenting returns in relation to investment cost is but one of many. 
Another method which could be used is that of the present worth 
criterion. Present \«)rth of an investment is the present value of the 
benefits it yields minus the present value of the investment cost (see 
Meek, 1971). If present worth is positive, this figure can be 
expressed as a percentage of investment cost. To convert the external 
rates of return used above, one needs only to subtract 100%. 
A third method is that of the 'internal' rate of return. This is 
I 
defined as the rate of interest which makes the accumulated present 
value of the flow of costs equal to the discounted present value of the 
flow of returns at a point in· time. It.can be ascertained by interpolation 
using the formula: 
where X is an assumed discount rate lower than the internal rate of 
return (IRR), Y is an assumed discount rate higher than the IRR, a is 
the difference between the present values of the costs and benefits 
given x%, and b the difference between the present values of the costs 
and benefits at Y% (see Shaw, op cit). 
1 The ways in which to present returns in relation to investment cost 
are considered in Peterson (1971, op cit), and Wise (1975). 
... 
The IRR for Pentland Crown is 24%. It means that on average each 
pound invested in R&D returned 24% annually from the beginning of the 
investment. Although there is a large difference between this and the 
external rate of return, both are just" two ways of expressing the same 
returns, as both are derived from the same data. The IRR is lower 
because of the long 'gestation' period, when no benefit is measurable, 
and costs are being incurred, 1951 to 1965. 
A fourth method by which to present returns is the benefit-cost 
ratio. This involves the simple division of net benefit by investment 
cost. It is, therefore, almost exactly the same as the external rate 
of return, except the ratio is precisely that, and benefit is not 
expressed as a percentage of costs. However, it has been suggested by 
Wise (op cit) that this pproach is incomplete, since resource cost is 
not considered correct from a social viewpoint: what should concern 
public decision makers is the return expressed in terms of all 
resource costs. 
Thus, the denominator should include all costs in resources as 
well as investment cost. Thus, the benefit-cost ratio for Pentland 
Crown, at the 5% discount rate, which is 10.9, would become 2.1. The 
effect then of this modified ratio is to make investment cost less 
significant for investment decisions, and the resource use consequent 
1 
upon investment effects more important. A major problem of this 
approach would seem to be the extent to which investment effects may 
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be sub-divided: there would need to be a common consensus if arbitrary 
decisions were to be avoided and consistent comparison made possible. 
Since ~enefits are in terms of saving resources, the dichotomy between 
positive and neg'ative resource effects does not seem particularly useful. 
1 The advantage of this, Wise points out, is that less significance is 
placed upon R&D cost estimates, which are "notoriously difficult" to 
identify. The present study', (and previous applications of CBA to 
R&D subject areas) has derived investment cost on conservative 
assumptions, and so this advantage is not important. 
9.12 Consideration of this present .:.:.tudy' s results wi th r~!gard tr'. 
what might have been expected Ly the SPBS 
It seems that the scale of economic success represented by the 
rates of return in table 9.12 was something less than the SPBS might 
.-
have expected. At the beginning of work for this present study, 
Simmons, the Director of SPBS, had indicated the economic benefits 
of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell to be larger (Simmons, 1970). 
At a discount rate of 10% these were estimated to stand at £3.S7m 
and £3.20m in 1982 for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell respectively. 
Since that time, and during the period whilst this study was still in 
progress, Simmons published a more comprehensive analysis of the 
estimated economic return to the whole activities of the SPBS. 
The Simmons' study suggested that net benefit was £13m (1972 £s), 
cumulated over a period 1963 to 1973; a total made up from benefit 
associated with freed acreage of £ll.lm (assessed upon a basis of 
£113 per acre saved with each acre returned), savings associated 
with Pentland Dell's early blight immunity of £1.4m (£3 per acre of 
planted acreage, 1963 to 1967), and Pentland Crown's virus resistance, 
assumed to be worth £1.4m (assessed at £3 per acre, and upon the 
assumption that growers planted 75% of their acreage with own-grown 
seed) • 
This compares with a net benefit suggested in this present study, 
of about £2.49m (1971 £s) (cf. table 8.19). It was found that there 
are extra growing costs associated with the planted acreage of the new 
varieties compared to a situation where Majestic might have been grown, 
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of around £4.53m. Also any advantage stemming from Pentland Crown's 
virus resistance was more than offset by high certified seed prices and 
seeding rates; in addition, the proportion of this variety's acreage 
planted with own-grown seed was assumed at only about 53% on average. 
Pentland Dell received no credit for saved spraying costs and, in fact, 
is represented in the C~A arithmetic as higher costing than Majestic. 
Also, this study did not assume that acreage could be freed prior 
to PMB quota imposition and therefore, assumed that resources would be 
saved only after 1969. In addition, the cost per acre saved amounted 
on average to £87, since it was considered that f~ctors such as chitting, 
management, interest could not be meaningfully related to marginal 
changes in planted acreage. 
These are significant differences and all the more surprising, 
when it is realised that Simmons used the PMB cost handbook (1972c op 
cit) referred to in this study. It perhaps reflects an optimism 
(possibly of the sort behind the simplistic approaches of other CBA 
work) on the part of the SPBS, without the accompaniment of necessary 
detail. However, a simpler approach does not necessarily lead to 
wrong overall results; it is useful to consider Simmons' results in 
a form which is comparable to those of this present study. 
Simmons' study aimed to establish the overall return to all of the 
SPBS's activities: he made assumptions as to future benefit, considered 
other crops, and derived benefit (on similar assumptions) from the 
commercial success of potato varieties other than Pentland Crown and 
I Pentland Dell. However, the substantial part of realised returns 
I This maiply takes into account the success of Red Craigs Royal. 
Simmons estimates a yield advantage for the variety over British Queen 
and Dunbar Rover, to derive cost savings associated with freed acreage 
of around £(1954)5 per acre (op cit: p.27). However, there are no 
grounds for assuming that a yield advantage would lead to reduced 
acreages in early crops, or for observing that Craigs Royal benefit 
came from replacing ~hose varieties, see above (Section 9.10). 
(ICr .. ]2 
(that is returns other than future ones) came from those two varieties. 
~~o make his results comparable, therefore, they have been adjusted to 
consider only the realised returns of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. 
Also Simmons took R&D costs for 1951 to the 1970s: his estimates 
have been reworked to include only the period 1951 to 1962, that 
comparable to the assumptions used to derive separate rates of return 
for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell in this present study. 
TABLE 9.14 
Simmons' results reworked to be comparable with those derived in 
the present study 
Investment cost 
Net benefit 
Rate of return (external) 
(internal) 
Benefit-cost ratio 
Adjusted b-c ratio 
1951-62 
0.39 
1963-72 
1.799 
461% 
36% 
4.6 
4.0 
1965-72 
0.724 
190% 
22% 
1.9 
0.16 
SPBS's R&D costs estimated by Simmons were apportioned between 
potatoes and other activities by taking the average staff ratio for 
195'1":"62. All figures were discounted from 1951 at 5\, and values 
adjusted to 1971£s. 
The cost assumption approach most comparable to the Simmons' one, 
is that used to derive the rates of return for Pentland Crown and 
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Pentland Dell specifically; that is, the relevant R&D costs are SPBS 
are those incurred during the development periods of the varieties. 
Thus, taking the net benefit derived in those instances and comparing 
it wit~ the reworked (on Simmons' assumptions of benefit) results, gives 
the estimates in.tab1e 9.14 above. The estimates for 1963-72 are those 
derived according to Simmons' principles; those for 1965-72 are estimates 
based upon this pre.sent study's ,principles: in both instances, the 
rates of return and benefit cost ratios are derived by comparing them 
against Simmons' investment costs. 
An interesting feature is how an adjustment of the benefit cost 
ratio, as suggested by Wise (above, Section 9.12), acts to make the 
Simmons' ratio appear relatively more favourable in relation to the one 
for this study. This is because Simmons assumes that there are no 
eAtra resource costs for Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, other than 
those associated with investment cost. Wise's suggestion probably 
has an inherent bias in favour of simplistic approachs to CBA. 
9.15 The significance of rates of return: some qualifications to 
the results 
Although the rate of return to investment in Potato R&D at the 
SPBS might not stand up to comparison with returns obtained e1swhere, 
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as the SPBS might have expected, the results are still good. Although 
Pentland Dell produces a ne9ative return, the indication is that had not 
is 'bli9ht immunity' broken down, the returns to plant breeding would 
have been very high indeed. The return from Pentland Crown is very 
high, but this must off-set the costs associated with Pentland Dell, 
when the return to 'both varieties' is considered. Nevertheless, this 
overall return is respectable considering the very long time scales 
involved, the inclusion of all potato R&D costs to 1960, and the short 
time allowed to benefits, 1965 to 1972. The significance of the results 
seem then, that in terms of resource cost, the value of commercial 
success, if it. is substantive, is likely to be high for society. 
However, there are two questions for the decision maker. He must know 
how this success compares with that of other investments, and what the 
chances are of such success repeating itself • Taking the last point first. 
.. The high rates of return estimated generally for R&D investment 
might be indicative of what is a weakness of retrospective studies. 
This is that they concentrate upon R&D investment which is known to 
have been commercially·successful. Given the use that CBA makes of 
market values, it is. to be expected that commercial success would trans-
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late into socio-economic success. In their survey of technical change, 
Kennedy and Thirlwell (op cit) point out that whereas most R&D is 
likely to generate no usable information at all, when it does, the 
results are often spectacula. v • To measure such achievement and then 
hold the results up as indicative of future social utility might be 
misleading, since'there might be no guarantee of success repeating 
itself. 
The SPBS has recently introduced a number of promising varieties, 
however, most of these come from the same research system which produced 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. Many changes have occurred in the 
breeding programme in recent years, and it seems that with the appoint-
ment of Dr. Simmons as Director in the 1960s, philosophy changed towards 
a more target orientated R&D. These changes have yet to produce 
varietal successes unassociated with the system that produced the older 
varieties. This study has emphasised the long time span involved in 
R&D programmes, it might be many years before success does repeat itself. 
Ideally, rates of return enable a decision-maker to rank in order 
of preference the investment projects he can undertake: then, subject 
perhaps to various constraints, he can descend his list until investment 
funds are exhausted. If the rates of return reflect the whole truth 
about resource cost, and efficiency is the first priority of government, 
then the selection process could be reduced in theory, to a simple 
mathematical routine. 
However, socio-economic problems often confuse the normative 
significance of the efficiency criteria, so that assessment and selection 
is not straightforward.' A major problem of comparability is consistency 
" of CBA approach, how the assumptions and methods of CBA have been used 
to derive rates of return so that results differ. It is likely that 
much has to be agreed about the present state of the 'art' of CBA 
before, in the words of Wise, the "existing techniques of CBA (can) 
be used for the fine-tuning of R&D allocations" (op cit: 1 p.259). 
1 . 
He states "In the course of time, with a purposeful effort on 
methodology, generally agreed procedures may emerge, but there is 
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much to be done before this happens. One serious lack is a body of 
adequate historical cost-benefit analyses: there is the classic study 
of Griliches'and a few others but this is a slender basis for 
synthesising a coherent system" (p.260)~ 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Government potato policy objectives and the regulation 
of the potato market 
Int:r.:oduction 
It was indicated in Section 2.8 that rate of return CBA can use-
fully be complemented with a broader type of CBA which aims to consider 
other, non-efficiency objectives which might ')e important to a public 
decision maker. A brief account of the Treasury's study of forestry, 
Section 3.8, indicated what kind of issues might be considered. 
Broadly there are two areas of interest which might usefully be 
considered by the present study: a specific one to the potato industry, 
and more generally, that of matters which are of relevance to general 
government economic policy. This last area of interest is considered 
below in the following chapter. 
This chapter will consider the former, the objectives of government 
and its agencies in intervening and managing the potato market. The 
substitution of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell for Majestic might. 
have affected the management of the market, and thereby had a result 
which has been at variance with government policy. Also, there is the 
associated question of how market management has affected the way in 
which society has been affected by the new varieties. The answer to 
. this might in some way qualify the rate of return estimates. 
This chapter falls broadly into two parts. The first concerns a 
statement of policy objectives, and the theoretical effects of the 
.. 
instruments used to influence trading conditions in the potato market. 
Secondly, the concern is to describe what trading conditions have 
act~lly been like, and consider this in relation to the substitution 
of Majestic by Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. 
10.1 Government potato policy objectives 
Government policy has had four main aims with regard to potatoes. 
The first has been the efficient production and marketing of types and 
quality of potatoes that users and consumers have required. Second, 
potato surpluses should be produced at the lowest prices possible which 
is consistent with a fair return to growers, and third, in a manner 
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that assures a reasonable degree of price stability for producers, users 
and consumers. Fourth, that the United Kingdom (UK) should be self-
sufficient in maincrop potatoes and products made from them, but that 
this aim should be based upon a competitive industry capable of with-
standing fair competition. 
The MAFF has stated that these aims are in the national interest 
and that their validity would stand in "any circumstances" . (MAFF et aI, 
1973 op cit). However, the self-sufficiency aim puts potatoes apart 
from other crops, and in some respects, this objective might seem to 
make the goal of low prices for consumers subsidiary. 
Generally, agricultural policy up until the 1970's has involved 
opening domestic food markets to world competition so that consumers 
have had the benefit of low prices (see Appendix 5). This probably 
had important distributional results, in that the burden of supporting 
farm incomes was shifted to some extent, from the consumer to the 
Exchequer. Given that the UK has had, and has operated successfully, 
a progressive taxation system, it is likely that farm incomes, in being 
. bolstered by subsidies, have been supported to a minimum degree by low-
income families (who probably pay relatively little taxation). Other-
wise, these families might have had to pay higher food prices, possibly 
with cuts in their purchase of the more costly food items (ones which 
might have associated with them relatively high nutritional levels). 
However, in the .. instance of ~otatoes competition from overseas suppliers 
has been severely limited by the government's self-sufficiency objective. 
10.2 Potato import controls 
A total ban is at most times in force on the importation of main-
crop potatoes (it is lifted only in,years of exceptional shortage: 
government might also impose a ban on exports, if shortages seem likely 
to occur). The effect upon domestic prices of this measure can be 
illustrated with reference to figure 10.1). 
It is assumed that the world price for potatoes, P
w
' is less than 
the domestic price, Pd , that would prevail without imports.
l If, 
given competition from imports, domestic price fell to world levels, 
more potatoes would be sold (given the attraction of low prices to 
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consumers) but domestic growers would produce less. That is, an extra 
quantity Q2Q3. will be supplied, but only OQl would be produced by 
domestic growers. There might also be a loss in foreign exchange 
approximately equal to the shaded area, figure 10.1; although this 
might be off-set to some extent, if freed potato resources were used 
to produce exports or save imports. 
If this is true, it seems that potatoes might have been over-valued, 
in efficiency terms, by an amount Pd-P (given that P reflects a 
w w 
competitively determined pattern of resource cost). That is consumers 
are over-paying, in terms of utility they derive, for the potatoes they 
get; given that the conditions of existing supply and demand would, 
under competition, determine equilibrium price at P • 
w 
This also means 
that the size of the potato growing industry is larger than it would 
, need to be if government were to only consider efficiency as an 
objective: thus, the resource cost required to produce output QIQ2' 
. 
1 World prices have been generally below British levels (for a figurative 
illustration of prices in the EEC, see Appendix 17). However, it does 
not necessarily follow that imported potatoes would be significantly 
lower in price in the British market, since the costs of transportation 
has to be considered. Even so, it has been suggested that if import 
controls were 'absent over a long period, then the Netherlands might 
establish a market in Britain and gear part of its potato industry 
to that end (EDCA t 1972 op cit) • 
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figure 10.1, is the efficiency cost of the self-sufficiency objective. l 
10.3 The self-sufficiency objective and the problem of instability 
of potato output 
It might seem then that making potatoes an exception to the cheap 
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food policy and instead have self-sufficiency is to ignore the possibility 
of achieving "the lowest prices possible". However, potatoes produce 
. 1 f d . • 2 their own spec1al prob ems or government a m1n1strators. 
These are mostly associated with a problem of output instability. 
Yield is greatly influenced by weather (particularly at planting time, 
when delays can seriously affect output), so that one year of poor crop 
yields and low national output with very high market prices, can be 
followed by another of good yields, surplus trading conditions and very 
low prices. The uncertainty of such a sequence of years can make itself 
felt, through growers' incomes, on future planting {~isions, which then 
are liable to make trading conditions even worse. 
This is explained diagrammatically by the cobweb theorem of price 
and output interactions (first described in an analysis of corn and pig 
price-ou~put cycles in the USA, see Ezekiel, 1938). It is necessary to 
assume the market takes place at discrete time intervals defined by 
crop seasons; so that output does not react to price directly, but only 
after a time lag. Each farmer plans his output on the expectation that 
its price will be similar to the one for his previous output. 
I 
2 
Thus, the pattern of resource use in potato production not only reflects 
consumer preference but also a non-efficiency government objective. 
This means that some part of the benefit, as measured in this study in 
terms of resource cost, is likely to be a reduction in resources put 
aside for self-sufficiency. This does not, of course, alter the value 
of the benefit, (resources are still saved), it merely implies that 
without gov~rnment intervention, the rate of return might have been 
smaller because the size of the potato industry would tend to be smaller. 
William Beveridge has been quoted as saying: "this puckish vegetable ••• 
as a producer of problems for Food Controllers, the potato has no rival 
in the vegetable or the animal world" (Winnifrith, 1962, p.68). 
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In figures 10.2 and 10.3, the lagged output curve related next 
season's output to current price, and the price curve relates current 
price to current output. For figure 10.2, assume that low yields have 
resulted in a small output, Ql' and high price, Pl. Encouraged by 
high prices (and high incomes, given inelastic demand) farmers then 
plant a larger acreage for the following season. Ceteris paribus, this 
leads to a large output, Q2' which results in a low price, P2• This 
disheartens farmers, and persuades them to plant a smaller acreage for 
the following year, which leads to another high price, P3, and so on. 
The extent of the cobweb problem over time, depends upon the slopes 
of the curves. If the price curve is less steep (the demand curve not 
so inelastic) than the lagged output curve (supply CurV2), the system of 
price-output interactions will tend to converge to equilibrium, and the 
problem will work itself out. This is the case for figure 10.1: the 
direction of the interactions is indicated by the arrows. If the price 
curve is steeper, which is likely with potatoes, given its very low 
demand elasticity, then the system might explode, as the arrows indicate 
in figure 10.1.1 However, because crop yield is so uncertain, it is 
likely that lagged output would not be so predictable in practice, and 
system oscillations might predominate. 
If potato prices and outputs are examined in Britain since 1955 up 
to 1972, it is seen that despite the presence of the PMB and import 
controls, there has existed a clear tendency to oscillation, and in fact, 
a cobweb pattern is discernible. This is shown diagrammatically in 
Appendix 18. There is some evidence for cobweb patterns in potato 
markets in the USA (Gray et aI, 1954). 
The self-sufficiency objective would not of itself solve the 
1 The price elasticity of demand, averaged during the period, 1966 to 
end-1972, (-)0.08 for the UK as a whole: this compares, over the same 
period, to (-)0.79, (-)0.73 and (-)1.45, for bread, root vegetables 
(excluding carrots) and canned peas respectively (MAFF, 1973a: table 14). 
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tendency of the domestic output to vary between years, but if, as 
happens, prices (and so growers'incomes) ar~ guaranteed at high enough 
levels, then enough farmers will plant potatoes to ensure that shortages 
(and the associated very high prices) will be avoided. l 
. 2 for most years this means a moderate surplus is likely. 
Of course, 
Thus, there is a price effect that consumers will benefit from. 
The high prices associated with shortages should be avoided. To lower 
income groups, very high prices, in a single year could be more serious 
than prices moderately higher in most years because of no cheap food 
policy. However, the target of a moderate surplus for most years might 
itself tend to lower prices in normal years, but not very much if the 
government acts to maintain market prices at a reasonable level for 
growers. 
The government can act by determining the levels of guarantee 
prices, but more importantly, indirectly, by influencing (through 
negotiation) the PMB. 
10.4 The PMB 
After a period of direct government control of the potato industry 
during the war and post-war years, the PMB was re-instituted in 1955, 
under the terms of the Potato Marketing Scheme (MAFF & OAFS, 1962).3 
1 Growers' prices have to be high enough to return an income comparable 
2 
to that which would be returned on alternative enterprise. This was 
apparently successfully done up to 1972: thereafter, some exceptional 
conditions in the world agricultural markets raised cereal prices to high 
levels, and afterwards, British membership of the EEC has ensured that 
cereal returns would remain at high levels; this has tended to make 
potatoes seem much less profitable than previously, and guaranteed prices· 
have been looking on the low side in recent years - if plantings are to be 
maintained. Of course, there will always be a demand for potatoes for 
rotational purposes at relatively low prices. 
Since 1969, Ministers after consultations with PMB and NFU officials, have 
set targets designed to produce a surplus of around 200,000 tons (CEA, 1975) 
3 It has been suggested that import controls were a reward,. a kind of quid 
pro quo for growers' co-operation in the marketing scheme; see 
Donaldson et aI, (1969). 
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Its membership was fixed at 33, 25 of whom were to be potato growers, 
another 4 special members; all to be elected by potato growers. Another 
4 members were to be appointees of the MAFF, and Secretaries of State 
for Scotland and Wales. S~atutory provision allowed ministers to set 
up a consumer committee, its purpose to consider the effects of the 
workings of the Potato Marketing Scheme, and report its findings to 
ministers (this has occurred twice since 1955). 
The PMB is empowered to directly intervene in the potato market by 
regulating output, price and quality. This it has done by controlling 
planted acreage, buying in the market, and policing quality standards 
(there has been of course, a more indirect influence, that through its 
supply of information, propaganda, services, negotiations with govern-
ment departments, and so on). 
principle. 
Consider now how the PMB has worked in 
10.5 Control of size of potato output 
Maincrop potato growers of more than one acre are required under 
the provisions of the Potato Marketing Scheme to register with the PMB, 
and pay it a subscription (known as the levy) on a per acre planted 
basis. Upon registration, growers are awarded an allowance of basic 
acreage, based upon individual growers plantings over a previous period. 
During years for which it is apparent to the PMB that planted acreage 
has a tendency to exceed that required to meet the nation's needs, growers 
are restricted from planting their full allowance of basic acreage, by 
the imposition of a quota. 
Quotas are not assessed individually, but applied blanket-fashion; 
so that if for one year the PMB announces a 90% quota, then all regis-
tered growers will be required to grow only 90% of their allowed basic 
acreage. The, acreage that. the PMB plans for, is determined annually in 
negotiations with the MAFF and NFU. Growers may, however, plant in 
excess of both the basic and the quota, if they are willing to pay a 
higher levy (which has been for many years, :£25 per acre, instead of 
the normal payment, currently, £4.20). 
Theoretically, acreage restrictions of this sort shOlild have two 
main effects upon the supply of potatoes. These can be shown diagram-
matically, figure 10.4 •. Growers might find that they have less scope 
for adjusting the annual size of their plantings, so that the supply 
curve for the industry becomes less elastic: the original cur ',"::!, SO' 
becomes steeper at 51' This dampens the effect of cobweb tendencies, 
perhaps slowing down the tendency to explosion. 
Secondly, acreage restrictions might be fixed to hold planted 
acreage below levels which might have prevailed under uncontrolled 
conditions. This is illustrated in figure 10.4 by a shift of the 
231 
supply curve to the left, so that it becomes similar to S2' This 
effect will make surplus seasons less likely. It would be achieved 
by lower quotas, or perhaps more permanently, by a rearrangement of the 
basic acreage. Of course, restriction of output will tend to affect 
price; the supply curve, S2' associated with a smaller output, Q2' and 
higher price, P2 , than curve, 501' which is associated with QO and PO' 
see figure 10.4. 
The importance to growers' income of inelasticity was noted above 
(Section 3.7), in respect to the general problem of introducing output 
increasing innovation, where general productivity is rising and farming 
is competitive. The control of output does soften the impact of this 
kind of technical change. If higher crop yielding potato varieties 
increase the supply potential of the industry, then all the PMB has to 
do, is impose quotas which take this into account. Prices will be 
maintained, and growers will continue to receive reasonable incomes. 
232 
10.6 Market price support operations 
The market price support operations of the PMB are based upon the 
guaranteed price level. Buying programmes are begun when it seems to 
the PMB, that going market prices are.likely to average out at below 
the guaranteed price. The PMB has described thi~~ function as a kind 
of buyer of the last resort: that is, growers are guaranteed a market 
for potatoes which might not otherwise find a market (PMB, 1970a). 
Growers are allowed to opt out of PMB contracts if market prices improve 
(or alternative markets offer themselves), and the PMB itself can 
release stocks directly into the market. 
The theoretical effects of market support are shown in figures 
10.5 and 10.6. An effective support price operation creates a demand 
curvey which is perfectly elastic for all potatoes in excess of a 
given quantity. Thus, in the figures, the demand curve, 000 , is 
adjusted to 001' at quantity, Qs' the amount allowed to consumers, 
given a support price, P • 
s 
The important feature of market support operations is that they 
create a floor price, beyond which growers might reasonably expect 
market prices not to fall. Thus, cobweb tendencies are dampened (see 
the direction of arrows in the figures): this effect will tend to be 
more marked if the support price is greater than what would normally 
have been the equilibrium price, Po in the figures. 
less pronounced in figure 10.6 than 10.5. 
The cobweb is 
There is a danger, however, that given a rise in grower confidence 
associated with the reduction in price uncertainty, output potential 
might be increased. Growers will strive to maximise crop yields, 
or simply plant more acreage (perhaps evading acreage restrictions). 
Thus, the supply curve might, over time, tend to move towards the right. 
The extent to which this occurs will depend upon the actions of the PMB. 
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If quality standards are enforced (not just in general terms, but 
specifically, in relation to the samples bought in market operations), 
and acreage restrictions continually reviewed and·ljusted, the danger 
might prove unreal. 
When support buying was first introduced in 1958, it was welcomed 
then by some critics of PMB, as likely to act as an incentive to ensure 
stricter acreage control than had previously been applied. This was 
because it was thought that support : '.tying would prove too costly for 
the PMB to tolerate a situation of chronic over-supply. Since most 
of the PMB's income was made up with growers' levies, it seemed that 
growers' themselves might be asked to meet a larger share of surpluses' 
costs (Allen, 1959). 
However, the government has seemed unwilling to see the PMB get 
into financial trouble and has been prepared to meet most of the high 
costs associated with support buying. A detailed account of how 
support buying might work, with its impact upon market prices, is given 
for the 1959/60 crop season, in Sykes and Hardaker (1962). 
10.7 Control of marketed quality 
The PMB has attempted to control and standardise the quality of 
potatoes going for human consumption, by the specification of suitable 
quality grades. In codifying quality standards, the PMB is enabling 
the market to recognise differences and upon that basis, establish 
price differentials. l The need to achieve a "good quality produce" was 
recognised at the PMB's re-institution (see PMB, 1955); descriptions 
of grades are given in PMB's annual reports (see for instance, PMB, 
1973a: Appendix A) • 
1 At the present time, the PMB specifies only one quality standard in 
addition to the minimum. It is a recommended standard only, and if it 
is to act as a measure likely to improve the choice of quality available 
to consumers the potato trade must be willing to market potatoes at this 
grade in sufficient numbers and in consistent supply to enable consumers 
to generally r~cognise the quality, and turn to it, should the minimum 
standard not satisfy their needs. 
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The most important feature is t',c specification of minimuI!1 standards, 
which are required for all samples marketed for human consumption, and 
must hold true at every stage of the distributive system. Offenders 
are liable to fines or expulsion from registration (this includes 
merchants and wholesalers, who similarly to growers, must register with 
the PMB) • The potato industry is policed by a PMB appointed inspectorate. 
Currently, the minimum standards should mean that not more than 
8% of any quantity of potatoes sold for human consumption should be 
subject to the following considerations. That potatoes should not be 
wrongly sized: potatoes are graded for size, and are out-graded if 
they do not pass through a 3a by 3a in. griddle mesh, or, alternatively 
pass through one of 1. 5/8 by 1.5/8 in. Potatoes should also be 
rejected if more than half the tuber surface is affected by common scab, 
if tubers appear diseased (or rotten), misshapen (or affected by 
secondary growth* effects), cracked or damaged (so that normal peeling 
is impossible), bruised internally, affected by greening,* and damaged 
by frost and pests (see PMB, ibid). 
An effective minimum quality control tends to lower the total 
quantity of potatoes which is made available to final consumers, and is 
therefore, likely to raise price (providing of course, that the rejected 
potatoes would otherwise have been marketed). In fact, until 1968, the 
PMB exerted control over the rate that potatoes were coming on to the 
market by varying the potato size permitted for sale for human consump-
tion. This practice was termed as 'varying the riddle', and was 
abandoned because it involved a wastage of sound potatoes (recently, 
however, temporary adjustments to riddle size were introduced when it 
seemed that potatoes might become under-supplied) • 
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10.8 Potato maincrop trading conditions 
The general success of the PMB can be gauged from an impression of 
the trading situation for maincrop potatoes shown in table 10.1. The 
figures for maincrop and human consumption are for the months of August 
to end-May, and thus omit to a large extent the effects of early crop 
production (there are likely to be overlaps of the main and early crop 
markets in August and May) • The uses for potatoes not shown in the 
table include those of exports, unrecorded sales, and stockfeed not 
covered by PMB schemes. Generally, these uses account for only a 
small proportion of the maincrop output. 
It is seen from the table that the tonnage required for human 
consumption has been fairly stable compared to the annual changes that 
occur in output. Where there is a wide divergence between the two, 
the result is a surplus. The other categories of usage do not appear 
to be meaningfully related to surplus outputs. In fact, in the heavy 
surplus years of the early 1970s, the category 'wastage' (made up of 
outgrades, shrinkage loss and wastage in store, stockfeed outside the 
PMB's schemes, and so on: see PMB/A op cit, notes to table llA) is at 
its lowest ever. 
Such a possibility would inflate the 'surplus'cate~ory. This 
category is made up of potatoes contracted to the PMB and still remain 
unsold at end-season, and so qualify for 'compensation' payment •. Up 
to end-1968, estimates were made and included for those potatoes assumed 
diverted from human consumption by the practice of varying the riddle 
(Section 10.7). Some of the surplus potatoes are diverted for stock-
feed under the PMB schemes, dehydration, export, and in at least one 
instance, for use in a product designed for famine relief (the size of 
alternative markets to human consumption is very small, see Appendix 19). 
TABLE 10.5 
Potato market trading conditions 1955 - 1972 
Maincrop 
total 
tonnage 
Human 
consumption Surplus 
(c) 
Seed Quota Wastage 
(a) (b) 
1955/56 4141 3864 
56/57 5032 +22 3780-2 
57/58 3957 -21 3942 +4 
58/59 3962 3730 -5 
59/60 5081 +28 3611-3 
60/61 4982 -2 3836 +6 
61/62 4378 -12 3888 +1 
62/63 4805 +11 3967 +2 
63/64 4616 -4 3933 -1 
64/65 4931 +7 3908-1 
65/66 5582 +13 4021 +3 
66/67 
67/68 
68/69 
4872 -15 
5390 +11 
4941 -8 
69/70 4403 -11 
70/71 5446 +24 
71/72 5351 -2 
4036 
3990 -1 
4093 +3 
3901 -5 
3867 -1 
3864 
39 (1) 
1095 (26) 
o 
o 
862 (23) 
808 (20) 
75 (2) 
20 
67 (2) 
675 (16) 
905 (20) 
o 
781 (18) 
203 (5) 
o 
1336 (38) 
1206 (34) 
Notes: All tonnage figures expresses as 'OOOs. 
(d) 
844 
768 
759 
756 
773 
664 
704 
728 
714 
702 
650 
688 
666 
597 
645 
613 
574 
(el·. (f) 
100% 921 (22) 
100% 595 (12) 
100% 401 (10)· 
100% 529 (13) 
100% 454 (9) 
100% 
90% 
614 (12) 
657 (15) 
100% 1020 (21) 
100% 834 (18) 
100% 520 (11) 
100% 630 (11) 
100% 
100% 
100% 
662 (14) 
468 (9) 
719 (15) 
85% 445 (10) 
95% 367 (7) 
87h 373 (7) 
± ·Figures in columns (a) and (b) denote percentage changes 
from pervious seasons 
Source: 
Figures in parentheses in column (c) express surplus and 
in (f) wastage percentages of maincrop output. 
PMB/A 
The main uses for, and costs of surpluses, 1965 to 1971, are 
summarised in table 10.2. ·It is seen that the proportion of surplus 
potatoes used for stockfeed is large; for two out of the five surplus 
seasons shown, it exceeded that proportion of surplus which qualified 
for .. compensation payment, see rows (b) and (c). The costs associated 
with surpluses are also large. For example, the average annual value 
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of tonnage sold for human consumption (tonnage times average market price) 
between 1965 and 1971 was around £79m: this compares to the average 
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annual surplus cost of about £7.8m, 10% of the value of the 1 or crop. 
TABLE 10.2 
Maincrop potato market support ( '000 tons, :~71 £5) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Total surplus 905 781 203 1336 1206 
Stockfeed 435 249 136 620 559 
Compensation 95 337 22 716 647 
Export (a) 45 
Riddle effect 330 195 45 
Total cost market support (£) 11300 10000 2300 19700 17400 
Total cost government (5) (b) 9000 500 8400 2300 600 18600 16500 
Value of stock feed (c) 2900 1500 800 3700 3400 
Value of compensation (d) 1800 6200 410 11200 9700 
Notes: (a) Potatoes dispatched by the PMB to the Continent for 
dehydration purposes. 
(b) Includes a cost to government of administering potato guarantee 
arrangements which include a contribution of around £O.Sm. 
(c) Assumin9 a price for potatoes of £6. 
(d) Assumin9 compensation paid at average market price for year shown. 
Sources: PMB/A, CCGB, 1972 op cit. 
Of the seventeen years shown in table 10.1 thirteen were ones of 
surplus, and three of these were seasons when surpluses were in excess 
of a million tons (which represents about a quarter of human consumption). 
Nine are in excess of the target surpluses fixed in 1969. 
Only once prior to 1969 did the PMB make use of its quota measures 
to restrict plantings, this was during 1961/62 after two seasons of 
heavy surpluses. A quota was imposed again in 1969, and thereafter 
maintained, see table 10.1. Yet durin9 the early 1970s the PMB was 
faced with two of the largest surpluses ever recorded; and criticism 
that it had be~n reluctant to impose realistic quotas (see for example, 
Arney, 1972a). 
1 The financial arrangements used to cover costs associated with 
surpluses are summarised in Appendix 20). 
HI, 
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Nevertheless, the imposition and maintenance of the 1969 quota 
restrictions did bring about a significant change in the size of main-
crop plantings, see table 10.3. The five year annual average for 1972 
is more than 54,000 acres below that for 1968. This isa'decline 
which more than accounts for the increase in general crop yields brought 
about by the widespread adoption of the SPBS's new varieties, and was 
necessary to allow for the contribution to higher average gross yields 
brought about by husbandry improvements generally. 
TABLE 10.3 
The decline in British planted maincrop acreage 
Year Maincrop Plantings 5 year moving average 
(a) (b) 
1965 516,820 4 '~l ,896 
1966 473,040 501,290 
1967 508,530 504,926 
1968 489,180 501,322 
1969 423,380 482,190 
1970 465,440 471,914 
1971 442,230 465,752 
1972 413,290 446,704 
Source: PMB/A 
Indeed, the restriction of acreage was sufficient to probably 
have an important effect upon the structure and, therefore, the 
efficiency of the potato growing industry. 
10.9 Structural problems associated with acreage quota 
imposition after 1969 
Prior to the imposition of quotas in 1969, there existed a marked 
tendency for potato growing units to increase in size, see table 10.4. 
" The total number of registered growers had declined substantially. 
Those who had planted less than ten acres were the ones most affected: 
as a group, they declined in "terms of a proportion of all growers, and 
of total planted acreage, see table. 
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TABLE 10.4 
The structure of the potato growing industry 
Acreage Number of Registered Growers 
size group 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 
Below 10 58738 51993 32376 24779 22289 
(77%) (74%) (55%) (50%) (51%) 
10-19.99 9350 8337 8274 7479 6459 
. (12) (12) (14) (15) (15) 
20-29.99 3454 3264 3392 2599 3020 
(5) (5) (6) (5) (7) 
30-39.99 1714 1624 1890 1786 1526 
(2) (2) (3) (4) (3) 
40-74.99 2083 2072 2067 2392 2091 
(3) (3) (4) (5) (5) 
75 and over 919 925 1090 1116 998 
(1) (1) (2) (2) (2) 
TOTAL 76258 70665 58761 49425 43990 
Acreage Acreage planted 
size group 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 
Below 10 160266 135593 115646 93414 89990 
(24%) (22%) (18%) (15%) (17%) 
10-19.99 124995 112773 111231 100722 . 89762 
(19) (18) (17) (17) (16) 
20-29.99 81723 77775 79741 75258 72498 
(12) (13) (13) (12) (13) 
30-39.99 57571 54948 63475 60002 . 52073 
(9) (9) (10) (10) ( (10) 
30-74.99 107914 107759 122841 124964 109715 
(16) (18) (19) (21) (20) 
75 and over 125358 126049 144284 148929 130772 
(19) (20) (23) (25) (24) 
TOTAL 657827 614897 637218 603289 544810 
Note: Figures in parentheses signify categories' totals as percentages 
of the whole. 
Source: PMB/A 
'-- '-,'. 
Large-scale growers, that is, those who had planted forty acres 
and over, increased as a group their proportion of the number of 
registered growers, and share of planted acreage. It is possible that 
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the figures in the table might understate the importance of large growers 
(and may, therefore, hide change), since acreage expansion often takes 
the form of rented acreage, and this is not reflected in the table. 
An EDCA report (1973) has suggested that the relationship between 
production unit size and productivity (as defined by gross output per 
unit of all inputs) is a positive one. This is because conomies of 
scale allow a full use of machinery and central facilities. 
The rate of structural change which the table implies for the 
period prior to 1968 is surprising since in theory, the basic acreage 
method of allocation might be expected to restrict flexibility (for 
instance, see the examination of quota restrictions in OECD, 1973). 
In fact, in percentage terms, the rate of change in the size of produc-
tion units between 1965 and 1968, is similar to those for wheat and 
barley, two crops unconstrained by acreage restrictions (MAFF et aI, 
1970: Table III). 
After the imposition of quotas in 1969, the trend to larger units 
stopped, and may have gone into reverse, see the 1971 figures in 
table 10.4. As a proportion of the total, numbers of small growers 
and potato growing units increased, whilst those of large growers and 
units decreased. Some l~ge-scale producers have charged that marketing 
arrangements have not allowed them to expand. For example, Arney has 
suggested that the more successful growers in eastern England have been 
prevented from expanding their plantings only by acreage quotas (1972b). 
It seems that the problem facing the PMB, and perhaps the reason 
behind any relu~tance it might have felt in imposing quotas, is one of 
a choice of compromise between allocative efficiency and distributional 
,.. _. . ____ '__ ~.-C. JI' J , I L ! .... 
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justice. The existing' i~,ethod of quota implementation probably favours 
a status quo distribution of growers and acreage, to the cost of those 
1 
who want to expand their acreages and outputs. It is likely that such 
a situation is likely to increase the pressure for maximising crop 
yields and quantity marketed. A tendency for production units to 
substitute other factors of production for one that has been restricted 
is a well documented phenomenon in economic literature (see Lancaster, 
1969: Chapter 4), and has been observed for potatoes in the instance 
of land, in American studies (see Gray, et aI, op cit). 
10.10 The implications of the commercial success of Pentland Crown 
and Pentlan5~_ Dell for the ac:b: evement of the aims of 
government policy 
It has been necessary to explain the workings of the PMB and some 
of the problems it has faced, to understand how Pentland Crown and 
Pentland Dell might have affected the achievement of the government 
2 policy aims outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The first 
objective of government potato policy was the achievement of efficient 
production and efficient marketing of the type and quality of potato 
required by users and consumers. This is usefully categorised into 
two parts, efficient production and efficient marketing. 
(a) The objective of efficient production 
Whilst growing costs per acre have been increased as a result of 
growing Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell instead of Majestic, the 
magnitude of costs saved resulting from retired acreage was such that 
cost per ton for human consumption would have been reduced in 1969 and 
the.reafter, see Section 8.7. 
1 
2 
The ~MB has proposed alternative solutions for acreage allocation (PMB, 
1972). One of which was to control output by the prohibition of high 
yielding varieties. This would mean that Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell would not be grown •. ,· 
A full critique of the workings of the PMB is not relevant here, only 
those facets of its activities which have some bearing upon how the new 
varieties have affected the situation with regard to issues of importance 
for this present study. . 
_ . .' I _. : __ , ~':I _. _to..L '~1 ___ ._-'--c_~ __ , ___ ·_,_ .• 
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As indicated in the previous section, acreage restrictions probably 
involved a loss of flexibility, and, therefore, perhaps a loss of 
ff " 1 e l.cl.ency. The contribution of the new varieties to this state of 
affairs is uncertain. It is unlikely to amount to any si~nificant 
cost estimate, which would go any way to off-set the above cost advantages. 
(b) The objective of efficient marketing of the type and quality of 
potato required by users. :'nd consumers 
There are two parts to this policy aim, the costs of marketing, 
and whether the potato trade and consumers have received the potatoes 
they wanted. The implications of differences in quality of yield 
between the new varieties and Majestic for costs was examined in Sections 
7.8 to 7.10. There, it was considered likely that costs had been 
increased overall. However, it is likely that with spraing troubles 
excepted, Pentland Dell with its uniform and attractive samples will 
facilitate quality grading and marketing. 
The second part of the policy aim involves asking the questi9n of 
whether Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were wanted by the potato 
trade and consumer; did they in displacing Majestic, improve the 
welfare of users and consumers. Two economists writing in the agricul-
tural press state that welfare was not enhanced, to the contrary: 
" ••• (Pent1and Crown) has a very high yield but is of poor 
.. quality, difficult to store and is not appealing to the 
taste of the consumer. It is easy to grow in almost any 
conditions and provides a higher return per acre than the 
lower yielding but higher quality potatoes because the 
PMB's policy ensures a market." (Haynes and Howarth, 1972). 
The last part of these comments implies something additional to the 
simple possibility that Pentland Crown might not be liked by consumers, 
in that somehow, husbandry practices and the workings of the PMB have 
combined to make the new varieties commercially attractive, and so 
presumably, consumers have, to some extent, been forced to accept 
1 . 
Of course, this will only last as long as more growers wish to plant 
potatoes than the available acre?ge allows. This situation certainly 
lasted up to 1972. 
1 them. It is a contention which has received wide support in the 
pOtato trade. 
The issues surrounding these allegations are complex, and because 
they involve the new varieties, a full examination is required by this 
present study. This is done in Chapter 12. Two important parts of 
the potato industry which had not entered directly into the debate 
associated with ~~ality questions, are the processing and catering 
2 
sectors. The needs of these can be considered here. 
(c) The usefulness of the new varieties for processing uses 
The growth of the different sectors of the potato processing 
industry during the 1960s and early 1970s, is shown summarised in 
Appendix 21. The fastest growing proce,ssing activity has been that 
of frozen and parfried chips. The crisp and dehydration sectors have 
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also significantly expanded the tonnage of po •. atoes used by them ann~ally, 
but in terms of percentage share of all potatoes processed, they have 
given ground to the frozen chip sector. 
Much secrecy surrounds the activities of the processing industry, 
but a rough indication of varietal use is provided by estimates given 
in Appendix 21. Pentland CrQwn and Pentland Dell have both been used 
extensively by frozen chip and dehydration manufacturers. It is 
difficult to judge if their existence has made any impact upon processing 
1 There are generally elements of 'force' in what are essentially cost 
innovations but which have consequences for consumer quality: in the 
sense that the innovations are producer induced, and then the onus is 
on consumers to recognise quality implications and if necessary, refuse 
the product for alternatives. However, consumer sovereignty assumes 
that consumers are aware of change, and do have the choice to refuse 
product change. The implication of the above allegation is that 
consumers ~o not have that choice. 
2 A description of the sectors of the potato industry, based upon the 
type of potato product sold, is given in Appendix 19. 
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that would not have existed if Majestic had still been widely grown. 
Conversations with company representatives during 1970 and 1971 
suggested that Pentland Crown was only acceptable to processsors because 
it was popular with growers. The variety seemed to have no particular 
advantage for processing. 
Whether they would have thought this if they had had to use 
Majestic on a large scale, is another matter (frozen chipping and 
dehydration have grown to their present sizes largely during the period 
of the SPBS innovation). It has been suggested in the agricultural 
press that the potato industry generally (including processors) is 
1 
confused about the kind of potato required (Gardener, 1971). 
(d) The usefulness of the new varieties for catering purposes 
It is possible that around 20% of potatoes used for human consump-
tion, is channelled into catering establishments (EOCA, 1972 op cit). 
The importance of catering to potatoes is examined in Gibbons (1970), 
and more generally, in Hunt and Jamison (1967). A wide range of 
concerns and customer is involved: for example, from state-sponsoren 
institutions, of which school canteens are probably the largest consumer, . 
to hotels and fish and chip shops, probably the largest private consumer. 
However, little is known about the industry's requirements, still less 
about the importance of specific potato varieties. 
1 Probably of more importance to processers than variety as such is price. 
Particularly in the dehydration sector, where price competition from 
imports is strong, despite the availability of subsidies, (see PMB, 
1974b op cit: Table 2). If PMB market support operations have 
significantly affected the prices of potatoes available to this 
processing activity, then the sector might have been held back in its 
expansion at a time.critica1 to future development (note the concern 
expressed ~n this respect in the report by the CCGB, op cit). The 
EOCA had observed during the 1960s that it was likely the sector's 
domestic market would be subject to substantial competition from imports 
by 1972/73, if the price advantage of the raw product used in the 
manufacture of imports was not off-set (1968 op cit). Recent 
statistics suggest that this has happened: during 1973/74 the raw 
potato equivalent used for imports of dehydration products, was nearly 
half the domestic total, (see PMB, 1974b: ibid). 
• .A ..:lflII. 
Simpson has suggested that caterers are more knowledgeable than 
domestic consumers about varietal cooking suitability, but that given 
the relatively high price for King Edward, they were generally "reduced 
to using the rather flavourless Majestic" (p.l9). Just'how Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell might have affected the Catering Industry is 
difficult to tell. What fragmentary evidence there is suggests that 
establishments generally take what potatoes are generally available, 
an important consideration being price (Simpson 1968; Gibbons 1965). 
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It was suggested to the author by a PMB regional officer that Majestic 
persisted as a popular variety in the face of competition from the new 
varieties in ~,(,uth-western England, because of its keeping quality and 
its importance to the tourist and holiday trade (written communication). 
However, taking catering as a whole, the displacement of Majestic 
has not resulted in any obvious effect. Similarly for processing, 
the consequences of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell being available 
instead of Majestic, has had no obvious overall effect. Thus, the 
policy objective probably has not been affected with respect to these 
two sectors of the potato industry. 
(e) The objective of price stabilisation 
The success of the PMB in stabilising prices depends, of course, 
upon its ability to bring supply into equilibrium with demand. In 
Section 10.8 it was noted that the PMB had been subject to criticism 
that it had not brought in adequate quotas to deal with a problem of 
chXonic over-supply, so that in the early 1970s some very large 
surpluses were recorded. 
The PMB attributed these surpluses to the effects of the new 
varieties, including those of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, in 
raising the general level of crop yields to where they were in "advance 
'. jo ..JIll . 
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of statistical trends" (PMB, 1972d: p.56). If this is correct then 
it implies that the new varieties have made the PMB's task of achieving 
price stabilisation more difficult. l 
Certainly, the pressures upon the PNB to maintain pric~s were made 
2 
worse prior to the imposition of quotas. However, the effects of the 
quotas were such as to retire a large amount of acreage from maincrop 
potato production, far in excess of that which could be attributable to-
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. The average annual estimate, 1969 
to 1972, of freed acreage attributable to Pentland Crown and Pentland 
Dell together, is about 20,000 acres, which is 38% of the annual fall 
in maincrop acreage noted in Section 10.8, after the imposition of 
quotas. In addition, the PMB seemed aware of what the impact of the 
new varieties would be upon crop yields (PMB, 1968b: pp.4-S). 
Given these c.onsiderations, and the probability that weather 
conditions were generally favourable in the early 1970s to high yields, 
then it seems likely that the large surpluses would have occurred 
anyway, if the new varieties had not existed. 
1 It also implies that acreage restrictions, begun in 1969, have not taken 
full account of the new varieties' extra output, and that therefore, the 
full extent of potential cost savings associated with retired acreage 
has not been realised. In addition, it suggests that costs were incurred 
in market support and surplus disposal after 1969, and, therefore, the 
rate of return which included costs associated with surpluses, Section 9.7, 
is an under-estimate of the real situation. 
2 Th~t is, the extra output potential of the new varieties contributed to 
surplus conditions. However, in 1968, they probably turned a near deficit 
trading situation into a surplus: thus, relatively high prices might 
have been prevented (Section 8.4), which in annual terms stabilised prices. 
It is questionable if the PMB would regard this as advantageous, since the 
Board seems rarely, if ever, to have advocated the use of imports to bring 
down prices in a deficit year. The aim of self-sufficiency is of course, 
to ensure price stabilisation. However,-the reluctance to bring in 
imports indicates that, paradoxically, self-sufficiency is a less 
flexible policy aim 'than price stabilisation. It is probably felt by 
the.PMB that prices in surplus seasons (which are the norm given the 
self-sufficiency aim) are unreasonably low, and so the grower is entitled 
to the reward of higher prices in deficit seasons. 
. ". 
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However, the new varieties could have made a contribution to more 
volatile trading conditions in two other ways. If planted acreage 
has varied less annually then crop yields then the smaller acreage 
brought about by the need to off-set the new varieties' y'ield advantage, 
might have meant that an increased proportion of total output has been 
made dependent upon the generally more volatile yield, and less upon 
plantings. Secondly, trading conditions might have been made more 
volatile if the new varieties' annual yields have been more volatile 
than Majestic's would have been. 
The evidence is mixed. It is not clear if planted acreage does 
deviate more strongly than crop yields (see table A22.l, Appendix 22), 
and on the second point, whilst it is possible that Pentland Dell's 
output might be more volatile than Majestic's, this is not clear in 
connection with Pentland Crown (cf. table A22.2, ibid).l 
It is likely however that overall, the new varieties by displacing 
Majestic, have brought some extra pressure to l-~ar upon the ability of 
the PMB to stabilise trading conditions and prices, if only because of 
the increased tendency to over-supply prior to acreage adjustment in 1969 • 
(f) The objectives of lowest reasonable prices consistent with 
a reasonable return to growers, and self-sufficiency 
That the displacement of Majestic might have made it more difficult 
for the PMB to maintain prices, means of course, that the Board has 
found it difficult to maintain reasonable incomes for growers. In 
1 There is additional evidence which suggests that Pentland Crown is 
.. a more reliable yielder across a range of conditions: for instance, 
note the positive 'rating for the variety in the growers' survey for 
wepther (Section 7.5), and the possibility that it reacts less 
adversely to drought (Lapwood et aI, 1971). 
addition, if total output has been made more dependent upon crop yield, 
it is necessary that the strategic reserve of resources available to 
ensure self-sufficiency take a greater proportion of all resources. 
Since, although the resource savings properties of the new varieties 
will have meant that the resource cost of producing potatoes' will have 
fallen, and that, therefore, the resource cost of self-sufficiency will 
have fallen with it; . a more volatile output situation requires that 
the resources reserved for self-sufficiency must fall less proportionally 
than those employed for meeting normal demand. 
However, the overall effect of cost savings is likely to contri-
bute to a more efficient industry, and, therefore, the attainment of 
the lowest reasonable prices consistent with a reasonable return to 
growers, providing growers' representatives are successful in keeping 
guarantee prices at reasonable levels, so that if surplus conditions 
are more likely, then returns remain unaffected. 
The achievement of the lowest reasonable prices (and indeed, aim 
of self-sufficiency to ensure ample supplies of potatoes upon a con-
sistent basis) as a policy objective, possibly reflects the concern of 
government generally with the distribution of income. The potato is 
a relatively inespensive food item, which holds a prominent place in 
the national diet; particularly, in the instance of low income families. 
10.11 The significance of the effects of the new varieties in 
terms of policy objectives, for the rate of return results 
The importance of the implications of the new varieties for policy 
objectives for the social decision maker, will depend upon the circum-
stances of the planning environment at the time of the decision. For 
instance, although the type and quality of a variety's output might not 
be that required by users or consumers, an investment could be considered 
worthwhile if government policy has given an emphasis upon efficiency 
and the saving of resource costs. 
Generally, the policy aims do seem to place an emphasis upon 
efficiency, and, therefore, the rate of return results would be very 
~ 
pertinent to a social investment decision. 
However, the issues considered thus far are not the only ones 
with which government policy may be concerned. There are others 
more general in concept and, hence, of relevance to overall government 
policy (rather than specifically relevant to potatoes), but which may 
still enter investment decision making as considerations. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
General policy considerations of possible !mpo'rtance to 
social investment decision making .. , 
'.~' I 
11.1 Introduction to chapter 
Since this study must keep to manageable proportions there is not 
sufficient space to refer to every factor that might be of interest 
to decision making associated with publically sponsored investment. 
There are five categories of subject area, however, which probably 
warrant attention. It is not possible to evaluate them in detail, 
but because they are issues which seem important to public debate at 
the present time of writing and to some extent have relevance to plant 
breeding, they ought to be considered in a CBA. The subject categories 
are for the convenience of this study termed - government spending, 
regional policy, balance of payments and long term considerations. 
11.2 Government spending 
The financial cost of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell in terms 
of their contributions to the total costs of sUrplus disposal and 
market support, was noted at about £4.24m (table 8.19). Around £3.91m 
of this was financed out of government sources of income. l The size 
of annual government contributions to surplus disposal is shown in 
table 10.2: the contribution to these totals caused by the new 
varieties is inferred in the same manner as for their contributions to 
total surplus costs, see Section 8.4. 
However, the SPBS innovation has probably had some beneficial 
effect for gov~rnment founding as well. Potatoes are a relatively high 
1 Thus the main burden of surplus financing is felt by taxpayers. These 
are not necessarily potato consumers, given the progressive tax system, 
and tendency for high income groups to consume less potatoes. 
cost crop, and since it is possible that freed resources will find 
employment in crops such as spring wheat and barley and since both are 
relatively low cost enterprises, it is likely that'go~e~nm~nt depart-
ments will need to make fewer subsidy payments. 
The consequences of a reduced potato acreage for subsidies are 
difficult to determine; for example, there does not appear to be a 
definite relationship between fixed capital equipment (including some 
machinery costs) and planted acreage of different crops. It is known, 
h.owever, that fertiliser costs per acre for potatoes are about twice 
those for spring wheat and barley (cf. Nix, 1972, op cit) and so it 
might be assumed that freed potato acreage might result in the saving 
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of around half the subsidization of fertiliser associated with that land. 
No record exists for payments made on fertilisers bound for 
potato acreages. It can be approximated however, by taking the total 
public expenditure upon fertilisers (H.M.G. White Paper, 1973) and 
apportioning it according to acreage shares taken by different crops. 
Since potatoes are hungry plants, the share apportioned to the crop 
might reasonably be doubled. This total is then multiplied by freed 
potato acreage, expressed as a proportion of the total potato acreage 
(plus, freed acreage), to obtain an estimate of saved subsidy payments; 
around to.3m might have been saved annually for the four years 1969 to 
1972. Since potato land used for other crops might have less than half 
the fertiliser,applications associated with potatoes, the actual savings 
might be about to.25m. with the costs of surpluses, this leaves a 
net financial loss to government of around t3.844m. 
11.3"Regional policy considerations 
The most important aspect of regional policy is probably the goal 
of full employment. Reduced potato acreages (because the crop is 
relatively labour intensive) will contribute to the trend of a lower 
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use of labour input in arable agriculture; but as far as the contribution 
of the Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell innovation is concerned, the 
effect is likely to be marginal. And given that unemployment levels 
have been relatively low in the main arable areas, labOur savings in 
potato production are likely to be swallowed up by the need~ of 
alternative crops. The effects therefore, in terms of wages and 
mobility (and thus, such matters as work satisfaction, removal and so 
on) might have been unimportant. Nonetheless, there might be excep-
tions associated with employment opportunities for casual labour and in 
areas outside the most prosperous arable areas. 
Few crops offer opportunities for casual labour employment as do 
potatoes and it is likely that if growers reduce their requirement with 
planted acreage, alternative opportunities might be difficult to find. 
The effect is uncertain, since casual labour in the most prosperous 
arable areas, where most of the maincrop potato acreage is loca t .::::d, is 
in short supply, particularly for the potato harvest (Section 6.7). 
Hence, alternative employment has probably been available. 
In the poorer arable, or mixed farming regions, however, the scope 
for alternative employment is likely to be limited. To an extent 
where, a reduction in family income from reduced casual employment 
opportunities, might make migration to urban areas significantly more 
financially attractive. This raises"the possibility of 'second round 
effects', upon regional incomes and employment generally: reduced 
spending power might work through a local multiplier effect to contract 
employment opportunities elsewhere in a region. Indeed, if this leads 
to migration, there will tend to be undesirable effects for the urban 
areas (depending upon the state of the national economy). 
,. 
The Treasury's forestry study gave prominence to development area 
policies and job creation, since forestry is an economic activity likely 
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to take place in areas of poor farming conditions (Section 3.8). This 
is not true of potatoes generally, but the important certified seed 
industry is centred in development areas, and so~ome consideration 
should be paid to the effects of the commercial success of Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell upon that industry. 
11.4 The Scottish certified seed potato industry 
The certified seed producing regions are situated away from the 
main potato growing regions of eastern England, in areas of Scotland, 
northern England, the Isle of Man, and Ireland, where climatic factors· 
are unfavourable for the spread of virus disease. The certified seed 
industry in Scotland is the largest supplier of seed to British growers 
and it is this part of the seed industry that this study will consider. 
To examine the whole would involve a subject too complex for.the time 
available here. The sources of certified seed and extent of planted 
acreages by region, are shown in Appendix 14. 
The period of Pentland Crown's and Pentland Dell's commercial 
success partly corresponded with a time of declining fortunes for the 
Scottish certified seed industry. The acreage certified for seed 
(inspected and certified by officials of the OAFS, under the Seed Potato 
Certification Scheme: for a description of the scheme, see Produce 
Studies, op cit), has declined markedly. A five year annual average 
of plantings to 1965 was approximately 75,000 acres, and by 1972 this 
had changedto·around 51,000 a fall of 24,000 acres. This trend 
appears to have resulted from a fall in the demand for certified seed 
from ware growers • 
.. It seems likely th~t the certified seed industry has to some extent 
brought .about a fall in demand on its own account, by allowing a poor 
quality image to become associated wi.th its samples and thereby given 
an incentive to the ware grow~rs to produce his own seed. The prominence 
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of own-grown seed was noted above (Section 7.l~). An examination of 
the problems which have faced the certified seed industry during the 
1960s is given in Hay (op cit), and more recently,' Produce Studies (op cit). 
The introduction of the SPES's new varieties might well have made 
an impact upon the fortunes of the industry, since the seed require-
ments of the new varieties have been different to those of Majestic 
(ibid) and the smaller'ware acreage probably led to a fall in demand. 
The importance of Pentland Crown's propensity to allow a greater use of 
own-grown seed has sometimes been stressed as a factor in the certified 
seed industry's decline (see Cullen, 1970, for example) • 
The impact of the new varieties can be assessed if the estimated 
seed requirements of the new varieties, 1965 to 1972, are compared to 
those that would have existed if Majestic had not been substituted. 
The requirements in the two situations have previously been estimated 
with regard to seed costs (Section 8.Sa, 8.6): the estimated plantings 
of certified seed in the two may be divided by the assumed general 
certified seed to ware acreage ratio, 1:6.2, to derive totals indicative 
of changes in certified seed acreage. 
In table 11.1, columns (a) show estimates of the difference in terms 
of ware acreage planted with certified seed in the observed new 
varieties situation to that which might have existed if only Majestic 
had been used. Columns (b) show these differences divided by 6.2, the 
consequences for certified seed acreage. Sections I and II of the 
,table depict changes with respect to actual planted acreage, and freed 
acreage respectively • 
.. It is seen that Pentland Crown has indeed, brought about a signigi-
cant fall in certified seed acreage, particularly after quota imposition 
in 1969. The average annual fall, 1969 to 1972, was about 1,788 acres, 
or 7% of the annUal decline in total acreage noted in table 11.1. 
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TABLE 11.1 
The im12act of the SPBS innovatiC' :) on the certified seed acreasre 
(a) (b) 
Ware Acreage Certified Seed Acreage 
Pentland Pentland Pentland Pentland 
Crown Dell Crown Dell 
(I) 
1965 - 2553 859 412 139 
1966 - 8807 - 1241 - 1420 - 200 
1967 - 9840 - 4052 - 1587 - 654 
1968 - 9792 17472 - 1579 2818 
1969 8667 10220 1378 1648 
1970 - 5503 17289 888 2789 
1971 -12718 18167 - 2051 2930 
1972 388 19569 63 3159 
TOTAL - 6622 12629 
(II) 
1969 - 4640 - 2506 748 - 404 
1970 - 5996 - 1684 967 - 272 
1971 -13557 - 5142 - 2187 - 829 
1972 -10074 - 2964 - 1625 - 478 
TOTAL - 5527 -1983 
OVERALL TOTAL -12149 10646 
The opposite is true for Pentland Dell, however, since this variety's 
average annual contribution, 1969 to 1972, was a positive one of about 
2,136 acres. Taken together, the varieties increase seed acreages, 
1969 to 1972, on average by 348 acres'~ 
The impression given by these figures is that the certified seed 
industry was not, on the who1e,.made worse off. This is strengthened, 
when it is realised that the generally high certified seed prices of 
Pentland Crown and the propensity for Pentland Dell to produce suitable 
tubers for the 'tops trade' (Section 7.11), might possibly have brought 
a larger income for the industry than Majestic would have done. 
On the other hand, the growing costs associated with the new 
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varieties might have been greater for the certified seed industry than 
if only Majestic had been grown. Too little is known about the new 
varieties effect upon certified seed production costs (for example, the 
effects of crop yield and quality) to be certain about the full effects. 
It is possible that Pentland Crown in particular, has brought a share 
of problems to the industry associated with tuber damage and storage. 
However, it seems reasonable to conclude that the SPBS innovation has 
not seriously affected the industry, so that distributional or regional 
considerations have been affected. 
One important point remains to be made generally about the nature 
of resource cost in development areas. The possibility that resources 
used in certified seed production might not easily find alternative 
employment, suggests that the costs reflected in certified seed price 
might overstate the opportunity cost of certified seed. Thus, the 
certified seed costs included in the rate of return arithmetic might 
have been too high and consequently, the returns to the new varieties 
too conservative. 
This possibility applies most strongly to labour. The Tresury 
study suggested that of a hundred jobs lost in a development area in 
Scotland only 15 might be compensated locally, another 30 be found 
elsewhere, and the rest unemployed (H.M. Treasury, op cit) • This 
seems to indicate a low alternative value of labour. If it were about 
half the market value, then upon the basis of the 1970 PMB cost survey 
data, and the assumption that certified seed prices reflected costs, 
seed prices might be 10% too high. 
11.5 Balance of payments 
Th~ importance of potato self-sufficiency has been noted, Section 
10.3: besides this a~, a general need to limit agriculturally based 
imports has received promine~ce in government policy (see EDCA, 1968, 
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op cit: the validity of such prominence will not be discussed,l but 
suffice to note that it rests mainly upon a requirement that the balance 
of payments remains strong and associated strategic reasons). The 
SPBS innovation will have had favourable effects for both. By freeing 
potato resources self-sufficiency becomes less resource costing and land 
is released for import saving (shortage of good arable is the main 
limitation upon increasing output potential: ibid). 
There might have been other consequences, less important but worthy 
of note. These include the varieties' contributions to surpluses and 
associated disposal of potatoes for stock-feed, with perhaps less need 
for cereals. Also, the general price effect in 1968 might have provided 
an adyantage to the dehydration industry at a critical time, in meeting 
competition from overseas. Certified seed exports might have been 
stimulated. For example, Pentland Dell in 1972/73 and 1973/74 
accounted for around 9% of seed recorded for export by the DAFS, that 
is, fifth in varietal importance. 2 
The import saving factor was incorporated in the rate of return 
arithmetic, in the Treasury's forestry study: this used a 20% notional 
premium for forestry output as indicative of benefit to the balance of 
payments (Section 3.8). Using this in this present study for the 
alternative outputs, of wheat and barley, which were made possible by 
freed acreage, the following rates of re'turn are derived. 
These maY'be compared to those rates listed in table 9.5. 
Notional values were attached to cereal market prices and rotational 
I The theoretical background to import savings is given by Ritson (1970). 
2 The amount involved is small (% of 45,700 tons). Pentland Dell appears 
to sell well to countries where Majestic is imported: they may, there-
fore be competi~ors. Countries that seem to plant Pentland Dell are 
Spain, South Africa, Italy, Poland, Israel, Portugal, Brazil and the 
Canary Islands. Pentland Crown does not seem to be popular. 
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values. It will be seen that for Pentland Crown, the rate at the 5% 
discount factor, has been increased by approximately 100% and more. 
. . 1 
Only small increases occur with the 10% discount factor, however. 
TABLE 11.2 
The impact of balance of payments considerations upon the rate of return 
Discount Rate 
5% 
10% 
Pentland Pentland 
Crown Dell Both 
920% 
376% 
Wheat 
- 389% 
- 230% 
49% 
6% 
11.6 Long term considerations 
Pentland Pentland 
Crown Dell Both 
1008% 
415% 
Barley 
- 358% 
- 215% 
60% 
7% 
The short term consequences of reduced rotations for crop yield 
were noted above (Section 9.2). It should be noted, however, that the 
effects over time might be very uncertain (ARC, 1970). This applies 
to the trend of an increasing specialisation of agricultural output 
itself. From several viewpoints specialisation may not be without 
social costs, which might over the lo~g period cancel the benefits. 
For example, the dependence of arable and livestock farming upon each 
other becomes weaker as the two activities are more heavily concentrated 
in areas away from each other. Thus, the arable regions come to 
depend upon increasing applications of artificial fertilisers, straw-
burning and are unable to dispose of surplus potatoes. The livestock 
areas find a worsening problem with animal sewage and scarce feeding-
stuffs. In both instances, there may be associated problems of pollu-
tion and costs to river authorities: for example see Riley, (1969). 
Specialisation may also adversely affect environmental and 
sociological factors (such ~s flora and fauna, landscape and village 
1 The propriety of including what is a collective, non-efficiency goal 
in the rate of return arithmetic is uncertain, see section 2.8. 
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communities) • To non-farming consumers of the countryside these matters 
are of the greatest concern and although nebulus and ignored by 
conventional CBA, perhaps they should be noted as relevant to social 
planning decisions. Certainly investment decisions concerned with 
agricultural research should be subject,to investigations of environ-
mental-economic reactions in physical (as opposed to agricultural 
consumer value) terms (for a general reference on this point see 
Coddington et aI, 1971). To date, it appears that the overwhelming 
stress in countryside management is given to agricultural crop yields 
in the short term (for a general discussion of public policy and ,its 
relation to the countryside considerations, see Bowers, 1972 op cit). 
The implication of these long-term considerations noted above, 
is that the effects of agricultural R&D upon environmental factors are 
not necessarily socially beniqn. Given the nature of much of the 
evidence, however, it is only possible to state that a concentration 
upon production factors in agricultural R&D has dangers which are 
probably not fully understood. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
The identification of relationships between factors which combine 
to affect consumer quality with regard to the commercial success 
of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, and some observations 
as to their significance 
12.1 Introduction to chapter 
In Chapter 10 it was stated that certain parties had alleged that 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were not of the type and quality 
required by consumers. It was possible, therefore, that the commercial 
success of the new varieties had not been compatible with the policy 
objective, the achievement of efficient marketing of the ~ype and 
quality of potato required by users and consumers (see Section 10.10b). 
This possibility is to be considered in this chapter. Of course, 
the concern of this present study is not strictly whether the new 
varieties have been wanted or not, but one which is consistent with 
the with and without criterion; whether in displacing Majestic, 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell have changed the type and quality of 
potatoes used by consumers, and if so, was the change consistent with 
an improvement in social welfare. l 
The fact that this question has been raised at all, might seem 
surprising. Since if the competitive conditions, upon which the 
significance of a rate of return analysis is based, and the key assump-
·tion that consumers are sovereign hold (Section 2.3); as hold they 
must to a sufficient extent if a CBA is to measure social efficiency, 
1 It was stated at the outset that some locally important, though minor 
varieties, have probably been displaced by the new varieties, (Section 
1.4). Unfortunately, the resources available for this study do not 
permit a consideration of what this has meant for consumer quality. 
then it is to be expected that consumers would not have chosen 
varieties in preference to Majestic, if the latter were more suited to 
their requirements. l 
It could be assumed that this is possible if the cost savings 
identified as associated with the displacement of Majestic by the new 
varieties, had been enough to be reflected in prices, to an extent 
where prices had been reduced enough to off-set, in the minds of 
consumers,any disutility associated with lower quality. Here, a 
situation would exist where the new varieties have been acceptable to 
consumers, but that the quality of those varieties is not preferred to 
that of Majestic. 
However, it was indicated above (SectionS.7), that the cost 
savings associated with the displacement of Majestic have not been 
significant enough to be reflected in final prices. Thus, the 
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question of why consumers should want to take the new varieties instead 
of Majestic remains. There are two broad answers~that consumers 
generally, have not thought quality differences to be signific.ant., or 
are generally apathetic about the changes, and secondly, consumers 
have had no alternative but to accept the displacement of Majestic. 
The answer is unlikely to be simple, since varietal potato quality is 
heterogeneous and differences might not be obvious even to the most well 
informed observer. 
These questions of consumer motivation could be side-stepped by 
this study, however, if it were possible to identify and measure 
disutility directly, by asking potato consumers, in a survey, what 
they would be willing to pay to avoid having the new varieties, and 
have Majestic instead. If the value of disutility should prove to be 
positive, .. then this could be compared to the value of resource costs 
1 The question of the sufficiency of the market model, and how it 
might be considered with regard to CBA, is raised below, Section 13.3. 
I 
saved. If, according to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion (Sections 2.7 and 
3.5) the latter is greater than the former, then the investment may be 
considered worthwhile; particularly so, if the difference when 
expressed as a rate of return is higher than other rates of return 
which could be expected on alternative investment opportunities. 
However, for reasons which will become apparent below, it was not 
feasible to survey consumer opinion in a way which would be meaningful 
in terms of varietal quality effects. 2 Instead, it was necessary to 
examine the grounds for the quality allegations, as they were relevant 
to the new varieties and Majestic. It was necessary to judge how 
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logically sound they were in relation to available evidence; what might 
have been expected, given the institutional nature and workings of the 
potato industry, and what is known about varietal quality. 
,12.2 John Sainsbury's Limited comp1aint to the Consumers' Committee 
for Great Britain, concerning the workings of the Potato 
Marketing Scheme, and subsequent conclusions 
Allegations that Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell might be associa-
ted with poor quality potatoes were originally contained in evidence 
lodged with the CCGB, to support John Sainsbury's Limited (JSL) 
complaint that the interests of the potato buying public had not been 
1 Of course, this dis utility will partly be based upon what might be 
properly termed resource costs: most notably, labour time spent upon 
the preparation of meals (which could, perhaps, be valued at the market 
price for domestic labour: see Sunday Times, 1971). Indeed, if the 
ratesof return derived in Chapter 9, which were based upon agricultural 
resource costs, are not to be under-estimates of the whole resource 
cost implications to society, then they should include such costs. 
2 A survey of consumer opinion was conducted for this present study. 
The purpose of it, however, was to obtain general information which 
would provide a check on information about consumer behaviour which 
was already available, since much of this information was controversial. 
Details of this survey and its results are given in Appendix 23. 
_. _. !UI _._:OiL . _ 1 ::. 2.:: 
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generally favoured by the workings of the Potato Marketing Scheme. 
The complaint received the support of the Produce Packing and Marketing 
Association (PPMA), a trade association which represents about 90% of 
the companies engaged in pre-packing potatoes, which also supplied 
evidence to the Committee, see CCGB (op cit). 
The evidence supplied by the PPMA and JSL contended that the PMB's 
market support operations worked to make high quality potatoes finan-
cially unattractive to produce, because growers had found it easy to 
supply in bulk, low'quality produce. This had been brought about by 
a situation facilitated by the introduction of low quality but high 
yielding varieties encouraged by a high floor price associated with 
support buying, and lax enforcement of the minimum quality standards 
(CCGB, op cit). 
Specifically, JSL and the PPMA claimed that they were unable to 
obtain the potatoes required on a consistent basis, for the pre-packed 
trade. The complaint, subsequent work of the Committee, and publica-
tion of its report stirred up further criticism from retail and whole-
sale interests (Rose, 1972). 
Much of the comment was centred around whether or not consumers 
were generally dissatisfied with the quality of potatoes they purchased. 
Attached to JSL's complaint was evidence in the form of results from a 
Gallup poll, commissioned by the company to ascertain the state of 
consumer opinion. The main feature was that out of a random sample 
of 1239 housewives, only 27% stated they had no complaints about the 
quality of potatoes they had last bought. 
This implies a consumer dissatisfaction with quality more general 
than would have been the case if only consumers of pre-packed potatoes 
had been affected by poor quality. However, it is possible that this 
1 
market has been more affected by quality than others. 
Pre-packing became important during the 1960s: in 1961/62 about 
8% of potatoes bound for human consumption have been estimated as 
pre-packed, a total which grew to around 19% for 1969/70 (Produce 
Studies, op cit), but afterwards fell to approximately 12%. This 
has probably failed expectations. For example, it was notedin 1961 
that around 50% of potatoes going for human consumption would be pre-
packed in a "near future" (Hessayon and Fenemore, op cit). It might 
be that the attraction of other potato pr·.ducts has proved too strong. 
Particularly, that of processed products: the convenience factors are 
likely to appeal to a similar kind of consumer, and processed potato 
products have become more popular in recent years. However, some 
evidence suggests that the nature of pre-packs might be associated 
in the minds of consumers with quality defects, such as rotting and 
damage (Simpson op cit: Gibbons, 1965 op cit). 
The condition of the potatoes which are bagged is very important. 
From survey reports generally it seems, that a high number of potatoe$ 
which are marketed are damaged, effects often making themselves felt 
through rotting much later on. Once packed, individual potatoes 
cannot easily be removed. This is a reason why the loose potatoes 
offered at a greengrocer seem more attractive to many consumers (even 
when offered at the same price): survey evidence suggests that only a 
third of conSUmers would prefer pre-packed potatoes (Simpson ibid: 
Gibbons ibid).2 
1 For a description of the markets and their commercial importance, 
see Appendix 19. 
2 A poor quality image might affect potato outlets: particularly the 
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sales of gen~ral stores, which are the type of outlet most associated 
with pre-packed potatoes. Evidence indicates that once trade is lost 
it is not easy to regain (Gibbons, 1970 op cit). It is not surprising 
therefore, that general store retailers like JSL have been vocal about 
potato quality. 
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The results of JSL's Gallup poll indicated that the main causes 
of general consumer dissatisfaction were associated with tuber marks 
and damage: other causes were greening, softness of tuber, poor 
flavour and colour after cooking (a copy of the poll's results is given 
in Appendix 24). These results are broadly in line with those obtained 
from other surveys of consumer opinion. 
Reference to some of this work was given in the report of the 
CCGB, and they are noted in Appendix 23, below. Since the JSL's poll 
two other surveys, one commissioned by the PMB, the other conducted 
by the Consumer Association, have had their results published. The 
former suggested that consumers had been satisfied with the potatoes 
they had bought, whilst the latter, confirmed the results and conclusions 
of previous work. This might seem str.ange since both surveys were 
conducted at about the same time: however, the differences between 
the one conducted by the PMB and others, appear to be ones which result 
from differences in object, methodology and presentation. l 
This general evidence for poor potato quality does not link the 
displacement of Majestic by Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. The 
recent surveys have uncovered nothing which directly links dissatis-
faction with the new varieties, and surveys carried out prior to the 
late 1960s, are irrelevant since the new varieties had not become widely 
available in the shops. This last point" suggests, indeed, that a level 
of general dissatisfaction had existed prior to the new varieties' 
commercial success (although, of course, it might have been made worse). 
However, the CCGB in its conclusions, and later, the MAFF in its 
conclusions after an investigation into the workings of the marketing 
I The survey of consumer opinion carried out for the present study 
confirmed ~ general dissatisfaction amongst consumers with the potatoes 
they'boughti the survey was carried out at about the same time as 
the PMB and CA ones. Some notes on the PMB and CA surveys are 
contained ,in Appendix 23. 
arrangements for potatoes (below), did link the growing of 'new high 
yielding varieties' to an unsa~isfactory quality situation. 
In 1972 the CCGB reported its conclusions on the effect of the 
Potato Marketing Scheme upon consumers. It stated that "in certain 
respects" consumers were "being less than well served" and that the 
Scheme was probably a contributable factor. It recommended a review 
of the 'Guarantee and Marketing Arrangements for Potatoes'. This was 
undertaken by the agricultural departments and resulted in a consulta-
tive paper "to serve as a discussion between agricultural departments, 
and the organizations concerned with the future of the potato industry" 
(MAFF et al, 1973', op cit) • This paper's general conclusion was that 
on balance it seemed desirable to give "greater weight to market 
1 forces" (para. 69) 
The paper seemed to accept the contention that the comme~al 
success of the new varieties was greater than freer market conditions 
might allow: that somehow the new varieties might not be conducive 
to the improvement of general market quality, and that the planted 
acreage of the new varieties was larger than the needs of the market 
required. Officials who worked in association to produce the paper 
were contacted for the purposes of this study, to see if they could be 
more explicit on points of relevance to the SPBS innovation. One 
observation is worth quoting in full: 
"Witnesses suggested to us that in order to maximise their 
returns some growers grew for quantity rather than with the 
needs of the market in mind. This is not to say that grown 
properly the higher yielding varieties of potatoes are not 
wanted by the housewife, but by growing to maximise yield, 
faults do occur which may 'not be so apparent in other 
varieties. I think the working party (which produced the 
paper) felt that introducing arrangements which would allow 
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1 SUch developments seemed shelved until more is established about what 
kind of common organisation will be required in the enlarged EEC. 
The Treaty of Accession allows a continuation of national policies in 
the meantime. One observer has noted that Europeans generally favour 
a freer market system (ACMS 1973), however the PMB has stated that the 
British system is envied by continental growers, and that there is no 
suggestion that the PMB will be wound up (Howells, 1973). 
market forces greater weight so that producers have a much 
greater incentive than at present to grow with the needs nf 
the market in mind, might result in a small swing away from 
higher yielding varieties" 
(MAFF written communication) 
12.3 The implications of the MAFF observations for the effects of 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell upon quality 
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The gist of the MAFF'observations is that at least in part, present 
marketing arrangements have not functioned in concord with the policy 
aim of efficient marketing of potatoes of the type and quality required' 
by users and consumers, and that the new high yielding varieties, namely 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, have been associated with this 
situation. The observations imply that the new varieties might be 
linked with poor quality in three ways. 
The first is that the new varieties are grown with the maximisation 
of crop yield in mind, rather than for the needs of the market. High 
varietal yields are, of course, a necessary factor in the attainment 
of maximum crop yield. Therefore, the new varieties have probably 
been grown for that reason, with the implication that since the new 
varieties possess a significant output advantage over Majestic, they 
have strengthened the incentives for growers to ignore the needs of the 
market. 
Secondly, in concentrating upon size of output, growers have 
handled the new varieties in such a 'way that quality had been poorer 
than it might have been, if growers had been considering the needs of 
the market. The question here for this present study is whether or 
not these faults would have occurred anyway, without the new varieties: 
in growing Majestic to maximise output, would these faults have still 
occurred. 
Lastly, if freer marketing conditions are likely to remove the 
emphasis given to the attainment of maximum outputs, then the contention 
that the new varieties would be planted less, given that the faults 
associated with growing to maximise yield would have been removed, 
implies that in the present situation, the market,would prefer to have 
varieties other than Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell. "The question 
for this present study is whether these other varieties inciude 
Majestic. If so, then it implies that the quality of Majestic is 
more preferable to consumers than that of the new varieties, and that 
therefore, the displacement of Majestic has resulted in a quality loss. 
Thus, to summarise, the quality implications are that the new 
varieties might have restricted the availability of quality potatoes 
(reducing the scope for quality markets); have faults associated with 
the way they are grown and handled, and be preferred less (even if 
produced with the needs of consumers in mind) than Majestic. To 
consider the strength of these possibilities it is necessary, since 
the workings of the Potato Marketing Scheme are central, to consider 
what should happen when varietal innovation occurs without market 
regulations and with perfect expression of consumer sovereignty. 
12.4 The determination of output quality with varietal innovation 
in conditions of perfect competition 
For the purposes of exposition it is convenient to assume that 
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only two potato varieties exist side-by-side, in a perfect market. One 
is a high quality, the other,· an ordinary quality variety. 
Under the "conditions of perfect competition, consumer sovereignty 
ensures that the quantity and quality of potatoes required by consumers 
is achieved, subject to the conditions of supply. If, in equilibrium, 
production costs associated with a high quality potato are higher than 
'those for an ordinary one, then the price of the former will be so 
much l?:igher .(not more so, for else growers would be earning abnormal 
profits). 
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If a new variety is introduced to the market, which is a perfect 
substitute for the ordinary quality variety except that it yields more 
per acre, then growers will want to grow the new variety since it offers 
an opportunity to earn high returns from a larger output~ This will 
result in an over-supply of ordinary quality, and price will fall to 
an extent where, in equilibrium, the extra returns associated with the 
sale of a larger output per acre are off~set by lower returns from a 
reduced price (this occurs in a similar manner so described for the 
effects of an output increasing innovation in agriculture generally, 
(Section 3.7». 
The extent to which plantings of the quality variety are affected 
depends upon the cross elasticities* of demand and supply (potentially, 
market interactions are very complicated and uncertain, hence a need 
generally for partial equilibrium assumptions in market economics, see 
Lipsey, 1963). The important feature to note is that the price 
differential between the ordinary and quality variety will tend to 
widen, as the price of the former declines. This will encourage 
consumers to see the advantages of higher quality in a less favourable 
light: if the quality factors involved do not seem worth the price 
differential, then consumers are likely to buy more of the ordinary 
quality variety. 
It is likely, therefore, that marketed quantities of ordinary 
quality will h~ve been increased by the innovation at the expense of 
those of high quality. However, this situation will have been 
brought about by the decisions of consumers themselves, based upon 
their valuation of quality factors. However, it might be that the 
new variety has a potential for its potatoes to be dressed to a high 
.. 
standard, and therefore, one would expect growers to have an advan-
tage of a higher output of good quality at the higher prices of the 
quality market. This possibility rests upon the strength of the 
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potential. All potato crops, no matter how bad the harvested quality, 
have a potential for dressing to high quality. 
What matters is the degree of harvested quality, since labour 
cost at grading, inconvenience, handling and storage problems all 
increase with poor quality.l Another factor is how the new variety 
might be received by the potato trade. If varietal attributes favour 
grading for certain kinds of product, for insta!.··.3, tubers give 
uniform and attractive samples which keep well, then the trade might 
offer premiums for pre-packing. 
The stronger the market price for quality, the lower the extra 
costs and inconvenience associated with producing quality, on the one 
hand, in relation to the market price, costs and convenience of ordinary 
produce on the other, the more likely will growers favour production for 
quality and the new varieties get used for quality markets. 
12.5 The influence of the PMB, upon the determination of output quality 
The purpose and workings of the PMB were described in Chapter 10. 
It was noted there that the contract price generally applied in the 
Broad's market support operations, is based upon guarantee price. This, 
therefore, is effectively a floor price beyond which, in surplus 
seasons, growers' prices generally do.not fall. This applies to all 
qualities of potatoes, but is likely to be of most value to growers 
who_tend to produce indifferent quality. 
Since in unsupported conditions, it is likely that the market 
for indifferent quality would be less sure, given that the potatoes 
most likely to be sold for human consumption would be the ones of the 
l.Grading to a higher quality does not necessarily involve a grower in 
more waste, since rejected potatoes might still be suitable for sale 
at the minimum quality standards, and wastage rates are therefore 
similar to those which would have come about given minimum quality 
standards. 
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best quality. In this situation it is likely that quality prices 
would fall less than those for indifferent produce. However, the market 
guarantee at a price which is not too different from the market average 
over all years (see table 7.7), has ensured that producers of indifferent 
quality have been able to secure near average prices. It seems certain that 
the effect of a floor price is to narrow the price differential that 
might otherwise exist between quality standards. l 
In addition, other factors associated with the workings of the 
PMB might combine to form conditions which are more favourable to 
producers of indifferent quality, than to those of higher quality. 
These are ones to do with the enforcement of the minimum quality 
regulations; and acreage control. 
The proportion of the total amount of potatoes marketed which is 
likely to be checked by the PMB inspectorate is small, and the discip-
line meted out to transgressors has often been minimal. 2 The 
problem intensified during surplus seasons, when much of the inspec-
torate's time is taken up with market support buying. Extra inspectors 
were appointed in 1972. However, there is some evidence to suggest 
1 The CCGB recommended "the fixing of a lower buying-in price when· 
2 
-market support has to be given. This would widen the gap between the 
rewards to the quality producer on the one hand and to the less good 
producer, on the other. (This would be a matter for Ministers, not 
the Board)Ji op cit: p.9. It is not suggested that floor prices are 
unreasonable in principle, or that the guaranteed prices have been 
generaly unreasonably high. The point is that the PMB buying-in prices 
have not acted to make indifferent quality seem less financially 
attractive than the marketing of good quality potatoes. 
The CCGB gave the following for inspections in 1970/71: "At farms, 
3,759 involving 28,963 tons of potatoes; at merchants' premises, 6,941 
involving 41,408 tons of potatoes; at retailers' premises 2,145; at 
pre-packers and fish friers 149; and at school canteens 248." (op cit: 
p.4). This is a small proportion of the tonnage destined for human 
consumption, which approaches four million tons. Of sanctions used to 
enforce standards, the CCGB observed, "In practice it is often impossible 
to -establish a case against him (a producer of sub-standard potatoes). 
If the potatoes are found on the farm, he has not yet marketed them and, 
if they are found elsewhere, the Board may not yet be able to prove that 
they came from him". It adds that whilst the licenses of merchants 
who deal in sub-standard potatoes can be withdrawn, it has rarely, if 
ever been done (ibid). 
that the quality standards were still inadequately enforced. For in 
the autumn of 1973, the CA found that when it bought samples of pre-
packed and loose potatoes, at a number of locations and shop outlet, 
only 25% and 33% respectively, were consistent with the minimum ware 
standard. The CA stated that most of the faults must have been present 
when the potatoes were graded at the farm (CA, 1974). The easier 
growers find it to market potatoes of indifferent quality, then the 
sharper is the incentive to maximise output and ignore the needs of 
the market. l 
Acreage regulation is likely to increase pressures to maximise 
output per acre, since the imposition of quotas limits the expansion 
of output from planting more land. The generally observed tendency for 
producers to substitute other factors of production of an input in 
short supply was noted with respect to acreage in Section 10.9. 
Some large growers have alleged that a combination of quota and 
guaranteed prices at reasonable levels, has allowed marginal growers to 
plant on poor land, experience high production costs and market. sub-
standard potatoes, and still make a good profit (Scorer, 1972). 
Certainly, the imposition of quotas in 1969 seemd to bring a halt to 
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1 The PMB seemed to accept in part, that the quality specifications laid 
down in its regulations, had not been entirely successful. In 1972, 
perhaps in reaction to the publication of the CCGB's report, the PMB 
brought in changes not onlyhtheinspectorate, but in its specifications. 
The aim was to prevent a preponderance of single faults in samples: 
also, common scab was included as a consideration at the minimum ware 
standard (it-had previously only featured in the recommended grades); 
the minimum riddle size was increased from l~ln. to liin., and a top 
riddle size introduced for the first time, of 3in. 
Other reforms at this time included the first general attempt at 
cOnsumer education with respect to varietal name and qualities, with the 
publication of a recognition chart. The compulsory labelling of all 
potato samples with the original source of supply, so that complaints 
could be relayed back (this reform had long been called for), and 
subsidy facilities were introduced to encourage growers to transport 
surplus potatoes to animal rearing areas for use as stockfeed. 
The changes r~ceived a mixed reception in the potato industry; for 
example, a survey of grower opinion indicated that 61% were doubtful-
about the potential effectiveness of the measures for consumer 
quality (Arable Farmer, 1972). 
structural change, which had favoured large-scale growers, who might be 
expected to be amongst some of the most quality conscious producers 
(the ones most favourable placed to invest in sophisticated storage 
systems, and employ ski.Iled labour) • 
These factors associated with the workings of the PMB are likely 
to work against incentives which encourage growers to produce the 
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qualities which might be required by the needs of the market. However, 
whilst there is evidence to suggest that quality has been generally 
indifferent (as supplied by surveys), there is little which directly 
implicates the PMB. The case against the Broad seems to be that it 
has·erred by default, that poor quality exists when the PMB is charged 
with the encouragement of the improvement of the marketed potato 
product (see PMB, 1955). 
However, there is some evidence that PMB market support operations 
have resulted in the marketing (and selling to the Broad) of poor 
quality potatoes, in the annual estimates of 'wastage', shown in 
column (f), table 10.1. Besides published accounts of oral allegations 
from trading participants, surveys, the only other evidence that market 
arrangements might have resulted in a lowering of quality lies in the 
'wastage' figures, and how these have varied in relation to total 
production between the years, see column (f), table 10.1. In surplus. 
years one might expect crop wastage to increase, both absolutely 
because total crop production would be at.high levels, and as a proportion 
of the total crop production since customers might be in a more power-
ful position to demand quality. 
But both absolute and proportion totals are relatively low for 
surplus seasons. The lowest of all, occur in the years of largest-
ever surpluse~, 1970/71 and 1971/72. There appear to be no increases 
in other categories of potato use, and it seems necessary, therefore, 
to conclude that a proportion of the national crop that would in an 
. average season be waste, is sold to the PHB in surplus' seasons. In 
the two years noted, the proportion of total production recorded as 
waste is 7\, which is 6% below the average figure recorded for 1955/56 
to 1971/72. 1 
It seems reasonable to think that market regulations have worked 
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to the disadvantage of quality producers and, therefore, has encouraged 
growers to ignore the needs of the market. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the needs of the market do not call for the existence of 
quality markets, and that the commercial importance of quality has been 
exaggerated by PMB detractors. 
12.6 The importance of quality markets to the potato trade 
Traditionally, potatoes might not have been considered a quality 
item, because they have been regarded as the cheap (perhaps, the 
filler) food mainstay of the British diet. Potato custom at retail 
is constant and, therefore, suggests that factors other than differences 
in quality might be important to consumers. Gibbons found that 
shoppers generally selected their potato outlet for reasons associated 
with convenience (proximity and delivery service), and regularly 
shopped at one place (1965 op cit: p.136). The general impression 
_ is that potato trading is generally stable, right through the distribution 
system back to the farmer. 
This has perhaps, given grounds for the PMB to state that 
consumers, merchants and retailers have,basically, seemed willing to 
1 The ACHS Ltd. has obserVed for 1973, that "There is a need to enforce 
the cur~ent grading and quality standards and to dispel any belief 
among growers that they can get away with marketing lower quality 
potatoes than specified in the minimum ware standard. In this way 
something in the order of 5-10\ of potatoes could possible be removed 
from the ware market". (1973 9P cit: p.5) 
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to accept the quality offered to them, since they have the right of 
.. refusal (PMB evidence to the CCGB, ··1972 op cit: p.37). Elsewhere 
the PMB has alleged that the potato trade generally has proved itself 
unwilling to meet the premiums necessary for quality graded'samples, to 
cover the high costs to farmers of extra grading (Hampson, .i972a). 
And indeed, attempts at the establishment of quality markets based on 
premiums have failed.), In addition, the PMB attempts to encourage 
grading at levels above the minimum ware standard, by the specification 
of standards in its annual reports, seem to have lacked general support 
from growers and the trade (these were the 'standard' and 'table' 
grades, see PMB, 1971 op cit: and were recently replaced by a single 
'premium' grade, PMB, 1973a op cit: Appendix A). 
The lack of support for potatoes graded to the PMB's recommended 
standards brings one back again to the allegations of the pre-pack 
interests, that although they are willint to pay the premiums required, 
retailers such as JSL, have found it impossible to get consistent and 
continuing supplies graded to the recommended standards. The reason 
being that growers have found it too easy to market indifferent quality 
and still make a good profit (evidence to the CCGB, op cit) • 
However, it is likely that the nature of the distributive system 
generally, its structure and practices, is not conducive to the 
establishment of new quality markets. The system is generally made up 
with small traders, who take supplies as offered, usually from a 
single source, and lack the facilities to handle several quality grades 
1 Two such attempts were those of the Pre-packers' Development Associa-
tion (which ai~ed to found a national standard of premium quality for 
pre-packed potatoes) and the PMB's voluntary labelling scheme, in 
1960 and 1962-1963 respectively. In the former instance, the 
Association besides blaming the trade also criticised the PMB and 
growers (see Gibbons, 1965 op cit) • 
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(or sort the potatoes themselves). These factors tend to favour 
inertia and conservatism with regard to market changes. It has been 
observed that merchants generally might be uninterested in market 
research and improving consumer quality·(see EDCA, 1972 opcit). 
Other factors might also be important for quality differentiation. 
The chaim of distribution. from grower to final consumer is long, 
usually involving a number of functions, the most costly of which is 
probably transportation. This tends to result in a large mark-up of 
retail price over that of farm-gate: for example, the average mark-up 
of London retail prices for white-skinned potatoes, on three dates in 
1970-1971, was about 162% (Appendix 15). This tends to dilute the 
effects of price differentials based upon different quality standards. 
Generally, distributors attempt to keep to constant absolute 
mark-ups, irrespective of the size of price changes passed to and 
fro ciong the chain of distribution: a common aim is to stabilise prices 
over the longest prior possible, sometimes across a range of vegetabl.c 
type (the profits of some off-setting losses in others), so that smooth 
trading and easier book-leeping are facilitated. Attempts at quality 
differentiation might be seen as unnecessary cowplications, likely to 
favour the larger general trading groups.2 
I The large number of merchants might b·e expected to facilitate quality 
choice. However, the regularity of custom throughout the distributive 
system acts against it; rural merchants tend to have a local monopoly 
where outputs are accepted regardless of type and passed on to merchants 
whose function is haulage, to wholesalers in urban areas, who might also 
have a local monopoly. A full. account of the potato distributive 
system is given in. Gibbons (1970 op cit): indications of distributive 
behaviour with regard to retailers in Research Services (op cit), and 
more specifically, with regard to Leeds and Nottingham, in Simpson (op 
cit) and Gibbons (1965 op cit). A general examination of the way the 
distributive system works for vegp.tab1es opneral1y, is Ellis et aI, (1967). 
2 The nature of the distributive system for agricultural commodities 
generally has given cause for concern \'Tith regard to quality (MAFF,· 1972a) • 
And that part with respect tQ potatoes particularly so, the EDCA observed 
that the potato industry would be hard put to withstand quality competi-
tion from EEC tradi~g partners, if freer marketing conditions were 
introduced (1972 op cit) • 
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The large retail multiples (particularly those which are based 
upon supermarket trading: where potatoes are generally stocked to 
complete the 'family range' offered to consumers, and convenience 
factors are important for staff handling costs) have generally relied 
upon pre-packed potatoes, and vary their prices in a way which is more 
responsive to trading conditions (Gibbons, 1970 op cit). They have 
tended to by-pass the traditional distributive system for potatoes, 
to ignore the urban wholesaler, and go directly to farm co-operatives. 
This development has been in accord with that of the establishment 
of central grading stations (generally, by grower co-operatives). 
These permit the pooling of outputs, the provision of COImnon facilities, 
and the development of alternative markets to those offered by the more 
traditional rural merchant. They offer to the trader who wants good 
quality, a chance to obtain potatoes on a more consistent basis, since 
unsuitable potatoes might be sufficient in number for them to be graded 
for other It,,,,rkets at the station. However, the proportion of potatoes 
bound for human consumption handled by stations and grower co-operatives 
has remained small: probably about 10% of the total in 1972 (Hill, 
1972: Symon, 1972). 
This low proportion might reflect the possibility that growers 
have lacked the incentive to combine to form co-operatives, and grade 
their outputs collectively for high quality. It has been observed 
that the main advantage of stations has stemmed not from the 'top-end' 
of the market, but from the facility provided for out-grades, usually 
for stock-feed but sometimes for processing, for which there might 
othe+wise have been no alternative market (Briggs and Umpleby op cit). 
This situation is consistent with the pre-pack allegations that 
the workings of the PMB have been such as to blunt the development of 
quality markets, and, therefore, to hold up the reform of the distribu-
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tive system for potatoes. The role of the new varieties in this is 
that their increased output potential over Majestic, has made the 
incentive to supply quality on a consistent basis less important, 
relatively less profitable. 
It might seem that the increased output potential also applies 
to quality samples, since a large crop yield is likely to lead to a 
larger marketable yield. This would seem to apply especially to 
Pentland Dell, which tends to naturally produce good looking tubers of 
uniform size, suitable for quality prepacks. Nevertheless, since 
growers generally were almost certainly producing for maximum outputs 
with Majestic, the psychological impact of the new varieties was probably 
in terms of crop yield size, rather than quality grading potentialities, 
which without generally established quality markets, would seem less 
obvious. 
But precisely because growers had been generally concerned with 
size of crop yield in the pre-new varieties situation it seems that 
the overall impact of the new varieties upon the establishment of 
quality markets would have been marginal, therefore. The combination 
of the workings of the PMB with the commercial success of the new 
varieties is likely to have been more important for consumer quality 
with regard to that at or about the minimum ware standard. First, 
however, it is necessary to consider the impact of the. new varieties 
upon the quality market which has been long established generally, 
that for King Edward VII potatoes. 
The PMB has expressed concern that growers had found this variety 
(and the minor one, Golden wonderl ) less profitable to grow relative to 
1 Golden Wonder has a quality reputation in some Scottish markets 
equivalent to King Edward elsewhere. It generally attracts a price 
premium. However, it takes only a very small part of the Scottish 
maincrop, generally less than 5%. 
.,;' 
the success of the new higher yielding varieties (1972a). This is to 
be expected initially, but thereafter competitive ,forces should have 
resulted in a fall in King Edward's planted acreage until its prices 
rose sufficiently to off-set the revenue advantages of'the'higher 
yielding varieties (Section 12.4). The extent of the acreage decline 
would depend upon the strength of consumer preference for King Edward's 
quality. 
12.7 The impact of the commercial success of the new varieties upon 
King Edward VII 
In terms of its proportionate share of the national maincrop, 
figures 1.1 and 1.2, there seems to have been little effect for plant-
, 1 
ings of King Edward (or Golden Wonder). This is in spite of what 
280 
appears to be a significant narrowing of the price differential between 
white-skinned and red-skinned (mostly 
King Edward VIIs) potatoes during the 1960s and early 1970s, in the 
London market. 
Using a list of prices published by the PMB (contained in evidenc~ 
to the CCGB, op cit): a comparison of a three year annual average to 
end-197l, to that for the period to end-1965, the price of red-skinned 
potatoes rose about 18% but fell in real terms by 11% (1971 £s). For 
white-skinned varieties, price rose 25% and fell 6% in real terms 
(1971 £s). That is, the price differential narrowed in real terms by 
around 23% between 1965 and 1971.~ The prices from which these were 
. estimated are given in Appendix' 15. 
lThis is also true in terms of its proportionate share of the national 
tonnage. For example, the slight reduction in the variety's share of 
aci'eage in the mid-1960s (from which the variety soon recovered, figure 1.1) 
was paralleled by a slight fall in its share of national tonnage: the 
cornrner~ial importance of King Edward is greater by about 1-2 percentage 
points than is indicated by planted acreage. 
2In terms of average grower prices, over five years to 1972, allowing for 
a mark-up of 1?0%, the average yield advantage has been such, over five 
years to 1972, that the retail prices for potatoes of alternative varieties 
would have had to increase by 2p/lb to off-set the extra revenue per acre 
associated with growing Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell instead of Majestic, 
This includes differences in costs' per acre •. 
Part of the reason is probably a result of an improvement in King 
Edward's profitability brought about by an apparent increased yield 
potential which occurred in the mid-1960s, see figure 7.1 and that the 
markets for King Edward and white-skinned varieties are .f~lrly 
1 independent of each other. Even with these qualifications, it seems 
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that the movement of relative prices has been such during the commercial 
success of the new varieties to suggest that competitive forces in 
determining the balance between high output varieties of ordinary quality 
on the one hand, and lower output but higher quality varieties on the 
other, work imperfectly. 
It is possible that given marketing arrangements have favoured 
growers of maximum outputs, then growers of King Edward might have 
been reduced in the past to a rump, concentrated in areas where 
husbandry and marketing conditions are especially favourable for King 
Edward. That, therefore, substantial changes in relative profita-
bilities are required before significant changes occur in acreage 
plantings. written communica.tions with regional officers of the PMB 
and ADAS suggested that some regions were particularly geared to King 
Edward. It seems that substantial shifts in crop profitabilities did 
not occur with regard to those of King Edward, and the impact of,the 
new varieties has been minimal. 
1 The increase in yields is probably associated with the displacement of 
seed stocks with that free from paracrinkle virus. This was discovered 
in 1930 to be present in the total stock of King Edward's seed. Virus 
free tested seed· was first introduced in 1959, and resulted in higher 
yields but with a preponderance of small-sized tubers (Hirst et al, op 
cit). In the results of the survey.conducted for this present study, 
it was possible to discern the presence of a dichotomy in the 
preferences of King Edward consumers and others (Section 12.9). Also, 
a part of the potato industry might be particularly geared to the 
production of King Edward, and therefore, the market might not be very 
responsive to changes in the white-skinned market. 
12.8 Faults in the quality of Pentland Crown ~nd Pentland Dell 
arising from the way the varieties were::rown and handled, 
'and influence of the workings of the p~n3 
It was noted in the results of the growers' survey (Section 7.5), 
and the commercial trials (Section 7.8) that Pentland Dell probably has 
a superior quality for grading than Majestic: this is less clear for 
Pentland Crown, but generally the variety ~,·':.':ms superior to Majestic. 
However, early difficulties might have been associated with Pentland 
Dell's susceptibility to spraing and tuber blight. Also, growers 
generally seem to have experienced difficulty with Pentland Crown in 
storage. In this instance, it seems that high yields encouraged 
growers to take risks with quality; Pentland Crown probably requires 
careful handling if its full quality potential is to be realised 
(Section 7.9). 
These considerations should be largely irrelevant for consumer 
quality, since an adequate enforcement of (and grower attention to) 
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PMB grading standards should remove poor quality potatoes from marketed 
samples. However, as indicated in Section 12.5, there are grounds for 
believing that many sam2les have not been graded up to the minimum ware 
standard. In addition, where grading is correctly conducted, there is 
always an increased possibility that more damaged potatoes will get 
through grading inspections (with disease spreading later in the tubers) 
if damage is generally at higher levels in a given crop. 
Pentland Crown's relatively poor storage propensity is likely 
to be of most importance for quality towards the end of the maincrop 
season. If this is so, then it might have been a factor associated 
with"an observed fall in consumption levels. It appears that consumers 
are well aware that quality deteriorates towards end-season generally 
(PMB, 1974a op cit) and, therefore, consumers could have been conscious 
of quality changes associated· with the displacement of Majestic at this 
time. 
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Table 12.1 gives estimates .of monthly potato consumption (excluding 
meals outside the home1) on a lbs. per head of population per annum basis, 
for the period 1960 to end-1972. Effectively, the maincrop season is 
over by May, and begins again in late August; thus the consumption 
totals for May to end-August are not given, since these would be likely 
to reflect mainly early crop* marketing conditions. 
TABLE 12.1 Monthly Consumption of Potatoes 
Sept .Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr Total 3 year avo 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
192 295 214 209 217 212 210 199 
194 207 215 210 218 231 231 195 
189 204 211 204 213 235 240 195 
203 213 215 208 206 200 211 207 
201 213 218 201 202 206 201 191 
206 223 224 205 208 210 206 195 
205 223 220 203 202 209 202 194 
202 224 223 198 210 207 200 194 
205 234 222 198 205 213 212 205 
205 233 217 186 195 203 201 185 
205 242 213 185 190 190 186 181 
205 241 213 185 181 191 185 183 
209 254 220 187 201 208 202 193 
207 
213 
211 
208 
204 
210 
207 
207 
212 
203 
199 
198 
209 
203 
205 
210 
211 
208 
207 
207 
208 
209 
207 
200 
200 
202 
Source: MAFF, 1973b 
The feature to note is the fall in annual consumption in the late 
2 1960s and early 1970s below previous levels; this resulted largely 
1 Monthly estimates are also published by the PMB as well as by the MAFF 
2 
(which are used in table 12.1). The PMB's figures are calculated from 
merchants' returns, and so include sales to caterers, but exclude 
potatoes which do not go through the conventional marketing channels. 
The MAFF estimates are used here because they permit a clearer presen-
tation of consumption when it occurS: a lag is probably associated 
with the PMB figures. However, both sets of estimates show very 
similar annual trends. 
A change a1~0 appears to have taken place around 1963/64: "this also 
coincIded with changes in varietal growing patterns. A period when 
King Edward VII stopped increasing its share of planted acreage at the 
expense of Majestic: seemingly after the advantage of the introduction 
of its paracrink1e virus free seed in the early 19s0s, figure 1.1. 
Recently, consumption levels have risen markedly. It is felt in the 
trade that this is a result of rising food prices generally (see Bullen, 
1974):. that consumers have been forced to switch to relatively cheap 
food categories for some meals. . 
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from lower consumption totals in the late season months, and be 
associated with reduced 'storage quality. However, other factors might 
also have been important, most notably mild winter weather which could 
have lessened the need for warm meals, ,with which potatoes, are used. 
If this were so, however, one would expect the consumption of some other 
foods to have been affected. 
There was a slow-down in the sale of processed foods about this 
time (see Richardson, 1971), and this was, in part, blamed upon the 
weather. Other foods, such as canned peas, and other root vegetables, 
do not seem to have been subject to any notable changes in consumption 
however (see MAFF 1973a, op cit: Table 10). 
If it is possible that quality of the potatoes available to 
consumers has been affected to an extent where consumption was affected, 
then it is probable that dissatisfaction with the quality of potatoes 
bought would have been widespread. 
This is because of the nature of the importance of potatoes in 
the national diet. Cohen has suggested that the public think in terms 
of food category, rather than in terms of individual items: for instance, 
'green vegetables' rather than a cabbage (1949). Potatoes might hold 
a unique role in traditional British meals in this respect, since they 
probably represent a category in themselves. If this is so, it is not 
surprising that there seems to be no evidence, in a British context to 
show conclusively which foods are generally substitutes for potatoes. 1 
This implies that consumers, when faced with changes in the quality 
offered to them, are unlikely to buy significantly less with poor quality, 
since it is not obvious to them what might be used instead with 
traditional meals. 
1 Gibbons produced results from his Nottingham survey, which suggested that 
a small number of housewives might turn to bread, vegetables, rice and 
macaroni (1965 op cit: table 47). American work has suggested that 
sweet corn, froze~ peas and rice might be alternatives (Hee, 1967). 
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As observed above, Section 12.2, there is no evidence to directly 
link the new varieties with the general level of dissatisfaction suggested 
1 by consumer surveys. . The case that the new varieties did influence 
quality at or around the minimum ware standard, must rest on the 
observation that growers have experienced trouble with handling and 
storing the new varieties, particularly Pentland Crown, that because 
the PMB has not enforced quality standards adequately, and given the 
concern of growers to maximise output, then sub-standard quality was 
probably marketed, to affect the general quality on offer to consumers. 
Thus, in terms of the second possible effect noted in Section 12.3, it 
is likely that faults in the growing of the new varieties did affect 
consumer quality. 
The main causes for dissatisfaction in surveys were associated 
with tuber damage and disease. However, cooking troubles and taste 
also featured·as important factors. These are important to the question 
of whether or not consumers might prefer one variety to another. 
12.9 The significance of varietal quality for taste and cooking 
suitability2 
Not much is generally known about the determinants of taste and 
cooking suitability under commercial conditions, it is a subject which 
has probably been neglected until recently, when processing interest 
made it more important. For instance, it has been observed that 
feeding practices are likely to adversely affect flavour (Gibbons, 1965 . 
. 1 There is some indication that the proportion of consumers dissatisfied 
with general quality has tended to increase over time, and therefore, 
got worse in the time of the new varieties. 
2 There are other quality factors not considered here such as nutritional 
content, which might differ between varieties, for instance, calorific 
and carbohydrate values. Nothing is known about these, and it is 
likely that varietal differences are insignificant to consumer 
preference, and potato use. 
op cit: p.147), and whilst in the advisory service the consequences of 
fertiliser applications have been noted as important, they are little 
1 
understood (Eagle, 1972). 
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Processing interest has involved a consideration of factors important 
to particular cooking uses, especially with regard to frying and 
associated factors of dry matter content* (which influences the amount 
of cooking oil used) anQ reducing sugars* (important to the colour of 
the finished product). An account of what processors would prefer from 
varieties is given in PMB (1974b op cit), and of their interest in 
quality more generally in Gibbons (1965 op cit). The NIAB introduced 
varietal assessments for dry matter, flouriness and freedom from dis-
colouration (see table 7.1; under 'quality') in the early 1970s largely 
because of the processing interest (NIAB, op cit).2 
Differences in varietal cooking qualities and taste have been 
examined and noted in several sources, most notably Whitehead et al 
(op cit), Burton (1966) and Cox (op cit). The influence of other 
factors upon cooking quality and taste, such as husbandry practices, 
soil and weather are, of course, important, but it seems that generally 
the most consistent and dominant influence is variety. However, whilst 
varietal cooking quality might seem of obvious importance in a variety 
like King Edward, because this is a variety known to consumers, it is 
less certain that it matters in a choice for consumers between the 
1 . 
The nature of flavour itself is not yet fully known (Burton, 1966). 
The industry seems to have given little attention to it; out of 231 
research projects lists in the PMB survey of potato R&D in the UK, 
only one seemed explicitly given over to flavour (PMB 1970b). 
2 However, it does not yet appear to have become important to growers in 
their varietal choices generally. For the growers survey, the NFU 
thought that' these considerations were unimportant, since growers 
would plant varieties which the market had accepted anyway. The only 
variety which processors specifically demand is Record, for crisp 
manufacture. 
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white-skinned varieties, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, and Majestic. 
The choice of varieties presented to consumers at greengrocers is 
generally one between the price premium demanding King Edward on the 
one hand, and other varieties, often unlabelled or simply marked 'whites' 
(Gibbons, 1965 op cit: CA, op cit).l 
From the results of the survey of consumer opinion for this present 
study (Appendix 23), it seemed possible that consumers are broadly of 
two kinds with respect to the type of potato bought and varietal 
awareness. Respondents who stated that they purchased King Edward, 
Golden Wonder and Kerr's Pink (both of these latter two varieties seem 
to be associated with good quality in Scotland) were more likely in 
their answers to state that their motivation for buying their potatoes 
had been preference or quality: the percentage of these respondents 
saw 68%, as against 32% who gave convenience factors as important to 
their choice. 
Of respondents who stated that they purchased 'whites', Majestic 
or unspecified varieties, 83%'bought for convenience reasons, and only 
2 11% for quality. This might suggest that quality differences between 
white-skinned varieties could be unimportant. However, the surveys' 
results indicate elsewhere that this 'low preference' group is no less 
dissatisfied with the potatoes it has bought than is the 'high 
preference' group: (in fact, the percentages are 55% and 42% respectively). 
1 Potatoes are not easily recognised, for example, King Edward is often 
labelled 'reds' but its skin is only part-coloured and after a period 
of storage may not have any colour at all (there is a red-skinned 
variant, Red King Edward; this is not widely sold however). Instances 
of incorrect labelling may occur; for example, during March 1973, the 
author visited 12 shops in Glasgow, and found 14 instances of what 
appeared to be'incorrect labelling, out of 21 selections • 
. 2 R 
This seems to be supportive evidence that the markets for King Edward, 
and the new varieties, are broadly independent, and why, therefore, 
they did not have a significant impact upon plantings of the older 
variety (Section 12.7). 
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A factor of some influence is that although consumers might be 
aware that differences exist in the quality of the types of potato they 
buy and use, they are unable to relate these differences on a consistent 
basis to variety. Survey evidence indicates that consumer knowledge of 
varietal name (Gibbons, 1965 op cit; PMB, 1974a op cit). It is to 
be supposed, therefore, that they know even less of the consequences 
of varietal choice for taste and cooking suitability. 
The situation with regard to presentation of potatoes at retail 
has probably contributed to this state of affairs. PMB inspections 
in 1973 revealed that only 4% of potato samples had varietal names 
attached to them (1974d). Labelling is not compulsory of course, 
however, the PMB has since 1972 encouraged growers to mark samples with 
names when source of supply is recorded (the PMB has made rubber stamps 
free on request) • 
To some extent the reaction to the PMB to calls for varietal 
labelling has been ambivalent. For example, it has stated the view 
that to consumers with "average taste buds" and to "cooks of average 
talent" a potato is "just a potato" (PMB, 1973b).1 However, in 
1972 the PMB published a varietal recognition chart, which described 
the main potato varieties likely to be available to consumers, and 
contained assessments of their relative cooking suitability for the 
1 The author encountered divided opinion within the ranks of the PMB on 
the question of varietal importance for quality. Regional opinion 
suggested that differences in varietal adoption patterns between 
different areas of the country, reflected consumer preference for 
the varieties concerned, Appendix 13. At head office, officials 
suggested that varietal attributes were relatively unimportant, in 
comparison with regional differences in husbandry and weather. 
Compulsory labelling at retail was, therefore, impractical, since 
associating varietal propensities with cooking suitabilities would 
expos~ retailers to prosecution under the Trades Description Act. 
The popularity of King Edward was 'traditional', its continuing 
success depending upon the buying habits of .. housewives. 
I ~ e\1Al-~ 
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main ways of cooking potatoes (PMB, 1975a). 
increased demand for compulsory lab~j.ling.l 
This has led to an . 
These a·sessments allow a consideration of the relative merits 
of the new varieties compared to Majestic. Once done, if these are 
associated with observed differences in cooking habits, it might be 
possible to infer if the displacement of Majestic could have had any 
effect upon consumer quality. 
12.10 Differences in varietal cooking suitabilit~es and taste: 
the possibility of whether consumers have been affected 
by the displacement of Majestic. 
Chart assessments of varietal cooking suitability was based upon 
a consensus of opinion from PMB home economists. The PMB has stated 
that they show "good average evaluations" which provide a IIfirst class 
guide" (1973b), and elsehwere, "experience has shown in the Board's 
Experimental Kitchen, ,some varieties are better than others for some 
purposes" (1975a op cit). The assessments are given in table 12.2 
below. 
The supriority of King Edward is evident. Desiree, a new red-
skinned variety introduced in the 1960s which may prove a strong 
competitor for King Edward, is also given a generally high rating: so 
too, are Maris Piper2 and Golden Wonder. The low ratings for all the 
1 
2 
Gibbons observed that this demand has grown out of a "new stream of 
interest" generally with food quality (1965 op cit). At about that 
time the Observer newspaper commenting on the publication of a report 
of the Food Standards Committee (which generally recommended labelling), 
stated: "tickets ought to inform the housewife whether she is buying 
King Edward or Home Guard potatoes" ·(1964). This call was repeated in 
the report of the CCGB (op cit). More recently, the PMB noted that 
"the most common complaint still voiced by the housewives who attend 
the Board's cooker demonstrations is that variety names are rarely 
shown in the shops" (1976: p.5) • 
. 
Increased consumer awareness might favour a shift from Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell to Maris Piper in the white-skinned market, given 
the newer variety's high assessments. The yield advantage of the 
former varieties may be small (Section 9.9) and growers will, there-
fore, not resist strongly the shift in consumer preferences. The 
future returns to. the SPBS investment seere dependent upon the size of 
Maris Piper's success (ibid). 
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maincrop varieties for salad use is a reflection of the texture of 
maincrop varieties, which is too mealy for salads (early crop varieties 
tend to have a waxy texture, and are therefore better). 
TABLE 12.2 PMB cooking usage assessments 
Chipped Salad 
Jacket Roast and Aug. Jan. & 
Variety Boiled Mashed Baked with meat Saute to Dec. after 
----
Desiree 4 4 4 5 5 1 1 
Golden Wonder 4 4 5 4 1 1 1 
Redskin 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 
Kerrs Pink 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 
King Edward VII 5 5 5 4 4 1 1 
Majestic 3 3 3 1 5 1 1 
Maris Piper 4 4 4 4 5 3 2 
Pentland Crown 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 
Pentland Dell 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 
Pentland Hawk 5 5 5 1 1 1 2· 
Pentland Ivory 4 4 4 3 4 3 2 
Notes: Key - 1 - not recommended 
2 - can be used for this purpose 
3 - good 
4 - very good 
5 - excellent 
Source: pr-m 1975a op cit 
Majestic receives good ratings for boiling, mashing and baking, 
excellent for chipping and saute (in fact, better than King Edward), and 
is not recommended for roast and salad uses. Pentland Crown and Pentland 
.Dell have identical ratings which when compared to Majestic, show 
differences in roast, chipping and salad use. The new varieties are 
judged superior, see table 12.2. 
A comparison of Majestic's ratings with those of Pentland Crown 
and Pentland o,el~ (both the newer varieties'ratings are identical) 
indicate differences in four .of the seven categories. The SPBS's 
varieties are rated.very good for baking (their only exceptional rating), 
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good for roast and salad use: whereas Majestic registers good, 
excellent (better than King Edward) and not recommended, for baking, 
roast and salad use respectively. 
Pentland Ivo+y, derived from a Pentland Dell - Pentland Crown 
hybridisation, is rated very good for all cooking purposes, except 
roast and salad use. .In all, it does better than its parents. It is 
I 
observed on the chart that the variety has a mealy texture. 
Other observations on the chart noted that Desiree, King Edward 
and Maris Piper rarely discoloured upon cooking, whereas Majestic had 
a tendency to do so. Majestic's good keeping quality is noted. 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were noted for their close texture. 
Nothing was stated explicitly about differences in maincrop 
varietal flavour. This reflects traditional attitudes that maincrop 
flavour is of no commercial importance, see below (Section 12.12) • 
Texture is probably of some importance to taste (Burton, op cit), but 
the chart does not point this out to consumers. 
The PMB have, in addition to the chart, published further advice 
on what varieties to use for different cooking purposes. This consists 
of a collection of recipes and associated recommended varieties: 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell are omitted altogether for boiling, 
mashing and roast (1974d). They are only recommended for baking2, 
frying and sauted uses. 
I 
2 
And might therefore, if consumers were aware of it, be a competitor 
for Golden Wonder in Scotland, since this is the main quality feature 
of this variety. 
PtObably because of their tuber size. It was observed in Section 7.9 
that Pentland Crown might have a tendency to get large tubers. The PMB 
perhaps sensitive to the allegation from JSL that it encouraged the 
marketing of potatoes the size of "old boots" (Rose op cit), introduced 
a top riddle size of 3in. in 1972. However, there is some evidence to 
indicate that consumers cannot get tubers large enough for baking (Gibbons, 
1965 op cit: .. Simpson, op cit: The Observer, 1973). In 1973, in 
response to requests from caterers the PMB introduced a 'bakers grade' 
for use by that trade. 
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Without labelling, however, it is difficult for consumers to use 
this information to make a rational choice of variety •.. And it seems 
likely that if the new varieties had aversely affected consumers' 
cooking, by displacing Majestic as the dominant ,,·:hite-skinned variety, 
then consumers aware of the varietal change, would have tended to vary 
their cooking habits. The results of two surveys of cooking habits, 
conducted in 1961 (Pickard & Cori, 1964) and 1972-1973 (PMB, 1974a op 
cit), indicate that changes did probably occur during the 1960s, see 
table 12.3. The results are not strictly comparable since slightly 
different questions were asked, see the table column headings. 
TABLE 12.3 Methods of Cooking Potatoes 
1961 (1516) 1972 (1786) 
, share of last , of meals 
before 7 p.m. 10 serving occasions 
Boiled 
Mashed 
Chipped 
Roast (with meat) 
Jacket baked 
Other 
Not stated 
27 
37 
17 
13 
n.a. 
12 
Sources: Pickard and Cori, 1964: Section III 
PMB, 1974a: op cit, Table 27 
29 
26 
18 
18 
2 
7 
Whilst Majestic was rated excellent for chipping purposes in the 
PMB assessments, Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell were rated at only 
good, but no impact was made upon the use of this cooking method in 
the 1960s as a result of the displacement of Majestic, see the table. 
Roasting became a more popular cooking method, and for this method 
the PMB rated the new varieties good, and Majestic not at all. Thus, 
it is possib~e that the new varieties might have made this method of 
cooking potatoes more popular, or were contributable factors. l 
lThe excellent ratings given to Maris Piper and Desiree, make these 
varieties more important for chipping. However, at the time of the 1972 
cooking habits survey these varieties probably had not had time to 
influence consumer actions to any ge~eral degree. 
The largest change in cooking methods occurred in mashing. 
Burton has stated that traditionally consumers have preferred a potato 
flesh texture which upon boiling breaks down into a dry crumbly mash 
(op cit). If this is so then the difference in texture between 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell on the one hand, and Majestic on the 
other, might have been important. The NIAB assessed Majestic highly 
for flouriness (table 7.1). However, the PMB chart whilst noting the 
close texture of the new varieties, rates the three varieties equally 
for mashing (although the recommendations for the recipes ignores the 
new varieties for mash). 
The increased use of potatoes for roast and decline in the 
popularity of mashed potatoes have probably influenced each other. It 
is difficult though, to link the change in cooking methods with the 
new varieties' displacement of Majestic, even though the varietal 
substitution seems consistent with the cooking change. There could 
be other reasons, the most likely for example, a change in eating 
habits associated with a general trend of increased meat eating (MAFF, 
1973b op cit), so that roasted meat meals have become more popular. 
It seems clear, however, that differences in cooking suitability 
have existed to an extent where the displacement of Majestic would have 
changed consumer quality. It is possible, given the above evidence, 
that this change affected cooking methods. The advantage of the new 
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varieties for roasting over Majestic, is probably the most important 
factor, since this is consistent with the largest increase in popularity 
associated with any cooking method. The new varieties might have 
contributed to a decline in the popularity of mashing, but this is not 
certain, and, therefore, overall the effect of the new varieties upon 
cooking quality has probably been to improve it, compared to the 
situation where only Majestic would have been offered to consumers as 
the leading white-skinned variety. 
294 
The original allegations against Pentland Crown noted in Section 
lO.lOb stated that the variety was "unappealing to the tastes of the 
consumer". Whilst this might be essentially so, in the sense that its 
flavour might have nothing to distinguish it,l there is no available 
evidence to suggest that Majestic is superior. 
12.11 Summary and conclusions of this chapter 
The question raised at the beginning of this chapter was whether 
the commercial success of the new varieties had been consistent with 
the government policy aim of the achievement of efficient marketing 
of the type and quality of potato required by consumers (Section 12.1). 
Or more generally to acertain if by displacing Majestic, the new 
varieties had changed the quality of potatoes generally available to 
consumers, and if so, with what consequences for welfare, and the 
interpretation of the rate of return .. esults. 
The nature of the allegations were considered first (Section 12.2), 
they were founded upon the quality interests of the pre-pack product 
sectors of the potato trade. The quality effects of the new varieties 
were associated with the workings of the PMB, and linked with general 
consumer dissatisfaction (uncovered by surveys of consumer opinion). 
The association was largely confirmed by the investigations and conclu-
sions of the CCGB and MAFF reports. ., 
Three possibilities were raised with regard to how the new 
varieties might have affected .consumer quality (Section 12.3). These 
were (1) that the new varieties had in combination with the workings 
of the PMB blunted the incentives for growers to produce high quality: 
1 The only evidence in this context was an observation of the Henry 
Doubleday Research Association on the results of a survey it conducted 
amongst its members to ascertain varietal qualities; Pentland Crown 
was rated tasteless except after Christmas, when flavour was considered 
to improve slowly with storage (Mills, 1969). Majestic was not rated. 
(2) in being grown to maximise output, the new varieties had produced 
quality faults, and (3) consumers would have preferred Majestic. 
Theoretically, varietal choice and associated qualities, are 
determined by the inter-play of supply and demand upon price (12.4). 
However, the price for minimum quality has been established at levels 
where a reasonable income is received by the intervention of the PMB 
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(Section 12.5). Other factors associated with the workings of, the PMB,' 
inadequate enforcement of minimum quality standards, and the method of 
acreage regulation, also play their part. So that quality incentives 
are probably blunted, and growers concentrate upon maximising outputs 
without proper regard to the needs of the market. There is evidence 
that wastage decreases in surplus seasons, when market support operations 
have been carried out. 
However, the potential for quality markets is restricted by the 
traditional nature and practices of the distributive system (Section 
12.6), but this state of affairs might be in part, a result of blunted 
incentives for quality, if new developments such as central grading 
stations have not been able to exploit potential quality markets based 
upon the pre-pack trade. It seems reasonable to suppose that the new 
varieties have had some effect in contributing to this situation, but 
only to a very small extent. 
A quality market of some importance is that for King Edward 
(Section 12.7); there have been no obvious effects caused by the intro-
duction of the new varieties. Thus, with regard to possibility (1) 
above, the general effect of the new varieties upon high quality 
markets has probably been only marginal. 
It is likely that the new varieties have had faults in their 
quality; asso~iated with growing and handling them to maximise output 
(Section 12.8). The irnportant factor is the extent to which growers 
have been able to sell potatoes below the minimum quality standard; 
there is evidence that this was possible (Section 12.5). Quality 
might have been most affected in the latter half of the maincrop season, 
and this corresponds to a time when consumers bought less potatoes 
than in previous years. It seems that possibility (2) is probable 
that quality marketed at the minimum ware standard was adversely 
affected by the new varieties, Pentland Crown in particular. 
Differences in varietal quality regarding cooking suitability and 
taste exist, and consumer behaviour suggests they are commercially 
important (Section 12.10). Cooking suitability differences exist 
between Majestic and the new varieties, which seem consistent with 
changes in consumers' cooking habits during the 1960s. It is likely 
that overall, the new varieties have improved cooking quality. Thus, 
it is' unlikely that consumers would have preferred Majestic to the 
new varieties. 
It seems that the general effects of the new varieties displacement 
of Majestic have produced a mixed result. The effect in terms of 
quality markets has probably been less significant than that in terms 
of quality at the minimum war standard and cooking suitability. Of 
these latter two concerns, the effects upon quality at the minimum 
ware standard are probably the more important, since survey evidence 
indicates that consumers have been most dissatisfied with disease 
and damage troubles, rather than cooking troubles. The overall effect 
upon general quality therefore, might have been such as ~o have left 
consumer quality worse off. 
.. However, it is impossible to be more specific so that the 
consequences of these quality effects might be measured and allowed 
for in the rate of return results. Instead they have to be noted as 
general qualifications to the measured results. It is the view of 
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the author that the quality considerations do not nullify, nor seriously 
off-set, the net benefit estimated in Chapter 9. 
There are some points though~ which whilst not of direct relevance 
to the investment decision of whether or not the new varieties' displace-
ment of Majestic has been worthwhile, are of importance to the general 
question of whether social resources have been employed effectively. 
These concern the need to ensure that consumer choice and quality are 
facilitated, with regard to varietal choice. It is conceivable that 
the effects of new varieties upon quality might, in the future, be such 
as to result in substantial costs to consumers, if they remain unaware 
of varietal attributes. 
12.12 The introduction of safeguards to facilitate consumer 
choice andqualityl 
From the research for this present study there are three considera-
tions of importance to the improvement of facilities which ensure 
consumers are able to obtain the quality they require in potato 
varieties. These are the introduction of compulsory varietal labelling; 
the testing and evaluation of new varieties, under commercial conditions 
by consumers, and the improvement of the quality of information 
available to plant breeders about consumer requirements. 
,These suggestions might seem to'imply that the industry has 
neglected consumers' interests, in favour of production ones: this, 
indeed, was part of JSL's allegations with respect to the workings of 
the PMB. There is some truth in this, not in the sense that the PMB, 
MAFF and other agencies have been overtly in favour of growers' interests, 
1 The question of how well an industry serves its consumers, the strength 
of competition and consumer awareness, can be answered only with a 
comparative analysis of a similar industry, or with reference to 
overseas' situations. Gibbons has reviewed what has been done in 
consumer and quality research in the potato industry in the USA, and 
concluded that there is wide scope for improvement in the UK (1965, 
op cit: Chapter 5). 
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but that given the nature of the tasks and problems it faces, ones which 
are essentially associated with supply, it is not surprising that 
1 
considerations associated with demand might be neglected. 
. It is a likelihood made all the more pertinent where demand seems 
stable and unresponsive to trading conditions, and in the instance of 
the PMB, membership is heavily grower orientated and funds short (so 
that it might be unwilling to incur additional expenses associated 
with market intelligence). 
The research service in Britain does not generally appear to give 
much explicit consideration to the consumers' position. The ARC in 
giving policy aims behind breeding new varieties of crops omits them 
al together: 
"to breed new crop plants and new varieties to provide, as 
far as possible, for the needs of farmers, growers and 
·processors that might otherwise not be satisfied from 
other sources". 
(1970, op cit: p.4) 
The trust is that farmers and processers will supply the varieties that 
best suit consumer requirements (and perhaps for cereals this might be 
so). According to Russell (1973, op cit) directors of R&D establish-
ments generally either do not know who should be the beneficiary of 
agricultural R&D or they assume the farmer is in most instances the 
immediate beneficiary (p.lS). 
Literature concerned with potatoes and the potato industry 
generally suggests a trust in market forces and power of consumer 
1 The idea that organisations work in a way reflected by the problems 
they face (so that quite often their operational objectives differ 
to ones behind the reasons for the establishment of the organisations) 
is one common in sociological research concerned with the behaviour of 
people in organisations. See for example, Perrow, 1961. There 
appears to be no countervailing institutional power to producer biased 
groups to represent consumer interests, except the provision of 
hearings and investigations on an ad hoc basis (which the CCGB, and 
a government minister might provide: these would take much of their 
evidence from data collected and presented by producer orientated 
groups). 
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preference, which seems difficult to justify i~ the light of what has 
been written so far. It appears to be generally felt on the farming 
side of the industry that potato varietal patterns broadly reflect 
consumer choice: this was particularly noticeable in priv~te communi-
cations with regional PMB officials. 
This seems true of plant breeders. Howard, head of the potato 
breeding section at the PBI has listed what he thinks might be the 
factors important to the commercial success of a new potato variety 
(1963b). It is an account which reflects many of the beliefs associated 
with consumer preference and needs, which are recorded in general 
literature about potatoes. The main feature about them is that they 
presume present trading conditions are determined by consumer preference. 
This has dangers. For example, Record, a variety recommended 
by the NIAB for cr.~_sp processing, is generally considered in the potato 
industry to be unsuitable for direct human cons~,wtion because the 
colour of its tuber flesh is yellow, and British consumers are believed 
not to like this colour (Pickard and Cori, op cit). However, the 
members of the Henry Doubleday Research Association have rated maincrop 
potato varieties according to flavour, and Record was noted as superior 
to all others (the "Cox of the kitchen garden", Mills op cit). 
Flavour was a factor associated with dissatisfaction in the surveys 
of consumer opinion: most notably in that of the CA, which produced a 
result where three-quarters of respondents complained o~ tastelessness 
(op cit). Plant breeders have rejected seedlings on the grounds that 
their flavour was not mild (Howard, 1970). This seems to have been 
based on the belief that because the present situation is such that 
consumers use maincrop varieties which are mild or insipid, generally 
as a neutral accompaniment to a fish or meat dish or as an inexpensive 
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constituent to fill out a stew, soup or pie, flavour is unimportant. l 
Very little is known about flavour; however, this need not prevent 
. . . ~ 
varietal assessment for this property in commercial trials. Work in 
psychology associated with multidimensional scaling of attitudes 
suggests that it is feasible to identify key features important to 
impressions of differences in flavour, see Shepard (1962). 
There is a general lack of consumer representation in testing and 
trials of new varieties. Gibbons noted its absence in the work of 
the NIAB in recommending varieties (1965 op cit: p.l07). The 
situation has changed little, except notably in one instance, when in 
1974, the commercial trials of recently introduced varieties, included 
"consumer acceptability data" gathered in questionnaires from shoppers 
at a supermarket (PMB, 1975b: p.3). 
From a study of information for this chapter, to assess the impact 
of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell upon the general quality of 
potatoes available to the public, it seemed very little was known 
generally about consumer varietal quality and its importance, to an 
extent that such information there was, was often untrustworthy. To 
the author, it seems that it is necessary to constantly review and 
examine consumer needs on a systematic basis, by an authority independent 
of producer interests, so that in the long term varieties which are the 
roost suited to consumer requirements can be produced by plant breeders. 
This might require modern market intelligence, such as modern business 
2 
uses generally. 
1 It is certainly so for processing, where a neutral flavour is preferred, 
since it is also possible for companies to add flavour in the 
processing (private'communications). 
2 Which ideally might be based on Drucker's advice, of not to think of 
consumers as buyers of a product, but in terms of their general 
behaviour, values and expectations (1968). 
· .. 
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This is not to argue that the different parts of the potato industry 
should be separated from one other, but that the function of good 
market intelligence is to guide every part of the industry in how . t 
might contribute to the whole and best satisfy consumer requirements, 
and thereby, maximise its return. Unfortunately, the pressures of the 
accountability arguments seem such that plant breeders will 
become more responsive to producer interests, and consequently more 
1 
remote from the market place, 
1 The concern with accountability of social R&D was noted in Section 
1.2. In their planning,agricu1tural departments probably put emphasis 
upon the welfare of individual farmers, rather than upon the welfare 
of final consumers (this seems to have been done with regard to the 
introduction of a new 'cost-benefit' system by the ARC): since in 
the present marketing situation growers seem likely to continue to 
produce for maximum output rather than with the needs of the market 
in mind (Section 12.5), this emphasis might result in the neglect 
of the marketplace. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Conclusions 
13.1 The economic value of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell 
in displacing Majestic: summary of conclusions 
(a) Resource costs 
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In terms of resource costs saved, at the 5% and 10% discount rates, 
the investment in potato R&D at the SPBS has, in producing Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell, resulted in a favourable rate of return. 
Society has been made better off compared to a situation where without 
the new varieties, only Majestic would have been grown, Chapter 9. 
Whilst it is fully realised that the quality of quantitative 
data was not good, and the assumptions used in meqsurement might be 
only approximations to the tru~ situation, it is felt by the author 
that the cautious approach lent to measurement, and the sensitivity of 
the rate of return to a wide number of considerations, were such as to 
make it possible to attach a strong degree of confidence'to this 
favourable outcome. 
This conclusion is brought about largely by the continued commer-
cial success of Pentland Crown. Pentland Dell's commercial success 
did not translate into an economic one, and the experience of this 
variety, indicates that the belief that it is certain plant breeding 
is a highly economical process because the cost is small in relation 
to gains (Section 1.1), might be mistaken. 
How the SPBS investment compares to others is uncertain. Previous 
CBA studies indicate 'results which suggest a higher return. However, 
there are problems of comparability; it is likely that the simple 
approaches of these studies have exaggerated the return: also, nearly 
all of the studies are based upon American conditions. It is safer 
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not to draw comparisons, and simply state the view that investment at 
. 
the SPBS has produced socially favourable results, but that it is 
uncertain how this compares to the favourable results of investment 
elsewhere. 
This favourable view is largely based upon an examinatign of potato 
production costs. There might be resource cost implications for the 
potato trade, consumer use, and for gardeners and associated interests. 
It was not possible to fully investigate these concerns, and therefoJ .. ', 
they must be regarded as qualifications to the above conclusion. The 
effects upon the garden trade are completely unknown; . the resource 
cost implications for the potato trade have probably been marginal, 
.~ . 
except with regard to qualit~ • 
. . 
It is probable that quality at or near to the minimum.ware standard 
was made worse. This is likely to have resulted in extra labour costs 
associated with inspection, handling and preparation • 
. 
these is important to consumers. The quality implications' are unlikely 
'. 
to have been as such as to turn the rate of return into an unfavourable 
one, however, . 
(b) R&D system spin-offs 
.-
The R&D associated with Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell produced 
benefits which were not included in the net benefit estimates. These 
included contributions to the development of future varieties (and some 
recently introduced ones, most obviously Pentland Ivory, Section 9.10), 
and to knowledge generally; particularly, with regard to genecology 
in relation to blight and virus investigations, Section 4.6. 
The feature to note is that the new varieties were products of a 
system of plant breeding, which although in recent times has been 
modified, is essentially a continuing process built upon previous 
knowledge and experience, Chapter 5. Thus, in some sense there is a 
build-up in capital, the benefit of which is uncertain but likely to be 
favourable if it leads to an improved understanding necessary to the 
improvement of potato varieties. 
(c) Incidence of investme~: '." __ effects 
The most important general effect upon prices, and hence for final 
consumer prices and growers' incomes, was probably felt in 1968 through 
the impact that the new varieties' extra output had upon trading condi-
tions. This was substantial enough to off-set any revenue or cost 
gains growers might have had from the new varieties during the period 
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1965-72, Chapter 8. However, the prompt action of the PMB in restricting 
acreage in 1969 ensured that growers would not be adversely affected 
thereafter. 
Given the importance of other factors in determining final prices, 
it is uncertain as to the extent that consumers have benefited from 
reduced costs per ton marketed for human consumption, brought about by 
the new varieties. 
do benefit. 
In the long term it must be assumed that consumers 
(d) Government potato policy objectives 
Since costs per ton marketed for human consumption have been reduced 
the innovation was consistent with the government aim of efficient 
production. It is to be observed, however, that a loss in acreage 
flexibili ty resulted from a reduced acreage, but this is unlikely to 
have had a significant effect upon costs in the medium term (Section 10.10). 
In terms of the policy objective of efficient marketing of the 
type and quality of potato required by users and consumers, the effects 
of the new varieties have probably been mixed. It is likely that the 
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effect upon high quality markets has been marginal, but significant for 
quality generally available at or about the minimum ware standard, where 
effects have probably left quality at a lower standard: the cooking 
quality of the new varieties, however, has probably improved the quality 
made available to consumers. The importance to the potato trade 
generally about these effects is uncertain. 
The development of processing does not seem to have been affected,. 
and too little information is available to know what the consequences 
have been for catering concerns (Section 10.10). Possibly it is the 
pre-packing interests and trade which has been most adversely affected 
by quality faults at the minimum ware standard (Section 12.11) • 
The remaining policy objectives of price stabilisation, lowest 
prices consistent with a reasonable return to growers, and self-
sufficiency, have not been greatly affected by the displacement of 
Majestic. The costs of the potato industry have been reduced, and it 
follows therefore, that the costs of self-sufficiency would have been 
reduced. There is a possibility that the new varieties might. have made 
output more volatile, and thus, increased pressures upon the PMB in its 
efforts to satbilise prices and maintain growers' incomes (Section 10.10). 
(e) General policy considerations 
It is likely that the new varieties success has involved extra 
government expenditure, associated with the early period when surplus 
disposal and market support was necessary as a result of the varieties' 
contributions to surplus conditions (Section 11.2). Some funds are 
saved if a reduced potato acreage brings about lower financial outlays 
associated with net savings in agricultural costs. 
The regional effects of the new varieties are likely to be marginal. 
However; some.consequences are likely to have been experienced in the 
.' 
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certified seed potato industry. But overall this is smaller th;;,n might 
have been expected, since the high usage of own grown seed associated 
with Pentland Crown has probably been off-set by advantages for seed 
producers of initially high prices and the low use of own-grown seed 
in crops of Pentland Dell (Section 11.4). 
The new varieties probably contributed significantly to the 
balance of payments, since their contribution to a small potato acreage) 
freed land for cereals which might otherwise have had to have been 
iIrq?orted. At,a 20% additiol' 1 notional value for output that would 
have otherwise been imported, the resource rate of return would be 
significantly increased (Section 11.5). 
The long term effects of a reduced potato acreage for rotation and 
health of the soil are uncertain (Section 11.6) • 
13.2 The signific~nce of the conclusions: some observations 
Whether or not a decision maker would accept that the commercial 
success of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell was socially desirable, 
depends upon what emphasis he wishes to give to the separate and perhaps 
conflicting policy considerations involved. Thus, the degree of 
importance attached to different investment effects, as identified in 
relation to distinct concerns, is something which is properly left to 
the'decision maker to perform. However, the analyst might usefully 
make some observations and give a personal view of the relative 
o 
im~tance of the conclusions. 
Pentland Dell was a bad investment. In terms of resource cost, 
under all assumptions, it produced a negative return; this was large 
enough to seriously affect adversely the size of the combined rate of 
return for both varieties, computed on the whole potato R&D invest-
ment cost to 19'9. Yet the variety came very near to producing a 
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positive rate of return; the fact that generally the estimates derived 
in Chapter 9 were so hugely negative, results from this propinquity. 
The blight immunity lasted long enough to allow a large number of 
growers to adopt the variety, so that large totals of extra growlng 
costs were amassed, but just a season or two too short, before quota 
restrictions brought about large cost savings; by that time Pentland 
Dell's planted acreage had fallen. If the break-down in blight 
immunity had occurred earlier or later, then the economic value of 
Pentland Dell might have been significantly different, and the 
investment in potato breeding at the SPBS would have been seen as 
more socially acceptable. 
Nevertheless, the commercial success of Pentland Crown was 
sustained, and the overall savings in resource costs sufficiently 
substantial to indicate that plant breeding can obtain results of 
sizeable economic benefit in relation to investment cost. In the 
author's opinion the success of Pentland Crown was large enough to make 
investment in plant breeding at the SPBS worthwhile, even accepting that 
the variety produced results which were prob~ly inconsistent with. other 
considerations, most notably with regard to some government potato 
policy objectives. 
It is to be observed that this inconsistencY is to be expected, 
or.at least looked for, in the commercial success of new output 
increasing varieties. The essential point is that marketing arrange-
ments should be strong and effective enough to amend the changes brought 
to (and pressures brought upon) the conditions of supply by varietal 
innovation, so that stability of trading conditions and product quality 
are maintained. 
It is the view of the author that marketing arrangements proved 
'-"'<' sufficiently flexible to off-set the de-st~~g effects of the new 
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varieties' increased supply potential. l Of course, in future cases of 
varietal innovation acreage· might not be ~djusted so quickly. In 1969, 
a situation of c~,ronic over-supply was probably obvious to the PMB, 
since crop yields had been rising generally for some time for reasons 
unassociated with varietal innovation. 
The extent to which the PMB is sensitive to changes in output 
potential is vitally important to the scale of the savings in potato 
costs brought about by new varieties. The economic success of the 
SPBS innovation was based upon the extent of the planted acreage of the 
new varieties, and size of the yield advantage over Majestic, the 
displaced variety. These factors determined the size of the retired 
acreage and associated savings, but the timing of acreage restrictions, 
and so actual realisation of savings was dependent upon the actions 
of the PMB. Of course, differences in the costs of growing new 
varieties compared to those of the ones displaced might be important, 
but these are unlikely to be as significant as the cost effect Fr~uced 
by the retirement of potato acreage. 
It is likely that yield advantage is important even for varieties 
which do not have an overall national advantage. For instance, a 
variety might have a yield advantage on particular soils (like Maris 
Piper on eelworm infested soils), or for certain husbandry techniques 
(as Pentland Hawk might have in terms of yield unaffected by mechanical 
damage) • 
In the instance of the Pentland Crown innovation the effectiveness 
of marketing arrangements was most suspect with regard to the consequences 
fpr quali~y; these do not seem to have been foreseen or understood by 
1 Some observers would disagree, see Section 10.8: even the PMB blamed 
the very large surpluses of the early 1970s upon an increased yield 
potential of new varieties, Section 10.10e. Since the new varieties 
appear to have caused the surplus of 1968, the PMB might have introduced 
quotas for that year; however, the introduction of quotas in 1969 seems 
reasonable enough. 
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the PMB. The introduction of trials for recently introduced varieties 
under com:-:,l(!rcial conditions might in the future uncover faults associated 
with the growing and handling of new varieties early enough, so that 
advisory authorities and inspection facilities are prepared to deal 
with potentially unsatisfactory situations. l 
13.3 The usefulness of CBA, its place in decision making 
This study has told a great deal about varietal effects and their 
economic importanc~particularly of the importance of yield advantage. 
Nevertheless, it was indicated that CBA, especially where it has followed 
a simple approach, without a prior and full investigation of the 
subject area, might omit important considerations (and associated 
investment effects) which could qualify the results of a rate of return 
analysis, (Chapter 3). 
In the instance of this present study, preliminary analysis revealed 
the important influence of the PMB, its part in determining savings in 
resource cost and the possibility that its workings might have been 
such as to influence the way the new varieties had been marketed and 
handled. A CBA along the lines suggested by previous work associated 
with investment effects of agricultural R&D, might fail to consider 
2 these factors. 
Indeed, the possibility that consumers '(and users) do not get the 
type and quality of potatoes they require suggests that the market model, 
1 The introduction of these trials is perhaps an important spin-off from 
, the ~xperience of the potato industry with what was, for the maincrop 
potato production, a novel situation - a major varietal innovation, 
for modern times. 
2 .. As indeed, the Simm:ms study (1974 op cit) failed to do: costs savings 
associated with reduced acreage needs were estimated there to have begun 
in.,1963, and the possibility that the new varieties might have affected 
consumer quality was not considered at all. 
on which CBA is based, might be an insufficient representation of the 
behaviour of the potato market; since some of the assumptions of the 
model that ensure consumers are sovereign do not hold to the extent 
where one can be reasonably certain Date of return results are 
1 1 'f l' t f 'l't 1 comp ete y mean~ng u ~n erms·o consumer ut~ ~ y. 
This is not to state that the market model is an unsatisfactory 
representation of how economic resources are allocated generally in 
the potato industry, but simply that there might be dangers associated 
with its use without adequate investigation of its assumptions and 
subsequent qualification. The application of CBA would seem to require 
2 
a complementary behaviourial-type analysis. 
This is not to argue in general terms, that applications of CBA 
require an accompanying behaviourial analysis, but more specifically, 
in sectors of the economy like the potato industry, where consumers 
lThe possibility that product quality might be adversely affected by 
innovation is generally a neglected subject in economics. In the 
popular literature much has been stated about the quality of life, how 
productivity gains might be achieved at the expense of product quality, 
but economic theory has tended to assume the possibility away· (see 
Freeman, 1974). The notable exception, in a general sense, are the 
theories of Galbraith, who used quality to explain how firms might 
control their markets (1957), and how this behaviour is not amenable 
to understanding using the tools of conventional market analysis 
(based upon neo-classical theories) (1974op cit), of which rate of 
return CBA might be thought a part (Section 2.7)·. 
2This could involve a closer look at processes and relationships between 
groups and organisations to gain an understanding of how behaviour and 
performance respond to and regulate choice, to determine both the patt.ern 
and consequences of output. This might actually supply decision makers 
. in the planning process how a rate of return might be maximised by 
action which is independent of the investment under consideration. For 
example, a simple marketing .reform, like varietal labelling, might 
dramatically alter the consumer acceptability of a given variety, with 
consequences for the epxected rate.of return. A behavioural approach 
might be open to controversy of a kind which surrounded the advocacy 
of the behavioural theories of the firm, against market model theories. 
Loasby has indicated that the two bodies of theories are not necessarily 
competitive, since they may be though of as paradigms, and therefore, 
conceptually compatible (1971). 
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might be limited in their power to choose between different varieties 
those that they prefer, it is misleading to suppose that market values 
can be used without qt~·'J.ification. Particularly, where the advice of 
Prest and Turvey is followed with regard to "large and unknowable" bias, 
that it should be ignored (Section 2.6): rather should the, nature of 
such bias be investigated. 
CBA is probably most suited to investment appraisal in agricultural 
subject areas where it is supported by a framework, or system of 
resource allocation. An appraisal of recently introduced resource 
allocation systems in agricultural research in the USA is given in 
Fishel (1971). These allow a broad consideration of a range of sod.r..l 
issues and concerns relevant to project selection, and facilitate the 
establishment of aims appropriate to a formalisation of say, breeding 
1 plans. A need for such systems in Britain has been indicated by 
Russel (1973 op cit): he points out that the tools for investment 
project selection at research institute level are already in existence, 
but that an overall system is missing. 
This suggests two levels of decision making and planning, sectoral 
and institute (or operational) • A behaviourial investigation of the 
subjec~ area for potential CBAs would most properly be conducted at 
the sectoral level. The organisation responsible for planning and 
analysis at this level might seek information from several alternative 
sources of advice, and have independent machinery to test that advice: 
the quality of data might thereby be imprmved for CBA at institute level. 2 
1 
2 
" 
The systems are similar in concept to PPB and PERT planning techniques* 
These aim at the explicit identification of objectives and required resourc~ 
This is in keeping with criticism of the Maplin London airport CBA 
conclusions and decisions. A panel of economists, an engineer and a 
'CBA practitioner' has suggested that government should use several 
alternative sources of information, and independent arrangements to 
check its quality; otherwise, sectional interests are likely to 
prevail and the public interest be ignored (IEA, op cit). 
· , 
;. 
The main purpose of sectoral decision making would be to decide upon 
generally agreed principles and procedures for eBA. 
Of course, institutes would have to be involved in sectoral 
decision making, for they would need to supply information concerning 
the quality of R&D resources, the chances of success and risk, and 
the special requirements such as legal constraints on what funds can 
be used for. 
The ARC has indicated that it intends to use improved systematic 
approaches to R&D management. In 1974 a pilot project costing 
scheme was term.!!ated at the National Institute of Agricultural 
Engineering, Scotland, and it is hoped that lessons from this will be 
used to construct a "eBA on a national basis" (NlAES, written communi-
cation). The attitudes of the authorities concerned with this 
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project as such as to suggest that social benefit is too difficult to 
measure. Instead the concern appears to be that of the individual 
farmer: the eBA involves the placing of a financial value on increased 
output, lower labour requirements or "other benefit arising". 
Nevertheless, the author believes that social benefit, even in the 
case of a difficult subject area like potatoes where marketing conditions 
are complex, can be both identified and"measured. Overall, it is the 
main contribution of this thesis that eBA can be a useful means of doing 
this: that providing the limitations of analysis are recognised 
explicitly, then eBA provides a most useful method for systematically 
assessing the economic value of agricultural R&D, particularly plant 
breeding. It is recognised that this present study produced estimates 
of benefit which are only rough approximations: however, this is a 
faul~.which·can be removed with the right institutional background, 
further research and investigation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Glossary of terms 
After-cooking blackening: A discolouration of potato tuber flesh upon 
cooking; the cause is a chemical complex formed between chlorogenic acid 
in the tuber. On cooking the cell walls break down and the iron 
chlorogenic acid complex is oxidized in the air, producing a blue grey 
pigment. 
blanking: Gaps or misses in the rows of newly emerged potato plants, 
caused by the non-emergence of plants as a result of tuber diseases or 
disorders and environmental factors. 
cash crop: A crop which is profitable in itself, and not simply planted 
to contribute to an overall farm profitability. 
chitting: The practice whereby potato seed is sprouted prior to 
planting, in boxes or trays, under cover. 
cost-effectiveness exercises: An appraisal of different methods of 
achieving a given objective, according to costs incurred: often involving 
a choice of the best combination of inputs to use in producing any 
given level of output. 
cracking: A cracking of potato tuber flesh or skin, caused by damage 
or secondary growth (see below) 
cross-elasticity: see 'elasticity' (below) 
demand curve: Demand is the quantity of a commodity that purchasers 
are willing to buy at a given price over a given period of time. A 
demand curve is a pictorial representation of a demand schedule, which 
shows the quantity purchasers will wish to purchase at various alter-
native market prices. It is. drawn on the assumption that income, 
tastes and all other prices remain constant (see Lipsey op cit). 
dry matter content: That part of the potato tuber which is not 
comprised of water. In terms of weight dry matter normally comprises 
about 18 - 28% of a fresh tuber, (see Burton op cit). 
early crop potatoes: The early potato market is divided into first 
and second early production. There is no clear cut division between 
the two on a varietal basis. Some varieties which are classified by 
the NIAB as·first earlies, such as Arran Pilot, are carried over into 
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the second early season while some second earlies, such as Craigs Royal, 
may be lifted as first earlies. A distinction is often made in terms 
of time (e.g. Cox, 1972 op cit): thus, the first early season, when 
potatoes are lifted at a low crop yield but usually command a very high 
price per ton, usually extends from the latter part of May to the end 
of June, and second early production covers the period July and August. 
Early crop potatoes are subject to specific standards of grading as 
soon as lifting commences. The ware standard of grading, which is 
meant to apply to maincrop, comes into force in August. Early crop 
acreages are not subject to direct PMB acreage controls (such as of the 
type of quota imposition applied to maincrop: direction is given by way 
of information). In 1973 early crop acreage accounted for approximately 
16% of the total acreage planted in Great Britain with potatoes (PMB 
Annual Report, 1974). Early potatoes are supposed to sell on flavour 
and quality, which might be correlated with freshness (EDCA, 1971 op cit). 
elasticity: This is a concept for understanding and measuring, the 
responsiveness of one variable to another. It is most often used in 
instances of the influence of changes in price upon demand, known as 
'price elasticity of demand'. This is not to be confused with 'cross 
elasticities of demand' which is a term used to describe the elasticity 
of demand for one commodity with respect to changes in the prices of 
other commodities. With some approximation it might be stated that the 
price elasticity of demand.indicates by how much in percentage terms the 
amount purchased will change if the prices increases by 1%; a minus 
sign attached to the elasticity coefficient indicates that demand will 
decrease if price rises. More formally, elasticity can be described 
as follows: if the relationship between demand (Q) for a commodity and 
the price (P) of the commodity is known, then the prica elasticity of 
demand is given by:- P/Q. dQ/dP' (see Lipsey op cit: Appendix 8). 
greening: Tuber colour turns green with exposure to light and 
affected flesh becomes toxic. 
internal bruising: A blackening or discolouration of the tuber flesh, 
caused by rough handling. 
haulm: Potato plant foliage. 
maincrop: The maincrop potato season lasts approximately from August 
to May. Potatoes are lifted as soon as the build-up to maximum yields 
permit, and might be thereafter stored for several months. In 1973 
\' ,;, 
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the maincrop acreage was approximately 84% of the total planted in 
Great Britain. See 'early crop' above. 
neo-classical paradigm: A pardigm defines the type of relationships 
that might be investigated, and the methods and abstractions regarded as 
legitimate within a particular problem area, (see T.S. Kuhn 'The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions'). The essence of neo-classical 
economics, in the words of J. K. Galbraith ('Economics and the Public 
Purpose'), is that individuals using income derived, in the main from 
their own productive activites express their desires by the way they 
distribute this income for the various goods and services available to 
them in markets (p.28). In short, market economics, sometimes called 
the 'marginalist' or 'subjectivist' school of economics (Sachs op cit). 
pressure group: Organisations or groups which operate by mobilizing 
support outside the conventional political processes, while simultaneously 
influencing the way ministers and civil servants take decisions, and 
members of parliament react. 
production function teChniques: Techniques which seek to measure 
technical progress as a separate item in a comparison of inputs to output. 
(see Kennedy & Thirlwall op cit). 
programme evaluation and review technique (PERT): In terms of general 
parlance this seems to be virtually interchangeable with 'planning, 
programming and budgeting' (PPB). They are methods of planning the 
undertaking of a complex operation (or series of investment projects) in 
a logical way by anaylysing the field of operations into component parts 
(or projects), and recording them in a style used to control or plan 
the inter-related activities, so that resources are meaningfully related 
to each other and to objectives. 
raiser: A potato certified seed producer who receives virus tested 
stocks from the DAFS and multiplies it for sale to the rest of the industry'. 
secondary growth: Tuber growth which is arrested and then resumed; 
this might result in a number of effects, such as tuber cracking, 
cavities in the tuber flesh (hollow heart) or irregular shapes. 
supply curve: This is similar in concept to the demand curve (see 
above) • 
tuber bulking: The bui~d-up in number and weight of tubers. 
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Symbols, conventions and abbreviations 
Symbols and conventions: 
£ = 
£m = 
1971£s = 
= 
'OOOs = 
lbs = 
% = 
* = 
Abbreviations: 
ACMS 
ADAS 
ARC 
CA 
CCGB 
CBA 
cf 
CEAS 
CSP 
OAFS 
EDCA 
EEC 
et al 
FN 
HMSO 
ibid 
lEA 
IITR 
IMTA 
in 
MAFF 
NASPM 
NEDC 
NFU " 
NIAB 
NIAE 
NIAES 
expressed in pounds. sterling 
expressed in million pounds sterling 
expressed in 1971 pounds sterling 
negative quantity or value 
expressed in thousands 
expressed in pounds weight 
per centum 
referred to glossary 
Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Services Limited 
Agricultural Development & Advisory Service 
Agricultural Research Council 
Consumers' Association 
Consumers' Committee for Great Britain 
Cost benefit analysis 
confer = compare 
Centre for European Agricultural Studies 
Council for Science Policy 
Department of Agriculture & Fisheries for Scotland 
Economic Development Committee for Agriculture 
European Economic Community 
et alibi = and others 
Footnote 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
ibfdem = in the same place 
Institute of Economic Affairs 
Illinois Institute of Technological Research 
Institute of Municipal Treasurers & Accountants 
inch 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food 
National Association of Seed Potato Merchants 
National Economic Development Council 
National Farmers' Union 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany 
National Institute of Agricultural Engineering 
National Institute of Agricultural Engineering, Scotland 
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NRDC 
OECD 
op cit 
P 
PBI 
PERT 
PMB 
PPB 
PPMA 
R&D 
SBES 
SGST 
SPBS 
TEMF 
UK 
USA 
USDA 
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National Research Development Corporation 
Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development 
opere citato = work cited 
page 
Plant Breeding Institute 
Programme evaluation and review technique 
Potato Marketing Board 
Planning, programming and budgeting technique 
Produce Packaging & Marketing Association 
Research and Development 
Sutton Bridge Experimental Station 
Select Committee on Science & Technology 
Scottish Plant Breeding Station 
Terrington Experimental Husbandry Farm 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
United States Department of Agriculture 
APPENDIX 3 
Metric conversions 
One long ton 1.016 tonnes 
One acre = 0.404 hectares 

TABLE A4.2 Varietal Percentage Shares of the Maincrop: England and Wales 
Arran Arran Doctor Kerrs Maris Pentland Pentland 
.Year Consul Peak Bintje Desiree Macintosh Pinks Piper Record Redskin Ivory Hawk 
1955 0.5 2.5 0.1 4.2 0.3 3.0 3.5 
1956 0.5 2.9 0.2 4.0 0.3 1.0 3.3 
1957 0.5 2.5 0.2 4.0 0.9 3.1 
1958 0.7 2.1 0.3 3.4 1.2 3.1' 
1959 0.7 2.0 0.3 3.7 1.5 3.1 
1960 0.4 1.7 0.3 3.8 1.3 2.7 
1961 0.3 1.3 0.2 3.9 1.7 2.8 
1962 0.7 0.8 0.3 2.9 1.8 2.9 
1963 0.8 0.8 0.3 2.9 2.9 2.5 
1964 1.1 0.9 0.4 3.3 4.4 2.2 
1965 0.9 0.8 0.4 3.4 3.9 1.9 
1966 0.9 0.7 0.4 2.6 4.8 1.4 
1967 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.8 4.9 1.1 
1968 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.2 5.4 0.6 
1969 0.5 0.1 0.5 2.8 1.0 0.6 7.8 0.5 
1970 0.5 0.4 4.0 0.7 2.5 6.6 0.4 
1971 0.4 0.4 5.6 0.5 6.5 5.9 0.3 0.7 
1972 0.3 0.5 6.5 0.3 6.8 6.8 0.2 2.3 
1973 0.7 7.9 9.6 7.8 0.2 4.2 0.5 
1974 0.8 9.2 11.4 9.0 0.1 5.4 1.4 
Source: Calculated from PMB statistics 
., 
TABLE A4. 3 Varietal percentage shares of the maincrop: Scotland 
Arran Arran Doctor Golden Kerrs Maris Pentland Pentland 
Year Consul Peak Bintje Desiree MacIntosh Wonder Pinks Piper Record Redskin Ivory Hawk 
1955 0.9, :'.' 0.9 0.9 1.6 7.0 30.2 1.0 11.1 
1956 0.8 ,. .0.8 1.4 5.7 30.3 0.7 13.8 
1957 1.0 0.6 1.4 4.4 28.1 0.6 14.3 
1958 1.2 0.5 1.8 3.7 26.7 1.2 16.1 
1959 1.1 0.4 2.0 2.7 27.0 1 .1 20.4 
1960 1.0 0.3 0.1 1.4 3.1 22.2 1.0 20.8 
1961 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.4 4.5 21.4 1.8 19.8 
1962 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.4 5.2 20.0 3.0 21.9 
1963 0.6 0.2 0.1 1.7 5.7 18.9 4.9 20.2 
1964 0.7 0.2 0.1 2.3 4.7 15.4 7.1 20.2 
1965 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.5 4.6 14.0 5.1 21.6 
1966 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 5.5 12.8 6.5 25.1 
1967 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.7 5.3 11 .5 8.2 25.6 
1968 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7 5.5 9.6 0.2 9.0 22.7 
1969 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.4 4.8 7.8 1.8 12.1 17 .5 
1870 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.3 3.6 6.8 5.4 10.0 15.1 
1971 0.5 0.4 1.5 0.3 3.6 5.9 8.9 6.7 12.5 2.3 
1972 0.4 0.3 2.0 0.2 4.4 5.9 11.5 7.3 9.1 7.3 
1973 . 0.4 3.7 3.8 5.5 15.1 9.0 6.7 3.4 2.1 
1974 0.7 7.0 2.1 5.4 19.9 9.7 4.8 3.4 4.3 
Source: Calculated from PMB statistics 
./ 
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General agricultural policy 
until the prospect of British membership of the EEC, agricultural 
policy of successive governments had been based almost entirely upon 
objectives laid down in the Agriculture Act of Parliament, 1947. 
These aimed for a stable and efficient industry, with minimum prices 
for consumers, albeit consistent with a "proper remuneration and 
living conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture". 
Accounts of the working of policy according to these principles 
are found in Metcalf (1969) and Midland Bank (1968). ,Broadly, the 
general approach has involved opening domestic agricultural markets 
to the world at large, to take advantage of world prices, which have 
usually been below those at which a large part of British agriculture 
could compete. 
Domestic producers were kept viable with a substantial outlay of 
state-funded subsidies. These took two main forms. The first is 
associated with deficiency payments. A schedule of guaranteed prices 
for farmers was drawri up annually after a review of the industry by 
government agricultural departments and the NFU. The guarantee 
levels were influenced to some extent by government's desire to influence 
the pattern of output to suit consumer demand. If market prices 
in the following season averaged less than the guarantees, then 
deficiency payments were made to farmers. The second group of 
subsidies were of a more straightforward kind, and took on the form 
of production grants, credit facilities and tax concessions. 
-. 
APPENDIX 6 
An application of the Griliches' CBA model to the Pentland Crown 
and Pentland Dell investment 
At the outset of preliminary work for this study of the SPBS's 
innovation, it seemed reasonable that thf:· Griliches' approach could be 
applied for estimating a social rate of return to R&D expenses 
associated with the commercially successful potato varieties, Pentland 
Crown and Pentland Dell. Application appeared to be fairly straight-
forward, although some doubts might accompany the necessary competitive 
conditions. 
These were associated with the observation that the PMB regulates 
the planted acreage and price of potatoes. Thus it was .. possible that 
the market price of potatoes might over-state the utility of potatoes 
to consumers. However, there were similar doubts about the price of 
hybrid corn, in the Griliches' study. He allowed for the intervention 
in the corn market by government agencies, by the substitution of a 
shadow price for the market one. 
This he did by using a method devised by Nerlove (1956) to 
approximate what might be a competitively determined price from observed 
market price. Also, the importance of the PMB as a distorting influence 
might seem less, if the organization's aims of market stability and 
maintenance of market quality were being achieved. Since then it would 
be likely that the PMB acted only to ensure a market equilibrium which 
would be close to that prevailing over the long term, in perfectly 
competitive conditions. 
Thus, the Griliches model was applied to derive a rate of return to 
investment at the SPBS. It seemed likely that the return would be 
high given the commercial success of the potato varieties: although 
not as high as that for hybrid corn, because of the relatively low 
potato acreage'compared to that planted with corn in the USA. 
" 
The formula used by Griliches to estimate returns to hybrid corn 
R&D was as follows: kPQ(l-~kn), where k is the percentage change in 
yield, P and Q are, respectively, the previous equilibrium price and 
quantity of corn, and n is the absolute value of the price elasticity 
of demand for corn. 
The value of k was found in the instance of Pentland Crown and 
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Pentland Dell by-taking the new varieties' crop yield advantage over 
Majestic (table 8.2), and expressing this as a'percentage of Majestic's 
crop yield (table 8.5). The results are shown in table A6.l. The 
annual 'average value for both varieties works out at approximately 
0.19, and this was used for k. 
TABLE A6.l 
Crop yield advantage over Majestic of Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell, 
expressed as a percentage of Majestic crop yield 
Pentland Crown Pentland Dell 
1965 24 27 
1966 18 37 
1967 20 19 
1968 22 23 
1969 17 13 
1970 11 7 
1971 20 18 
1972 17 13 
Annual Average 19 20 
Sources: Tables 8.2, 8.5 
The value of P was estimated by taking the average growers' market 
price for potatoes in a period just prior to that when the new 
varieties first appear~d in the PMB acreage statistics, that is, 1960 
to 1964. Prices were taken at 1971 values from table 7.7. The 
annual average worked out at £22.71. However, this estimate did not 
allow for the effects of the PMB market support operations, and so, 
following Gri1iches' procedure, the Ner10ve formula was used to 
deflate price. 
This was as follows: dplp = (dq/q)/(n + e), where p is the 
o " 0 
equilibrium price, nand e are the demand and supply elasticities, 
and dq is the surplus dealt with by the PMB. (See Ner10ve, 1956: pp.65-66). 
The MAFF has estimated the elasticity of demand for potatoes to be 
-0.08 (1973a op cit). However, no estimate appears to exist for supply: 
some American evidence suggests that 0.50 might not be too unreasonable 
(G.S. Shepherd, 'Agricultural Price Analysis'). Estimates of surpluses 
are shown in table '9.1. Again in the period, 1960-64 was chosen, and 
,-
surpluses were expressed as a percentage of total tonnage (not as 
expressed in the table, as a percentage of human consumption). The 
annual average was 7.4%; this, in conjunction with the elasticity 
. .... 
APPENDIX 6 Page 3 
estimates, produced a figure of 0.18 by which to adjust price, which as 
a result become £18.62. 
became £19. 
Rounding the figure off, the value for P 
The value of Q was estimated by taking Majestic's planted acreage 
during 1960 to 1964, and multiplying it by the variety'S anpua1 crop 
yield. Estimates are shown in table A6.2. The annual average 
quantity produced by Majestic was around 2,473,600 tons. 
TABLE A6.2 
Derivation of average output of Majestic 1960-1964 
Average crop yield Planted Estimated 
ton/acre acreage output (' OOOs) 
1960 9.85 302797 2983 
1961 9.40 240098 2257 
1962 9.55 248942 2377 
1963 8.85 248480 2199 
1964 9.55 267185 2552 
Annual average 2474 
Sources: Table A ~,.,; PMB/A 
The information necessary to resolve (l-~kn) is already given. An 
estimate of 1.0076 was obtained. It was then possible to derive an 
estimate for the Gri1iches' formula: 0.19 x 19 x 2473600 x 1.0076 = 
£8.997562m. This figure, however, assumes that this might be the. 
return if all of Majestic's acreage had been entirely taken over by 
the new varieties • 
Thus it is necessary to adjust returns by annual estimates of the 
planted acreage of the new varieties (table 8.3). This is done in 
The acreage of the new varieties between 1965 and 1972 
is expressed as a percentage of Majestic's annual average plantings 
between 1960 and 1964 and then used to multiply the figure £8.9976m, 
to derive returns. These are discounted at the 5% and 10% discount 
rates (values are shown in table 9.3). 
The rate of return to investment in potato R&D over the period 
1922 to 1960, is estimated at the 5% and 10% discount rates of 935% 
and 158% respectively, during the period 1965 to end-1972. Expressed 
as ,annua1'averages these are approximately 117% and 20% at the 5% and 
10% discount rates respectively. R&D costs are smwn in table 5.2. 
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TABLE A6.3 
Derivation of estimates of returns 
Planted acreage of new Estimated Discounted Returns 
varieties, expressed as returns (£m) 
percentage of Majestic (£m) 5% 10% 
1965 .04 0.360 0.044" 0.006 
1966 .12 1.080 0.126"' 0.016 
1967 .32 2.879 0.320 0.040 
1968 .46 4.139 0.439 0.050 
1969 .33 2.969 0.300 0.033 
1970 .61 5.489 0.527 0.055 
1971 .67 6.028 0.555 0.054 
1972 .63 5.668 0.493 0.051 
Total 2.804 0.305 
Annual average 0.350 0.038 
This return does not include an allowance for any effect upon 
resources which might have been brought about by differences in 
production costs between the new and substituted varieties. Griliches 
allowed explicitly "for extra seed costs associated with the use of 
hybrid seed. If cost differences are significant, then it might be 
expected, given competitive assumptions, that they would be reflected 
in the shift of the supply curve. For example, higher seed costs 
might to some extent off-set the lower costs per unit of output brought 
about by the new varieties' output advantage. 
It may seem too, that the SPBS return does not allow for the 
utility of resources freed from potato production. This consideration 
is implicitly allowed for given the assumptions of perfect competition: 
the cost of potato resources should adequately measure their opportunity 
foregoine in the next best alternative uses. Thus, the value of 
saved potato costs, as passed on to potato consumers in lower prices, 
adequately ref~ects the utility of freed resources elsewhere. 
The rates of return derived following the Griliches' model of 
" approach are much higher than those derived in the more detailed resource 
cost approach followed in the text of "this present study. The rates 
most comparable are those for 'both varieties', see table 9.12: in 
" 
annual terms they are approximately 110% and 18% less at the 5% and 
10% discount rates respectively. 
• i 
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Varietal crop yields 
TABLE A 7.1 
Maincrop varietal yields (1~ in. riddle, tons per acre) 
England and Wales Scotland only 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965* 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969** 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Notes: (1) * 
Majestic 
9.85 
9.40 
9.55 
8.85 
9.55 
King Edward 
and 
Red King 
9.75 
9.95 
9.85 
8.40 
8.95 
11.10 
10.85 
11.30 
9.90 
10.40 
11.55 
11.15 
11.25 
Majestic/ 
others 
10.9 
10.0 
10.6 
8.0 
9.1 
Estimates for 1965 and thereafter shown in 
Table ,'~.1. 
(2) ** After 1968 crop yields were estimated by 
the PMB on a random sample basis, and not 
as before on routine crop checks. 
Source:, PMB" . 
Kerr's 
Pink/ 
Redskin 
10.8 
10.2 
11.1 
8.8 
9.4 
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The SPBS 
TABLE A 3 .1 
Statement of Expenditure at the SPBS, 1954 
Salaries: 
Officers. including Sub-Station 
Secretary and Office 
Superannuation Contributions 
Auditor's Fee 
Labour 
National Insurance . 
Seeds and Roots 
Manures 
Sundry Working Expenses. including Renewals of 
Implements and Tools 
New Equipment 
Laboratory Expenses 
Library Expenses 
Rent. Rates. Taxes and Insurances 
Printing, Telephone, Postages and Office Supplies 
Heating. Lighting and Cleaning 
Travelling Expenses 
Property Repairs 
Regional Trials and Potato Multiplications 
Seafield - Oraining. Manures and Cultivations 
Edinburgh Central of Rural Economy -
Contribution towards Upkeep 
Total Ordinary Expenditure 
Depreciation on Temporary Buildings. Tools, etc. 
Total Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure: 
Seafield - Buildings under Construction 
and Surveyors' Fees £48,757 7 1 
Sugar beet investigations 
Source: SPBS (1954) 
£ 12,358 7 
2,112 7 
8 
8 
£ 14.470 15 4 
1,385 0 5 
47 5 0 
3,684 6 2 
360 15 9 
15 16 11 
300 1 0 
1,495 13 4 
551 12 10 
163 9 3 
256 5 1 
257 14 7 
612 18 2 
1.105 1 11 
446 14 3 
111 8 0 
179 9 10 
531 18 10 
360 8 0 
£ 26.336 14 8 
78 14 9 
£ 26.415 9 5 
£ 1.431 13 2 
TABLE fl .. ? 2 
Factors important to selection in brreding at the SPBS in the 19505 
1. High yield 
2. Attractive tuber shape 
3. Good colour. texture and flavour of tuber flesh 
4. Uniform medium sized tubers· 
5. Good keeping quality 
6. Good grouping of tubers in drill 
7. Good foliage to suppress weeds 
8. Immunity to wart disease 
9. Immunity from blight 
10. Immunity or field immunity from mosaic viruses 
11. Resistance to leaf-roll 
12. Resistance to scab 
13. Resistance to dry rot and other storage disease 
14. Resistance to eelworm 
15. Resistance to minor diseases (e.g. Black leg. skin spot) 
16. Resistance to climatic extremes. 
Source: Black. 1953. p.95-6 
TABLE A ~ '.3 
Potato Varieties Bred at SPBS. and Introduced to the British Market 
Year of Year of Year of Year of 
Cross Name Cross Name 
The Alness 1928 1934 Pentland Glory 1955 1963 
Craigs Defiance 1933 1938 Pentland Hawk 1958 1966 
Craigs Royal 1939 1947 ,. Pentland Ivory 1959 1966 
Craigs Snow-white· 1939 1947 Pentland Javelin 1959 1967 
Craigs Alliance 1939 1948 Pentland Kappa· 1960 1967 
Pentland Ace· 1943 1951 Pentland Lustre 1960 1968 
Pentland Beauty 1946 1955 Pentland Squire 1960 1970 
Pentland Crown 1951 1958 Pentland Meteor 1960 1970 
Pentland Dell 1953 1960 Pentland Raven 1961 1970 
Pentland Envoy 1953 1961 Pentland Marble 1961 1970 
Pentland Falcon 1954 1962 
Sourcez M'acarthur (1970) 
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Price Index 
The index used for this study was that of the consumer price index (CPI). 
Changes in the value of the pound may be defined as the inverse of changes 
in the levels of prices: when prices go up, the amount that can be 
purchased with a given sum of money declines. The CPI arises as a by-
product of the compilati.on of national accounts. Estimates of consumer 
expenditure are made at current prices and are revalued at constant 
prices of a base year. The CPI is the ratio of these, expressed as an 
index. The base year in operation at the time when the CPI was taken for 
use in this study was 1963., A copy of the index is shown in Table A~.1. 
TABLE Aq.1 
Central statistical office index of the internal purchasing 
power of the pound (1963 = 100) 
1922 265 1937 314 1958 110.6 
1923 279 1938 310.6 1959 109.9 
1924 277 1960 108.8 
1925 275 1946 183.5 1961 105.7 
1926 282 1947 171.8 1962 101.8 
1927 289 1948 159.5 1963 100 
1928 292 1949 155.8 1964 96.9 
1929 296 1950 151.5 1965 92.8 
1930 307 1951 138.9 1966 89.2 
1931 329 1952 131.1 1967 87.0 
1932 337 1953 128.9 1968 83.3 
1933 346 1954 126.6 1969 79.1 
1934 344 1955 122.4 1970 75.0 
1935 339 1956 117.2 1971 69.6 
1936 330 1957 113.6 1972 64.7 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 
This index c~n be used to derive a new index with a base year which is 
more appropriate to this study, that is, 1971 = 100. If the purchasing 
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power of the pound is taken to be 100 in 1971. then its comparable 
purchasing power in year' X would be: 
100 pence times (index number in year X/index number in 1971. 69.6) 
Doing this for every year with which the study is concerned produces 
the index shown in table A9.2 
TABLE A q. 2 
Index of the Internal Purchasing Power of the Pound (1971 = 100) 
1922 38,1 1938 446 1954 182 
1923 401 1939 425 1955 176 
1924 398 1940 402 1956 168 
1925 39.5 1941 379 1957 163 
1926 405 1942 356 1958 159 
1927 415 1943 333 1959 158 
1928 420 1944 310 1960 156 
1929 425 1945 287 1961 152 
1930 441 1946 264 1962 146 
1931 473 1947 247 1963 144 
1932 484 1948 229 1964 139 
1933 497 1949 224 1965 133 
1934 494 1950 218 1966 129 
1935 487 1951 200 1967 125 
1936 474 1952 188 1968 120 
1937 451 1953 185 1969 114 
1970 108 
1971 100 
1972 93 
Strictly because of continual changes in· the pattern of consumer's 
expenditure and the way in which the index is derived. the CPI does not 
provide a theoretically valid measure of the way prices have moved 
between two years. when neither of them is the base year. However, 
the extent to which this bias a.ffects the CPI is not large relative to 
the movements in prices shown b~ the index. 
The CPI has been estimated only for years since 1946 (as far as it has 
covered .expenditure of all consumers. as defined for national income 
purposes). For the period, 1914 to 1938. the only availabl price index 
suitable for estimating chang~s in the value of the pound was the 'cost 
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of living index' compiled monthly by the Ministry.of Labour. This was 
designed to measure the average changes in the cost of maintaining the 
standard of living prevalent in work.ing class households. 1904 to 1914. 
This index has been combined with the CPI by the Central Statistical 
Office. as the best indication of how prices have moved since 1914 to 
the present. It is therefore. used to derive Table Aq.2. Estimates 
for 1939 to include 1945. are arbitrarily tak.en as a graduation from 
the 1938 estimate to that of the 1946 one. 
Explanatory notes concerning the mea~urement of the pound's purchasing 
value are published annually by the Central Statistical Office. More 
generally, the subject is explained in the Treasury publication, Economic 
Progress Report (No. 29, July, 1972). 
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Potato production costs 
TABLE A.l: .1 
Great Britain potato production costs, maincrop 1970* 
(Adjusted market values per acre) 
Factor 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Sprays 
i) Herbicide 
ii) Pesticide 
Hi) Fungicide 
iv) Haulms defoliant 
Total materials 
Labour 
i) Cultivations, planting, 
fertilising, spraying etc. 
ii) Harvesting 
Total labour 
Machinery 
i) Tractor fuel, depreciation 
and repairs 
ii) Special machinery 
iii) General machinery 
Total machinery 
Chitting 
Irrigation 
PMB levy 
Rent and rates 
Total other direct costs 
OVerhead labour 
General maintenance 
Management and office expenses 
Interest charges 
Total overheads 
Total costs to lifting 
£ Averase 
32.3 
20.4 
2.5 
2.0 
2.7 
2.1 
9.3 
62.0 
7.2 
13.0 
20.2 
8.4 
15.7 
6.7 
30.8 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
9.5 
20.0 
5.0 
2.5 
2.0 
5.0 
14.5 
147.5 
Storage (inc. handling into store) 8.5 
Grading (labour cost) 7.4 
Total cost of production 163.4 
Source: PMB 
Ranse£ 
21.0-53.0 
12.0-29.0 
0.7-3.7 
1. 5-2.8 
0.7-4.8 
2.1-3.8 
5.0-15.1 
2.5-12.6 
9.6-20.3 
12.1-32.9 
4.5-11. 7 
8.0-20.1 
4.0-11.2 
16.5-43.0 
3.0-7.0 
3.0-12.5 
5.5-17.0 
0.8-7.5 
1.0-4.5 
1.0-4.0 
4.2-17.6 
4.5-17.5 
89.60-260.8 
TABLE A10 .• 2 
Estimates of potato castings (1971£s) 
19631 19641 
Seed 45 35 27(2) 25 33 35 27 23 
27(4) 
Fertilizer 17 17 20(2) 14 16 22 20 20 
15(3) 
15(4) 
Spraying 6 4 3(3) 3 12 7 12 7 
5(4) 
Casual Labour ) 17(2) 21 
) 21(3) 
) 
9(4) ) 
) 42 42 16 30 37 29 ) 
21(2) Res. Labour ) 23 
) 21 (3) 
) 
31 (4) ) 
Machinery 12 16 17(2) 17 27 34 21 29 
16(3) 
26(4) 
Chitting 
Irrigation 4 4 6 7 5 7 
Rent 7 7 6(2) 6 11 10 10 10 
. 8 (3) 
8(4) 
Notes: 1. Raynor, 1965 5. Anderson, 1967 
2. Davison,' 1967 6. NFU 
3. Anderson, 1965 7. PMB, Table A10.1 
4. Mathias, 1967 8. NFU 
9. PMB, 1973d 
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Varietal descri( ions 
Majestic. Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell have been described in the main 
text. Only descriptions of Kerr's Pink. King Edward VII. Maris Piper 
and some other SPBS's varieties. are given here. For other descriptions 
of varieties. still recommended by the NIAB. such as Desiree and Record." 
see NIAB (1972): for descriptions of some other varieties. such as Golden 
Wonder and the 'Arran' series of varieties. see PMB (1965). 
Kerr's Pink This variety was bred in Scotland by a private breeder. 
first being marketed as 'Kerr's Pink' in 1917. but had been released 
earlier under several local names. Tubers tend to be round. pink skinned. 
indented at the heel with deep eyes. The variety is susceptible to skin 
spot. virus and common scab. Tuber shape is sometimes irregular where 
conditions are conducive to secondary growth. The variety is widely 
used in Scotland: it is possible that its floury product on cooking has 
had consumer appeal in northern markets. although there does not appear 
to be any direct consumer evidence of this. 
King Edward VII It is possible that this variety was bred by a gardener 
in the north of England. It was marketed under its present name in 1902. 
Tubers are oval shaped and have part-coloured pink skin. Red King Edward 
is wholly pink. The RIAB have described it as requiring very good 
husbandry conditions. its quality as the "highes~'for the English market. 
It is very susceptible to blight. susceptible to wart disease. 
Maris Piper 1his variety was bred at the PBI. and the NIAB first 
recommended it for general commercial use in 1966. Tubers are oval and 
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white skinned. The variety is an early maincrQP liable to give uniform 
samples of tubers. It· is susceptible to common scab and.slug damage. 
The NIAB has noted that the variety rarely discoloursi~ cooking. Maris 
Piper is the first commercial variety to have some resistance to potato 
eelworm. 
Descriptions of SPBS varieties 
Craigs Alliance This variety was first marketed in 1950. Tubers are. 
oval and white skinned. The NIAB recommend this variety for use as a 
second early variety and note that its yield is potentially of first early 
maturity. Yield is high at maturity except under dry conditions. Craigs 
Alliance is moderately resistant to tuber rots. 
Craigs Royal This variety was first marketed in 1948. Tuber shape is 
oval with part-coloured pink skin. Red Craigs Royal is wholly pink. 
The NIAN recommend both varieties for their good yield and quality. Their 
susceptibility to common scab and tuber hair cracking is noted. 
Pentland Beauty This variety was first marketed in 1956. Tubers are 
short oval shape and part-coloured pink. The NIAB withdrew the variety 
from recommendation in 1972. It had noted disadvantages associated with 
depth of tuber and prominent lenticals under wet conditions. . It had been 
recommended as a second early variety. with "very good" cooking quality. 
Pentland Hawk This variety was named in 1966. Tubers are oval to long-
oval and white skinned. It is susceptible to spraing to a degree which 
is similar to Pentland Dell's reaction. The variety might withstand 
rough handling to an above average extent. 
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Pentland Ivory Named in 1960. this variety is provisionally recommended 
by the NIAB • Tubers are short oval shaped and white skinned. It is 
. an early maincrop. recommended by the NIAB for both processing and domestic 
use. It has good resistance to virus Y and moderate resistance to tuber 
blight. However. the variety is very susceptible to sprai~g. and crops 
might sometimes be subject to stolon retention at maturity. Dry matter 
content is very high. 
%& 1 , , " ¥* 
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The growers survey 
:,: .. " 
Copy of questionnaire enclosed aside 
PE:ff.:Il\.lIDFIELDS PLANT BPEEDING srrATTON SURVE"K" 
This survey has ~een compiled by B. J. Witcher of Pent.landfields, 
Edinburgh, in conj unction \<li-i:h G. H. Umpleby of -c.he NFU Marketing 
Department. Could you please fill it in and return it in the stamped 
addressed envelope provided. 
The acreage of Pentland Crown and Dell has expanded over the last five 
years, largely by replacing Majestic. The survey is to find out what in 
the experience of the grower are the advan'cages and disadvantages of 
growing Crown and Dell relative to Majestic. 
Filling in the Survey. 
1. Overall Ranking: please' indicate your order'of preference of the 
factors listed, for example, write I for the most important, 2 for 
the second, and so on. 
2. Crown and Dell Columns: please indicate by means of a tick if these 
varie'cies have the advantage over Majestic, or cross, if Majestic 
performs better. Leave blank, if little difference. 
3. Comments: please en'cer any observation that you may have to offer 
concerning listed points. Estimations will be very much appreciated. 
( -,ctor 
1. Less frequent replacement of 
seed. 
2. Lower seed rate required. 
3. Lower fertilizer application. 
4. Lower herbicide application. 
5. Lower pesticide application. 
6. Lower fungicide application. 
7. Higher. yields of ware quality. 
8. Lower damage levels. 
9. Rapid .tuber bulking and early 
mntur.ity. 
10. Uniformity of tuber size and 
"" , - shape • 
.. 11. Tolerant of wide range of 
( 
12. 
soils. 
Tolerant of wide range of 
weather. 
13. Stores well. 
14. Better disease resistance. 
15. Increased reliubi1ity. 
Al1yother factors of importance 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Planned Acreage"in '1971 1972 
Crm·m 
.. 
, Dell 
lI'..ajestic . 
Other' 
Overall Crov-m Dell Comments 
'. 
- -I 
1 
J 
" 
I 
and acreage gro~m during 1970 
I 
I . 
i 
.. J 
,J 
_____________________ ~ _________ r~ ________________ _ 
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Regional patterns of varietal adoption 
A survey of Local Opinion 
A study of regional acreages statistics indicates that there are quite 
marked variations in the adoption patterns for Pentlands Crown and Dell. 
This is illustrated in Figures A13~1 and A13.2 and aside. Compared to 
the national acreages. some regions record faster and some slower rates 
of adoption; in some instances. the shape of the adoption curve was 
different. It was decided to survey the opinion of AoAS and PMB 
regional officers to discover what reasons lay behind regional variations 
from the national average. 
Regions were chosen for analysis on the basis of the classification made 
by the PMB for their national survey of the maincrop in 196B. as in 
Figure A1l.3. This made computations of regional varietal acreage easier 
and facilitated their geographical classification. 
In the Spring of 1973 letters were sent out to AoAS and PMB regional 
officers. pointing out which potato va.rieties grown in their areas 
recorded above and below national acreage averages and requesting their 
comments and reasons. These comments are interesting and go sorreway in 
explaining what', why and where the new varieties replaced existing ones. 
The material upon which variations from national acreages were identified 
is summarised in the tables towards the end of this appendix. 
The Eastern Region 
The eastern region is a large exporter of potatoes. recording as it does 
the most acreage of maincrop. The processing and London markets are 
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important factors influencing the overall varietal pattern. Maris Piper 
and King Edward are popular in this region. Maris Piper is particularly 
so in the Isle of Ely. where in 1972/73 around 26% of the. mai lcrop 
acreage was planted in this variety (the national ave~agewas 7%). This 
variety owes this acreage mainly for its eelworm resistance; the eastern 
region has within its boundaries some of the most intensive potato land' 
in Britain. and eelworm is a major problem. 
King Edward is grown as a price premium fetching variety. It is grown 
on some of the best potato soils in the country and exported everywhere. 
from South Wales to London. Crop yields are high. and given the high 
consumer reputation of this variety. there appears to be no incentive 
to switch to other red-skinned potatoes and this accounts for the low. 
acreage of Desiree. 
Pentlands Crown and Dell and Majestic record low averages. and this appears 
to be associated with the regions preoccupation with the quality trade 
and eelworm. 
The East Midlands Region 
Pentland Crown is very popular in the.east midlands. It produces 
excellent yields of good appearance on sand and limestone soils and is. 
in many instances grown as a dual purpose variety for both ware and 
processing (frozen chipping and dehydration). Its advantages for 
processing were said to include its bold. even-sized tubers. their clean 
appearance. particularly that resulting from its common scab resistance 
and a relatively high dry matter content. 
The low acreage of King Edward in this region is seen as resulting from 
generally poor soil conditions for the variety. This was said to affect 
crop yields. 
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The West Midlands Region 
Until recently the west midlands region showed a high acreage of Doctor 
MacIntosh. This was grown by a small number of v~ry lar~~ growers. 
Apparently, it was suited to their land and yielded very well. However, 
" . 
these growers have since replaced the variety with the higher-yielding 
Pentlands Crown and Dell. 
Desiree records an above average popularity and seems to suit west midlands 
soil and weather. Much of the output is sold for pre-packing. This 
variety seems to have spread in this region on a reputation spread by 
'word of mouth', and not through trade publicity. King Edward remains 
very popular in the west midlands, particularly so in Warwickshire, where 
some large growers specialise in it, growing for the price premium in 
midland and London markets. 
Majestic is not popular because of its propensity to cracking and other 
secondary growth effects. Pentland Crown is preferred for its better 
quality. 
Pentland Dell records below average plantings in the west midlands. This 
appears to be a result of its susceptibility to spraing and blight. In 
the late 1960s spraing was very prevalent throughout Shropshire, Stafford-
shire and Hertfordshire, and "some producers suffered heavy financial 
loss, as their crops were unsaleable" (PMB, local office, written communi-
cation) • Also, late blight on crops of Dell during the 1966/67 season 
in Hertfordshire proved 'disastrous'. Pentland Dell's acreage fell and 
was replaced by Pentland Crown. 
The South Eastern Region 
In the south eastern region Pentland Crown records above average acreage. 
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This is tho~ght due. by the PMB. to 'exceptionally ~igh yields'. an 
absence of tuber marks from common scab and cracking: virus Y. very 
troublesome in southern areas of Britain. has affected Crown's stocks 
only moderately. and the use of own grown seed is possible~~" However. 
Majestic has made something of a comeback in some areas. This is 
thought because it has bet~er cooking qualities than Pentland Crown and 
many growers switched to Majestic when Pentland Dell proved susceptible 
to blight and spraing (which account for the low acreage of Dell in this 
region). 
Desiree is popular and has been replacing King Edward. particularly in 
Essex and Kent as a variety for pre-packs in the London and south-east 
markets. It is considered that Desiree holds its colour better in the 
packs. 
The Northern Region 
The northern region has recorded some above average acreages for some 
unusual varieties. Arran Peak. Arran Consul and Redskin. Redskin was 
produced on a large scale. in good quality. for local markets. particularly 
Carlisle. However. a series of husbandry difficulties confront the 
variety. For example. it is difficult ~o store. subject to spindly 
tubers. blight and gangrene. It is also felt that consumers prefer 
other varieties. Redskin has now been largely replaced by Pentland Dell. 
popular for its high yields and, quality. 
Arran Peak was grown for its popularity amongst consumers in County 
Durham. but has recently been replaced by Pentland Crown and Dell. because 
of their high yields. Arran Consul was largely grown by local growers 
for the Darlington market. where it was able to command a price premium. 
Pent lands Crown and Dell to some extent made an impression on this trade. 
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Desiree was once widely grown but growers could not get a price premium in 
local markets. where there was only a poor demand. The variety has 
given some trouble with common scab. Some seed is exported to other 
regions. Majestic and King Edward both record acreages below average. 
Majestic is widely subject to cracking and the financial return is poor 
compared to Pentland Crown. The local demand for King Edward is poor. 
Local soils. particularly the grey soils. do not produce the tuber colour 
and crop yields are generally low. 
The Yorkshire and Lancashire Region 
Redskin. still grown in local pockets. was once widely grown for local 
markets. there is still a good demand from fish and chip shops. Pentland 
Crown and Dell have replaced much of the Redskin acreage. and are grown 
over the whole region. Quality is generally high. 
Majestic is still liked by a number of growers and merchants. It grows 
and sells well. particularly as a late season maincrop to fish fryers. 
King Edward on the other hand. has never been popular with growers. 
since it produces poor yields of very small tubers. However. this 
variety sells readily in local markets. The Sheffield market prefers 
Desiree. 
The South Western Region 
G10ucestershireand north Somerset are important markets for King Edwards 
from the eastern counties. but local growers experience "poor yields and 
quality with this variety~ It is also very blight susceptible. Most 
of King Edward is grown"in north Gloucestershire. In south Somerset. 
Cornwall and Devon. consumer preference is for white varieties. which 
are cheaper than King Edward. Majestic is widely grown on the Somerset 
"" 
sands. Pentland Dell is pop'ular in Cornwall where it suits the summer 
----------------------
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and autumn holiday trades: it is a high yielder. On the red soils of 
Devon, Majestic is still retained, along with Arran Consul, for their 
value as late keepers. 
Wales 
Doctor MacIntosh was popula~ until its recent replacement by Pentlands 
Crown and Dell. King Edward is imported into the region in large 
quantities but is difficult to grow locally. It is susceptible to 
blight and tends to produce low yields of poor quality. 
REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN VARIETAL MAIN CROP PERCENTAGE SHARES 
Pentland Crown 
Nat. 
Av. N YL WM EM E SW SE W S 
1965 2 1 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 
'1966 4 4 6 3 6 1 2 3 2 2 
1967 7 7 9 6 11 4 2 5 4 4 
1968 11 11 12 11 17 7 4 10 4 8 
1969 17 18 21 13 22 9 7 20 9 13 
1970 25 29 29 24 32 16 12 30 16 15 
1971 29 27 32 30 37 19 18 41 25 18 
1972 30 27 34 36 35 19 22 45 33 18 
Pentland Dell 
Nat. 
Av. N YL WM EM E SW SE W S 
1965 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1966. 3 5 5 4 2 1 5 4 3 4 
1967 10 18 14 12 7 5 20 12 11 11 
1968 14 30 20 14 11 7 27 13 19 12 
1969 11 28 16 9 8 5 23 9 18 13 
1970 .. 10 22 14 8 7 5 22 7 17 16 
1971 11 25 18 7 8 5 25 5 17 18 
1972 ·11 . 29 30 7 9 3 21 4 13 16 
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Maris Piper 
Nat. 
Av. N YL WM EM E SW SE W S 
1970 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 5 
1971 6 4 5 4 5 12 2 1 4 9 
1972 7 5 5 5 7 13 3 2 5 11 
Majestic 
Nat. 
Av. N YL WM EM E SW SE W S 
1965 57 49 71 42 60 48 70 84 69 33 
1966 54 49 68 44 56 44 66 80 66 28 
1967 48 41 59 41 48 40 53 71 60 20 
1968 39 30 49 33 38 34 49 64 55 16 
1969 33 24 42 18 30 28 50 49 47 13 
1970 26 21 37 22 23 21 43 45 40 9 
1971 19 13 27 14 16 13 36 34 31 6 
1972 13 '8 20 8 12 a 32 15 23 5 
King Edward 
Nat. 
Av. N YL WN EN E SW SE W S 
1965 27 2 8 40 27 49 7 9 4 13 
1966 25 2 6 34 24 48 5 8 4 10 
1967 23 1 4 28 21 46 4 9 2 9 
1968 23 1 4 29 21 47 2 8 3 10 
1969 23 0 3 30 20 49 5 15 3 10 
1970 22 0 3 26 18 47 5 8 2 11 
1971 19 5 3 23 15 42 5 8 3 10 
1972 20 4 3 21 14 46 5 3 4 13 
Desiree 
Nat. 
Av. N YL WM EM E SW SE W S 
1969 3 2 2 7 3 1 3 3 1 0 
, 1970 4 4 3 10 '4 3 5 5 3 1 
1971 6 4 4 13 6 4 7 7 6 1 
1972 6 4 5 14 8 5 7 8 8 2 
Source: Calculated from PMB statistics 
j" 'Note: The National Average is for England and Walei 
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pesticides are applied with fungicide) • 
The cost is worked out upon a per acre basis, according to the 
principles laid down in the handbook and then multiplied by the varietal 
crop proportions considered to have had spray treatments (in the 1968 
survey) • The derivation of total spraying costs per acre are shown 
in table 9.11. The costs per acre associated with Pentland Crown are 
shown as greater by to.079 than those suggested for Majestic: for 
Pentland Dell prior to end-1968, greater by to.4l, and post-1968, 
greater than Majestic by £0.454 per acre.· These are multiplied by the 
new varieties planted acreage to obtain estimates of extra costs 
associated with growing the new varieties. 
TABLE 8.11 
Estimated varietal labour costs associated with spraying (£ per acre) 
Pesti- Haulm 
cide Fungicide Herbicide defoliant 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Majestic 0 0.384 ( .50) 0.128 ( .4) 0.128 (.59) = 0.319 
Pentland Crown 0 0.384 (.68) 0.128 ( .38) 0.128 ( .69) = 0.398 
P.O. to end 1968 0 0.384 (.55) 0.128 ( .48) 0.128 ( .68) = 0.360 
P.O. post 1968 0 0.64 ( .94) 0.128 ( .48) 0.128 
PC M" .079; po 68 M "" .041; po p68 M "" .454 
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote proportions of varietal 
acreage likely to receive applications 
Calculated using table 7.10 
(.86) 
The herbicide category is interesting, since it is possible that 
= 0.773 
. 1 
herbicides allow growers to minimise cUltivations (Evans, 1972). That 
it might be assumed that where herbicides are applied say, one less 
cultivation is required. Using the PMB handbook again, the roost 
appropriate cultivation to be affected is ridging: it is assumed that 
the equipment was a mould board ridger, capable of covering ten acres 
1 There might also be advantages associated with increased crop yield and 
faster harvesting (Evans ibid): but these do not seem to have been measured. 
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Certified seed 
: " . 
TABLE AIIr.1 
1970 Crop survey distribution of "Certified Seed" used in 
England and Wales 
Seed producing region 
Scottish 
Own grown 
Northern Ireland 
English 
Welsh 
Miscellaneous 
Source: EDCA (1972) 
TABLE AI4-.2 
% of total potato crop using seed 
47 
37 
7 
5 
1 
3 
Acrease certified for seed in Scotland, Ensland and Northern Ireland 
('ODD acres) 
Year Scotland England N. Ireland 
1955 76.6 10.4 27.6 
1956 78.1 10.9 33.8 
1957 72.7 9.4 28.0 
1958 72.5 9.1 25.6 
1959 75.7 10.5 28.5 
1960 79.0 8.6 28.7 
1961 70.5 7.1 .22.7 
1962 71.3 6.9 23.5 
1963 75.8 8.1 29.5 
1964 83.8 9.8 29.6 
1965 72.8 8.7 20.3 
1966 56.9 8.5 16.5 
1967 59.3 9.9 20.3 
1968 55.7 9.6 19.9 
1969 49.3 7.7 20.1 
1970 53.6 8.6 20.8 
1971. 50.5 9.1 17.7 
1972 46.6 8.5 14.9 
Source: PMB 
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Retail prices for potatoes 
TABLE AIS.1 
Retail prices 1962-71, London area 
Date 
16. 1.62 
14. 1.64 
17. 3.64 
12. 1.65 
16. 3.65 
12.10.65 
18. 1.66 
22. 3.66 
18.10.66 
17. 1.67 
21. 3.67 
17.10.67 
16. 1.68 
19. 3.68 
15.10.68 
14. 1.69 
18. 3.69 
21.10.69 
20. 1.70 
17. 3.70 
20.10.70 
19. 1.71 
16. 3.71 
25. 9.71 
Red-skinned 
Retail price 
(pence per lb) 
1.87 
2.29 
1.58 
1.87' 
1.46 
1.35 
1.66 
1.77 
1.77 
2.29 
1.87 
1.87 
1.77 
1.77 
1.87 
1.98 
1.98 
2.29 
2.29 
2.71 
2.08 
2.08 
2.25 
2.25 
. ,:.:.-. 
White-skinned 
Retail price 
(pence per Ib) 
1.46 
1.66 
1.35 
1.46 
1.25 
1.25 
1.04 
1.25 
1.46 
1.66 
1.56 
1.56 
1.46 
1.46 
1.46 
1.56 
1.56 
1.87 
2.08 
2.29 
1.66 
1.87 
1.50 
1.50 
Source: PMB evidence to Consumers Committe for GB p.42 
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TABLE AS.2 
Farm prices 1962-1971, London Area (per ton) 
1962 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
Notes: 
Source: 
Red-skinned Varieties 
Annual 
Average 
17.45· 
17.48 
14.50 
16.18 
18.76 
16.87 
19.54 
22.02 
20.47 
3-year 
moving 
average 
17.48 
16.05 
16.48 
17.27 
18.39 
19.49 
20.68 
(23.25) 
White-skinned Varieties 
Annual 
Average 
13.63 
13.56 
12.32 
11.67 
14.87 
17.63 
15.52 
18.73 
15.15 
3-year 
moving 
average 
13.17 
12.52 
12.95 
13.39 
14.67 
15.96 
16.47 
(17.52) 
Price data in individual years is computed from average 
prices on three separate occasions during early, middle 
and late season. No figure is given for 1963, and the 
average figure for 1962 is computed for mid-season only. 
Figures in parentheSiS show the 1965 3-year average in 
1971£s. 
Based upon data presented in Table A~.1 
Ql 
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TABLE A 1 (, • 1 
Total 
Year Arable 
1960 18051 
1961 17955 
1962 18121 
1963 18212 
1964 18382 
1965 18523 
1966 18484 
1967 18325 
1968 18241 
1969 17943 
1970 17788 
1971 17857 
1972 17848 
Notes: . (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Arable Agricultural Acreage (Britain) 
Other 
Wheat Barley Cereals Beet Fodder 
2102 3372 1196 436 1215 
1827 3828 1899 427 1130 
2266 3986 1673 424 1077 
1928 4731 1415 423 959 
2206 5032 1226 443 892 
2535 5395 1105 455 842 
2238 6130 990 446 774 
2305 6027 1111 457 774 
2417 5933 1068 465 822 
2059 5962 1110 457 812 
2495 5542 1136 463 738 
2710 5654 1052 471 695 
2786 5653 948 468 664 
'Other' cereals includes oats. mixed corn and rye 
'Potatoes' includes the early crop 
Other Vegetables 
519 415 
695 363 
543 385 
592 396 
536 378 
504 370 
588 368 
562 409 
529 442 
721 472 
537 508 
468 454 
481 444 
'Fodder' includes beans. peas. turnips and swedes and mangolds 
Source: Monthly digest of statistics 
Temporary 
Grass Potatoes 
6868 829 
7084 703 
7033 735 
7012 768 
6686 778 
6572 741 
2280. 669 
5971 708 
5873 691 
5738 614 
5750 669 
5718 634 
5827 584 
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Overseas prices 
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Price-output interactions 
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Potato Markets 
The ware potato market 
There are a number of potato markets based upon the ways potatoes 
are produced, presented and sold to the general public. The largest 
is that based upon the sale of fresh, loose potatoes, the ware market. 
It has been estimated that over 70% of potatoes used for human consump-
tion in 1972/73 were ware potatoes (ACMS, 1973). 
Consumers are usually able to select individual tubers and so 
choose in detail the standard of first order quality they require. 
Also, it is common practice, where loose potatoes are offered, to 
present a choice between two kinds of potato: based upon "whites" 
(usually varieties which may be of only ordinary cooking quality), and 
"reds" or "King Edwards" (varieties which may be of high cooking quality) 
(CA, 1974). The latter selections are generally priced at a premium. 
The processed potato market 
The second most important market in terms of size (which might 
indeed under stant its importance, since value added per unit of weight 
of potato is greater than for other types of potatoes) is that of 
processed potato products. It has been esttmated that in 1973/74 
around 20% of the domestic crop was processed (PMB, 1974b). Processed 
potatoes are those which have been subjected to a number of activities: 
blending, cooking, packing and sometimes freezing. The final product 
may be accompanied by strong sales promotion, often using national media 
of communications, and quite unlike the scale of publicity given to ware 
potatoes (it has been estimated that for 1970, £2m was spent on 
dehydrated products alone; Newman, 1970). 
The growing importance of processing (and expectations regarding a 
promising future) has had a considerable impact upon the consciousness 
of the potato industry with regard to cooking quality: it has made 
the industry aware of the importance of such factors as dry matter* 
and reducing sugar contents.* Both of these are important where 
potatoes are fried, as in crisp and chip manufacturing: the former, 
~ecause it is associated with oil usage and cost; the latter, because 
it affects colour of the finished product: see Burton (op cit) • 
Some processing companies have been strict about the quality of 
potato that is acceptable to them; . these are those involved with crisping 
and some kinds of canning. Usually these companies will take only 
certain varieties. The PMB has published quite detailed specifications 
with regard to both the kind of potato tuber and cooking quality 
required by the processing industry (see PMB, 1974b: op cit) and on 
occasion processors may reject whole loads which have been delivered 
to factories (for example if internal bruising is suspected). However, 
generally, it seems that in practice standards have not been so 
stringent, and potatoes which are generally available are taken 
(Elliot, 1970). 
The pre-packed potato market 
Third in order of size is the market for pre-packed potatoes. 
It has been estimated that around 12% of the potatoes that went for 
human consumption in 1972/73 were pre-packed (ACMS, op cit). Pre-
packed potatoes are those which have been selected and packed in bags 
(usually polythene) prior to retail sale. This kind of potato 
produce has probably been more associated with the general store, 
particularly those of the large retail multiples such as supermarkets, 
than with the greengrocer type of outlet. 
Presentation to the consumer is usually based upon trade or brand 
name. Samples are liable to contain any kind of potato or variety 
(including high cooking quality ones), but the emphasis is generally 
upon appearance, and therefore first order quality. Prices are 
generally higher than for ware potatoes (CA, op cit), probably to cover 
costs associated with sorting and bagging. 
The advantages of both processed and pre-packed potatoes are ones 
associated with convenience. Shopping time is cut to a minimum and 
handling is easier: in the instance of processed products, cooking 
preparation is minimized. There are also advantages of this type to 
the general store (perhaps not so obvious for specialist vegetable 
outlets). Staff-time and space might be saved, self-service facili~ated. 
Generally it seems that less prominence is given tothe sale of 
potatoes in general stores than in greengrocers. They are sold in 
the former, probably because they help complete the range of products 
generally necessary to an average family's weekly food requirements 
'(Gibbons, 1970). In greengrocers, potatoes might be viewed as more 
a profitabie line in themselves, able, as one observer has suggested, 
to 'carry' such business as exotic fruits (Simpson, op cit) • 
Bulk buying market 
A fourth kind of market, which appears to have become important 
recently, is that which involves the sale of potatoes in large bags, 
14 lbs. and over, from farms, local markets and milk-rounds. Perhaps 
as many as one in three consumers bought potatoes in this form at least 
once during 1973 (PMB, 1974a op cit). It is likely that the purchase 
of potatoes in bulk is associated with a desire to economise at a time 
of rising food prices. Unfortunately, almost nothing is known about 
this market. 
Uses for potatoes other than for human consumption 
r6r a general review of alternative markets to those of human 
consumption, see Burton (op cit: pp.302-S). Compared to other 
countries the UK has a very small alternative use for potatoes: mainly 
for stockfeeding when potatoes are in surplus and need disposal. 
Central grading stations have sometimes provided a continuing opportunity 
to provide out-grades for alternative markets, but generally, it seems 
growers have lacked an incentive to seek alternatives. Potato 
prices have been generally too high to permit the establishment of 
a domestic starch industry (see PMB, 1972b). The PMB has sought 
ways to remove surplus potatoes from the market by the investigation 
of the development of a dehydrated product suitable for stockfeed 
(PMB, 1971 op cit), and provision of subsidised arrangements to 
transport potatoes to animal rearing areas (PMB 1973c). 
APPENDIX 20 
Financial arrangements to cover costs of surplus seasons 
The financial arrangements used to cover costs associated with 
surpluses during the late 1960s were based upon an agreement between 
the PMB and government in 1966. This committed the PMB to an annual 
payment of at least tlm, raised from growers' levies, to be put into 
the market support fund. The government was required to contribute 
funds at a rate of two to one, for any expenditure necessary to 
market price support operations. A sliding scale was devised to 
ensure that the PMB paid the whole cost of a variable basic tonnage, 
should the final average market price exceed the guarantee price. 
These arrangements were soon abandoned, however, when in 1967/68 
a large surplus required that the government come to the aid of the 
PMB and pay an extra tlm. The cost of government support is shown 
in table 10.2 row (g) (for further details of surplus financing, 
see MAFF et aI, op cit). 
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TABLE A2.1.1 Raw potatoes used for processing in Great Britain ('ODDs tons) 
Processed product 
CANNED WHO/-E ' 
Impor-~ed raw product 
'Imported final product 
CANNED OLD/DICED, SOUPS 
CHIPS, FROZEN AND PAR-FRIED 
Imported final product 
CRISPS 
Imported raw product 
Imported final product 
DEHYDRATED ' 
Imported raw product 
Imported final product 
Total Home Crop used 
Total Human Consumption, GB crop 
Percentage of Home Crop processed 
Notes: (1) NA - not available 
1965/66 1966/67 
1 2 
(7) (15) 
(7) 
10 11 
10 25 
(20) 
265 278 
34 
320 
4696 
7% 
(45) 
32 
(30) 
348 
4650 
,8% 
1967/68 
6 
(18 ) 
(12 ) 
13 
57 
(38 ) 
298 
(40) 
39 
(111 ) 
413 
4650 
9% 
1968/69 
9 
( 13) 
(9) 
15 
87 
(20) 
315 
(49) 
40 
(110 ) 
466 
4750 
10% 
(2) Totals for imported final product are for the United Kingdom 
1969/70 
19 
(6) 
(11 ) 
16 
136 
(11 ) 
296 
(25) 
(2 ) 
80 
(124) 
547 
4620 
12% 
1970171 
15 
(12 ) 
(15 ) 
17 
186 
(13 ) 
330 
(12) 
(2) 
92 
(109 ) 
640 
4670 
14% 
1971172 
23 
(11 ) 
(14 ) 
17 
206 
371 
(10) 
(2) 
80 
(85) 
697 
4720 
15% 
1972/7: 
24 
(1 ) 
(NA) 
17 
275 
387 
(13 ) 
(NA) 
92 
(2) 
(NA) 
795 
4940 
16% 
(3) The following ratios are used to convert raw potato to processed product: canned 10:9 (canned content 
including brine), chips 20:9, crisps 4:1 and dehydrated 7:1 
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TABLE A1.1.2 
Processing varieties. percentage estimated usage 
Varieties Year to 31.5.70 1971 1972 
Bintze 2% 2% 1% 
Home Guard 3% 3% 2% 
King Edward 4% 2% 1% 
Majestic 12% 13% 19% 
Maris Peer 1% 2% 1% 
Pentland Crown 17% 26% 29% 
Pentland Dell 10% 12% 15% 
Record 51% 40% 32% 
Source: Private correspondence with trade sources 
APPENDIX 22 
Annual crop yield and acreage variations 
TABLE A22.1 Annual deviations in planted maincrop acreage and 
crop yields from the average 
Acreage planted 1965 to 1972 
Average acreage 'OOOs acres 
Highest 
Lowest 
1967 
1972 
Yield per acre 
466 
509 
413 
Average yield per acre tons 11.0 
Highest 
Lowest 
Source: 
1971 
1968 
PMB/A 
12.1 
10.1 
% deviation from average 
9 
11 
10 
8 
TABLE A22.2 Annual deviations in varietal crop yields, 
England and Wales 1968 to 1972 
Pentland Crown 
Average yield per acre tons 
Highest 
Lowest 
1971 
1969 
Pentland Dell 
Average yield per acre tons 
Highest 1968 
Lowest 1969 
Majestic 
Average yield per acre tons 
Highest 1970 
Lowest 1969 
Source: table 8.1 
11.8 
12.5 
11.1 
11.6 
12.3 
10.6 
10.1 
10.6 
9.3 
% deviation from average 
6 
6 
9 
9 
5 
8 
APPENDIX 23 
The consumer survey 
Copy of questionnaire enclosed aside 
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APPENDIX 23 
A survey of consumer opinion 
Previous surveys of consumer opinion 
Results from surveys of consumer opinion have been published in 
the following publications: 
(1) Pickard and Cori (op cit), a national survey of 1507 
housewives, which was conducted during November and 
December~ 1961, by Produce Studies Limited for the PMB 
and NFU. 
(2) Gibbons (1965 op cit), a survey of 199 housewives in the 
Nottingham area, which was conducted during November, 1962, 
and February to March, 1973; by Gibbons for an M.Sc. 
thesis at Nottingham University (he had been involved in 
potato trading). 
(3) Simpson (op cit), a survey of potato marketing which included 
the attitudes of 54 households and other groups in the Leeds 
area: it was conducted in June, 1967, by Simpson and the 
marketing economics department of Leeds University. 
(4) CCGB (op cit), a national survey of 1326 housewives, conducted 
during May, 1968, by Gallup Limited for JSL. 
This publication appears to have been instrumental in leading to 
two other more recent studies (the results of these were unknown at 
the time of this present study's survey). 
(5) PMB (1974a op cit), a national survey of 1631 housewives, 
which was conducted during September, October, 1972, and in 
March, 1973, by Research Bureau Limited for the PMB. 
(6) CA (op cit), a national survey of 1500 association members, 
conducted by the CA during April and November, 1973. 
Publication (1) does not present survey results in detail, but 
does give useful insights into the nature of consumer behaviour as it 
exists, and indicates how potatoes might be used by consumers. 
Unfortunately, no attempts were made to link varietal type with market 
needs and consumer dissatisfaction. Also, questions were long and 
elaborate', and the report gave no indication of how this style of 
questioning might influence results. 
1 
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Publications (2) and (3) are regional in nature and did not 
related to the national situation, but of all the reports, their detail 
and observation offer the most informative insights into varietal 
importance and consumer opinion. They also seem the most neutral in 
terms of results assessment. Unfortunately, they were carried out at 
a time when the SPBS's varieties had not made any substantial impact 
upon the market. 
publication (4) was concerned only with consumer satisfactions; 
(5) with an emphasis upon what consumers actually purchased, as well 
as cooking habits~ knowledge of varietal names and attitudes about 
quality (varietal effects were not considered, however). Super-
ficially, the PMB publication appeared to contradict the results of 
the JSL survey. Upon examination, however, the results may not be 
so very different; that is, apparent discrepancies may be explained 
, ,4, • 
by the method of questioning, presentation and interpretation of results. 
This is not to suggest that survey agencies are other than 
objective, but that if survey briefs differ, it is likely that approaches 
do as well. Both the JSL and PMB surveys were based upon nationally 
representative samples and may, therefore, be regarded as reliable 
indications of opinion generally, in the light of the questions posed. 
The JSL survey sought evidence for consumer dissatisfaction, whereas 
that of the PMB's aimed to "establish the true view of the consumer" 
(PMB op cit, p.6). 
This difference in purpose appears to have influenced the surveys, 
so that on the one hand, an attempt was made to locate and assess the 
causes of dissatisfaction with quality generally available, whilst on 
the other, it was attempted to depict an average but more considered 
view of potato quality. This might explain the contrast of the simple 
question and spontaneous answers"of the JSL survey to the more elaborate 
questions and prompted replies of the PMB one (these are sometimes 
termed 'guided' or 'focussed' interviews). 
Publication (6), based upon results obtained after the PMB survey, 
in turn appears to contradict the. latter's findings. It might be that 
CA members are conscientious shoppers, and liable to dissatisfaction 
above that of the average consumer. An observation made in the CA's 
re~rt suggests how its results might differ from those of the PMB: 
that although the majority of members told the association about 
examples of unsatisfactory potatoes, only a fifth of them were surprised 
1 
enough by this to be generally dissatisfied with the potatoes they bought. 
The CA added that people probably had "pretty low expectations". 
The need for, and objectives of survey 
An unfortunate feature of must of the survey evidence however, has 
been the extent of associated controversy. Particularly, where issues 
of consumer satisfactions and preference had been concerned; for 
example, it sometimes seemd to the author that the degree of confidence 
that could be attached to evidence presented by those two antagonists, 
JSL and the PMB, was small. 
It was because of these feelings that the author decided to seek 
attitudes directly from consumers in the market place. Not so much 
to measure the consequences of the SPBS innovation upon consumers (this 
would have meant a rigorous investigation, which demanded financial 
resources quite beyond those available for this study), but as a test 
or check upon the trustworthiness of important contentions and material 
used in this chapter. It was hoped that an up-to-date and geographi-
cally widespread impression of consumer varietal knowledge, preferences 
and associated problems, would be obtained. 
It was realised from the results of previous work that consumers 
were likely to know very little, explicitly, about the effects of 
specific varietal characters. So it was deemed necessary to ask more 
general questions associated with varieties, satisfactions and cooking 
habits. At the same time, advantage of survey facilities could be 
taken to check if there were potato substitutes, and opinions concerning 
pre-pack and processed products. 
Survey methodology 
(a) Survey population (coverage) " 
The number and category of potato consumer surveyed was to a large 
extent determined by circumstances, particularly availability of voluntary 
interview personnel. However, it proved possible to cover important 
centres of population representative of different types. In the 
terminology of the Registrar General, used in survey work by the National 
~ood Survey Committee (see MAFF, 1973a op cit), sampling areas were 
obtained in the 'London conurbation' (Surbiton); two in 'provincial 
conurbations' (Glasgow and Liverpool), and two in 'larger towns' 
(Aberdeen and Swindon). 
Some sampling was conducted at Louth, a small town in a rural 
setting, but the results seemed heavily influenced by the replies of 
farmers' wives and agricultural workers, and not representative of 
potato consumers generally. No attempt was made to sample other small 
towns. The composition of the population covered by the survey was 
21% each for Glasgow, Aberdeen and Swindon; 20% for Surbiton and 16% 
for Liverpool. Thus, the survey is biased towards northern markets, 
where the greengrocer and King Edward VII trade is less prominent 
than further to the south. This might not be too important, given 
that the Pentland varieties are white-skinned and do not seem to be 
important competitors with King Edward VII. 
(b) Method of sampling 
Interviewers were asked to approach shoppers in central shopping 
areas, and themselves fill in the questionnaires. Selection of 
respondent was left to interviewers, and was, therefore, non-random. 
This method is known as 'quota sampling', and its advantages with 
respect to 'probability sampling' have been the subject of controversy 
for some years (see Moser and Kalton, 1971; p.127). 
With quota sampling, it is not possible to estimate sampling errors, 
since the basic theoretical requirements of randomness are not fulfilled 
(every item in a population should have a calculable probability of its 
changes of selection). Statisticians have sometimes argued that quota 
sampling is unreliable to the extent that its results are worthless. 
Whereas market opinion researchers have tended to defend it for its 
cheapness and administrative convenience (the reason why it was adopted 
here). 
{c} The questionnaire 
A copy of the questionnaire is presented in table A2S.l. This 
was designed in co-operation with someone with training in questionnaire 
design, and experience with interviewing. Wording was designed to take 
up a minimum of time for asking qu~stions. To some extent the questions 
. were open ended; interviewers were instructed to record answers verbatim, 
. and not to prompt replies. The main purpose was to achieve consumer 
strength of opinion, but also gain insights into the context of the 
. answer. 
" It was felt that a more formal approach to questions would act to 
disguise the relative importance of the most significant factors {that 
'is, the first factors to come to the mind of consumers were assumed to 
be the most important for the time). This point is discussed in Moser 
and Kalton (op cit: pp.299-300). The value of open-ended questions 
is examined in Simon (1969: p.278). A problem with this approach is 
that associated with the summarization of data: the author had to 
interpret respondents replies (of course, this does prevent categoriza-
tion of answers on the part of interviewers). 
(d) Timing 
Interviews were conducted during February, 1973~ that is, towards 
the end of the maincrop season, but well before early crop potatoes 
could influence the market. It might be expected that potatoes are 
less fresh, and thus, of poorer quality than they would be prior to 
Christmas, so answers might be biased in the direction of consumer 
dissatisfaction. Exc~pt where requested otherwise, consumers were 
required to relate their answers to the whole of the 1972/73 season 
however (they were not told the purpose of the survey). All but one 
of the five interviewers were inexperienced, but it was hope that 
careful briefing would have reduced bias to a minimum. 
Survey results 
A total of 131 respondents were achieved. No count was kept of 
the number of people who refused to co-operate with the interviewers, 
but it was thought that the number was around the same as those who 
consented to co-operate. 
table form below. 
The results of the survey are summarised in 
(a) Consumer preferences (tables A23.2) 
Respondents were not very knowledgeable about the potatoes they 
bought: 22\ did not know what kind of potatoes they had last purchased 
(and it is likely that some others guessed) • A total of 55\ respon-
dents said they had bought a named variety, nearly always King Edward VII. 
The reasons given for buying different kinds of potatoes could be 
. grouped mainly into three~ . convenience, preference and quality. 
Convenience may be associated with proximity of supplies, limited 
choice available: preference implies a priority of choice, and quality 
.. might imply the best of a given choice. Of course, in practice these 
categorie:;; are ambiguous, but the distinction between the former and 
latter two has a significance to respondents' attitudes to potatoes 
and therefore has some significance for varietal choice. 
It seemed that the respondents who knew least about the potato 
variety they had bought, were the ones most likely to give convnience 
as a factor for purchase. Also this group commonly listed 'whites' 
and supermarket brands as types bought. Majestic was the variety 
most associated with convenience factors. By contrast, preference 
and quality were most associated with King Edward VII and Golden 
Wonder (the two high second order quality varieties). 
Price was mentioned by only a few respondents as a factor important 
to choice. There were some marked regional variations. Convenience 
factors were less frequent in Surbiton, where King Edward VII seemed 
popular; in Aberdeen convenience factors were most often mentioned, 
and white-skinned potatoes bought. 
(b) Varietal knowledge (tables A21.3 and 23.4) 
When asked to name potato varieties, respondents showed a distinct 
lack of knowledge, despite the PMB varietal recognition poster campaign, 
which was then at its height (posters commonly being exhibited in 
shops). Most respondents could name King Edward VII, but only 44% 
named Majestic, despite its 50 years of commercial success. Only one 
respondent named Pentland Crown and none, Pentland Dell, Desiree, a 
potato which has been introduced since the SPBS varieties, and although 
its acreage is still very low, was known by 2% of respondents: 
perhaps its red skin is both recognisable, and memorable. 
Redskin, a variety long present in northern markets, appeared more 
generally known by southern respondents, to whom it is not readily 
available. Perhaps in southern markets it is confused with King 
Edward VII (sometimes labelled 'reds' at retail, to contrast with 
'whites'). When asked to name preferred varieties, respondents chose 
mostly King Edward VII and Golden Wonder: reasons given were mainly 
cooking quality and taste. 
Respondents were asked if they grew potatoes in gardens, and if 
so, which varieties. This question was included as a check to see if 
gardeners were more knowledgeable and conscious of quality in 
varieties. As a group they did indeed appear so, particularly of 
., early crop varieties such as Arran Pilot, Epicure and Home Guard. 
The respondent who 'named Pentland Crown had grown it in his garden, 
King Edward VII was the most popular garden variety. 
(c) Consumer satisfaction (table.A23.6) 
Respondents were divided evenly between those satisfied, and those 
not. The main cause for complaint was associated with first order 
quality, bad parts and damaged potatoes. However, cooking factors 
figures prominently, particularly after-cooking blackening and tuber 
softness or disintegration. ,Respondents mentioned fewer causes of 
satisfaction than for dissatisfaction, and interviewers noted that 
consumers expressed the latter with more emotion. Satisfied 
respondents gave cooking quality and taste as factors which most satisfied. 
Levels of satisfaction varied widely with locality. Glasgow, an 
area which had showed a relatively high varietal knowledge and concern 
with preference and quality, produced dissatisfaction in 73% of 
respondents, the majority of complaints were concerned with cooking 
quality. Aberdeen, on the other hand, produced 70% of respondents as 
satisfied; this was the area where varietal knowledge seemed lowest, 
with a minimum concern with preference and quality. It is not clear 
what this means; for example, at Glasgow, poor quality might have made 
respondents there careful in their choice of potatoes, or it might be 
that they have higher standards and a wider choice available to them, 
and so are less tolerant. 
(d) Cooking habits (table A23.7) 
Trouble with cooking potatoes had been experienced by 36% of 
respondents. The main difficulty seemed associated with boiling, this 
affected about 67% of respondents who had had cooking problems. 
Sloughing and disintegration were the most mentioned factors. 
Respondents generally had difficulty in suggesting varieties which 
would be most suitable for different cooking methods, and positive 
replies almost always put forward King Edward VII. Majestic was 
mentioned only in a few instances, and then that mostly was for baking 
and mash. King Edward VII was mentioned less for chipping and salad 
uses (although still more than any other variety). 
a popular choice for Glasgow respondents. 
Golden Wonder was 
(e) Consumption of potatoes (tables A2.3 .• 8, A2;L9 and A23.l0) 
The main reasons given for respondents changes in size of potato 
purchases were asso'ciated with dietary reasons and family size. A 
tofal of 11% of respondents who bought less, did so because of changes 
in potato quality. The total percentage buying fewer potatoes was high, 
at 60%: only at Aberdeen did respondents feel that they purchased 
about the same quantity as previously. 
Where respondents stated that they bought less, they were asked 
what, if anything, they used instead. The largest number, about 35%, 
felt that they probably consumed more vegetables of another sort; 29% 
did not know, and another 11% stated that they used no substitute. 
Interviewers thought that respondents had most difficulty answering 
this question. 
When asked whether they preferred loose or pre-packed potatoes 
(at the same price), 74% of respondents chose the former. It appears 
that the advantages associated with loose potatoes were freshness, 
absence of rotting and ease of selection. Pre-pack were chosen for 
convenience factors, and cleanness. Of respondents who bought 
processed products, as many as 80% said that they did not prefer them 
to meals made from fresh potatoes: they were bought for convenience. 
(f) Price and iffiProvements in quality (table A2l.ll) 
When asked if they were willing to pay more for an improved quality 
potato, 56% of respondents stated that they were. The factors that 
respondents would most like to see associated with an improved quality 
potato were freedom from damage and bad parts (the most often mentioned 
1 factor), and improved taste. Cooking quality was also frequently 
mentioned, roughly by the same number of respondents who stated that 
they experienced cooking troubles. It should perhaps be noted, that 
respondents who were willing to pay more, were not necessarily those 
who were dissatisfied with quality. At Swindon and Surbiton, there 
was a tendency for dissatisfied respondents not to want to pay more. 
General points 
It cannot be claimed that the survey gave results which were 
accurate reflections of the opinions of all potato consumers: the 
number of respondents was small, and the choice of individual respon-
dents was left (as a result. -of the quota sampling method) to the 
briefed but inexperienced interviewers. However, the author found the 
results of the survey informative: some insights were obtained which 
did not seem available from elsewhere. Where the results can be 
1 In view'of the fact that generally respondents did not seem too 
dissatisfied with taste, this is surprising and suggests that market 
acceptance does not necessarily mean that improvements should not be 
made. 
compared to those of other survey work, they do not seem too greatly 
at variance. 
The survey adds a degree of strength to arguments and evidence 
presented in the previous chapter. It seems that general consumer 
dissatisfaction might well exist. Also, that although consumer 
awareness or varietal names might be poor, consumers might not be 
indifferent to quality factors which are influenced by varietal type: 
indeed, there appears to be a popularity associated with the second 
order quality varieties, King Edward and Golden Wonder. l 
Pentland Crown and Pentland Dell appeared to have made no 
significant impact upon the consciousness of respondents: therefore, 
there is nothing to directly link these varieties with dissatisfaction. 
1 Those respondents who listed King Edward for different ways of 
cooking, were able to reflect in their answers, the lower propensity 
of the variety to chip well, as noted in the PMB wall chart. 
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TABLE A23:\ 
Reasons for purchasing potatoes (last purchase only) 
Kinds of potato last bought 
Percentage Variety 
35 King Edward 
11 Whites 
10 Kerrs Pink 
6 Supermarket brands 
4 Majestic 
4 Golden Wonder 
4 New Potatoes 
2 Reds 
5 Other kinds 
22 Don't know 
Reasons for buying these varieties 
Percentage 
36 
24 
21 
9 
7 
7 
1 
1 
2 
Reason for buying 
Convenience 
Preference 
Quality 
Habit 
Limited choice on display 
Price 
Appearance 
Variety 
Don't know 
Of the varieties bought for convenience 
38% were Whites and Majestic 
27% were Supermarket potatoes 
19% were King Edwards and -Golden Wonder 
14% were Kerrs Pink 
Of the varieties bought out of preference 
81% were King Edward and Golden Wonder 
11% were New Potatoes 
7% were Kerrs Pinks 
Of the varieties bought for quality reasons 
74% were King Edward 
17% were Whites and Majestic 
9% were others 
.'-. 
TABLE A 2~.2 
Consumer varietal knowledge 
Name of Variety Percentage of respondents 
naming this variety 
King Edward 
Kerrs Pink 
Golden Wonder 
Majestic 
Arran Pilot 
Epicure 
Redskin 
Home Guard 
Duke of York 
Red Craigs Royal 
Red King 
Arran Banner 
Desiree 
Sharpes Express 
Other varieties 
9% named 'Whites as a variety 
77% 
49% 
43% 
44% 
26% 
21% 
19% 
15% 
6% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
4% 
7% named 'Lincolnshires' as a variety 
4% named 'Cyprus' as a variety. 
3% named 'Jersey' as a variety 
2% named 'Ayrshires' as a variety 
6% named other kinds 
14% of respondents knew 1 variety by name 
27% of respondents knew 2 varieties by name 
27% of respondents knew 3 varieties by name 
11% of respondents knew 4 varieties by name 
9% of respondents knew 5 varieties by name 
7% of respondents knew 6 varieties by name 
5% of respondents knew more than 6 varieties 
TABLE A' 2~.:; 
Preferred varieties 
38% of the respondents had no preference. Of the other 62% 
Of these 
47% of them preferred King Edward 
21% of them preferred Golden Wonder 
10% of them preferred Kerrs Pink 
6% of them preferred Majestic 
5% of them preferred Arran Pilot 
6% of them preferred Other varieties 
10% of them preferred a 'type' rather than a variety 
78% were preferred because of cooking quality 
51% were preferred because of taste 
24% were preferred because of their appearance 
1% was preferred because of price 
TABLE .,\23.l, 
Varieties grown in the garden 
43% of the respondents had grown potatoes in their gardens 
Of these -
32% had grown King Edward 
25% .Arran Pilot 
17% Kerrs Pink 
15% Epicure 
12% Home Guard 
10% Golden Wonder 
12% Majestic 
8% Other varieties 
3% Non-varieties· 
Note: ·a type rather than a variety 
TABLE A '23.S 
Consumer satisfaction 
49% of the respondents were satisfied with the potatoes they had bought 
over the last year. 48% were dissatisfied. and 3% didn't know. 
Of those who were satisfied: 
55% were satisfied with the cooking quality 
42% " " taste 
26% " " tuber size 
16% " " price 
7% " for convenience reasons 
3% " with the tuber shape 
3% " " reduced disease marks 
1% " for other reasons 
Of those who were dissatisfied: 
(34)· 72% were dissatisfied because of too many eyes/bad bits etc. 
(34) 67% " wastage/damage 
(24) 51% " after-cooking blackening (19 ) 37% " softness and disintegration 
(14) 31% " greening 
(11 ) 22% " cooking quality (10) 21% " the taste 
(4) 7% " the tuber size 
(2) 4% " dirtiness 
(1 ) 1~ " internal marks • 0 
Note: ·as a percentage of the total of respondents 
TABLE A 23,S 
Cooking Methods 
A. 60% of the respondents said that they had no trouble in cooking 
potatoes. 36% said that they did have trouble and 3% didn't know. 
B. Of those experiencing trouble: 
67% said that they had trouble with boiling 
16% " " mash 
12% " " Jacket baking 
12% " " roasting 
6% " " chips 
6% " " salad use 
C. Varieties best suitsd for different cooking purposes 
D. 
53% of respondents didn't know which varieties were best for different 
cooking purposes. 
Of those who said they did: 
97% named King Edward 
30% " Golden Wonder 
15% " Kerrs Pink" 
9% " Majestic 
6% " 'Whites' 
3% " Other varieties 
9% " Other non-varieties· 
Varieties most named for different cooking purposes were: 
Boiling: 61% King Edward Mash: 78% King Edward 
17% Golden Wonder 11% Majestic 
11% Kerrs Pink 11% Others 
11% Others 
Jacket 70% King Edward Roast: 75% King Edward 
baked: 20% Majestic 25% Others 
10% Golden Wonder 
Chips: 33% Golden Wonder Salad: 43% King Edward 
37% King Edward 57% Others 
19% Kerrs Pink 
9% 'Whites' 
2% Others 
Percentage of responses for each cooking purpose 
38% Chips; 16% Mash; 
6% Salad use. 
9% Jacket baked; 16% Boiling; 
Note: ·Named by type or location rather than variety 
14% Roast; 
TABLE A 2:'.7 
Consumption of potatoes 
60% of the respondents bought 
14% " 
25% " 
1% didn't know 
Of the respondents' who bought 
61% did so because 
less potatoes than 
more poratoes than 
the same amount as 
less 
of diet reasons 
they 
they 
they 
used.to buy 
used to buy 
had always bought 
31% " a change in family soze 
11% " quality reasons 
11% " health reasons 
7% " convenience reasons 
5% " preference reasons 
5% " price reasons 
Of the respondents who are buying more 
63% did so because of change in family size 
37% did so for other reasons 
Of the respondents buying less potatoes the following substitutes 
were mentioned 
35% said they consumed more vegetables 
11% " rice 
6% " salad 
4% " pasta products 
2% " bread 
5% " other foods 
11% " no substitute 
29% didn't know 
TABLE A 2],.1 
Pre-packed potatoes 
7% of the respondents preferred loosspotatoes to pre-packed ones. 
24% preferred pre-packs and 2% didn't know 
Of those who preferred loose potatoes 
45% considered them as being fresher 
20% " less likely to be rattan 
13% " to be more convenient 
12% preferred being able to select and choose 
12% considered them to be more economical 
7% preferred them for other reasons 
Of those who preferred pre-packs 
-68% considered them to be more convenient 
50% considered them to be cleaner 
18%. preferred them for other reasons 
or soft 
TABLE A 2~·:cj 
Processed potatoes 
61% of the respondents said that they did not buy processed potatoes. 
39% said that they did buy them 
Of those who did buy them 
82% did so for general convenience reasons 
15% did so because of convenience in shopping 
15% did so because of ease in storage 
18% did so for other reasons 
Of the processed potato consumers 
82% did not prefer them to fresh potatoes 
14% did prefer them to fresh potatoes 
4% didn't know 
TABLE A 23.10 
Factors thought desirable in a higher quality potato 
72% of respondents wanted less wastage from damage/bad bits/eyes 
51% " " improved taste 
34% .. .. improved cooking quality 
22% .. .. better sizes 
7% " " a more floury potato 
·4% " " a firmer potato 
3% " " a cleaner potato 
2% " " whiter flesh 
1% " " improved skin colour (more red-skinned 
1% " " other factors 
varieties) 
APPENDIX l't 
JSL's Gallup Poll 
Consumer dissatisfaction with the quality of potatoes 
(A Gallup Poll commissioned by J. Sainsbury Ltd) 
Nature of dissatisfaction 
Qual! ty before cooking 
Too many eyes, bad parts etc. 
Too many potatoes were cut or damaged 
Green potatoes 
Potatoes were too dirty 
Potatoes were too big 
Potatoes were too small 
Quality after cooking 
Potatoes were too soft 
Potatoes were black or discoloured 
Poor taste 
Potatoes were lumpy after cooking 
.source: CCGB. 1972; p.27 
Number of complaints 
as a percentage of 
housewives interviewed 
31 
18 
15 
11 
8 
5 
23 
18 
17 
6 
APPENDIX 2'$ 
List of visits and personal communications 
The following organizations were visited in the course of this study: 
The Department of Agriculture & Fisheries for Scotland, Edinburgh 
The Edinburgh School of Agriculture 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, Westminster 
National Farmers' Union, Louth 
National Farmers' Union, Scotland, at Edinburgh 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany, Cambridge 
National Institute of Agricultural Engineering, Scotland 
Plant Breeding Institute, Cambridge 
Potato Marketing Board, London 
Potato Market Board, Statistics' Branch, Oxford 
Ross Foods Limited, Grimsby 
Information was received from numerous individuals and organizations in 
the mail and over the telephone. 
Some of the more important were: 
They are too many to mention here. 
American universities with departments having individuals who had been 
active in evaluating agriculturwl R&D. These included the Universities 
of Chicago, Iowa State, Minnesota and Yale: advice and information was 
forwarded from these institutions by T.W. Schultz, A. Paulsen, W. Peterson, 
W.L. Fishel and R.E. Evenson. Other establishments in both Britain and 
America also offered advice, concerning questions associated with R&D 
evaluation. This included the National Economic Development Office 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
APPENDIX 25 Page 2 
Information about varietal effects was gathered with the help of all 
the regional offices of the Agricultural Development and Advisory 
Service and the Potato Marketing Board. Institutions such as the 
Terrington and Arthur Rickman Experimental Husbandry Far~ii Rothamsted 
Experimental Station. Sutton Bridge Experimental Station. Food Research 
Institute and the National. Association of Seed Potato Merchants. 
provided published information and accounts of information known to them. 
Information regarding the potato industry more generally was collected 
from opinion at meetings and conferences. Other than the Potato 
Marketing Board and the Ministry of Agriculture. written communications 
were conducted with John Sainsbury Limited and the Consumers' Association. 
My sincere thanks to all who showed interest and were able to provide 
information. 
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